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ABSTRACT 
ANTI-DOPING POLICY:  RATIONALE OR 
RATIONALISATION? 
Since 1998 anti-doping policy has undergone massive change.  The level of world-wide 
cooperation involved in establishing an international anti-doping system is unprecedented 
in the history of the regulation of performance enhancing substances in sport.  Such 
cooperation and the unipartite nature of public doping discourse give the impression that 
anti-doping policy is clear, unproblematic and universally acceptable.  However, 
scratching the harmonious surface of modern anti-doping approaches reveals fundamental 
problems and inconsistencies, the two most basic of which go to the very core of the 
policy.  Basic issues — what constitutes doping and the reasons why we prohibit it — are 
still unsettled, lack clarity and give rise to many significant operational issues.  For 
instance, the definition of ‘doping’ in doping discourse is quite different from the 
definition in the World Anti-Doping Code:  what is thought of as ‘doping’ is very different 
from what is punished as ‘doping.’  Moreover, the commonly suggested anti-doping 
rationales do not adequately explain the present prohibition on the use of performance 
enhancing substances in sport.   
In light of this uncertainty, two questions arise:  why is there so much confusion and why 
do we prohibit doping in sport?  Desmond Manderson, in his study of the origins of illicit 
drug laws, has wrestled with a similar question; his conclusions are that drugs have been 
prohibited more for what they symbolise than their pharmacological properties.  This thesis 
argues that, in a similar way to illicit drug policy, the symbolism of performance enhancing 
substances in sport has played a major role in the development of anti-doping policy.  To 
demonstrate the influence of such symbolism, three significant time periods in anti-doping 
history are considered in the thesis:  the 1920s, the 1960s and the 1970s.   
The most formative aspect of symbolism in the 1920s, when anti-doping rules were first 
passed, was the association between doping and illicit drug taking.  The stigma attached to 
stereotypical images of illicit drug-users contributed to ‘doping’ being viewed as contrary 
to the amateur ethos and the adoption of a regulatory system modelled on illicit drug policy 
approaches.  
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In the 1960s, when anti-doping policy began in earnest, illicit drug symbolism was also 
extremely influential.  Concerns regarding drug addiction in sport fuelled fears about the 
health of the athlete which were prominent in doping discourse at this time.  Combined 
with a strong belief in the power of drugs in general, illicit drug symbolism led to the 
expansion of the illicit drug model of regulation to include illicit drug style testing.   
Doping changed in the 1970s with the emergence of training drugs such as anabolic 
steroids.  Steroids became strongly associated with ‘communist’ athletes and were viewed 
as extremely powerful transforming drugs.  A kind of steroid hysteria was thereby created 
in doping discourse.  Simultaneously, the continuing influence of illicit drug symbolism 
meant that the previously adopted illicit drug model was also applied to steroids.  
The conclusion of the thesis is that anti-doping policy is not fundamentally a rational 
system: instead it has been driven much more by emotional factors such as public opinion 
than rational argument.  Such a basis is bound to create confusion and explains many of the 
problems of current anti-doping policy.  The way in which symbolism has led to the 
regulatory decisions in anti-doping history is summarised as constituting the ‘reactive 
regulation model’ in the concluding section of the thesis.  This pattern of regulation has 
produced a number of important operational difficulties in current anti-doping law, the 
prime example being the ‘fallacy’ of in-competition drug testing to deal with the issue of 
training drugs such as steroids.1   
Finally, it is argued that in light of the reactive nature of anti-doping policy, it is unlikely 
that recent challenges, such as gene doping and the use of non-analytical evidence, will be 
treated any differently to past challenges.  Anti-doping policy has always been largely 
driven by reactions to symbolism; there is no reason to suspect this type of approach will 
change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1
   Canada, The Honourable Charles L. Dubin, Commission of Inquiry Into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices 
Intended to Increase Athletic Performance (1990) Canadian Government Publishing Centre: Ottawa, 394ff. 
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PROLOGUE 
What is doping?  Why do we prohibit it?  These two questions should be easy to answer, 
especially when the solution appears clear on the face of the World Anti-Doping Code 
(WADA Code), the almost universal anti-doping code for sport.  But, as this thesis will 
demonstrate, appearances can be deceiving. 
This thesis is about anti-doping policy.  It considers the reasons behind the modern 
approach to the use of performance enhancing substances and methods in sport.  There 
have been a number of arguments in academic literature about the reasons for the present 
prohibition on such substances.  There have also been a number of narratives of the history 
of anti-doping policy which tend to focus on the rational drivers of anti-doping policy such 
as concerns for health and the fairness of sport.  However, as Dimeo states: ‘[t]he early 
discourses on anti-doping, from the mid-1950s onwards, can be interpreted in a number of 
ways.’1  This thesis concentrates on one particular interpretation:  one which focuses on the 
role of symbolism.  It will be argued that the influence of symbolism is an extremely 
important factor in explaining how anti-doping policy has come to be the way it is today 
and that symbolism is the important link in explaining many of the confusions and 
inconsistencies in the modern approach to doping in sport. 
The structure of the thesis can be compared to the working out of a mathematical algorithm 
and proof.  Firstly the problem is set out, then the working and finally the solution.  ‘QED’ 
(quod erat demonstrandum) is often written at the end to signify that the proof is complete.  
The first section of the thesis — Part I — is devoted to setting out the problem, identifying 
the need for the subsequent symbolic analysis.  Part II presents the ‘solution’:  the analysis 
of the symbolism of performance enhancing substances in sport.  Part III reveals exactly 
how the analysis provides a solution for the problems presented in Part I.  Chapter Eight 
explains how the analysis provides those answers and Chapter Nine is the QED at the end 
— the final word on the solution to the problem providing an explanation of the 
significance of what has come before.   
Part I identifies the need for a new and different analysis of the history and origins of the 
modern approach to doping — since anti-doping policy is not what it appears.  On the 
surface doping law and discourse seem to represent a rational and systematic approach to a 
well-defined problem supported by robust justifications.  This seemingly untroubled 
                                                
1
   Paul Dimeo, A History of Drug Use in Sport 1876-1976: Beyond Good and Evil, 2007 (London: Routledge), 130. 
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picture is presented in Chapter One through an examination of a number of aspects of 
recent anti-doping discourse and developments in anti-doping policy.2  But on closer 
examination, a very different picture appears.  Even the most basic concepts are ill-defined 
and confused, as demonstrated in Chapters Two and Three.  
Chapter Two focuses on the issue of doping definition and concludes that when we talk 
about ‘doping’ it is not clear exactly what we are talking about.  Aspects of confusion 
include the role of the intent of the athlete, the effect of the substance on the athlete and the 
basis on which things are selected for inclusion on the list of prohibited substances.  
Chapter Three examines the question of why we prohibit performance enhancing 
substances and analyses the justifications which have been offered for a total prohibition in 
the past.  It will be concluded here that we don’t know exactly why we prohibit doping.  
This much is clear from the short-comings of anti-doping rationales. 
Having established the problem in Part I, Chapter Four goes on to answer the questions of 
why there is so much confusion in anti-doping discourse and why we prohibit performance 
enhancing substances.  Desmond Manderson, in his research into the origins of illicit drug 
policy, has wrestled with similar questions.  His answer is that drugs have been prohibited 
because of what they symbolise, rather than their pharmacological properties.  This chapter 
will contend that a similar analysis is appropriate for doping due to the obvious importance 
of public opinion on the issue of doping and the parallels between illicit drug policy and 
anti-doping policy.  It will be concluded that symbolism provides the missing piece to 
many puzzles in anti-doping discourse. 
Part II — the solution to the problem — contains an analysis of the symbolism of doping 
in three important time periods in anti-doping history.  Chapter Five focuses on the 1920s 
and 1930s and concludes that the most significant symbolism at work linked performance 
enhancing substances with illicit recreational drug use.  This link led to the view of 
performance enhancing substances as being contrary to the essence of amateur sport and 
eventually to the adoption of a similar regulatory system:  a total prohibition. 
In Chapter Six the 1960s will be examined and it will be found that similar illicit drug 
symbolism was at work to the 1920s.  It will be argued that such symbolism was a strong 
influence in the health concerns about doping which were so prominent in anti-doping 
                                                
2
   The discussion will relate to anti-doping policy up to December 2008.  There will be some significant changes to 
the WADA Code which will become operative in January 2009.  These changes will not be considered in detail in 
the thesis but will be noted where important to the argument. 
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discourse in that era.  The ongoing influence of illicit drug symbolism naturally led to the 
further adoption of regulatory enforcement procedures borrowed from illicit drug 
approaches in the form of drug testing. 
The 1970s, examined in Chapter Seven, brought a new type of drug to sport, and with it a 
new type of symbolism.  The rise of anabolic androgenic steroids fundamentally changed 
doping forever.  Illicit drug symbolism was no longer the major imagery involved in anti-
doping discourse, although it was still operative.  Steroids became closely linked with 
‘communist’ athletes and were seen as extremely powerful transforming drugs in that 
context.  These two aspects of symbolism led to a kind of steroid hysteria.  Ongoing illicit 
drug symbolism meant that the illicit drug model was thought adequate to deal with 
steroids despite their very different characteristics to previous doping agents. 
Thus Part II, being the substantive part of the thesis, contains the symbolic analysis of anti-
doping policy.  The sources from which this analysis derives are publicly available 
documents from the relevant time periods, primarily newspapers and business documents 
of sports organisations.  There has, therefore, been no need to acquire human subject ethics 
approval.   
Chapters Eight and Nine form the final part of the thesis which draws together the first two 
parts by considering how the symbolism of doping has created problems in the operation of 
anti-doping law.  Chapter Eight covers the problems previously identified in Part I of the 
thesis.  Most significantly, it will be argued that the influence of symbolism has led to the 
confused state of doping definition and the unsatisfactory nature of anti-doping rationales. 
Chapter Nine will take a wider view of the role of the symbolism of doping.  Here, a model 
of the way in which such symbolism has affected anti-doping policy will be presented, 
called ‘The Reactive Regulation Model’.  The remainder of the chapter will be devoted to 
demonstrating the implications of out-working out of such a model in anti-doping in the 
past, present and future.  It will be argued that the past pattern of reactive regulation 
suggests that the future will be no different.  Anti-doping policy, it is suggested, always 
was and always will be a reaction to the symbolism of performance enhancing substances 
and methods in sport. 
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PART I:  THE HIDDEN DILEMMAS OF ANTI-DOPING 
POLICY 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
WHAT LIES BENEATH ANTI-DOPING POLICY? 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is a clear, still night and the stadium is a-buzz with excitement.  A hundred thousand 
spectators fill the stands to watch the Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games.  Millions 
more watch on television screens around the world.  As the Olympic torch burns above the 
stadium, the Olympic flag is carried into the centre of the arena.  When the flag reaches the 
centre of the field, the flag-bearers from every nation form a semi-circle around the 
rostrum and a lone athlete steps forward into the spotlight, raises their right hand while 
with their left they take a corner of the five-ringed flag.1  They say: 
In the name of all competitors, I promise that we shall take part in these Olympic Games, 
respecting and abiding by the rules that govern them, in the true spirit of sportsmanship, for 
the glory of sport and the honour of our teams, committing ourselves to a sport without 
doping and without drugs.2  
The crowd roars its applause and an Olympic judge steps forward to take the judges oath… 
At every Olympic Games since the year 2000, the athlete’s oath has included that last 
phrase:  ‘committing ourselves to a sport without doping and without drugs’.3  The 
inclusion of these words indicates the status which the issue of the use of performance 
enhancing substances has in sport today.  ‘Doping’ is so important that out of all the issues 
in sport it, alone, is singled out for a special mention in the oath taken at, arguably, the 
most important sporting competition in the world.   
The presence of doping in the Olympic oath does not only indicate the significance of the 
matter, it also testifies to the level of consensus the problem attracts:  ‘doping’ and ‘drugs’ 
are almost universally viewed as repugnant in the sporting context.  At each Olympic 
                                                
1
   Karel Wendl, 'The Olympic Oath: A Brief History' (1995) 3(1) Cititus, Altius, Fortius, 4. 
2
   International Olympic Committee, Sport and the Olympic Games: Symbols and Emblems 
<http://www.olympic.org/uk/utilities/faq_detail_uk.asp?rdo_cat=10_39_0> at 3 August 2008. 
3
   Ibid.  
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Games one athlete promises ‘a sport without doping’ on behalf of more than ten thousand 
athletes.4  Over a hundred thousand spectators tacitly approve of these sentiments as they 
applaud the athlete’s oath being taken.  Millions of others around the world silently agree  
as they watch the ceremony on television.   
The scene certainly makes it seem that the issue of doping and drugs in sport is clear and 
that there is world-wide consensus on modern anti-doping strategies.  But scratch the 
surface of this picture and you will find a very different reality.  History shows us that even 
as the athletes vow to participate in the Games without doping, many are injecting 
prohibited drugs into their veins or popping prohibited pills into their mouths.  And while 
the crowd applauds the ideals encapsulated in the oath, the majority of people believe that 
the Olympic competition will be far from drug-free.5    
Appearances and reality are quite different here.  The same can be said for anti-doping 
policy in general.  This chapter will contend that on the surface anti-doping policy appears 
to be unproblematic, rational and attracts universal consensus, but underneath the reality is 
very different.   
As set out in the previous introductory chapter, the first part of this thesis will demonstrate 
the need for a new kind of analysis of the development of anti-doping policy.  The 
justification for the symbolic analysis set out in the next part derives from the fact that anti-
doping discourse and policy are full of difficulties, confusion and inconsistencies and thus 
previous, ‘rational’ explanations of the history of the development of anti-doping policy 
are inadequate to explain why anti-doping is the way it is today.  To that end, this chapter 
will firstly review the ‘surface’ of anti-doping policy by considering a number of aspects of 
anti-doping policy and discourse, including recent international developments, rhetoric and 
public reaction to doping incidents.  All these aspects of the modern anti-doping landscape 
give the impression that there is universal agreement on, and understanding of, the current 
approach.  The chapter will conclude that the appearance of consensus is misleading and 
the arguments of the next two chapters will be foreshadowed.  Finally, the overall 
argument and structure of the thesis will be presented in detail, to provide further context 
for the material in this chapter and the rest of the thesis. 
                                                
4
   Sydney 2000 Games Info, Some Olympic and Paralympic Games Achievements (2000) 
<http://www.gamesinfo.com.au/ho/ARNW103002.html> at 3 August 2008. 
5
   An American poll shows over half of those polled believe that some of the US track and field athletes are using 
prohibited substances:  AJ Perez and USA Today, Poll: Doping Questions Cloud Americans' View of Games 
(2008) <http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/beijing/2008-07-31-poll-doping-cover_N.htm> at 3 August 
2008. 
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II THE APPEARANCE OF CONSENSUS:  PRESENT  
ANTI-DOPING POLICY 
There is now unprecedented agreement and cooperation in anti-doping policy at an 
international level, which has had far-reaching implications for national anti-doping 
programmes.  
On November 30, 2006, Reuters published an article stating that the world governing body 
of chess would introduce drug testing at the Asian Games in order to be considered for 
inclusion in the Olympic Games.  The article stated: 
the sport’s top official in Doha said he had no idea how drugs could enhance chess 
performance. “I would not know which drug could possibly help a chess player to improve 
his game” the competition manager Yousuf Ahmad Ali said. “But yes, there will be official 
monitors who may demand that players undergo a drugs test after the rounds”.6 
Such unity of international approach to anti-doping has been reached in the early 21st 
century that even sports which are not affected by doping are induced to comply!  To 
appreciate the significance of this level of agreement, it is necessary to understand the 
efforts involved in establishing this unified approach. 
A International Developments 
Before 1999 anti-doping policy was an individual matter for each sport, country and 
organisation.  Although for many sports and organisers, the Olympic Movement Anti-
doping Code (OMADC) provided a model, anti-doping policies varied in their definition of 
doping (strict liability versus intent-based violations), the types of substances and methods 
prohibited, the applicable sanctions, the defences available to the athlete and the avenues 
for appeal. 
1 The Creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
Since November 1999, when the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was created as a 
result of an international conference on doping, there has been an international revolution 
in the approach to anti-doping.  The establishment of this international agency was 
heralded as bringing in ‘…[a] new dimension…to the fight against doping in sport’7 since 
                                                
6
   Reuters, Chess Players Tested For Drugs (2006) 
  <http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,,20846809-5002700,00.html> at 14 September 2008. 
7
  IOC president, Juan Antonio Samaranch, Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Board of WADA, 13 January 
2000, Olympic House, Lausanne (2000)  
 <http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/130100-ENG.pdf> at 14 September 2008, 1. 
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‘[w]ith one historic associative act, sport organizations and governments [were] now united 
in their efforts to achieve completely drug free sport.’8  In 2003, at a second world 
conference, many of the major sports federations and governments agreed to accept the 
new World Anti-Doping Code (WADA Code) as the universal anti-doping policy for sport 
— modelled on the OMADC, pursuant to the Lausanne Declaration of 1999.9  For the first 
time in history, all sports and countries could be subject to the same anti-doping rules. 
The stated aim of the WADA Code is to ‘advance the anti-doping effort through universal 
harmonization of core anti-doping elements.’10  Eight years on, the Code has come a long 
way towards achieving that aim.  By the 2004 Athens Olympic Games all participating 
sports were required to accept the Code as their anti-doping policy.11  National 
                                                
8
  Richard Pound, WADA: Message From the Chairman <<http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory_id=1> at 7 July 2005.  The catalyst for the changes was a series of 
international doping scandals in 1998: Australian customs officials discovered vials of human growth hormone in 
the luggage of Chinese swimmers who were attending the World Swimming Championships; prosecutions 
relating to the former state-supported doping of East German athletes continued in Germany; Irish Olympic 
champion swimmer, Michelle de Bruin, was charged with tampering with her urine sample and French customs 
agents and police uncovered wide spread doping in the 1998 Tour de France:  Jim Ferstle, ‘World Conference on 
Doping in Sport’ in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (Eds), Doping In Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the 
Olympic Movement, 2001 (Champaign: Human Kinetics), 275 – 286, 275.  These events, particularly the Tour de 
France scandal, prompted the IOC Executive Board to hold an international conference on the fight against 
doping in February 1999:  Judge Kéba Mbaye, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Legal and Political Aspects 
of Doping’ (Paper presented at the World Conference on Doping in Sport, Lausanne, 2-4 February 1999), 1.  The 
main result of the conference was the creation of WADA. 
9
  ‘Lausanne Declaration’ adopted by the World Conference on Doping in Sport, Lausanne Switzerland, 4 February 
1999.  A copy of the Lausanne Declaration is available at World Conference on Doping in Sport, ‘Lausanne 
Declaration’ Adopted by the World Conference on Doping in Sport, Lausanne Switzerland, 4 February 1999 
(1999) <http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/lausanne-declaration-doping-sport> at 14 September 2008. 
10
  Hereafter the Code will be referred to by its common name the WADA Code.  WADA Code, Introduction: The 
Purpose, Scope and Organization of the World Anti-Doping Program and the Code, 1.  Note that references to the 
Code in this thesis will be to version 3.0 rather than the 2007 amendments which become operative in January 
2009 since that is the version of the Code in use at the time of writing:  World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-
Doping Code: 2007 Code Amendments, Code Version 3.0 (2007) World Anti-Doping Agency <http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/WADA_Code_2007_3.0.pdf> at 15 January 2008 and World Anti-Doping Agency, 
2009 Code Implementation (2008) <http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=735> at 23 
October 2008.  However, in most sections of the Code relevant to the thesis, the 2007 amendments are not 
significantly different from the 2003 version although some of the page numbers may vary.  Any other relevant 
variations between the 2003 Code and the revised Code will be highlighted. 
 Nevertheless, it should be noted here that the 2007 version of the Code does contain a few significant changes 
from the 2003 version.  For details of these changes see Lauri Tarasti, 'Some Juridical Questions in the Revised 
World Anti-Doping Code' (2008) 2008(2-3) International Sports Law Review 17 and John Marshall and Amy 
Catherine Hale, 'Will The New WADA Code Plug All the Gaps?  Will There Be By-Catch?' (2008) 1-2 The 
International Sports Law Journal 37.  The most significant of these changes for the purposes of this thesis relate 
to the increased flexibility in applicable sanctions via the reclassification of most doping substances as ‘Specified 
Substances’ which are therefore subject to Article 10.4 of the Code.  The commentary in the next two chapters 
also pertains to the 2003 version of the Code and some comments which arise from the inflexible nature of the 
mandatory sanctions in the 2003 version may appear outdated after the January 2009 implementation date due to 
these changes.  However, the purpose of the discussion in this thesis is not to criticise anti-doping policy as it 
stands but rather to understand why anti-doping policy has come to be the way it is.  Therefore, the problems 
identified in the 2003 WADA Code remain significant since they serve as a means of highlighting the way in 
which anti-doping policy has developed historically.  Thus, whether the comments apply to the 2009 version or 
not, anti-doping policy has demonstrated these problems at some point in time and they are, therefore, relevant to 
the overall argument.  Furthermore, many of the changes to the 2003 Code have been made in recognition of 
some of the problems and inconsistencies identified. 
11
     Richard McLaren, 'CAS Doping Jurisprudence: What Can We Learn?' (2006) 1 International Sports Law Review 
4, 4. 
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governments were required to adopt the Code before the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin.  
After a process of consultation, in 2007 the Code was modified:  the changes to the Code 
were accepted by stakeholders at the World Conference on Doping in Sport in Madrid on 
15–17 November 2007 with an implementation date for all stakeholders of January 2009.12   
WADA has now assumed a pivotal role in anti-doping programmes internationally, 
engaging in coordination and facilitation of out-of-competition drug testing of athletes 
throughout the world; updating and publishing the WADA Code Prohibited List each year 
(the list of prohibited substances and methods); facilitating the adoption of the Code by 
sports and governments; promoting anti-doping research; accrediting drug testing 
laboratories and educating athletes regarding their doping responsibilities.13  Under the 
WADA Code, WADA also has the right to appeal doping cases to the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport (CAS).14  In 2007 WADA had an expenditure of $27,268,260 (US),15 its budget 
being made up of contributions from the Olympic Movement and public authorities.16  
2 The Development of the WADA Code 
The WADA Code has also assumed a vital role in the anti-doping movement.  Sports which 
have accepted the Code still have their own anti-doping policies but the rules must contain 
certain provisions ‘without substantive change’, while other provisions allow for a little 
more flexibility on the part of the policy maker.17  Two major consequences of a universal 
anti-doping code are mandatory universal sanctions (two years for a first offence and 
lifetime for any subsequent offence18) and a single list of prohibited substances and 
methods applicable to all sports.19  Although there are still some sports which have not 
adopted the WADA Code, substantial political pressure has been brought to bear on these 
                                                
12
   The adoption of the Code by national governments is facilitated through the International Convention Against 
Doping in Sport under the auspices of UNESCO (the United Nations body responsible for education, science and 
culture).  The convention was adopted at the 33rd General Conference in 2005 and member countries are now 
working towards ratification:  World Anti-Doping Agency, Q&A on the Code (2006)  
 <http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=367> at 14 September 2008. 
13
     WADA Code, Article 20.7. 
14
  WADA Code, Article 13.2.3 (e). 
15
   World Anti-Doping Agency, 2008 Budget Expenditures (2008) <http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/2008_Budget_Expenditures.pdf> at 28 August 2008. 
16
  World Anti-Doping Agency, Contributions to WADA's Budget 2008 (2008) <http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/WADA_Funding_sept2008_Web_update.pdf> at 24 September 2008. 
17
  WADA Code, 6.  The provisions which must be incorporated without substantive change are listed on page 6 of 
the Code. 
18
  Sanctions are found in Article 10 (Individuals) and Article 11 (Teams) of the Code.  Note that the 2007 
amendments of the Code aim to introduce more flexibility in the sanctions applied:  see Marshall and Hale, above 
n 10, 38. 
19
  World Anti-Doping Agency, The World Anti-Doping Code: The 2008 Prohibited List, International Standard 
(2008) <http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/2008_List_En.pdf> at 15 January 2008.  It should be 
noted that there is provision for extra substances or methods to be added to the list for a particular sport but the 
basic list applies to all sports:  WADA Code, Article 4.2. 
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organizations to accept the Code.  For example, the Australian Football League (AFL) did 
not wish to accept the WADA Code due to the applicable universal mandatory sanctions.20  
After political and financial pressure from the federal government — including a threat to 
take away federal funding from the sport — the AFL accepted the Code.21  Given this sort 
of coercion, it seems that most sports will sign up to the Code in the future.22   
International agreement on policy has not been in name only:  compliance with these 
international agreements has significant implications for national programmes.  The 
administrative changes undertaken by national organisations in compliance with the Code 
are further evidence of the commitment of the parties to a unified approach. 
B National Developments 
At the national level there are three significant developments in anti-doping policy to 
mention:   
• the introduction of the WADA Code as government policy  
• the establishment of specialist doping bodies 
• the increasing involvement of state law enforcement agencies.   
The effort that these changes have involved is further evidence of the level of commitment 
to achieving harmony in anti-doping policy. 
 
 
 
                                                
20
  The AFL stated that they were concerned that ‘the gravity of the consequences for a professional athlete, is 
contrary to principles of fairness and justice widely accepted as basic human rights…’:  Australian Football 
League Players Association, AFL and WADA - Your Questions Answered (2005)  
<http://www.aflpa.com.au/index.cfm?id=DOE34044-CBED-E222-264E9F39BA893C29> at 5 July 2005. 
21
    Greg Denham, 'AFL bows to Federal Anti-Doping Pressure', The Australian (Melbourne), 20 July 2005, 3.  
Similarly, in the US there has been substantial political pressure on the National Baseball League to accept the 
Code, including hearings before Congressional committees complete with TV coverage:  US Committee on 
Government Reform, Media Coverage for March 17th Hearing Into Steroids in Major League Baseball (2005) 
 <http://reform.house.gov/GovReform/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=23796> at 14 December 2006. 
22
  WADA actively encourages this kind of pressure on the part of governments.  Minutes of a WADA executive 
meeting discusses the pressure that was put on the ALF and the major league baseball:  World Anti-Doping 
Agency, Minutes of the WADA Executive Committee Meeting 20 November 2005, Montreal Canada (2005)  
 <http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/ExCo_Minutes_20_11_05_DRAFT.pdf> at 14 September 2008. 
There has been ongoing discussion and argument between WADA and the powerful FIFA (Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association – the international federation in charge of association football, including 
the World Cup) regarding FIFA’s acceptance of and compliance with the Code.  This resulted in WADA seeking 
an advisory opinion from the Court of Arbitration for Sport to determine whether FIFA’s policy did comply with 
the Code:  see Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS2005/C/976&986: Advisory Opinion (2005) WADA 
<http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/CAS_Opinion_FIFA.pdf> at 16 January 2008.  This is an 
example of the strong pressure which has been brought to bear on sporting federations. 
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1 Adoption of the WADA Code 
In line with their international responsibilities under the Copenhagen Declaration23 and/or 
the International Convention Against Doping in Sport 2005, national governments have 
changed the policies of their national sports organisations to comply with the WADA 
Code.24  For instance, Australian government bodies such as the Australian Institute of 
Sport and the Australian Sports Commission now have anti-doping policies which are 
compliant with the WADA Code.  Similar processes have been, and continue to be, 
undertaken around the world as national governments ensure that their organizations are 
WADA Code compliant.25 
2 Changes to Enforcement Bodies 
National anti-doping structures have also received an overhaul in the wake of the adoption 
of the WADA Code.  In Australia, a new government-funded anti-doping organisation was 
launched, the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Agency (ASADA)26 which undertakes drug 
testing and other doping investigations, preparation of doping cases, athlete education, 
policy development and monitoring.  Similar agencies in the United Kingdom (UK 
Sport),27 Canada (the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport),28  and the USA (the United 
States Doping Agency)29 are either fully or partially funded by the respective national 
government.30 
                                                
23
     In which a number of countries accepted the WADA Code:  World Anti-Doping Agency, Copenhagen 
Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport (2003) <http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/copenhagen_en.pdf> at 14 September 2008.  The International Convention Against 
Doping in Sport is a UNESCO initiative:  International Convention against Doping in Sport 2005, UNESDOC, 
Certificate No 55048, 15 March 2007, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=31037&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, at 30 October 2008.  See also UNESCO, 
UNESCO General Conference adopts International Convention Against Doping in Sport (2005) 
<http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=30253&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html> at 7 
December 2006. 
24
   This process also affects private sporting organisations through funding constraints as mentioned above in 
relation to the AFL. 
25
  WADA has a monitoring role and requires mandatory reporting on compliance with the Code:  World Anti-
Doping Agency, Code Compliance Assessment Survey <http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=746> at 14 September 2008.  Stakeholders are required to report on 
their compliance with the Code in 2008:  World Anti-Doping Agency, Code Compliance and Reporting 
<http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=736#> at 9 January 2008. 
26
  Senator Rod Kemp, Minister for Arts and Sport, New Body to Take Up the Fight Against Drugs in Sport (Press 
Release 23 June 2005) 
 <http://www.minister.dcita.gov.au/kemp/media/media_releases/new_body_to_take_up_the_fight_against_drugs_
in_sport> visited 20 July 2005. 
27
  UK Sport, Drug-Free Sport <http://www.uksport.gov.uk/pages/drug_free_sport/> at 14 September 2008. 
28
  Sport Canada, The Canadian Policy Against Doping in Sport 
  <http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/pol/dop/index_e.cfm> at 14 September 2008. 
29
  ‘In the United States, the Olympic effort is unique in that it is funded by contributions from private citizens and 
by major support from the corporate community.  The U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) is one of only a few of 
the current 198 NOCs (National Olympic Committees) that receives no continuous federal government subsidy’:  
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Although Australia has had a government funded anti-doping organisation since the early 
1990s, ASADA’s functions and powers are wider than its predecessor.31  Of particular note 
is ASADA’s power to ‘receive, use and disclose information relevant to a possible breach 
of a sport’s anti-doping policy.’32  This allows ASADA to exchange information with other 
government law enforcement agencies such as the Australian Federal Police and the 
Australian Customs Service.  The existence of this power is reflective of a new trend in 
anti-doping, where national law enforcement agencies are playing a much greater role in 
the detection of doping violations.33  No longer is doping the primary domain of the sports 
federation, it is squarely within the jurisdiction of public law enforcement and, judging by 
a few recent cases, also within their enforcement priorities.  In 2004 John Hoberman wrote:  
‘Today, after two decades of sports doping scandals, the anti-doping campaign is being 
annexed by the War on Drugs and by state prosecutors in the United States and Europe.’34 
Events since 2001 indicate that the trend is not just confined to Europe but that this 
development, too, is part of the harmonious anti-doping approach of the 21st century.  The 
                                                                                                                                              
USOC, USOC website, General Olympic FAQs <http://www.usolympicteam.com/19116_18922.htm> at 2005 20 
July. 
30
  All these bodies are examples of ‘National Anti-Doping Organisations’ under the WADA Code: WADA Code, 
Definitions, 72. 
31
  The predecessor to ASADA was the Australian Sports Drug Agency (ASDA) which was established in response 
to the federal senate inquiry into the use of performance enhancing substances in Australian Sport in 1989:  
Minister for the Arts and Sport Senator the Honourable Rod Kemp, Media Release: New Sports Drugs Body 
Enhances Australia's Reputation (2006) 
<http://www.minister.dcita.gov.au/kemp/media/media_releases/new_sports_anti-
doping_body_enhances_australias_reputation> at 15 January 2008; Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Standing 
Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts, 'Drugs in Sport: An Interim Report' (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1989) and Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Standing Committee on 
Environment, Recreation and the Arts, 'Drugs in Sport: Second Report' (Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1990). 
32
  Ibid.  See Australian Sports Anti-Doping Agency Act 2006 (Cth), Part 8 (ss 67ff) (Information Management). 
33
  It is interesting to note that in the 1930s in horse racing circles the US Federal Bureau of Narcotics were involved 
in raids on the tracks to detect illegal substances being used in horse doping.  This will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter Five.  In the years between the 1930s and 1990s the involvement of state agencies has been quite limited 
but now the link between doping and state law enforcement is being strengthened once again. 
34 
 John Hoberman, ‘After ‘Unbreakable’ Barriers Fall, Doping Questions and Denials’, The New York Times (New 
York) 25 April 2005, 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9900E6DB133AF936A15757C0A9629C8B63> at 
14 September 2008.  Hoberman was, no doubt, alluding to events such as the 1998 Tour de France where French 
police and customs officials discovered wide-spread drugs use.  MacAloon has put the change in even stronger 
terms:  
The actions of the French (and later Dutch and Italian) state authorities during the Tour de France delivered the most 
important blow against doping since the 1988 Ben Johnson case and the subsequent Dubin Commission hearings.  
These actions reflexively demonstrated the impotence of the sports authorities and their testing programs from the 
purely practical point of view of successfully catching drug cheats.  Overnight, from this one perspective, the 
magistrates and police took over anti-doping leadership from the sports agencies, at least in Europe.  
 John J MacAloon, ‘Doping and Moral Authority: Sport Organizations Today’ in Wayne Wilson and Edward 
Derse (Eds), Doping In Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement 2001, (Human Kinetics: 
Champaign) 205, 213. 
 A similar tendency can be seen in the US where Senator John McCain held hearings into the use of doping in 
Olympic Sports in 2004:   see Doriane Lamberlet Coleman and James E Coleman Jnr, 'The Problem of Doping' 
(2008) 57 Duke Law Journal 1743, 1743. 
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Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO) investigation was chiefly the work of 
government investigatory agencies.35  The 2004 doping scandal involving the Australian 
cyclist, Mark French (discussed in Chapter Two), involved a number of government 
departments and officials, including Australian Institute of Sport personnel, customs 
officials,36 police,37 Cycling Australia — the relevant sports federation — and an 
independent retired judge, Robert Anderson QC, acting on behalf of the Australian Sports 
Commission.38  The pattern of government agency involvement in doping cases continued 
in the 2005 Tour de France with another arrest by French police after customs officials and 
police discovered phials of EPO (erythropoietin) in a car owned by the wife of an Italian 
rider.39   
Never before have anti-doping efforts featured so strongly in the agendas of national 
governments.  This unprecedented cooperation is certainly suggestive of a very strong 
underlying consensus on the issues.  The unipartite nature of approaches to doping is not 
limited to official government policy, public opinion on the issue shows similar unity, as 
the next section will demonstrate. 
III THE APPEARANCE OF CONSENSUS:  MODERN DOPING 
DISCOURSE 
It was September 1988 at the Seoul Olympics.  Julie and I made our way to Juan Antonio 
Samaranch’s presidential suite at the Shilla Hotel, where we were entertaining members of 
the Coca-Cola board of directors.  I had to be there as the chair of our marketing efforts, 
and Coca-Cola was one of our most enthusiastic supporters.  We arrived, just on time, and 
were met by a clearly agitated Samaranch.  “Have your heard the news?” he asked. “What 
news?” I replied.  “It’s terrible”, he continued.  “What is it? Has someone died?”  “It’s 
worse”, he said.  “For God’s sake, what is it?” I asked again.  He took me into his bedroom 
and closed the door.  “Ben Johnson”, he said.  “He tested positive.”  Only the day before, 
Johnson had run the most exciting 100 metre final in history, winning in an astonishing 
9.79 seconds, well ahead of his fellow competitors.  The analysis of the backup “B” urine 
sample was now under way and the International Olympic Committee’s Medical 
Commission would meet that evening to deal with the matter.  It was, or so it seemed at the 
time, a very long lunch, especially with many of the American Coca-Cola directors and 
                                                
35
  The BALCO scandal will be considered in more detail later in the thesis. 
36
  Andrew Geoghegan, Drugs Claims Tarnish Cycling Team (2004) ABC 7.30 Report Transcript, 20 July 2004, 
(2004) <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/s1158211.htm> at 14 September 2008. 
37
  Minister for the Arts and Sport Senator Rod Kemp, Cycling Report Tabled in Parliament: Press Release, 29 July 
2004 (2004) 
 <http://www.minister.dcita.gov.au/kemp/media/media_releases/cycling_report_tabled_in_parliament> at 21 July 
2005. 
38
  Australian Sports Commission, CAS Decision on Mark French (Press Release, 12 July 2005) 
<http://www.ausport.gov.au/fulltext/2005/ascmedia/20050712.asp> at 14 September 2008. 
39
  Jeremy Whittle, ‘Frigo Arrest Casts Dark Cloud Over Tour Again’ Times Online (London) 14 July 2005, 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-685-1693189-685,00.html> visited 14 July 2005. 
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their spouses congratulating us on Johnson’s win and several of them saying how happy 
they were that our Canadian had beaten Lewis, who was not well liked.  We smiled and 
thanked them, while dying inside, and could hardly wait to escape.40 
Thus begins a chapter headed ‘Performance Cheats:  Doping’ in Dick Pound’s Inside the 
Olympics; a volume which includes a detailed narrative of the events surrounding the 
infamous doping incident of the Seoul Olympics in 1988.  Despite the intervening years, 
the events have enduring significance and the associated media commentary still represents 
some of the clearest and most poignant statements of public opinion about the issue of the 
use of performance enhancing substances in modern sport.  The subsequent discussion of 
public opinion and doping will therefore begin with a brief analysis of the Ben Johnson 
saga.   
A Public Opinion and Doping Scandals 
1 Ben Johnson 
(a) The Background 
The events of September 1988 are well known and set out in Pound’s comments above.41   
Johnson’s second sample confirmed the presence of stanozolol.  He was disqualified from 
the competition by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and he returned to Canada 
as a fallen hero.   
There is no name in the history of sport which is more incontrovertibly associated with the 
issue of doping than that of Ben Johnson.  Part of the reason for his infamy has to do with 
the specific circumstances of the positive test.  In order to fully appreciate the public 
reaction to the 1988 scandal it is helpful to provide some background to the episode.  
Firstly, there was a dramatic lead up to the race.  Due to a long rivalry, the clash between 
Johnson and American, Carl Lewis, was heralded as the ‘the most anticipated footrace of 
the Olympics’;42 the ‘spotlight show of these 1988 Olympics.’43   
                                                
40
  Dick Pound, Inside the Olympics, 2004 (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada Ltd), 49. 
41
  For a full account of the events see Canada, The Honourable Charles L. Dubin, Commission of Inquiry Into the 
Use of Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance (1990) Canadian Government 
Publishing Centre, Chapters 3 and 4, 234ff.  See also CBC, Running Off Track: the Ben Johnson Story, Canada's 
Shame (1988) <http://archives.cbc.ca/IDC-1-41-1392-8702/sports/ben_johnson/clip5> at 14 September 2008 for 
television footage from the time. 
42
     Steve Jacobson, 'Seoul Olympic Games the 100 Still Carl "Me First" Lewis', Newsday Nassau and Suffolk (New 
York), 23 September 1988, 185. 
43
    Leigh Montville, 'Johnson's 100 Was a Dash Into History', The Boston Globe (Boston), 25 September 1988, 73.  
Part of the reason that the race claimed so much attention was because of the different personalities involved.  So 
different were the two men that their rivalry was claimed to be the ‘drag racer’s version of Frazier vs Ali.  
Johnson is Frazier: stern, no nonsense, a hard hat and lunch pail.  Lewis is Ali: glib, flashy, a spotlight and a 
microphone’:  Steve Kelley, 'Johnson's Healed But Can He Top King Carl?' The Seattle Times (Seattle), 14 
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Secondly, Johnson’s home country of Canada associated intimately with the victory.  
During a post-race interview the prime minister of Canada, Brian Mulroney, telephoned to 
congratulate Johnson, saying ‘it’s a marvellous evening for Canada’.44  The victory was 
celebrated more widely than in Canada.45  Klobuchar put it like this: 
Ben Johnson.  He had lifted his country and millions around the world into one of those 
rare moments of shared exhilaration that crosses all boundaries and unites all cultures… 
It didn’t matter who you wanted to win.  The finest athletic performances often cut across 
partisanship.  They become concerts, evoking that spontaneous eruption of awe and 
recognition in which all can join, as the do for a Caruso or Leontyne Prince.   
That’s what has always made the Olympics something beyond — the universality of it, the 
performance of the best on the grandest stage.  That is why for 48 giddy hours Ben Johnson 
belonged not only to Canada but to the world.46 
Thirdly, the guilty athlete was the winner of the blue ribbon event in the highest profile 
sporting competition in the world. 
(b) The Reaction 
When the results of the drug test were publicised, shock and disappointment were 
widespread.  The public reaction was no less dramatic than the account given by Pound.47  
Upon receiving the news, Canada moved instantaneously from a state of national 
celebration to mourning.  Some of the headlines and comments published include:  
• ‘Canada’s Shame’48  
• ‘the news hit Canada like a cyclone’49  
• ‘Ben Johnson, how could you?’50  
                                                                                                                                              
September 1988, E1.  For commentary on some of the differences between the characters involved see Jacobson, 
ibid.  Another factor adding to the drama was the fact that there was no love lost between the two.  In his post 
race news conference Johnson made it clear that the main significance that the gold medal held for him was that it 
signified that he had beaten Lewis; ‘[t]he important thing…was to beat Carl’ he said:  Charlie Francis, Speed 
Trap, 1990 (London: Grafton Books), 261. 
44
  CBC, above n 41. 
45
     It seems part of the celebration was because many were quietly satisfied that the ‘shy uncomplicated soul’ had 
won:  James Christie, 'Carl Lewis Versus Ben Johnson - Duel at 100 Meters Looms For Track Stars', The Globe 
and Mail (Toronto), 15 September 1988, C7.  Johnson was also described as ‘the no nonsense…hard hat and 
lunch pail’, ‘uncomfortable in public’, ‘the son of a Jamaican telephone installer/farmer/beekeeper’:  Bud Shaw, 
'The 100-Meter Showdown: If Ever There's Been a Grudge Match in Track, it's Carl Lewis vs. Ben Johnson For 
the Title of World's Fastest Human.' The Atlanta Journal-Constiution (Atlanta), 22 September 1988, E/03.  Lewis 
was not as popular, seen as ‘glib, flashy’, Kelley, above n 43.  
46
   Jim Klobuchar, 'Olympic Ideal Hadn't Too Far to Fall', Star Tribune (Minneapolis), 29 September 1988, O18. 
47
   In this thesis public reaction will be gauged by published opinion (i.e. in newspapers and other news media).  It is 
recognized that there is a danger in equating public opinion with published opinion since published opinion may 
well represent a very limited and biased sample size of public opinion.  However, the focus in this thesis is 
primarily on the type of opinion which would have affected sports policy makers.  It is unlikely that sports 
officials have the resources to undertake suitable sociological studies to accurately measure public opinion.  Thus 
the only source of information about this is from the press or from personal contacts.  So the opinion in the 
published media will be considered as a reasonable indication of this influence.   
48
   CBC, above n 41.  
49
  David Owen, 'Canadians Mourn the Downfall of Big Ben', The Financial Times (London), 28 September 1988, 4. 
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• Johnson was described as a ‘national embarrassment’51  
• ‘[it was] a moment of great sorrow for all Canadians’52  
• ‘Canadians Cry Betrayal’53 and 
• But in Calgary, host of this year’s Winter Games, the Olympic Spirit was rekindled by 
Johnson’s victory.  There had been two nights of partying on Electric Avenue.  Now there 
it’s just empty streets and hangovers, and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney has to feel 
foolish for phoning Seoul to congratulate Johnson.54 
So strong were the feelings generated that he had to be physically protected from the 
reporters and others who lined the route on Johnson’s journey home.55  Johnson was 
immediately banned from competing on any Canadian team for life56 and subsequently 
disqualified from athletics for two years by the international federation.57  Five months 
after his suspension, the Canadian government appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the 
events and the wider issue of performance enhancing substances in elite sport.58  During 
this inquiry it was revealed by Johnson’s coach, Charlie Francis, that Johnson and his other 
athletes had used steroids in their training.  Before the enquiry Johnson had denied the 
charge, saying ‘I have never knowingly taken illegal drugs and I would never embarrass 
my family, friends and my country, and the kids who love me’.59  However, he 
subsequently confessed to having used steroids.60  The Commission’s findings led to major 
changes in Canadian sport. 
Given the initial reaction to the events of September 1988, it was foreseeable that 
Johnson’s name would become ineradicably linked with the ‘dark side’ of sport which 
doping now represents.  He has been condemned to history as the demon61 and ‘pariah of 
                                                                                                                                              
50
   Ibid.  Comment by Mr John Anderson, a news anchor on Canadian local radio as reported by David Owen. 
51
   Ibid. 
52
   Ibid.  Comment by Canadian Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney as reported by David Owen. 
53
 Herbert H Denton, 'Johnson Goes Home in Disgrace/ Canada Cries Betrayal', The Washington Post 
(Washington), 28 September 1988, B5. 
54
   Tom Weir, 'Johnson Hurt Much More than Himself', USA Today (McLean), 28 September 1988, O4E. 
55
  Tom DiPiazza, 'Silent Johnson Zips Past Reporters', The Record (New Jersey), 28 September 1988, d03; Robert 
Dvorchak, 'No Hero's Welcome for Johnson', Houston Chronicle (Houston), 28 September 1988, 8; 'Tearful 
Johnson Needs Police Escort to Return Safely to his Ontario Home', St Louis Dispatch (St Louis ), 28 September 
1988, 7D. 
56
  Denton, above n 53.  
57
  The IAAF (International Amateur Athletic Federation as it then was):  Joe Concannon, 'International Athletes' 
Response: No to Drugs', The Boston Globe (Boston), 28 September 1988, 42. 
58
  Dubin, above n 41.  
59
     CBC, above n 41. 
60
   However, he and his then medical advisor, Dr Astaphan, maintained that Johnson had never used stanozolol and 
that the positive drug test in Seoul must have been wrong, a claim the Commissioner Dubin rejected, Dubin 
above n 41, 308. 
61
   Simon Barnes, Why Transition to a Clean Sport has Left Us Cynical and Self Righteous (2003) Timesonline 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/more_sport/athletics/article1162321.ece> at 13 September 2008. 
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the sporting world’.62  Although Jackson claims that ‘[i]n Canada, the initial shock and 
disbelief quickly turned to either sympathy or anger and resentment, as evidence of 
Johnson’s prolonged steroid use emerged.’63 In the popular media, sympathetic views of 
Johnson were, and still are, few and far between.  As a direct effect of this negative 
publicity, Johnson lost his livelihood:  all sponsorship deals vanished64 and he has since 
had great difficulty finding employment.65 
The Ben Johnson story and the subsequent governmental inquiry have been described as a 
melodrama66 and academic attention has been given to the significance and effect of that 
melodrama in terms of race relations in Canada and US/Canadian rivalries.  It is quite clear 
that the events were highly dramatic and that this influenced both the official and public 
response.  However, what is of interest here is not so much the reasons behind the reaction 
to Johnson’s positive but the singularity of that response.   
                                                
62
   David Belton, BBC News: The Pariah of the Sporting World (2001) BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/1449381.stm> at 14 September 2008.  
 Interestingly, many of Johnson’s competitors returned positive doping tests at some point in their careers.  It has 
been revealed since then that 4 out of 5 of the top finishers in that 1988 race have all tested positive for banned 
substances:  Jacquelin Magnay, 'Lean, Mean and This Time Clean', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 
January 31 - February 1 2004, 65. 
 In 2003 it was publicised that Carl Lewis, a well-known anti-doping activist, tested positive to prohibited 
stimulants two months before the 1988 Olympics but was allowed to compete after arguing that his use was 
inadvertent:  see Mark Zeigler, 'Three Strikes and King Carl Kept Running', The San Diego Union - Tribune (San 
Diego), 17 April 2003, D; Dave Hannigan, 'If We Can't Believe in Carl Lewis, Then Who's Left? Evidence that 
American Authorities Covered up Positive Drug Tests by Top US Athletes in the 1980s Means it's Hard to Credit 
That Anyone Was Clean', Sunday Tribune (Dublin), 20 April 2003, 4. 
 Lindford Christie tested positive to pseudoephedrine after the 200m race at the Seoul Olympics but was cleared 
when the IOC Doping Committee gave him the benefit of the doubt after he explained his positive test by his use 
of ginseng tea: Tim Adams, Since When Did Seb Coe Learn to Jive Talk (2005) The Guardian 
<http://observer.guardian.co.uk/osm/story/0,,1559783,00.html> at 31 August 2006.  He was suspended from 
competition at the end of his career for two years after testing positive for the steroid nandrolone (Christie has 
always maintained his innocence).  See also Rachel Corbett, New Studies Shed Light on Nandrolone (2001) 
<http://www.sportlaw.ca/articles/doping_nandrolone.php> at 14 September 2008; Tim Kerr, 'Doped or Duped? 
The Nandrolone Jurisprudence' (2001) 1(March) International Sports Law Review 97. 
 Dennis Mitchell, who placed fourth in the final after Johnson’s disqualification, was suspended by the IAAF for 
two years in 1998 after testing positive for testosterone. 
 Desai Williams, who came 6th after the disqualification, admitted using steroids during the Dubin enquiry but 
never tested positive.   
 Ray Stewart, who came 7th, coached track and field athletes including Jerome Young who lost his gold medal at 
the Sydney Olympics after testing positive for drugs.   
 Andrew Jennings maintains that Professor Manfred Donike retested a number of the male athlete’s samples from 
the Seoul Olympics and discovered at least 50 had been taking steroids, Andrew Jennings, The New Lords of the 
Rings: Olympic Corruption and How to Buy Gold Medals, 1996 (London: Simon and Schuster), 245. 
63
   Steven J Jackson, 'Exorcizing the Ghost: Donovan Bailey, Ben Johnson and the Politics of Canadian Identity' 
(2004) 26(1) Media Culture Society 121, 122. 
64
     Bud Shaw, 'Johnson's Losses Include Endorsements Disgraced Sprinter Arrives Home Minus Medal and Millions 
of Dollars in Terminated Advertising Deals Around the World', The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (Atlanta), 28 
September 1988, C/01; Associated Press, 'Johnson Lost More than Medal', Patriot-News (Harissburg), 28 
September 1988, D1. 
65
   Belton, above n 62.  Interestingly, others in the Seoul final went on to have careers in sport and related fields 
despite their own subsequent positive doping tests as discussed above.  See Jacquelin Magnay, above n 62. 
66
   John MacAloon, 'Steroids and the State; Dubin, Melodrama and the Accomplishment of Innocence' (1990) 2(2) 
Public Culture 41. 
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The public response to Johnson’s positive doping test was universal in its condemnation; 
there was very little evidence of division in public opinion, at least in the popular media.  
Whether showing any sympathy for Johnson or not, writers resoundingly condemned what 
Johnson did:  ‘What Ben Johnson did was profoundly wrong because he did it, not because 
he got caught.’67  Very little was said in Johnson’s defence.68  Examples of comments 
include:  
• ‘Johnson knew the rules, and so did his trainers.  It is sad that his wondrous 
speed may have come, in some way, from the chemistry lab instead of from the 
deep well of human effort and endurance that the Olympics is designed to 
tap.’69  
• ‘the absurdity that is Ben Johnson…Ben Johnson now knows he took a chance 
and it carried a price.’70  
• ‘Ben Johnson is the stained symbol of steroid use in the Olympics…’71  
• ‘To win an Olympic gold medal is one of the highest honours an athlete can 
seek.  To win with the help of body-altering chemicals cheapens the recipient 
and cheats the competitors who play by the rules.’72  
• ‘Ben Johnson always ran like a man possessed.  Now, it turns out, at least, part 
of the time he was…Ben Johnson made a deal with the devil and the account is 
coming due.’73  
• ‘I think the kids of Canada, and probably elsewhere, felt violated.’74  
• ‘Ben Johnson cheated…Rather than having achieved, Johnson deceived.’75  
• ‘He has gone from Ben Johnson to has-Ben Johnson.’76   
                                                
67
   Richard Estrada, 'Learning From the Olympics', The Dallas Morning Herald (Dallas), 28 September 1988, 26A. 
68
   The only partial departure in the media were occasional voices reminding the public that Johnson was just one of 
a large number of athletes who partook in this kind of activity or that some blame must be levelled at the 
competitive nature of modern elite sport:  see Klobuchar, above n 46.  These two themes came through strongly 
in the Dubin inquiry, above n 41.  
69
   'Stripping Ben's Medal Upholds Game's Integrity', The Omaha World-Herald (Omaha), 29 September 1988, 60. 
70
   Dick Williams, 'Firm Olympic Drug Rules Are a Model for U.S. Pros', Atlanta Journal-Constitution (Atlanta), 29 
September 1988, A/19. 
71
   Dave Anderson, 'Steroids: Olympic Shame is Only the Beginning', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 29 
September 1988, 3. 
72
   'Stripping Ben's Medal Upholds Game's Integrity', The Omaha World-Herald (Omaha), 29 September 1988, 60. 
73
   Associated Press, 'Johnson Lost More than Medal', Patriot-News (Harissburg), 28 September 1988, D1. 
74
   Klobuchar, above n 46.  
75
   Denton, above n 53.  
76
   Weir, above n 54. 
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Even a writer who saw the fallout from the scandal as being a huge overreaction still 
agreed that ‘Ben was wrong.  Ben took the place on the Olympic team of some kid who 
would have gone to Seoul and tried his best without test tube muscles.  Ben let down his 
team mates…’77  
Thus ‘Ben Johnson remains one of the most infamous and controversial athletes in both 
Canadian and Olympic history.’78  Simon Barnes has written: 
These days only drugs are immoral and Ben Johnson is the demon of all demons…  But 
Johnson risked his liver and his virility and his psychological health for us, and we don’t relish 
that at all…  We like to make sure that everyone associated with drugs is a Johnsonesque 
demon…  Thus Johnson in general and sport in particular have become a convenient receptacle 
for the world’s terror of drugs…and the ultimate symbol of this fear and loathing of drugs is 
the figure of Ben Johnson.  Sport in general and Johnson in particular have become a vehicle 
for our self-righteousness about the issue of drugs.  Drugs is not what we do, it’s what people 
such as Johnson do.  And, it is believed, they deserve everything that happens to them.  And, 
by the same token, it proves that what we do is All Right.79 
Although a number of high profile doping scandals over subsequent years may have dulled 
the shock and surprise surrounding the scandal,80 there has been no softening of attitudes 
towards Johnson’s actions. 
Thus, the public reaction to Ben Johnson’s story was, and remains, both predictable and 
homogenous.  But is the treatment of Johnson typical of public reaction to doping?  
Subsequent doping scandals also prompted similar reactions and show that it was not the 
melodrama of these events alone which can explain the cohesive public reaction to 
Johnson’s situation.  Each new public doping scandal, with its associated dramas, produces 
a similar cohesive response. 
2 Marion Jones Confession 
(a) The Background 
In October 2007 US Olympic athletic champion, Marion Jones, confessed to having lied to 
federal authorities regarding her use of prohibited performance enhancing substances.  
Jones had been questioned in the course of a federal investigation into the BALCO and had 
denied that she had used prohibited substances throughout the course of the investigation 
which lasted for a number of years.  In 2007 Jones finally confessed to lying to the 
                                                
77
   Gary Lautens, 'Johnson Cheated But the Nation Not in Disgrace', The Toronto Star (Toronto), 28 September 
1988, A4. 
78
   Jackson, above n 63, 122.  
79
  Barnes, above n 61. 
80
   For an example of Johnson’s acts being put in context see Mary Jollimore, ‘Was Johnson Singled Out?’ 2004 
164(3) Time, 46. 
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investigators about her knowledge and use of the designer steroid, ‘THG’ 
(tetrahydrogestrinone).81   
In a statement immediately after her court confession Jones said: 
I have let my country down and I have let myself down.  It is with a great amount of shame 
I stand before you and tell you that I have betrayed your trust.  I recognise that by saying 
I’m deeply sorry, it might not be enough and sufficient to address the pain and hurt that 
I’ve caused you.  Therefore, I want to ask your forgiveness for my actions, and I hope that 
you can find it in your heart to forgive me.82   
Jones returned her Olympic medals to the IOC soon after making her confession83 and the 
International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) wiped all records she had set 
after 1 September 2000 from their books.84  On 11 January 2008 she was sentenced to six 
months imprisonment for lying to the investigators.85   
(b) The Reaction 
The public reaction to this confession of doping was equally as unified as the response to 
Johnson’s doping positive.  The reaction was predominantly shock and scandal over, not 
only her drug-taking, but also the extent of her lies regarding the issue:  Jones having filed 
a defamation suit against the owner of BALCO who publicly claimed that she had used 
THG.  There was also an element of vindication as the suspicions which had been hinted at 
in the media for some time were proved true.  It seems that the only difference of opinion 
over the Jones story centred on the extent to which her confession (albeit belated) should 
atone for her sins.  Some writers applauded Jones for finally telling the truth while others 
refused to give Jones any approbation for such a late confession.  However, her initial 
conduct — taking prohibited substances and lying about it — attracted universal censure.  
No doubts were expressed about the morality of what she had done.86  Judgement was 
passed on both her steroid use and her lying. 
                                                
81
   See media release:  US Department of Justice: US Attorney Scott N. School, Olympic Gold Medallist Marion 
Jones-Thompson Pleads Guilty of Making False Statements in Two Separate Federal Criminal Investigations 
(2007) 
 <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/press/2007/2007_10_05_jones-thompson.guiltyplea.press.html> at 14 January 
2008.  
82
   'Her Great Shame', New York Daily News (New York), 6 October 2007, 18. 
83
   Jenny McAsey, Jones Jailing a 'Lesson to Cheats' (2008) The Australian 
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23047058-2722,00.html> at 14 January 2008. 
84
   International Associations of Athletics Federations, IAAF Press Release on Marion Jones (2007) IAAF 
<http://www.iaaf.org/news/Kind=512/newsId=42470.html> at 14 January 2008. 
85
   McAsey, above n 83; Reuters, Learn from Jones Sentence: IAAF (2008) ABC News 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/01/12/2137142.htm?section=sport> at 14 January 2008.  
86
   An interesting opinion, written for the Geelong Advertiser, suggests that we should be very slow to condemn 
Jones since cheating is part our culture.  The evidence of this is found in networking to get ahead in business.  
Nevertheless, the opinion condemns both networking and Jones’ actions:   'Cheating Part of Our Culture', 
Geelong Advertiser (Geelong), 10 October 2007, 23. 
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Some examples of media statements include:  
• ‘Sprinter’s Doping Shame.’87  
• ‘Her Great Shame.’88  
• ‘After consistently professing her drug-use innocence, Jones is finally coming 
clean, so to speak.  That is a good thing.  The bad thing is the lousy example 
she set for young athletes to whom she was a role model.’89  
• ‘Oh yes, Jones says she did not know she had been given steroids — falling 
back on the “someone fed me flaxseed oil” defence.’90  
• ‘Jones betrayal has robbed us of our faith…but deep down there is a horrible 
mix of sadness, disappointment and anger bubbling away like demonic 
butterflies…Little did us sports lovers know then she was making fools of us.’91 
• ‘She is now a liar and a cheat, her sins laid bare for everyone to see.’92  
3 Other Scandals 
All major doping scandals of the last few decades have given rise to similarly homogenous 
reactions:  some examples are the revelations of the doping programme undertaken by the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the 1970s and 1980s93 and the circumstances of 
the Mark French affair in 2004 in Australia (discussed below).  To argue that revelations of 
doping in elite sport give rise to consistent public responses is not to claim that each new 
revelation elicits exactly the same response.  Naturally, the public reaction to each scandal 
varied in intensity according to the details of the circumstances.  The lack of knowledge or 
consent involved in the case of the East German athletes quite appropriately produced 
much more public outrage than incidents where the athlete has knowingly and intentionally 
used doping agents.  What did not vary was the unquestioning commitment to both the 
principle of prohibitive anti-doping policy and the operational system in place to deal with 
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   'Sprinter's Doping Shame', Scottish Daily Record (Glasgow), 6 October 2007, 9. 
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   New York Daily News, above n 82. 
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    Ibid. 
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    Ibid. 
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   Claire Hughes, 'Jones' Betrayal Has Robbed Us of Our Faith', Yorkshire Post (Leeds), 8 October 2007, 
<http://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/sports-columnists/Claire-Hughes-Jones39s-betrayal-has.3311736.jp> at 17 
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   'Olympic 'Hero' Admits Steroid Use, Dishonesty', The St Petersburg Times (St Petersburg), 9 October 2007, 79. 
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   See for example Glenda Korporaal, 'Lying, Cheating and Winning', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 11 
October 1997, 38, 38; 'Sex Change Torment of Steroids Athlete', Daily Mail (London), 30 December 1997, 11; 
Larry Siddons, 'East German Steroids Use Outlines Old Stasi Files Indicate Widespread Program Included 
Olympic Stars', Seattle Post Intelligencer (Seattle), 6 December 1994, D6 and The Associated Press, 'East 
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it.94  Furthermore, as will be discussed later in the thesis, even where public sentiment does 
not correlate with the law, there appears to be consensus on the response to ‘doping 
scandals’.  For instance, the reaction to Andrea Raducan’s disqualification from the 
Sydney Olympics, although legal under the applicable anti-doping law, was equally 
homogenous.  The Romanian gymnast was treated with almost universal respect and 
sympathy.95  Similarly, the Australian response to the disqualification of Alex Watson was 
characterised by widespread criticism of the IOC’s approach. 96  
In the commentary surrounding these incidents, public reaction was in agreement regarding 
the moral dimension of the activities:  practices viewed as ‘doping’ were seen as an evil 
that must be dealt with by the severest means possible.  But the homogeneity of the public 
response to doping does not end with reactions to revelations of specific examples of 
doping by athletes.  Rhetoric over the general issue of doping is also highly repetitive.  
Some examples of the rhetoric involved in the reporting of these scandals and the anti-
doping ‘war’ will be considered below.97  
B Public Opinion and Anti-Doping Rhetoric 
Anti-doping rhetoric universally characterises doping as a kind of evil or cancer which, if 
left untreated, spreads and infects the very essentials of sport.  Like the public response to 
doping scandals, there appears only one acceptable type of language when discussing the 
issue of doping. 
One of the most notorious condemnations of doping in modern times was delivered by 
Juan Antonio Samaranch, then president of the IOC: 
Doping equals death.  Death psychologically, with the profound, sometimes irreversible 
alteration of the body’s normal processes through inexcusable manipulation.  Physical 
death, as certain tragic cases in recent years have shown.  And then also the death of the 
                                                
94
  It should be noted here that these comments do not apply to academic criticism.  The focus of these comments is 
purely on public, non-academic comment as found in the popular press. 
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   See for example Sue Williams, 'Life Goes On....A Perfect Score as Raducan Braves the World', The Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney), 29 September 2000, 4; 'An Olympic Victim of Zero Tolerance', Omaha World -
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   See for example 'Australia Critical of IOC Over Athlete's Banning - Doping', Reuters 28 May 1992; Roy Masters, 
'500 Tested, Two Positive - Both Ours', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 23 September 1988, 2 and Tony 
Sarno, 'Today's Athlete: Lean, Fit and Juiced Up', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 18 February 1989, 1. 
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   The term ‘anti-doping war’ is used in a similar way to the ‘war on drugs’ and there are many similarities between 
the two ‘wars’.  Like the ‘war on drugs’, the phrase is a little ambiguous and difficult to define.  In this thesis the 
term ‘anti-doping war’ will be used to refer to anti-doping messages in the media and other forums, as well as 
official anti-doping policy. 
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spirit and intellect, by the acceptance of cheating.  And finally moral death, by placing 
oneself outside the rules of conduct demanded by any human society.98 
Samaranch used this kind of language frequently, referring to doping as ‘a series of acts 
which transgress and violate certain immutable principles’.99  He characterised athletes 
engaged in doping as ‘using artificial means to provoke natural physiological reactions, or 
by attempting with various tricks to hide the irrefutable evidence of their dishonest 
actions.’100  Not confined to the IOC president, this kind of emotive, hyperbolic language 
is characteristic of the entire debate.  Hints of it are found in the WADA Code.  The 
fundamental rationale statement for the Code states:  ‘Anti-doping programs seek to 
preserve what is intrinsically valuable about sport’ and ‘Doping is fundamentally contrary 
to the spirit of sport.’101  
It is not just the sports authorities that are convinced that doping is evil  public opinion 
appears to condemn it just as strongly.  The consistency in public outrage is expressed in 
public support of tough anti-doping measures.  Houlihan notes that ‘current [anti-doping] 
policy is, though, capable of being strongly defended on the basis of the weight of 
democratic community condemnation and pervasive disapproval.’102  The pervasive 
disapproval of doping is visible in the intense reaction provoked each time a new doping 
scandal arises, such as the ones discussed above.  Calls for strict application of anti-doping 
policy are frequently made in a similar kind of emotional language to that used by anti-
doping officials.  For instance, in responding to the news of Dwain Chamber’s suspension 
for drug use, the famous British runner, Sebastian Coe, wrote in 2004:  ‘we cannot, without 
blinding reason and cause, move one millimetre from strict liability — if we do, the battle 
to save sport is lost.’  Or, in the wake of the BALCO investigation, reporter, Sally Jenkins, 
wrote: 
Let’s define exactly what performance enhancers are:  non-sporting ways to gain an 
advantage that are unhealthy when abused, and which make it difficult for other 
competitors not to use them, too, in order to keep up.  They are an insidious and seductive 
chain reaction of evil, because anyone who aspires to be great believes they have to use a 
substance in order to become so.103 
                                                
98
  “President of IOC Condemns Drug Use”, The New York Times (13 September 1988) in John Hoberman, 'How 
Drug Testing Fails' in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (eds), Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the 
Olympic Movement, 2001 (Human Kinetics: Champaign) 241, 243. 
99
  Ibid. 
100
  Ibid, 242. 
101
  WADA Code, 3.  
102
     Barrie Houlihan, Dying to Win: Doping in Sport and the Development of Anti-Doping Policy, 1999 (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Publishing), 128. 
103
  This emotive language was in an article in which Jenkins questions whether drugs should be banned in sport 
anymore.  Even in this context the issue attracts emotive and colourful condemnation:   Sally Jenkins, 'Steroids, 
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Language of disapproval and condemnation is extremely consistent.  There is very little 
room to doubt that doping is a persistent evil and the number one issue in sport today!104   
IV CONCLUSION:  THE APPARENT CONSENSUS 
From the brief perusal of various aspects of the modern anti-doping landscape it can be 
seen that there is a strong consistency in publicly expressed opinions on the topic.  It has 
also been demonstrated that the unity of opinion regarding doping is not limited to public 
opinion, the developments in official international anti-doping policy in the last ten years 
shows an unprecedented level of unity.  Not only has WADA been established with inter-
governmental support and the WADA Code been almost universally accepted by both 
sports federations and national governments, there has also been major changes at national 
government level to adapt to the requirements of this Code.  The fact that national 
governments have been willing and eager to make these changes — often at great expense 
— demonstrates the high level of political commitment to the collective approach.   No 
doubt this political commitment is due to the perceived level of public support. 
Not only is there homogeneity in terms of official policy but public responses to doping 
scandals involving individual athletes and the rhetoric in the anti-doping war is highly 
repetitive in its message.  Such is the potency of this ‘group think’ that there is a strong 
sense that to speak in a different way about doping would amount to betrayal.  For 
example, it is quite common to read commentary which presents alternative suggestions 
for anti-doping programmes to be prefaced with a disclaimer stating that the author is not 
condoning doping105 or by re-emphasising the worthy goals of anti-doping programmes.106 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Steroids, Steroids, Blah, Blah, Blah...Is Anyone Taking Any Notice?' The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 
February 14-15 2004, 67. 
104
   For example Dick Pound, Inside Dope: How Drugs are the Biggest Threat to Sports, Why we Should Care and 
What Can be Done About Them, 2006 (Ontario: Wiley Canada). 
105
   Eg Pat Connolly begins her article, ‘It’s Time to Ban Punitive Drug Testing’ by stating:  ‘There is more confusion 
about drugs in sport today than ever.  I have long been an opponent of drug use in sport, actively pushing for 
legislation and drug testing.  But recently I have come to the conclusion that there should be only limited punitive 
drug testing…’:  Pat Connolly, 'Its Time to End Punitive Drug Testing', The New York Times (New York), 28 
October 1990, A1.  Norman Fost, 'Banning Drugs in Sport: A Skeptical View' (1986) 1986(August) Hastings 
Centre Report 5, 5 states:  ‘Let me emphasize my personal distaste for drugs in sport, particularly performance-
enhancing and recreational drugs.  As an athlete I would not use them.  As a physician, I would not prescribe 
them.  As a father I would urge my children to avoid them.  As a citizen, I deplore their wide-spread use…’ 
106
   Eg David Mottram, 'Does the International Olympic Committee (IOC) List Need Updating?' (1999) 27(1) Sports 
Medicine 1, 8 and Ryan Connolly, 'Balancing the Justices in Anti-Doping Law: the Need to Ensure Fair Athletic 
Competition through Effective Anti-Doping Programs vs The Protection of Rights of Accused Athletes' (2006) 
5(Spring) Virginia Sports and Entertainment Law Journal 161, 200. 
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V WHAT LIES BENEATH THE APPARENT CONSENSUS? 
The cohesive nature of the public reaction to doping scandals, the existence of WADA and 
the acceptance of the WADA Code may, at first blush, suggest that anti-doping policy is 
clear, unproblematic and universally acceptable.  The consistency which has been achieved 
in anti-doping policy suggests, at least at a superficial level, the approach must be well-
defined, lucid and consistent.  At the very least, it could be assumed that the fundamentals 
of the policy are strong and that if the policy presents any difficulties, they must only 
appear on the very perimeter of the matter.  
However, the apparently settled state that anti-doping policy has reached belies the fact 
that anti-doping policy is fraught with inconsistency and is characterised by a lack of 
clarity regarding some of the most basic issues.  Below the unified surface of public 
reaction lies a perplexing web of confusion and questionable assumptions.  Even the most 
basic questions such as ‘what is doping?’ and ‘why do we prohibit it?’ are far from clear; 
that lack of clarity has significant effects on the operation of anti-doping policy.   
A Background:  A Summary of Present Anti-Doping Policy 
In order to appreciate the discussion below regarding some of the confusions in modern 
anti-doping policy, it is necessary to have some understanding of present anti-doping 
policy.  Here, a brief summary of how the WADA Code works will be presented. 
Up until 2003 all sports and all sports competitions had their own, unique anti-doping 
policy.  Many, however, were modelled on the OMADC which was applicable to the 
Olympic Games.  That policy also became the basis of the WADA Code.  As stated above, 
all Olympic Sports and countries have adopted the WADA Code, as have many other major 
sports.107 
Under the Code there are numerous ways in which an athlete can be found guilty of 
doping.  Despite the number of different ‘doping violations’, until recently the focus has 
been on drug testing.  This process now involves random, unannounced testing of any 
athlete who is subject to the Code.108  In order to facilitate unannounced testing, the athlete 
                                                
107
   However, each sport still has its own anti-doping code which is based on the WADA Code.  As Tarasti, above n 
10, 17, notes, signatories to the Code are required to adopt all provisions in substance under the 2007 version (p 9 
of 2007 version) but it is still not clear which articles are mandatory and which are not.  
108
   The anti-doping agency establishes what, in Australia, is called the Registered Testing Pool of athletes.  ‘An 
athlete's inclusion in the RTP is based on a number of factors related to the athlete, level of competition, sport and 
ASADA's anti-doping program requirements.  ASADA's RTP is constantly reviewed and updated and athletes 
can be notified for inclusion or removal on to the RTP at any time.’  Australian Sports Anti-Doping Agency, 
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is required to provide information to the appropriate body as to their whereabouts at all 
times.  Australian athletes need to submit ‘Athletes Whereabouts’ forms to ASADA in 
which the athlete nominates a location where they will be for one hour each day for sample 
collection.  
Where a doping violation is proved via a positive drug test, doping is a strict liability 
offence.109  Unless able to prove that the test result was inaccurate, the athlete will be 
sanctioned, regardless of their subjective state of mind.  Consequently, athletes who 
inadvertently or accidentally ingest performance enhancing substances are guilty of 
‘doping’.  The Code also includes a provision which applies the strict liability approach 
where the ingested substance gave them no advantage over their peers. 
There are other forms of doping violations:  use or attempted use of a prohibited 
substance,110 refusal to submit to testing,111 failure to provide whereabouts information,112 
tampering with a sample,113 and possession, trafficking and administration of a prohibited 
substance.114  Although historically the strict liability offence with a positive drug test was 
the focus of doping prosecutions, an increasing emphasis is now being placed on these 
‘non-analytical’ forms of proving doping.  At this stage, however, drug testing and the 
strict liability anti-doping violation still appear to be the major focus of anti-doping policy. 
The WADA Code describes the doping violations by reference to a list which contains 
categories of performance enhancing substances and methods, some of which are 
prohibited only within competition, others both during and outside competition.  An 
example in the second category is anabolic steroids – predominately training drugs, the use 
of these drugs is primarily outside competition.  As most international sports now have the 
                                                                                                                                              
Doping Control: Requirements for Athlete Whereabouts Information (2006) 
<http://www.asada.gov.au/control/whereabouts/requirements.htm> at 15 January 2008.  In Australia there was 
recently a controversy over the inclusion of high school team athletes in the Registered Testing Pool:  see 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, The World Today: Drug Testers Forced Schoolboys to Strip (2007) 
  <http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2007/s1889796.htm> at 15 January 2008. 
109
   WADA Code, Article 2.1.  The commentary to the revised Code now indicates that the ‘use of’ provision is also a 
strict liability offence, WADA Code, Article 2.2.1.  This has clarified the uncertainty that surrounded the term ‘use 
of’ both before the establishment of the Code [see comments of the IAAF anti-doping panel in the Krabbe case, 
quoted in Lauri Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases, 2000 (Milan: SEP Editrice), 70] and after 
the adoption of the first version of the Code.  See comments by the CAS panel in the French appeal: French v the 
Australian Sports Commission and Cycling Australia, Appeal Partial Award Pronounced by the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport Oceania Registry, CAS 2004/A/651, 11 July 2005.  This point will be discussed more fully 
in Chapter Two. 
110
   WADA Code Article 2.2. 
111
   WADA Code Article 2.3 
112
   WADA Code Article 2.4 
113
   WADA Code Article 2.5 
114
   WADA Code Article 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8. 
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WADA Code as their doping policy, almost all athletes are now subjected to a single 
prohibited list.115  
The penalties for doping are now universally applicable.  For a first offence, an athlete will 
receive a two year suspension and a life suspension for a second offence.  The Code does 
contain some provisions for reducing the sanction in ‘exceptional circumstances’116 or 
where certain ‘specified substances’ are involved.117  However, where an anti-doping rule 
violation takes place, disqualification from that particular competition and event will 
automatically ensue; only the additional ineligibility period will be open to reduction or 
elimination.118  Cases under the exceptional circumstances provisions have so far shown 
that these provisions are difficult to trigger.119 
This very brief review does not, of course, cover all the details of the WADA Code.  Rather 
than providing a full analysis of all the legal issues in the Code, the intention here is to 
provide an overview of some of the fundamental parts of the Code in order to provide a 
framework for subsequent discussion in this, and later chapters of the thesis. 
B Far from Consensus:  Ambiguities of the ‘Anti-Doping War’ 120 
1 Miscellaneous Mysteries of Anti-Doping Policy 
Any impression that anti-doping policy is unproblematic is far from accurate.  Even a 
transitory observation of the current anti-doping approach reveals many questions and 
problems.  
For example, questions can be raised as to why the use of ergogenic substances in sport is 
perceived as such an ‘evil’ thing when what is affected is sport:  something which, for the 
vast majority of people, simply fills leisure time and does not affect their survival or long 
term happiness to any great extent.  Questions also exist regarding the difference between 
doping rules and doping discourse:  why are all prohibited substances and methods treated 
                                                
115
   WADA Code 2008 Prohibited List.  There is a possibility of a particular sport adding to the List by agreement 
with WADA if a certain substance is deemed appropriate for inclusion for that specific sport.  WADA Code, 
Article 4.2.  See WADA Code 2008 Prohibited List, 10, for the list of substances for specific sports.  
116
   WADA Code Article 10.5 
117
   WADA Code Article 10.3.  The Specified Substances Provisions are found in Article 10.4 in the revised Code.  
118
   WADA Code Articles 9 and 10.1 respectively.   
119
   Richard McLaren, 'Exceptional Circumstances: Is it Strict?' (2005) 2 (May) International Sports Law Review 32; 
Jessica K Foschi, 'A Constant Battle: The Evolving Challenges in the International Fight Against Doping in Sport' 
(2006) 16 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 457 and Anne Amos, 'Inadvertent Doping and the 
WADA Code: Can Athletes with a Cold Breathe Easy?' (2007) 19(1) Bond Law Review 1; Peter Charlish and Rob 
Heywood, 'Anti-Doping Inconsistencies Snare American Star' (2007) 8 Texas Review of Entertainment and 
Sports Law 79, 100.  Note that under the revised Code these sections will apply to more types of anti-doping rule 
violations and thus may make these provisions easier to trigger.  
120
   In this thesis the term ‘Anti-doping War’ will be used to include references to anti-doping references in the media 
as well as official anti-doping policy. 
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equally in law — the same sanctions apply121 — when they are not treated equally in 
public opinion?  For instance, there is a vast difference between the manner in which Ben 
Johnson, on the one hand, and Samantha Riley,122 Shane Warne,123 or Andrea Raducan124 
on the other, were treated by the popular press.  While both Ben Johnson and Andrea 
Raducan were punished in a similar way (both lost their Olympic gold medals), Johnson 
was demonised by the media while Raducan received sympathy.  There was also a 
difference between the treatment of Ben Johnson compared to the other competitors in that 
race who subsequently tested positive for prohibited substances.  The differences in guilt 
are obvious to the public:  intentional dopers are hated while inadvertent ones are often 
given sympathy.  Why is this not reflected in doping law?   
Further questions exist regarding the persistence of anti-doping policies.  Most experts 
agree that drug testing is largely ineffective in deterring the use of prohibited substances by 
athletes.125  For example, well known steroid experts Charles Yesalis, Michael Bahrke and 
James E Wright, in 2000, referred to the ‘impotence of drug testing’126 and in 2004 Yesalis 
                                                
121
  Assuming that the exceptional circumstances and specified substances provisions discussed above do not apply.  
It should be noted here that the recent changes to the WADA Code makes many substances ‘specified substances’ 
(exceptions include anabolic steroids).  This means that in many situations the athlete will be able to reduce their 
punishment (the minimum sanction would be disqualification and a reprimand) if they are able to show how the 
substance came to be in their system and that it was not ingested in order to improve their performance:  see 
WADA Code 2007 Code Amendments, Article 10.4.  It should be noted here that under the OMADC (Article 3) 
there were different sanctions according to the specific substance involved, anabolic steroids attracting the 
severest punishments:  Robert C.R. Siekmann, Janwillem Soek and Andrea Bellani, Doping Rules of 
International Sports Organisations (1999), 600-601.  However, under the WADA Code they are all subjected to 
the same sanctions unless the specified substances provisions apply.   
122
   The Australian swimmer who took a Digesic tablet.  Riley was resoundingly forgiven for trusting her coach and 
her place as media darling did not change:  T Magdalinski, 'Drugs Inside Sport: The Rehabilitation of Samantha 
Riley' (2001) 17(2) Sporting Traditions 17.  See also Caroline Overington, 'When it Comes to Drugs in Sport, 
Australians Have No Right to Cry 'Foul', The Age (Melbourne), 30 September 2000, 4. 
123
   The Australian cricketer who took diuretic tablets.  Warne was seen as stupid and vain in taking his mother’s 
‘fluid pills’ to improve his on-camera appearance and heralded as a returned hero once his suspension was over: 
Alex Brown, Invite Only as Warne Takes Junction Oval for a Spin (2004) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/02/04/1075853941933.html?from=storyrhs> at 2 August 2008; Neil 
Wilson, Michael Warner and Leela de Krester, 'Not Sinister, Says Botham', Herald Sun (Melbourne), 2003, 7.  
ABC’s media watch was particularly astute in recognising the extreme laxity of the media (in this case Channel 
Nine’s A Current Affair) in its treatment of Warne’s doping positive:  Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 
Media Watch Stories in 2003 (2003) <http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/s796416.htm> at 14 
September 2008. 
124
   Discussed more fully in Chapter Two.  Raducan tested positive for pseudoephedrine at the 2000 Olympics.  
Attitudes expressed in the media were overwhelming sympathetic to her.  See for example 'This Time, Back the 
Drug Cheat', St Petersburg Times (St Petersburg), 30 September 2000, 1C; Peter Bossley, 'Failng the Drugs Test 
But Passing the Test of Nobility', The Sentinel (Stoke on Trent), 1 October 2000 and Sue Williams, 'Life Goes 
On....A Perfect Score as Raducan Braves the World', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 29 September 2000, 
4.  Note that pseudoephedrine has now been removed from the WADA Code Prohibited List.  The argument still 
stands for other substances such as marijuana and alcohol.  
125
  Charles E Yesalis and Michael S Bahrke, 'Where There is a Will to Gain an Edge, Athletes Find a Way', The New 
York Times (New York), 7 March 2004, SP 10.  See also John Hoberman, 'How Drug Testing Fails: The Politics 
of Doping Control' in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (eds), Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the 
Olympic Movement, 2001 (Champaign: Human Kinetics Publishers) 241; Robert Voy and Kirk Deeter, Drugs, 
Sport and Politics, 1991 (Champaign: Leisure Press) and Ferstle, above n 8, 363. 
126
  Charles E Yesalis, Michael S Bahrke and James E Wright, 'Societal Alternatives' in Charles E Yesalis (ed), 
Anabolic Steroids in Sport and Exercise (2nd ed) 2000 (Champaign: Human Kinetics Publishers Inc) 461, 465. 
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and Bahrke claimed that ‘[u]nless you are unlucky, careless or have an I.Q. somewhere at 
or below room temperature, you are probably not going to be caught by a drug test.’127  
The criticisms of modern sport drug testing programmes include the failure to strategically 
test athletes at appropriate times and the fact that analytical tests yield both false negatives 
(doped athletes do not test positive)128 and false positives (non-doped athletes test 
positive).  Both these criticisms of the analytical aspect of drug testing have wide 
implications.  Yet drug testing has continued to increase in amount and expense over the 
years.  Why pour resources into something that is so imprecise and ineffective? 
These are just a few examples of some of the more obvious mysteries which arise in 
relation to the ‘anti-doping war’.  These conundrums are important in their own right, but 
there are two more difficult issues in current anti-doping policy which strike at the very 
heart of the whole ‘war on drugs in sport.’  
2 The Basic Issues:  Ambiguities in Doping Definition and Rationales  
Many difficulties which arise in anti-doping policy can be traced back to a lack of clarity 
regarding two basic questions:  what is doping and why should it be prohibited?  Chapters 
Two and Three of this thesis will detail some profound problems with the way in which 
doping is currently defined and the justifications for the present policy.  The ambiguities 
relating to these two aspects of anti-doping policy are not simply products of the current 
approach, they have existed for as long as anti-doping policy has.  Therefore, by way of 
introduction to the problematic nature of these dimensions of doping policy, in this chapter 
some of the historic confusions over doping definition and doping rationales will be 
reviewed.  This history will not only show that doping definition and doping rationales 
have always been characterised by difficulties but will also provide some context for the 
subsequent argument in Chapters Two and Three where current confusions arising from 
these two aspects of doping policy will be considered.   
                                                
127
   Yesalis and Bahrke, above n 125. 
128
   For an example of these kinds of criticisms see David L Black, 'Doping Control Testing Policies and Procedure: 
A Critique' in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (eds), Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the 
Olympic Movement, 2001 (Champaign: Human Kinetics Publishers Inc) 29 who discusses the problem of false 
positives; R.Craig Kammerer, 'Drug Testing and Anabolic Steroids ' in Charles E Yesalis (ed), Anabolic Steroids 
in Sport and Exercise (2nd ed, 2000) 415 and R.Craig Kammerer, 'Drug Testing in Sport and Exercise' in Michael 
S Bahrke and Charles E Yesalis (eds), Performance-Enhancing Substances in Sport and Exercise, 2002 
(Champaign: Human Kinetics) 323 for examples of some of the problems of false negatives.  Interestingly most 
critics of current drug testing programmes see the way forward as better testing, better sample collection and less 
conflict of interest on the part of the administrators of the programme rather than a different type of regulatory 
system.  See for example, Black, this note, 38ff and Kammerer, this note, 334. 
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It is important to note first that the two questions — what is doping and why prohibit it — 
are interlinked, since determining which practices constitute doping can only be done by 
defining which practices are morally reprehensible.  This, in turn, hinges on defining what 
is, in principle, repugnant about these practices.  For the sake of clarity the two issues will 
be considered separately here. 
C  Far from Consensus:  The Historic Confusion over Doping Definition 
1 Doping Definition:  The Deviant Behaviour 
(a) General Concepts:  ‘Theoretical Definition’129 
Since the late 1920s when anti-doping policy began, the range of practices that have fallen 
under the definition of ‘doping’ has substantially narrowed.  In the 1930s ‘doping’ was 
‘used in a general sense to describe any method of improving athletic performance 
temporarily, either during training or in connection with competitive events’.130  In the 
1930s, Boje listed under the category of ‘doping’: 
Apart from actual drugs, such as Benzedrine, cocaine, caffeine, coramine and others, the 
agents used for ‘doping’ also include dietetic preparations, glucose, vitamins, and various 
non-toxic salts such as phosphates, which are also normally consumed in food. 
The term also covers the inhalation of pure oxygen and ultraviolet irradiation, indeed even 
massage and the encouragement shouted to competitors in athletic contests’ can be 
regarded as falling within the concept.131   
Now, however, the term technically only applies to the use of those substances and 
methods specifically identified on the relevant prohibited list.  Of course, in everyday 
language, ‘doping’ also refers to things outside the list which are still viewed as 
illegitimate forms of performance enhancement.  For instance, in 1998 Juan Antonio 
Samaranch was quoted in the newspaper, El Mundo, as saying ‘doping now is everything 
that, firstly is harmful to an athlete’s health and, secondly, artificially augments his 
performance.  If it’s just the second case, for me that’s not doping.  If it’s the first case it 
                                                
129
   The term ‘theoretical definition’ is here used in opposition to ‘operational definition’ to connote the ideas that the 
general population have in mind when they discuss doping as a general concept. 
130
  Ove Boje, 'Doping: A Study of the Means Employed to Raise the Level of Performance in Sport' (1939) 8 
Bulletin of the Health Organisation of the League of Nations 439, 439. 
131
  Ibid.  Interestingly Boje opens his article by stating that the term was originally used to describe ‘certain methods 
designed to augment the functional efficiency of athletes by means of highly active drugs.’  It appears that the 
concept had widened by the time of the first anti-doping policies only to be narrowed again to present 
conceptions.  See also John Hoberman, Mortal Engines: the Science of Performance and the Dehumanisation of 
Sport, 1992 (Ontario: The Free Press), Chapter 4, 100ff for further examples of what might have been considered 
unacceptable performance enhancement in the past. 
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is.’132  Even in common usage, however, the term does not have the same wide 
connotations that it did in the 1930s; it appears to be limited to substances and methods 
which are identifiable as sports ‘drugs’ (this point is considered further in later chapters).133 
There is, then, a distinct difference between the way that ‘doping’ was defined when anti-
doping first began and the present conception of the term.  The definition of doping has 
proved to be a very difficult problem for anti-doping officials over the intervening years.  It 
will be argued in Chapter Two that when the current theoretical definition of doping is 
analysed, it becomes evident that there is deep confusion in public opinion as to which 
practices should be defined as doping.  The aspects of doping definition where these 
perplexities are particularly evident include the significance of the intent of the athlete, 
which substances are, or should be, included on the prohibited list and the significance of 
the route of entry of the substance.  All of these aspects of doping definition in public 
discourse will be considered in Chapter Two. 
(b) Legal Definition 
The confusions over doping definition are, perhaps surprisingly, not restricted to public 
opinion — the legal definition of doping has been, and remains, one of the most difficult 
aspects of anti-doping policy.  In 1963, a convention of European sports governing bodies 
produced what appears to be the first ‘doping’ definition: 
The administration to, or use by, a competing athlete of any substance foreign to the body 
or any physiological substance taken in abnormal quantity or by an abnormal route of entry 
into the body, with the sole intention of increasing in an artificial and unfair manner his 
performance in competition.134  
Houlihan notes that although there were obvious weaknesses in this first definition (which 
was adopted by the IOC and other bodies) it marked the beginning of an ‘intense 
discussion by all the key bodies interested in the definition of doping’.135  Within a year a 
number of similar attempts to define the offence appeared.  By 1964, Ariens was able to 
say ‘[c]oncerning the concept of doping there is quite a variety of opinions…’, stating that 
                                                
132
   These comments caused a huge public controversy and the IOC attempted to water down his comments:  see 
MacAloon, above n 34, 223.   
133
  This issue will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis.  It is noted here that the WADA Code 2008 
Prohibited List, M1 to M3, also contains ‘methods’ such as blood doping which defies the categorisation of a 
‘drug’.  However, it will be argued later that these types of methods are prohibited because of their symbolic links 
with drugs through the use of needles and other drug related paraphernalia.  
134
   Houlihan, above n 102, 130.  See also Lan Barnes, 'Olympic Drug Testing: Improvements Without Progress' 
(1980) 8(6) The Physician and Sports Medicine 21, 22.  Note that Paul Dimeo, A History of Drug Use in Sport 
1876-1976: Beyond Good and Evil, 2007 (London: Routledge), 95, suggests that there was a previous doping 
definition — in 1972  —  produced by the Federazione Medico-Sportiva Italiana, which strongly influenced the 
first international meeting held by the Council of Europe committee in 1963.  
135
   Ibid. 
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there were ‘divergent definitions’.136  He went on to list a number of definitions proposed 
by various organisations: 
• The Dutch Federation of Medical Sport-Examination Centres:  ‘the application 
of unnatural means by sportsmen with intent to increase their performances.’ 
• The German League of Sports-Doctors:  ‘the use of any drug – effective or not 
given with the intent to increase the performances in competition.’ 
• The IOC:  ‘the use of drugs and artificial stimulants of any kind is condemned 
and any person offering or accepting doping in any form whatsoever, cannot 
compete in the Olympic Games.’ 
• Council of Europe Committee for Out-Of-School Education:  
the administration to, or the use by, a healthy individual of an agent foreign to the 
organism by whatsoever route introduced, or of physiological substances in 
abnormal quantities or introduced by an abnormal route with the sole object of 
increasing artificially and in an unfair manner the performance of that subject 
while participating in a competition.’137 
Ariens went on to say: 
Most definitions are restricted to the increase in the performance by the use of 
drugs…Furthermore, it is clear that not the effectiveness of the artificial means used, but 
the intention with which they are used, namely, the increase of the performance by these 
means, turns the scale.138 
Also in 1964, the British Association of Sports and Medicine (BASM) published a 
statement which included an extended definition of doping: 
The administration to or use by a healthy individual while taking part in a sporting 
competition of: 
a)  Any chemical agent or substance not normally present in the body and which does 
not play either an essential or normal part in the day to day biochemical 
environment or processes of metabolism, regardless of dosage, preparation or route 
of administration,  
and/or 
Any chemical agent or substance which plays an essential or normal part in the day to 
day processes or metabolism or forms a normal part of the biochemical 
environment, when introduced in abnormal quantities and/or by abnormal route of 
entry and/or in abnormal form,  
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Either or both of which (a. and/or b.) are present in the body of the individual during 
competition for the PURPOSE or with the EFFECT of modifying artificially the 
performance of the individual during competition.  
DOPING IS ALSO:- 
2. The administration to or use by an individual temporarily or permanently disabled by 
disease or injury who takes part in a sporting competition of:- 
c)  Any chemical agent or substance regardless of nature, dosage, preparation or route 
of administration, for the sole purpose of alleviating or curing the disability or its 
cause, which, being present in the body of the individual during competition 
would, BY ITS SECONDARY effects improve artificially the performance of that 
individual during competition.139 
Despite the inadequacies of these types of definitions,140 many anti-doping policies soon 
employed similar definitions with only minor alterations.  At this stage in history, doping 
was consistently defined as an offence of intent — intentionally attempting to enhance 
performance.141  
It was not until 1967, when the IOC published its first list of banned substances and 
practices,142 that doping definitions began to evolve towards a strict liability definition.143  
The focus changed from the subjective intent to the presence of particular banned 
substances in the athlete’s body fluids, detected through an ever-increasing battery of drug 
tests.  By 1972 it was clear that intent was no longer needed to prove a doping offence.  
The IOC’s decision against US swimmer, Rick DeMont, was the first to show the 
irrelevancy of intent.  DeMont lost his gold medal in the 400m freestyle following a 
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positive doping test for ephedrine, a substance present in his long-term asthma medication.  
He had reported using this medication on his official medical records before the event.144   
Between 1971 and 2003, strict liability offences became increasingly important, to the 
point that this type of offence has been called the ‘fundamental cornerstone’ of anti-doping 
policies.145  There have been both legal146 and academic challenges147 to the strict liability 
doping offence.  Despite these attacks, sports organisations, the CAS148 and domestic 
courts149 have all upheld the concept of the strict liability doping offence.  The usual 
justification for such a severe rule is that it is necessary in order for sports organising 
bodies, with limited funds and resources, to be able to effectively enforce anti-doping 
regimes.150  
Thus there has been a substantial shift in the legal definition of doping.  At one time intent 
was articulated as being the essence of doping,151 now the ‘cornerstone of anti-doping 
policy’ makes intent irrelevant.  However, the near universal acceptance of the strict 
liability definition does not necessarily indicate that agreement was easily reached.  As 
Ferstle states:  ‘All organizations involved in the issue struggled with the dual problem of 
defining doping and establishing what constituted proof of a doping offence.  These issues 
continue to be debated up to the present.’152   
The historic struggle over definition continues, albeit on a less visible level in the discourse 
and law surrounding the issue.  There are a number of aspects of modern doping definition 
which, upon analysis, are flawed.  Some of the aspects which will be considered in Chapter 
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Two include the divergence between the operational (legal) definition and the theoretical 
definition of doping and the impact of the provisions which make both the intent of the 
athlete and the effect of the substance irrelevant. 
2 Doping Definition:  The Prohibited List 
Ferstle has linked the development of the first list of prohibited substances, produced by 
the European Doping Colloquium in 1963, to concerns over ‘the difficulty of 
discriminating between doping and legitimate medical treatment with a substance that 
could improve performance.’153  Along with an amendment clarifying the therapeutic use 
of such substances, the Colloquium developed a list to ‘further define what constituted an 
offence’.154  This list consisted of a number of broad categories of drugs such as narcotics, 
amine stimulants, alkaloids, analeptic agents, respiratory tonics and hormones.  A similar 
list was produced by the IOC in 1967 (discussed in Chapter Five) which, as Houlihan puts 
it, became the ‘benchmark list’ for a large number of sports.155  
The fact that the IOC’s list became the guide for other policies is not necessarily indicative 
of a general agreement as to which substances should be considered doping: ‘Even 
agreement regarding what substances should be on the banned list was difficult to 
achieve.’156  Furthermore, the way in which the IOC list grew hardly provided a good role 
model.  As Pound states, ‘[t]o say that the scientific basis of all the decisions to list certain 
substances and not others was sound would be a vast overstatement.’157  If the IOC list has 
been the benchmark standard since the late 1960s, it is clear that confusion over the list has 
existed since that time. 
The discussion in Chapter Two will demonstrate that today there is still ambiguity 
regarding the way in which substances come to be regarded as doping agents.  Although 
the process may be a marked improvement on the past, there are many avenues for 
confusion about which substances are, and which are not, doping agents.  The confusion is 
evident in both public discourse on doping and the selection criteria for the WADA Code 
Prohibited List, both of which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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D Far from Consensus:  The Historic Confusion Over Anti-Doping Rationales 
The driving rationale for anti-doping policy in the 1920s and 1930s was articulated in quite 
a different way from today’s rhetoric.  As will be discussed in Chapter Five, the IOC 
passed its first anti-doping ‘condemnation’ in 1938.  At this time, doping was viewed as 
one of a number of aspects of elite sport which challenged the amateur ethos of the modern 
Olympic Games.  Some of the other issues discussed under the broader heading of 
‘amateurism’ included the nationalisation of sport for political aims, athlete training 
camps, appearance fees, athlete pocket-money and indemnities for the dependents of 
athletes during the athlete’s absence. 158  In the 1930s there was no separate consideration 
of why doping should be viewed as challenging this ethos or why it should be prohibited 
outright. 
Since the IOC lifted the prohibition on professional athletes competing in the Olympic 
Games in the late 1980s, the issue of professionalism in Olympic sport is a thing of the 
past.159  Doping now stands as an independent issue, quite apart from professionalism.  
And of all those issues, it is only doping which is now demonised.  Furthermore, almost 
every kind of performance enhancement (apart from doping) is now acceptable.  Full time 
training, dietetic preparation, oxygen tents,160 high altitude training and psychological 
assistance are all considered normal and legitimate aspects of athletic training.  Doping 
alone raises the ire of the public.  As Barnes points out, other sacrifices which athletes 
make to pursue their goals are applauded, while doping is abhorred.161  Doping is now seen 
as the ‘biggest threat to sport today’, not just one of a number of issues.162 
As will be discussed in Chapter Three, there have been a number of justifications or 
rationales presented for anti-doping policy over the years.  The most contemporary 
statement is found in the introduction to the WADA Code: 
Anti-doping programs seek to preserve what is intrinsically valuable about sport. This 
intrinsic value is often referred to as “the spirit of sport”; it is the essence of Olympism; it is 
how we play true.  The spirit of sport is the celebration of the human spirit, body and mind, 
and is characterised by the following values: 
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• Ethics, fair play and honesty 
• Health 
• Excellence in performance 
• Character and education 
• Fun and joy 
• Teamwork 
• Dedication and commitment 
• Respect for rules and laws 
• Respect for self and other participants 
• Courage 
• Community and solidarity 
Doping is fundamentally contrary to the spirit of sport.163 
The reasons given for the prohibition on doping today are entirely different from those of 
the framers of the original anti-doping condemnations.  Here no reference whatsoever to 
professionalism can be found; a prohibition on doping is assumed appropriate for both 
amateurs and professionals.   
This thesis will also argue that the rationale statement of the WADA Code in no way 
represents a complete and adequate answer to the question of why we prohibit doping in 
modern sport.  There are still many inconsistencies and problems which can be identified 
in the commonly presented rationales.  As will be demonstrated in the discussion in 
Chapter Three, these problems are no less real today than in the 1920s, despite the seeming 
solidarity of opinion which a statement like the WADA Code rationale statement suggests. 
VI THE THESIS 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the basic contention of the thesis is that anti-doping 
policy is not primarily driven by any of the anti-doping justifications (examined in Chapter 
Three).  Rather, anti-doping policy is largely a result of the symbolism associated with the 
use of performance enhancing substances in sport.  This symbolism has had an 
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immeasurable impact on public opinion.  Public opinion has, in turn, affected the public 
image of sport.  This public image has been the driving force behind much of anti-doping 
policy to date.  Desmond Manderson wrote in relation to illicit recreational drugs, ‘drugs 
have been prohibited for what they symbolize and not because of what they do’.164  
Adapting these words to the doping context provides a good summary of the thesis 
argument:  doping agents have been prohibited for what they symbolize and not because of 
what they do. 
A fuller outline of the progression of the argument will be provided below. 
A  The Research Question 
The seemingly unruffled and harmonious surface of the ‘anti-doping war’ is actually a 
mirage.  So far this chapter has presented the current picture of anti-doping efforts; the 
image being one of universal condemnation of doping as a general concept and for guilty 
individuals on the one hand and unparalleled cooperation towards achieving universal anti-
doping policy on the other.  For all intents and purposes, anti-doping policy seems to be 
based on widespread understanding and agreement.  However, there has always been 
confusion and problems in anti-doping policy, even in relation to the very basic issues of 
doping definition and doping rationales.  The next two chapters of the thesis will 
demonstrate that when it comes to doping, despite all appearances to the contrary, we do 
not really know exactly what we are talking about, nor exactly why we are talking about it.  
This analysis will lead to the research question.  
It will be argued that there is a very basic reason why anti-doping policy is characterised 
by such profound ambiguity.  The ambiguity arises from the origins of anti-doping policy.  
By understanding the way in which anti-doping policy developed, the reason for the 
resulting confusion will be clear.  The primary research question of the thesis can therefore 
be put thus:  why do we prohibit doping and why do we define it the way we do?   
B The Null Hypothesis 
Anti-doping policy did not develop upon a rational basis – it was not a well considered and 
balanced policy, logically tailored to deal with a clearly constructed and comprehensively 
understood problem.  Rather, the predominant influence in anti-doping policy is to be 
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found outside the rational realm and in the emotional (or ‘arrational’)165 realm.  The thesis 
will argue that the main driver of anti-doping policy was the perceived need to protect the 
image of sport and that, in turn, the primary reason public image was such a problem in 
doping was due to the emotional reaction caused by the symbolism of doping.  This 
symbolism relates doping closely to the use of illicit recreational drugs by athletes.  It will 
be shown that, rather than anti-doping policy being prompted by concerns about making 
sport fair for all, fears associated with the use of illicit drugs in sport were the main force 
behind these laws up until the 1960s.  From that time on, the symbolism changed slightly.  
Still, the driving force was not so much about the pharmacological properties of the 
substance than what the substance symbolised.  The symbolism relating to ‘doping’ and 
‘doping agents’ has produced public sentiment strongly against the use of such substances 
in sport.  Chapters Five to Seven of the thesis will provide historical evidence of these 
symbolic links.   
The thesis will culminate in Chapter Nine with the presentation of a model (the ‘Reactive 
Regulation Model’) explaining the way in which symbolism has influenced anti-doping 
policy.  The model, presented below in Figure 1, summarises the main argument: 
Figure 1: The Reactive Regulation Model 
Symbolism relating to the 
use of performance 
enhancing substances in 
sport
Public opinion regarding the 
use of performance 
enhancing substances in 
sport
Negative image for sport/ 
clash with the intended 
image of sport/ public 
relations issue for sports 
officials
Reactive regulation of the 
use of performance 
enhancing substances in 
sport
 
This pattern has been repeated numerous times in the history of anti-doping policy and has 
led to a patchwork system which has little internal coherence or consistency.   
The analysis of symbolism used in this thesis is based on a framework of analysis 
presented by Desmond Manderson, in his work on the history of illicit drug laws.  
Manderson argues that: 
What has remained constant throughout the changing face of reason in all these 
jurisdictions has been the feelings of revulsion or seduction, of dirt and purity, which 
images of drugs have always provoked.  It is this symbolism which we need to 
understand…  By focusing on the symbolism of drugs, we may begin to explain the 
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intensity of emotion which surrounds the question of drug use in society and of which the 
law is a clear and constant reflection.166   
Similarly, it will be contended here that doping in general, and individual doping 
substances specifically, have been prohibited not so much for what they do, as for what 
they symbolise.  The thesis therefore applies Manderson’s symbolic analysis to the field of 
doping in sport.  
By its very nature, ‘symbolism’ is a somewhat elusive concept to define.  Dictionary 
definitions of ‘symbolism’ refer — with a high degree of circularity — to the practice of 
representing things by symbols, or of investing things with a symbolic meaning or 
character’.167  ‘Symbol’ is defined as ‘something used or regarded as standing for or 
representing something else; a material object representing something immaterial; an 
emblem, token, or sign.’168  ‘Symbolism’ in this thesis means associated objects or ideas; 
the images which generally spring to mind when confronted with a picture or description 
of the use performance enhancing substances, or even at the mere mention of a particular 
substance or practice.  The ‘general consensus’ aspect of the concept highlights the fact 
that associated ideas and images will be highly dependent on the social, political and 
historic setting in which the term or vision is placed. 
C The Thesis Framework 
As previously outlined in the introductory chapter, the thesis will be divided into three 
parts.   
The first Part, comprising Chapters One, Two and Three, will consider in more depth the 
problems of modern anti-doping policy.  In this part, entitled ‘The Hidden Dilemmas of 
Anti-Doping Policy’, the focus will be on the two basic questions of ‘what is doping’ and 
‘why do we prohibit it’.  These chapters will demonstrate that there has always been 
uncertainty about these issues and that this lack of clarity has ongoing significance in anti-
doping policy.  These chapters reveal the end product of the process of reactive regulation 
which will be described later in the thesis:  a confused maze of ideas, ethics and rules.  In 
essence these chapters will provide a dilemma for the subsequent analysis to explain:  why 
is anti-doping policy such a mess?   
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Part II, ‘The Symbolism of Anti-Doping Policy’, comprises Chapters Four to Seven.  
Chapter Four will present the alternative model of analysis that will be applied to the 
history of anti-doping policy in Part II.  Chapters Five to Seven will then consider the 
symbolism of doping in three significant time periods:  the 1920s, 1960s and 1970s.  The 
aim of these chapters is to show just how strong and significant the symbolism associated 
with doping and doping agents was in these time periods. 
Part III, ‘The Role of Symbolism in Anti-Doping History’, comprises Chapters Eight and 
Nine.  This part will discuss the mechanism by which this symbolism has led to our present 
state of anti-doping policy.  The final chapter of the thesis will also consider the future of 
anti-doping in light of the influence of symbolism.  
In summary, the thesis will: 
• Reveal the unsettled nature of anti-doping policy with a focus on two basic 
issues: what is doping and why do we prohibit it 
• Pose the question:  why is anti-doping policy so ambiguous and unclear? 
• Demonstrate the profound role that symbolism has played in the formation of 
anti-doping policy and how that has led to confusion in anti-doping policy 
• Suggest a model of how anti-doping policy has developed which takes public 
reaction to symbolism into account, and 
• Consider what symbolism can tell us about the future of anti-doping policy.  
 
The next chapter will examine the first basic issue:  what is doping? 
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CHAPTER TWO  
THE AMBIGUITIES OF DOPING DEFINITION 
ARTICLE 1 DEFINITION OF DOPING  
Doping is defined as the occurrence of one or more of the anti-doping rule violations set 
forth in Article 2.1 through Article 2.8 of the Code.  
ARTICLE 2 ANTI-DOPING RULE VIOLATIONS  
…The following constitute anti-doping rule violations:  
2.1  The presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an 
Athlete’s Sample.  
2.1.1 It is each Athlete’s personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance 
enters his or her body.  Athletes are responsible for any Prohibited Substance or its 
Metabolites or Markers found to be present in their Samples.  Accordingly, it is not 
necessary that intent, fault, negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part be 
demonstrated in order to establish an anti-doping violation under Article 2.1. … 
2.2  Use or Attempted Use by an Athlete of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited 
Method.  
2.2.1 The success or failure of the Use of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited 
Method is not material.  It is sufficient that the Prohibited Substance or Prohibited 
Method was Used or Attempted to be Used for an anti-doping rule violation to be 
committed….1 
I INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the definitional ambiguity which, it is argued, constitutes one of the 
puzzles of anti-doping policy:  what exactly are we talking about when we speak of 
‘doping’?  A detailed analysis of the working of anti-doping law and doping discourse 
reveals the ‘arrational’2 basis of modern anti-doping policy, as this chapter will reveal.   
It may be axiomatic to suggest that the first task of any legal code is to clearly define the 
deviant behaviour.  Anti-doping policy should be no exception.  Upon initial examination, 
anti-doping policy is no different; the first few provisions of the World Anti-Doping Code 
(WADA Code) are devoted to defining doping.  Doping is defined as the occurrence of any 
of the anti-doping rules listed in the Code.  Apart from the usual ambiguities that lawyers 
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are rewarded handsomely for exploiting, on the face of the document the WADA Code 
definition does not present any major inconsistencies or difficulties.  Doping is defined by 
reference to the WADA Code Prohibited List; under the classic strict liability offence in 
Article 2.1, once it is proved that one of these substances was in the athlete’s specimen, a 
doping offence has taken place.  This definition of doping seems unambiguous.3   
However, as foreshadowed in the previous chapter, there are profound difficulties arising 
from the way in which the offence of doping has been, and is now, defined.  Chapter One 
outlined the historical confusion over doping definition.  Ever since anti-doping policy 
started, identifying the deviant behaviour and the contents of prohibited lists have been a 
source of perplexity.  Both these aspects will be analysed in a modern context in this 
chapter, demonstrating that the troubled character of doping definition has not changed.  
Far from resolving the problems of the past, present anti-doping policy has come to a 
consensus which is no more satisfactory than past attempts.  Since historic difficulties have 
already been addressed in the previous chapter, this chapter will consider only the current 
problems in doping definition.   
The claim here is not that confusion reigned in developing the operational (legal) definition 
in the WADA Code.  Being largely adopted from predecessor anti-doping policies,4 the 
current legal definition represents a consensus of opinion on what is considered a 
reasonable working definition.  Although some of the problems identified in this chapter 
will focus on the operational implications of the legal definition, the inadequacies of the 
definition presented in this chapter largely relate to general notions of what constitutes the 
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Capobianco, Modahl and Krabbe in Buti and Fridman, 67-74 and for an example of the second, Rebagliatti at 11-
12 and Baxter, discussed below. 
4
  The 1999 version of the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code (OMADC, also called the Olympic Movement 
Medical Code) contains similar provisions to the presence of, the use of and trafficking offences:  see Article 2 in 
Robert C.R. Siekmann, Janwillem Soek and Andrea Bellani, Doping Rules of International Sports Organisations, 
1999 (The Hague: TMC Asser Press), 600-601.  Note that Pound states that the OMADC was not actually a legal 
document until this time, Dick Pound, Inside the Olympics, 2004 (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada), 69.  
The doping rules of the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) in 1996 contained three main 
types of doping offences: the presence, the use of and admitting use.  The IAAF rules also had the ancillary 
offences of failure to submit to doping control, assisting/inciting others and 
trading/trafficking/distributing/selling: Simon Gardiner, Alexandra Felix, John O’Leary, Mark James and Roger 
Welch, Sports Law, 1998 (London: Cavendish Publishing), 170.  These offences were essentially the same in 
2000 but failure to submit to doping control was a main offence: see Lauri Tarasti, Legal Solutions in 
International Doping Cases, 2000 (Milan: SEP Editrice), 69.  Other sports, such as swimming, also had anti-
doping definitions which were substantially the same as the IAAF policy: see Siekmann et al, this note.  It is clear 
from the World Conference on Doping in Sport that the OMADC was a primary influence on the drafting of the 
WADA Code:  Judge Kéba Mbaye, 'Report of the Working Group on the Legal and Political Aspects of Doping' 
(Paper presented at the World Conference on Doping in Sport, Lausanne, 2-4 February 1999), 2-3. 
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‘sin’ of doping in the eyes of the public.  It will be argued that there is an enormous 
difference between this instinctive definition and the operational definition.   
The next two chapters will go beyond merely pointing out the inadequacies of doping 
definition and rationales.  Rather, the purpose of these chapters is to demonstrate that these 
inadequacies have implications for understanding how anti-doping policy has developed.  
Each chapter will conclude that such irregularities demonstrate that anti-doping policy is 
not fundamentally based on logic.  Instead, it will be shown to largely be ‘arrational’ such 
that it is necessary to look to other, non-rational explanations for the development of such a 
policy.  The subsequent chapters of the thesis, particularly Chapters Five to Seven, will be 
devoted to providing an explanation which more adequately explains how anti-doping 
policy, and its related difficulties, came into being. 
II DOPING:  THE DEVIANT BEHAVIOUR 
One particularly troubling aspect of doping definition is the way in which the operational 
or legal definition of doping differs from the popular definition of doping; what is thought 
of as doping is different from what is punished as doping.  There are two relevant aspects.  
The popular doping debate implicitly assumes that doping is about ‘intent,’ while the strict 
liability doping offence makes intent irrelevant.  Secondly, the combination of strict 
liability and those provisions of the WADA Code which make the effect of the substance 
irrelevant cause particular problems.  Working together, these provisions punish athletes 
who have no intention of enhancing their performance for having what is, essentially, an 
ineffective substance in their system.  People may be willing to punish athletes for taking 
effective doping substances even in the absence of intent.  But punishing athletes 
displaying neither intent, nor performance advantage, takes the operational definition of 
doping a long way from popular notions of what ‘doping’ is all about. 
A The Role of Intent in Doping Discourse Versus the Strict Liability Rule 
To support this argument, it is necessary first to identify the popular definition of ‘doping’.  
There are a number of sources which provide evidence of this ‘theoretical definition’,5 
three of which will be considered here:  the language used in the rhetoric surrounding the 
                                                
5
   The term ‘theoretical definition’ is here used in opposition to ‘operational definition’ to connote the ideas that the 
general population have in mind when they discuss doping. 
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issue of doping; the language of case law; and the language used in the rhetoric of anti-
doping debates. 
1 Theoretical Definition of Doping 
(a) Anti-Doping Rhetoric 
One of the most notorious condemnations of doping is found in the speech by Juan 
Antonio Samaranch, set out in Chapter One.6  He describes doping as death of the body, 
spirit, intellect and morality.  The message is that by ‘cheating’ athletes are committing a 
dreadful sin against themselves and their community.  Cheating is seen as a deliberate act 
involving the mind as well as the body.  Other condemnations of doping by Samaranch, 
such as ‘athletes who use banned substances to improve their performance commit a series 
of acts that transgress and violate certain immutable principles’,7 similarly refer to the 
moral/psychological life of the athlete, the mindset being the repugnant element.  
Furthermore, Samaranch’s rhetoric is representative of much anti-doping rhetoric.  Doping 
is still fundamentally about ‘cheating’, no matter how the concept may be legally defined. 
(b) Language of Case Law 
Even in the language of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which has continuously 
upheld the idea of strict liability in doping, it is possible to detect the implicit assumption 
that doping involves intent.  For instance, in Kowalczyk,8 the court considered if there was 
evidence that use of a specified substance was not intended to enhance performance.  The 
court stated that, by submitting medical certification, the athlete had shown a prima facie 
case that the use was medical, it was then up to the authority to prove that it was used as a 
‘doping agent’.  ‘Doping agent’ was juxtaposed against the words ‘was not intended to 
enhance sport performance’,9 implying that a ‘doping agent’ is one which was intended to 
enhance performance.  The implicit belief that doping involves intent to enhance 
performance is consistent with the assumptions displayed in anti-doping rhetoric.10  
 
                                                
6
   See Chapter One, page 25, footnote 98. 
7
  John Hoberman, 'How Drug Testing Fails: The Politics of Doping Control' in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse 
(eds), Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement, 2001 (Champaign: Human 
Kinetics) 241, 243. 
8
   Arbitral Award delivered by the Court of Arbitration, Justyna Kowalczyk v International Ski Federation, CAS 
2005/A/918. 
9
  WADA Code, Article 10.3. 
10
   As opposed to the inadvertent ingestion of such substances, particularly in the course of treating a cold or other 
common illness. 
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(c) Language of Anti-Doping Rationales 
This theoretical definition carries over into the language of the WADA Code.  The 
introductory statement to the Code has been set out in Chapter One.11  It mentions ethics, 
honesty, values and spirit within sport.  References to such principles show that what is 
repugnant about doping is that it exhibits the wrong mindset:  athletes who dope do not 
share the ‘right’ values.  And the spirit of sport ‘is the celebration of the human spirit, body 
and mind.’12  It is simply preposterous to say that an athlete who accidentally and 
unknowingly ingests a prohibited substance has, by doing so, exhibited an attitude at all, 
let alone one which is contrary to the spirit of sport!  Nor has an inadvertent ‘doper’ acted 
contrary to the values listed above.  The implicit assumptions which drive this rationale 
statement are clearly based on the concept of ‘cheating’, an intentional use of performance 
enhancing drugs.  There can only be consistency in notions of ‘doping’ if the offence 
involves the mind. 
The concept of Olympism, so integral to the concept of the ‘spirit of sport’, is defined in 
the Olympic Charter: 
Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining to a balanced whole the qualities 
of body, will and mind…  Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy found in 
effort, the traditional value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical 
principles.13 
Olympism, and therefore the spirit of sport, is a philosophy which balances the body, will 
and mind.  This idea also has to do with conscious thought, values and ethics; the state of 
mind of the athlete.  When these ideas are imported into the Code’s ‘rationale statement’, it 
further emphasises the fact that what is repulsive about the practice of doping is that it 
contravenes the mind-set or attitudes which sport is meant to exhibit.   
In all these sources, it is implicitly accepted that ‘doping’ refers to intentional use of 
performance enhancing drugs.  It appears, therefore, that anti-doping rules fundamentally 
aim to sanction athletes who try to gain advantage over their competitors by using 
prohibited substances. 
 
 
                                                
11
   See Chapter One, page 39, footnote 163. 
12
   Emphasis added. 
13
  International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter, Fundamental Principles  
 <http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf> at 13 September 2008. 
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2 Operational Definition of Doping 
For a number of pragmatic reasons, mostly to do with the enforceability of the rules,14 
under the strict liability approach, doping has come to be defined as the mere presence of 
the substance in the body of the athlete.15  Under the strict liability rule, doping is defined, 
not with reference to the state of mind or values, but by reference to a state of body; as 
soon as a prohibited substance in discovered in the athlete’s specimen, a doping violation 
has occurred.  Doping is not about ‘spirit, body and mind’; under this rule it is singularly 
about the ‘body’.  Thus, under Article 2.1 of the WADA Code, it is possible that an athlete 
who is the very embodiment of the ‘spirit of sport’ — ethical, committed to fair play, 
honest, dedicated and respectful of the rules — will be guilty of contravening a provision 
which is intended to punish those who exhibit a state of mind contrary to the ‘spirit of 
sport’.   
This inconsistency reveals that the WADA Code doping definition is not quite as clear as 
the current harmonious approach to anti-doping policy would suggest.  Even within the 
WADA Code itself, there appears to be an unaccountable difference between the situations 
anti-doping policy is aimed at and the situations in which the policy actually takes affect.   
B The Definition of Doping in the Inadvertent Doping Cases 
These differences are most poignant in the inadvertent doping cases since it is in those 
cases that the clash of definitions is no longer simply a theoretical one.  The cases outlined 
below reveal where there is a real difference between what is generally perceived to 
constitute doping and what is punished as such by modern anti-doping policy.        
1 The Law:  Inadvertent Doping Cases 
In order to demonstrate the operation of doping definition in problematic cases, a brief 
summary of the outcome of a number of inadvertent doping cases will be provided. 
 
 
                                                
14
   The classic defence of the strict liability doping offence is found in Arbitration CAS 94/129, USA Shooting & Q v 
International Shooting Union (UIT), award May 23, 1995 in Matthieu (Ed) Reeb, Recueil des sentences du TAS, 
Digest of CAS Awards II 1986 – 1998, 1998 (Berne: Staempfli Editions SA Berne), 193.  The relevant part of that 
judgement was extracted and published in the commentary to the first version of the WADA Code as justification 
for adopting the strict liability approach:  WADA Code, 9. 
15
  Under the WADA Code, there are a number of other ways of defining doping (outlined in Chapter One).  Some of 
these do involve the mind of the athlete.  However, the fact that the strict liability offence is not the only way of 
defining doping does not detract from the argument that in many doping cases the offence is defined without 
reference to intent.  It is therefore legitimate to consider only the strict liability offence in this discussion. 
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(a) Pre WADA Code Cases  
(i) Laumann 
A Canadian rower, Silken Laumann, mistakenly took Benadryl Decongestant (containing 
pseudoephedrine) rather than Benadryl (containing no banned substances) for a cold.  She 
had sought advice from two doctors, who had not distinguished between these two 
preparations.  Initially suspended by her federation, Laumann was subsequently reinstated 
but a doping offence was recorded and her Pan Pacific medal confiscated.16  No further 
sanction was imposed because ‘there was no intentional or negligent use of a banned 
substance.’17 
(ii) Foschi18  
US swimmer, Jessica Foschi, tested positive for a prohibited steroid, mesterolone.  Foschi, 
her parents and her coach ‘consistently denied knowingly taking or giving the substance to 
the appellant, or any product that may have contained mesterolone’19 or knowing how such 
a substance could be found in her urine sample.  The American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) accepted that the applicable rules (those of the Fédération Internationale de 
Natation — FINA — the international federation for swimming) imposed the strict liability 
definition but said: 
Having concluded that the Claimant and all those connected to her are innocent and 
without fault, we unanimously conclude that the imposition of any sanction on the 
Claimant so offends our deeply rooted and historical concepts of fundamental fairness 
so as to be arbitrary and capricious.20 
The case was subsequently appealed to the CAS by FINA.  The court upheld the strict 
liability approach and only took subjective matters into account in determining the further 
sanction to be applied.21   
                                                
16
   The Pan Pacific medal was not returned even though the federation reinstated her because the decision regarding 
the medal was in the hands of the event organizers rather than the international rowing federation: see Maclean's 
the Canadian Encyclopaedia, Laumann Fails Drug Test (1995) 
<http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0010416> at 13 
September 2008. 
17
  Toronto Star, 8 April 1991, E1 cited in Buti and Fridman, above n 3, 121. 
18
  In the Matter of Arbitration Between Jessica K Foschi and United States Swimming Inc, American Arbitration 
Association, No 77-190-0036-96 (1 April 1996) partially reproduced in Ray Yasser, James R McCurdy and C 
Peter Goplerud, Sports Law: Cases and Materials (3rd Ed), 1997 (Anderson Publishing Co: Cincinnati) at 151-
153.  For a good discussion of the case see Aaron N Wise, '"Strict Liability" Drug Rules of Sports Governing 
Bodies' (1996) August 2 New Law Journal 1161.   
19
   Richard McLaren, 'CAS Doping Jurisprudence: What Can We Learn?' (2006) 1 International Sports Law Review 
4, 6. 
20
  Yasser et al, above n 18, 152-153.   
21
  The CAS found Foschi guilty of doping in accordance with the strict liability approach but reduced her ban from 
two years to six months due to the mitigating circumstances.  The court there differentiated between an absolute 
liability offence (where the athlete can do nothing to exculpate herself) and strict liability, where a positive drug 
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(iii) Raducan v International Olympic Committee (IOC)22   
The gold medal winning Romanian gymnast was given Nurofen Cold and Flu tablets 
(containing pseudoephedrine) by the team doctor at the 2000 Olympics.  The Olympic 
Movement Anti-Doping Code (OMADC) strict liability definition was applied and her 
Olympic gold medal confiscated.  During the case, expert evidence was adduced that the 
substance had not enhanced performance.  The evidence was rejected as irrelevant by the 
court, the court deciding that Article 4.4 of the OMADC23 specifically stated that ‘the 
success or failure of the use of a Prohibited Substance’ was irrelevant to the offence.24 
(iv) Baxter v IOC25  
The British slalom skier, Alain Baxter, took a Vicks Vapor inhaler (containing the 
prohibited stimulant, levmetamfetamine).  The product appeared identical to a permitted 
version sold in the United Kingdom so he didn’t read the ingredients list.  The strict 
liability offence in the OMADC was applied and Baxter’s Olympic bronze medal was 
confiscated.  Again during the case, evidence was adduced that there was no intention to 
enhance performance and that no ergogenic effect was gained but the court rejected these 
factors as irrelevant under the OMADC.26 
(b) Post WADA Code Cases 
The cases above predate the WADA Code.  There have also been a number of relevant 
cases since the introduction of the Code.  However, under the Code there are provisions 
which can affect the outcome of such cases.  Under Article 10.3 the anti-doping panel is 
able to adjust the ineligibility period (i.e. suspension) according to the level of fault of the 
athlete for doping violations involving certain specified substances.27  However, the strict 
                                                                                                                                              
test raises a rebuttable presumption that the athlete is guilty.  McLaren notes that the Foschi case seems to 
contradict the approach taken by the court in C v Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA) CAS 
95/141 in Matthieu (Ed) Reeb, Recueil des sentences du TAS, Digest of CAS Awards II 1986 – 1998, 1998 
(Berne: Staempfli Editions Berne) at 220 as to the role of the fault of the athlete in determining a doping case:  
see Richard McLaren, ‘A New Order: Athlete’s Rights and the Court of Arbitration at the Olympic Games’ 
(1998) VII Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies 1, 8.  
22
  Andreea Raducan v International Olympic Committee (IOC) CAS OG 00/011 in Tribunal Arbitral du Sport, 
Court of Arbitration, CAS Awards – Sydney 2000, The Decisions Delivered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
During the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, 2000 (Lausanne: Court of Arbitration for Sport), 111. 
23
  Article 4.4 of the OMADC, in Siekmann, Soek and Bellani, above n 4, 600. 
24
  Raducan v IOC, above n 22, 120. 
25
  Baxter v IOC CAS 2002/A/376. 
26
  Ibid, 11–12.  Note that the court accepted this evidence as true but rejected it as irrelevant. 
27
    WADA Code, Article 10.3.  
The Prohibited List may identify specified substances which are particularly susceptible to unintentional anti-doping 
rules violations because of their general availability in medicinal products or which are less likely to be successfully 
abused as a doping agent.  Where an Athlete can establish that Use of such a specified substance was not intended to 
enhance sport performance, the period of Ineligibility found in Article 10.2 shall be replaced with the following:  
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liability rule still applies and an athlete will be disqualified regardless of fault.28  But if an 
athlete can prove that they were without fault or negligence’ as defined in Article 10.5.1,29 
or without significant fault or negligence, defined in Article 10.5.2,30 then the ineligibility 
period can be eliminated or reduced respectively.   
(i) Squizzato v FINA31  
An Italian swimmer used a cream (containing an anabolic steroid, clostebol) purchased by 
her mother to treat a skin infection.  She did not ask a doctor or anyone else whether the 
substance contained prohibited substances.  She was found guilty of doping by the CAS.  
The court stated that she had failed in her duty of diligence since ‘with a simple check, she 
could have realized that the cream was containing a doping agent’[sic]32, as the product 
listed the prohibited substance on the label.  Squizzato failed to show no fault or 
negligence but since there was no intention to enhance her performance, her negligence 
was found to be ‘mild in comparison with an athlete that is using doping products in order 
                                                                                                                                              
First violation: At a minimum, a reprimand and no period of Ineligibility from future Events, and at a maximum, one 
(1) years’ Ineligibility. 
Second violation: Two (2) years’ Ineligibility 
Third violation: Lifetime Ineligibility 
However, the Athlete or other Person shall have the opportunity in each case, before a period of Ineligibility is 
imposed, to establish the basis for eliminating or reducing (in the case of a second or third violation) this sanction as 
provided in Article 10.5 
 It should be noted here that the 2007 version of the Code seeks to satisfy criticism of the inflexible nature of the 
mandatory sanctions of the 2003 version by allowing consideration of the athlete’s intent through the widening of 
the application of the Specified Substances provisions.  Although this may help to deal with the perceived 
injustice of some of these cases, it does not change the definitional problems in that the new Article 10.4 only 
deals with the ineligibility period and not the finding of an anti-doping rule violation (i.e. a finding of ‘doping’).  
Therefore, the changes to the Code at this point do not significantly change the argument here.  Interestingly, the 
comment to the revised Art 10.4 refers to the specified substances as substances where there is a greater 
likelihood of susceptibility of credible ‘non-doing’ purposes, suggesting again that theoretically doping is about 
intent.  
28
     WADA Code, Comment to Article 2.1.1 and Article 9. 
29
   Article 10.5.1  No Fault or Negligence.  
If an Athlete establishes in an individual case that he or she bears No Fault or Negligence, the otherwise applicable 
period of Ineligibility shall be eliminated.  When a Prohibited Substance or its Markers or Metabolites is detected in an 
Athlete's Sample in violation of Article 2.1 (presence of Prohibited Substance), the Athlete must also establish how the 
Prohibited Substance entered his or her system in order to have the period of Ineligibility eliminated.  In the event this 
Article is applied and the period of Ineligibility otherwise applicable is eliminated, the anti-doping rule violation shall 
not be considered a violation for the limited purpose of determining the period of Ineligibility for multiple violations 
under Article 10.7.  
30
  Article 10.5.2   No Significant Fault or Negligence.  
If an Athlete or other Person establishes in an individual case that he or she bears No Significant Fault or Negligence, 
then the period of Ineligibility may be reduced, but the reduced period of Ineligibility may not be less than one-half of 
the period of Ineligibility otherwise applicable.  If the otherwise applicable period of Ineligibility is a lifetime, the 
reduced period under this section may be no less than 8 years.  When a Prohibited Substance or its Markers or 
Metabolites is detected in an Athlete's Sample in violation of Article 2.1 (presence of Prohibited Substance), the 
Athlete must also establish how the Prohibited Substance entered his or her system in order to have the period of 
Ineligibility reduced. 
31
  G. Squizzato v FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, 11. 
32
   Ibid, 11. 
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to gain such advantage.’33  She received a one year suspension (rather than the usual two 
years) under the no significant fault provisions. 
(ii) Puerta v ITF34   
A tennis player accidentally drank from a glass that his wife had used to take medication 
(which contained etilefrine).  He had been drinking water with his family at a table with a 
number of identical glasses.  While temporarily away from the table, his wife used the 
glass that he had been drinking from to take her medication.  The medication was tasteless, 
odourless and colourless.  His wife had gone from the table when Puerta returned.  He took 
the same glass and drank water from it.  The CAS held that although the circumstances of 
the case were exceptional, Puerta had failed to exercise the utmost caution.  The panel 
stated: 
Athletes must be aware at all times that they must drink from clean glasses, especially in 
the last minutes before a major competition…  In the Panel’s view it would not have been 
too much to expect of him to ask his brother-in-law upon returning to the table whether the 
glass that he was going to use was “his glass” or whether “anyone had used his glass” 
during his absence.  Mr Puerta cannot avoid the conclusion that he suffered a momentary 
lapse of attention and exhibited a momentary lack of care when he used a glass over which 
he had lost visual control.35 
Puerta was found not to be significantly at fault or negligent, due to these factors:  the 
substance ingested was water which he had brought with him (in an effort to avoid 
inadvertent doping); the substance was colourless, odourless and tasteless; he had no 
reason to know that his wife had used his glass in his absence; the glass was only 
unattended for a few minutes; and the concentration of etilefrine could not have been 
performance enhancing.  Puerta received a two year sanction instead of the otherwise 
applicable life suspension.36 
(iii) Canas v ATP37 
A tennis player was found to have taken hydrochlorothiazide (HCT) due to a mix up of 
medications by ATP tournament staff.  Canas had medication prescribed by a tournament 
doctor which was to be left at the reception desk for him.  However, the medication left for 
Canas was one that had been prescribed for someone else.  Canas was found guilty of a 
                                                
33
  Ibid, 11–12. 
34
   Puerta v ITF CAS 2006/A/1025. 
35
  Ibid, 26. 
36
  This was Puerta’s second doping offence.  The CAS panel reduced the eight year suspension that the ITF anti-
doping panel had given (in accordance with the ITF/WADA Code doping rules) as they were of the view that this 
was indistinguishable from a life suspension and was therefore disproportionate to the circumstances of the 
offence: ibid, 41. 
37
   Canas v ATP, CAS 2005/A/951. 
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doping offence by the CAS.  The court found that he had been ‘clearly’ negligent in taking 
the medication ‘with no review whatsoever of the contents of the box even though he knew 
that the medication had been through several hands before being delivered to him.’38  
Relying ‘blindly’ on the system did not show the diligence required.  Therefore, Canas 
failed to satisfy the no fault or negligence test.  The court did, however, accept that he was 
without significant fault.  Factors which the court took into account included:  the fact that 
the player’s use of the medication was medicinal; he had never had other positive doping 
test; Canas dealt with his illness in the safest possible way (i.e. seeing a tournament doctor) 
and the mistake was made by the ATP’s staff not the player himself.  On this basis, the 
sanction was reduced from two years to fifteen months. 
(iv) Edwards39  
A US athlete ingested nickethamide when she took two glucose tablets given to her by her 
chiropractor.  She was found guilty of a doping offence under the applicable doping rules 
(International Association of Athletics Federations — IAAF — which were WADA Code 
compliant) by the CAS.  The court found that Edwards had ‘conducted herself with 
honesty, integrity and character’, and that she did not seek to ‘gain any improper advantage 
or “cheat” in any way’.  She was, however, negligent in failing to check whether the 
glucose tablets given to her contained a prohibited substance.  The tablets were purchased 
in a foreign country and the packaging contained warnings (in French) that the product 
contained a prohibited substance.  These factors should have led the athlete to enquire 
further.  The situation was found not to be ‘truly exceptional,’ and therefore neither the no 
fault nor the no significant fault provisions were applied.40  Edwards was suspended from 
athletics for the usual two years.41 
 
 
                                                
38
  Ibid, 14. 
39
  Final Award in the Arbitration between Ms Torri Edwards and International Association of Athletics Federations 
(IAAF) and USA Track and Field (USATF), Court of Arbitration for Sport Ad hoc Division – Games of the 
XXVIII Olympiad – Athens, CAS Arbitration No CAS OG 04/003. 
40
   Ibid, 16. 
41
  One other case which shows that it is not impossible to satisfy the exceptional circumstances criteria is the ATP 
Anti-Doping tribunal decision of Oliver:  ATP Anti-Doping Tribunal, The ATP Anti-Doping Tribunal Appeal of 
Gordon Oliver (2004) 
 <http://www.atptennis.com/en/common/TrackIt.asp?file=http://www.atptennis.com/en/antidoping/oliver.pdf> at 
13 September 2008.  In that case the positive doping test arose from the athletes’ use of the herbal pills, ‘Relax 
Aid’, which he took to help him sleep.  The ATP anti-doping rules have a slightly different exceptional 
circumstances provision which is not divided into no fault or negligence and no significant fault or negligence.  
The case will therefore not be considered here.  See Richard McLaren, 'Exceptional Circumstances: Is it Strict?' 
(2005) 2 (May) International Sports Law Review 32, 35–36 for a good overview of the case. 
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2 Theoretical Definition in Inadvertent Doping 
There’s many a slip between cup and lip!  The case summaries provided here demonstrate 
just how easy it is for an athlete to be guilty of the most heinous crime in sport:  doping.  In 
some cases one must wonder at the naivety of top level athletes who fail to check the 
contents of medication.  But is stupidity what ‘doping’ is really about?  Reliance on fallible 
expert medical advice is certainly not the behaviour that ‘doping’ involves, while a policy 
which holds athletes responsible for simply taking a drink of water from their own cup is 
so far from what society considers as ‘doping’ that it is almost comic.42 
There has been much written and said in criticism of the strict liability doping offence and 
the cases outlined above are evidence of the potential difficulties of such an approach.  
This thesis does not aim to contribute to the debate regarding the appropriateness of this 
type of offence for doping.  The point here is that there is disparity between what the 
general population — including athletes and administrators — perceive doping to be 
(intentional cheating) and what the legal system defines as such (the mere presence of a 
substance).  It may be that the strict liability approach to doping is fully justified and 
represents the fairest compromise for all involved.  It may be that society is fully cognisant 
of the injustices presented by these inadvertent doping cases but counts them as a 
necessary price to pay for ensuring that the guilty do not go unpunished.43  Nevertheless, 
the important point here is that the strict liability approach does not accord with what 
people unconsciously think of as ‘doping’.  If society is willing to accept the strict liability 
approach, then the only way to avoid confusion and inconsistency is to change the way 
doping is thought and spoken of. 
3 The Irrelevancy of Effect and the ‘Use Of’ Provision 
Differences between the theoretical and operational definition of doping are magnified 
where the strict liability offence operates in conjunction with provisions which make the 
effect of the prohibited substance irrelevant in determining whether doping has taken 
place.   
Article 2.2, set out above, contains the ‘use of’ doping offence.  Article 2.2.1 makes it clear 
that under this offence the ‘success or failure’ of the substance is irrelevant in 
                                                
42
   But for the serious consequences for the athlete’s career. 
43
   Though the public outcry caused by these types of cases suggests that there is far from unanimous agreement on 
this point. 
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determination of the offence.  It is the combination of these two provisions which is so 
problematic. 
The main problem arises in interpreting the ‘use of’ provision as a strict liability offence.  
If the ‘use of’ provision required proof of intent then evidence would be needed to show 
that the athlete endeavoured to use a prohibited substance to enhance their performance; 
whether their endeavour succeeded or not would be irrelevant.  This would be entirely 
consistent with the popular definition of ‘doping’:  an athlete attempting to gain an 
advantage over their peers by using a prohibited substance or method.  Like the WADA 
Code, whether that endeavour succeeded is not relevant to the theoretical understanding of 
doping either.44   
In the revised edition of the Code there is a new Article 2.2.1 which makes it clear that 
intent is not needed for this offence to be proved.  Before its insertion there was some 
ambiguity as to the role of the Athlete’s intention.45  Since the insertion of the new Article 
2.2.1, however, it is now beyond doubt that from January 2009, the ‘use of’ provisions 
require no proof of intent or knowledge.46 
                                                
44
   This would also be consistent with notions of ‘attempt’ in criminal law where it is agreed that the accused should 
not escape judgement simply because their attempt to commit a crime failed.  At criminal law there is need to 
show intent on the part of the accused to prove ‘attempt’ to commit an offence as well as the accused taking a 
positive step towards committing the offence: see Britten v Alpogut [1987] VR 929 at 938 per Murphy J.  The 
combination of the concept of ‘attempt’ in the WADA Code which does involve intent and the concept of ‘use’ 
which now clearly does not, seems a little at odds.  However, the comment to Article 2.2.1 makes it clear that 
intent is needed to prove ‘attempted use’ under Article 2.2.  This brings the idea of attempted use in line with 
common law ideas of attempt. 
45
  The definition section of the Code lists a number of activities as ‘use’ such as application and ingestion, which 
appear to involve some intentional conduct on the part of the Athlete.  The definition section of the Code defines 
‘use’ as ‘the application, ingestion, injection or consumption by any means whatsoever of any Prohibited 
Substance or Prohibited Method’ while ‘attempt’ is defined as: ‘purposefully engaging in conduct that constitutes 
a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of an anti-doping rule violation’:  
WADA Code, Definition, 78 and 73 respectively.  Application and injection seem to involve knowing conduct, 
while ingestion and consumption do not necessarily involve such knowledge.  Accordingly, without the revised 
Article 2.2.1, it was unclear on the face of the Code whether the ‘use of’ provisions were intended also to be strict 
liability offences.  Despite the existence of similar provisions in previous anti-doping instruments such as the 
OMADC, this type of provision has rarely been considered judicially in isolation.  It was therefore a subject of 
legal debate as to whether the ‘use of’ provisions were intended to be strict liability offences or not.  For example, 
Judge Tarasti contended that ‘use of’ provisions in the former anti-doping code regulations of the IAAF required 
proof of intent.  Beloff discusses the judge’s comments and, while he takes exception to the comment that the 
‘presence of a prohibited substance’ required intent or negligence, he has does not question the comment in 
relation to the ‘use of’ provision: Michael Beloff, 'Drugs, Laws and Versapaks' in John O'Leary (ed), Drugs and 
Doping in Sport: Socio-Legal Perspectives, 2001 (London: Cavendish Publishing) 44ff for a discussion of the 
different doping offences in the IAAF anti-doping policy.  See also Hayden Opie, 'Legal Regimes for the Control 
of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport' (1990) 12 Adelaide Law Review 332, 347 who also argues that ‘uses 
or takes advantage of’ is likely to involve intent on the part of the athlete. 
46
  Interpreting Article 2.2 as strict liability appears to be consistent with one CAS case which briefly considered the 
‘use of’ provisions under the WADA Code.  In French v The Australian Sports Commission and Cycling 
Australia, the panel said: 
 A Doping Offence occurs if there is use of a glucocorticosteroid.  Does the verb ‘use’ require an interpretation 
that mens rea be an element or does the word ‘use’ create strict liability?  In sporting matters involving anti-
doping rules the approach of strict liability has normally been the case.  
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It is also now clear that the definition of doping Article 2.2 is not consistent with the 
theoretical definition considered above, since no mind-set is required for this provision.  
But there is a further discrepancy with the theoretical doping definition.  In order to 
illuminate this it is necessary to make a few preliminary points. 
Firstly it has been stated above that general notions of doping involve intent of the athlete.  
However, it is conceded that, despite the implicit assumptions in public discourse that 
doping involves intent; the general population and anti-doping authorities appear willing to 
accept a definition of doping that involves only the state of body in the strict liability 
offence.  The CAS has made this clear in their classic defence of the strict liability doping 
offence in Q v UIT.47  Secondly, the justification for the ‘body-only’ definition has always 
been the argument that an athlete who accidentally takes a prohibited substance 
nevertheless gains an advantage and it would therefore be unfair to the competitors to 
allow that athlete to compete.  Thirdly, when considering the ‘body only’ definition of 
doping, it is necessary to consider the question:  what is the state of body that doping 
involves?  There are two possibilities.  It could be that doping is defined as a body 
containing a prohibited substance.  The other possible definition is that of a body which 
has been enhanced by a prohibited substance.  These three points taken together reveal the 
ambiguity.   
This last point may seem like a fine distinction but it is extremely important and lies at the 
heart of the confusion.  If the required state of body for ‘doping’ is merely the presence of 
a prohibited substance then there is no inconsistency between Article 2.2 and the 
theoretical definition of doping.  Alternatively if the generally accepted ‘body only’ 
definition hinges on an enhanced state of body, then clearly the current Article 2.2.1 — 
which makes this irrelevant — is at odds.  Given the points set out above it is much more 
likely that the latter is the case.       
The obvious assumption in the justification for the strict liability offence as articulated by 
the CAS is that the inadvertent doper is distinguishable from the rest of the field in sporting 
terms, making their participation unfair for the other athletes.  The only way a relevant 
distinction can arise is if the athlete’s performance has been positively affected by the 
substance.  It is clear, then, that the objectionable state of body here is not simply the 
                                                                                                                                              
 Appeal Partial Award Pronounced by the Court of Arbitration for Sport Oceania Registry, French v the 
Australian Sports Commission and Cycling Australia, CAS 2004/A/651, 11 July 2005, 11–12. 
47
  Q v UIT above n 14, 194.  There the CAS stated that inadvertent doping must be punished to maintain fairness for 
other competitors.  The previous version of the WADA Code quoted this as the justification for including the strict 
liability offence in the Code.  This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Nine. 
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presence of a prohibited substance but a body affected by that substance.  There can be no 
question of unfairness to the rest of the cohort of athletes if the substance has no effect.  
Since neither ergogenic effect nor intent are necessary under (present) Articles 2.2/2.2.1, 
an athlete could be guilty of doping despite having neither the appropriate state of mind or 
body.48  Herein lies another inconsistency:  the state of mind and body (as defined by the 
justification for the strict liability offence) are fundamental to the definition of doping as 
defined by the rationale for the Code, while neither are relevant to the definition of doping 
as defined by Article 2.2.1. 
An example may illustrate the point.  Let us say that information emerges that an athlete 
has been ingesting (‘using’) a substance which they assume is a legal supplement, but 
which actually contains a prohibited substance.  Circumstantial evidence could allow the 
athlete to fall foul of Article 2.2, despite there being no intent to use a prohibited substance 
(assuming the athlete was taking the supplement for its general health benefits).49  Let us 
also suppose that the prohibited substance has no benefit in that athlete’s particular sport 
— like anabolic steroids for a spin bowler in cricket50 or cannabis for most athletes.51  The 
athlete could still be prosecuted for doping, even though they haven’t intended to gain a 
performance advantage and have not gained any such advantage.  This seems a far cry 
from general notions of ‘doping’. 
Such inconsistency between the theoretical and operational definition of doping is the very 
reason that cases such as Raducan, Baxter and Puerta (described above) are often 
perceived as being unfair.  Those athletes had no intent to gain an advantage and yet were 
disqualified from their sport — and in two cases lost their Olympic medals — for having a 
substance in their system which would not have had any positive effect on their 
performance.  These situations do not correlate with what ‘doping’ is all about.52   
                                                
48
   It is noted here that the latest version of the WADA Code recognises some (inverse) relationship between 
performance enhancement, intent and guilt.  The comment to the revised Article 10.4 (Specified Substances) 
states that the greater the performance enhancement potential, the higher the burden to prove no intent.  This 
demonstrates that either intent or effect are important in doping since if there is no effect, then it is more 
important to prove that there was no intent to dope in order to disprove a doping accusation.  Nevertheless, the 
fact remains that it is possible to be guilty of doping despite having no intent and no performance effect.      
49
  This anti-doping rule violation can be proved in a number of ways:  see WADA Code, Comment to Article 2.2.1. 
50
  ACB Doping Panel, Decision: Shane Warne (2003) 
 <http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/documents/acb_findings_warne.pdf> at 13 September 2008, 9. 
51
  Stephen Heishman, 'Cannabis: Clinical Pharmacology and Performance Effects in Humans' in Charles E Yesalis 
and Michael S Bahrke (eds), Performance Enhancing Substances in Sport and Exercise 2002 (Champaign: 
Human Kinetics) 247, 253. 
52
   It should be noted here that under the WADA Code there is opportunity to have the ineligibility period either 
eliminated or reduced under Articles 10.3 and 10.5 as outlined above.  The point has also been made above that 
despite these provisions, the athlete will always be disqualified from competition and a doping violation recorded.  
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4 Conclusions:  Inadvertent Doping 
The puzzles and ambiguities presented by the inadvertent doping cases are troubling 
because they lead to a major difference between what society defines as ‘doping’ and what 
the law punishes as ‘doping’.  The operation of the strict liability rule in inadvertent doping 
situations leads to athletes who clearly have no such repugnant intent being found to have 
‘doped’.  This is troubling but it is not inexplicable since a number of justifications exist 
for including these situations — where there is no intent but an advantage is gained — in 
the definition of doping have been accepted.53  What is puzzling beyond explanation is the 
operation of the strict liability rule where it is clear that the athlete without intent has not 
gained a performance effect.54  By operation of the current Article 2.2.1 these athletes are 
still punished for doping.  This type of situation is so far from what society defines as 
‘doping’ that it is a wonder that such situations have been accepted as ‘necessary’ to the 
anti-doping effort. 
C Doping Definition in Doping Discourse:  Responses to ‘Doping’ Incidents 
The uncertainty over doping definition is not confined to the operation of the strict liability 
rule.  It is clear that there is confusion as to what constitutes doping also in popular 
discourse surrounding the issue, most apparent in the public response to ‘doping’ incidents.  
The point is therefore best illustrated by a recent example of such an incident.55  
 
                                                                                                                                              
Thus, these provisions do not affect the fact that these situations are defined as ‘doping’; a definition that does not 
accord with popular notions of ‘doping’. 
53
   These arguments were also included in the Quigley case, above n 14.  The court there accepted the argument that 
the only way to have an effective anti-doping program is to remove the need for anti-doping authorities to prove 
intent on the part of the athlete.  How far this justification still stands in the current anti-doping environment 
where there is much more resources, both financial and human is debatable. 
54
   This seems particularly harsh since, in this sense, the offence of doping is even tougher than the criminal law of 
attempts.  The situation where a prohibited substance is found in the body of an athlete which could not enhance 
their performance can be compared to the concept of impossibility in the law of criminal attempts.  In Australia 
the accused can be guilty of an attempt even if it was physically impossible to commit the substantive offence 
(the approach taken in Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476 by the House of Lords where physical impossibility was 
thought to circumvent a finding of attempt was rejected in NSW in R v Mai (1992) 26 NSWLR 371 at 379-384 
per Hunt, CJ).  Nevertheless, to be guilty of an attempt, the defendant must still have the requisite intent.  As 
Murphy J, as he then was, in Britten v Alpogut (1986) 23 a Crim R 254 (Vic CCA), at 264, stated:  
Attempts are crimes because of the criminal intent of the actor …. He is punishable for an attempt, not because of any 
harm that he has actually done by his conduct, but because of his evil mind accompanied by acts manifesting that 
intent.  The criminality comes from the conduct intended to be done. 
 The offence of doping goes even further to apply to situations where there is neither intent nor the possibility of 
performance enhancement.  See also above n 44 regarding attempts within the WADA Code. 
55
   In the next section of this chapter three other recent ‘doping’ scandals will be considered which will demonstrate 
the lack of clarity regarding the definition of doping in regard to which particular substances are or should be 
prohibited.  These three examples are also relevant for this part of the discussion as they show confusion about 
how doping is defined as an offence.  However, in this section which focuses on the more general concept of 
doping, rather than specific substances only, the BALCO investigation will be considered. 
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1 BALCO Investigation 
The Bay Area Laboratory Co-operative (BALCO) investigation and subsequent court cases 
has been hailed as the ‘biggest doping scandal of all time.’56  Although Ben Johnson’s 
positive at the Seoul Olympics and the East German state-sponsored doping plan are 
arguably on the same scale, there can be little doubt that the BALCO enquiry has attracted 
world-wide media attention and had far-reaching implications. 
(a) The Facts 
In 2002 federal investigators began an investigation of BALCO, a Californian company 
supplying performance enhancing substances to athletes.57  The investigation gathered 
momentum after federal agents raided the BALCO offices and an anonymous coach sent a 
syringe to the University of California laboratory which contained the previously unknown 
designer steroid, tetrahydrogestrinone (THG).58  BALCO was implicated as the source of 
the drug.  After the laboratory developed a test for the new drug, a number of high profile 
athletes were sanctioned for use of either THG or modafinil (a doping stimulant). 
Of more interest for present purposes though, is the federal investigation involving a grand 
jury trial in which four BALCO personnel were convicted and sentenced on various 
charges including distribution of illegal steroids to athletes.59  On May 6, 2004, the US 
Senate Commerce Committee made the evidence gathered in the federal investigation 
available to the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) for purposes of investigating 
drug use among athletes.  On the strength of the evidence given to USADA, a number of 
athletes received suspensions for THG and modafinil use.60  Elite athletes such as Alvin 
                                                
56
  Jerrold Colton, legal representative of Kelli White quoted in Jeff Blumentahl, 'Local Lawyer Takes Lead in Kelli 
White Case' (2004) 230(106) The Legal Intelligencer 1. 
57
  BALCO had been supplying various substances to elite athletes since it had been founded by Victor Conte in 
1984:  USA Today, BALCO Investigation Timeline (2006) 
  <http://www.usatoday.com/sports/balco-timeline.htm> at 13 September 2008. 
58
  Department of Justice, Media Release: February 12 2004: Four Individuals Charged in Bay Area with Money 
Laundering and Distribution of Illegal Steroids (2004) 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/February/04_ag_083.htm> at 13 September 2008; Jacquelin Magnay, 
'Running Scared', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 25–26 October 2003, 33. 
59
  Department of Justice, above n 58;  Sean  Webby and Elliott Almond, Conte Cops Plea Deal in BALCO Case, 
Must Serve 4 Months Jail (2005) <www.mercurynews.com> at 18 July 2005; MediaCorp Press, Trio Pleads 
Guilty in BALCO Case, Preventing Steroid Trial (2005) <http://www.todayonline.com/articles/61813print.asp> at 
18 July 2005; Longman, Jere, ‘Conte Pleads Guilty in Steroids Case - Bonds, Other Athletes Won't Have to 
Testify’ Chicago Daily Tribune (Chicago) 16 July 2005, 1; Elliott Almond and Sean Webby, 'Track Coach Makes 
a Deal in BALCO Case', The San Jose Mercury News 27 July 2005 and Reuters, 'BALCO Head Pledges Anti-
Steroid Drive', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 19 October 2005.  See also USA Today, above n 57.  The 
founder, Victor Conte, served four months imprisonment, followed by four months home detention. 
60
  United States Anti-Doping Agency, Press Release: U.S. Track Athlete White Accepts Two-Year Suspension 
From USADA, May 2004 (2004) 
 <http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/resources/press_releases/pressrelease_5_19_2004.pdf> at 13 
September 2008; United States Anti-Doping Agency, Press Release: U.S. Track Athlete Alvin Harrison Receives 
Four-Year Suspension For Participation In BALCO Drug Conspiracy, October 2004 (2004) 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?   Chapter Two 
 61 
Harrison61 and Kelli White admitted to the use of these drugs, while Michelle Collins and 
Tim Montgomery fought their suspensions in the CAS.62  The fallout from the 
investigation has continued for some years.63     
(b) The Reaction 
Not surprisingly, the BALCO investigation received world-wide media attention.  Of 
particular interest were comments made by US journalists regarding the ‘non-analytical 
positive,’ the term used to describe a doping case where the evidence does not include a 
positive drug test. 
About 10 days after the Senate committee made the grand jury evidence available to 
USADA, Sally Jenkins, in the Washington Post, criticised the ‘non-analytical positive’ 
which she called an ‘evil little something’; ‘USADA’s way of dealing with athletes they 
suspect but can’t catch red-handed.’64  She was appalled by the idea that Marion Jones 
might be sanctioned on the strength of evidence such as ‘signed checks and e-mails,’ and 
pronounced that:  ‘The US Anti-Doping Agency ought to be promptly restructured, and its 
                                                                                                                                              
 <http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/resources/press_releases/tfaharrison101904[1].pdf> at 13 September 
2008; United States Anti-Doping Agency, Press Release: U.S. Track Athlete Toth Receives Suspension For 
Positive THG Test, May 2004 (2004) 
 <http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/resources/press_releases/pressrelease_5_4_2004.pdf> at 13 September 
2008; United States Anti-Doping Agency, Press Release: U.S. Track Athletes Price and McEwen Receive 
Suspensions for Positive THG Tests, April 2004 (2004) 
<http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/resources/press_releases/pressrelease_4_29_2004_c.pdf> at 13 
September 2008; United States Anti-Doping Agency, Press Release: U.S. Track Athlete Jacobs Accepts Four-
Year Sanction For THG Steroid Offence, July 2004 (2004) 
<http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/resources/press_releases/tfjacobs071704[1].pdf> at 13 September 
2008. 
61
  United States Anti-Doping Agency, Press Release: U.S. Track Athlete Alvin Harrison Receives Four-Year 
Suspension For Participation In BALCO Drug Conspiracy, October 2004 (2004) 
<http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/resources/press_releases/tfaharrison101904[1].pdf> at 13 September 
2008; United States Anti-Doping Agency, Press Release: U.S. Track Athlete White Accepts Two-Year 
Suspension From USADA, May 2004 (2004) 
<http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/resources/press_releases/pressrelease_5_19_2004.pdf> at 13 
September 2008. 
62
  Collins subsequently settled her case in return for a decreased suspension (to four years): USA Today, above n 
57,  eventually received a two year suspension from the court: Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, 
Montgomery Banned Two Years For Doping, World Record Expunged; Gaines Also Banned (2005) 
 <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/12/14/SPG8BG7Q681.DTL> at 13 September 2008.  
Award Rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport in the Arbitration Between United States Anti-Doping 
Agency and Tim Montgomery, CAS 2004/O/645.  
63
  During the Athens Olympics two Greek athletes who missed their drug tests in mysterious circumstances were 
later linked with BALCO, USA Today, above n 57.  One of these athletes, sprinter Katerina Thanou, was barred 
by the IOC from competing at the Beijing Olympics as a result of the events surrounding the Athens Olympics:  
CBC, IOC Confirms Positive Doping Test by Greek Hurdler (2008) 
<http://www.cbc.ca/olympics/athletics/story/2008/08/17/olympics-athletics-day9.html> at 9 September 2008.  
Chapter One details Marion Jones’ role in the BALCO affair. 
64
  Sally Jenkins, 'This Agency Lacks the Inside Dope', The Washington Post (Washington), 17 May 2004, D01; 
Sally Jenkins, This is Wrong: USADA Has Athletes Guilty Until Proven Guilty (2004) 
<http://www.journalnow.com> at 7 May 2004.  In her article, she railed against the fact that the Senate had 
handed over the grand jury documents to USADA which, as she sees it, goes against the principles of due 
process, so important in the US legal system.  It may well be the case that such an action on the part of the Senate 
committee does raise such legal issues, but that is not the point of the discussion here. 
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martinet CEO Terry Madden stripped of his blazer, for threatening to use such a thing 
against anyone…’.  She claimed ‘the “non-analytical positive” was a tacit admission by 
USADA that it ‘[wa]sn’t doing its job particularly well – otherwise why would it need 
such a thing?  USADA has way too much power and not nearly enough good science and 
sound legality.’65 
Jenkins ended the article with this:  ‘What’s really going on here is that the drug police are 
short-circuiting due process because their science isn’t good enough.  They can’t catch 
cheaters fair and square – so they’ve decided to cheat, too, on the rules of evidence.’66 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Tim Guierda: 
That process got more complicated when the United States Anti-Doping Agency came up with 
this silver bullet called the non-analytical positive, an unprecedented and seemingly 
unconstitutional device that allows athletes to be banned because of suspicion and without 
traditional proof…  It no longer takes a failed steroids test to keep someone from competing in 
the Olympics.  USADA can now do it on the basis of documentary evidence or corroborating 
testimony or whatever else is convenient.67 
Not all commentators were of the same view, however.  Responding to Jenkins comments, 
David Kindred had this to say: 
Well, now.  To call that “evil little something” by its proper American name is to call it 
circumstantial evidence; that is its evidence from which a reasonable conclusion can be made.  
As it happens, of course, most criminal prosecutions are built on that kind of evidence.  Martha 
Stewart could bake you a cake out of the circumstantial evidence used against her.68 
These journalists, of course, are writing to sell newspapers and are not being paid to be 
consistent or logically defensible.  Nonetheless, examination of some of these comments 
reveals yet another way in which the definition of doping has been distorted. 
(c) Doping Definition in the BALCO Example 
The journalistic comments above focus on the way doping should be proved; the argument 
being that doping should only be proven by way of a positive doping test.  As has been 
noted above, this type of proof goes hand-in-hand with the strict liability definition of 
doping.  Circumstantial evidence (such as emails and signed cheques) goes more to 
proving intent.  Claiming that drug testing is the only appropriate way to prove doping is 
akin to saying that doping should only be defined with reference to the state of body of the 
                                                
65
   Ibid. 
66
  Ibid. 
67
   Tim Guidera, USADA's Methods Seem Un-American (2004)  
 <http://www.savannahnow.com/stories/061204/2233896.shtml> at 13 September 2008. 
68
   David Kindred, NBC Sports, Sporting News: Smoke, Fire and Tainted Olympic Dreams: BALCO Age Justifies 
Use of Paper Trail to Catch Cheaters (2004) 
 <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1208/is_22_228/ai_n6126783> at 8 February 2008. 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?   Chapter Two 
 63 
athlete, and that the state of mind is irrelevant to the definition.  As the above discussion 
has demonstrated, the state of body definition is a far cry from the type of practices that the 
public wish to be punished as doping.  Even within the BALCO discourse it is clear that 
the abhorrent part of the episode was that athletes were intending to gain advantage over 
their peers through the use of prohibited substances.  Yet here it is claimed that evidence 
proving the repugnant state of mind is not sufficient. 
This is just one example of public doping discourse which suggests that the universal 
understanding of what doping is all about is perhaps not as universal as first thought.  In 
the next section, three other examples of doping discourse will be discussed in relation to 
the contents of the prohibited list.  These examples also demonstrate the lack of 
consistency in this aspect of doping definition.   
D Conclusions on Doping Definition:  the Deviant Behaviour 
Doping definition is not as clear cut as could be assumed on the face of modern anti-
doping policy.  It has been demonstrated that there is a profound inconsistency between 
what anti-doping rhetoric and public debate consider to be ‘doping’ and what is actually 
punished as ‘doping’.  This is clear in doping case law, particularly the inadvertent doping 
cases, and public debate surrounding ‘doping’ related incidents.  The lack of clarity in 
these examples largely relates to the role of the athlete’s intent which is at odds with 
intuitive notions of doping.  While, theoretically, the repugnancy of doping relates to the 
state of mind of the athlete, legally the focus is solely on the state of body (in some cases 
not even the same state of body as the theoretical model).  As shown in Chapter One, the 
issue over the way the offence of doping should be defined is not only a modern problem; 
it has been at the heart of the debate over anti-doping policy since the 1960s.  The 
confusion continues today and applies not just to the definition of the deviant behaviour 
but also which substances should be defined as ‘doping. 
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III DOPING DEFINITION:  THE PROHIBITED LIST69 
The ambiguity over doping definition goes beyond the general issues discussed above.  
There is, and always has been, difficulties in defining which substances should be included 
on prohibited lists and thus be defined as doping. 
Three recent examples of the public reaction to ‘doping’ scandals are the best starting point 
for illustrating the confusion prevalent in modern doping discourse in this regard.  
A Doping Definition in Doping Discourse 
1 The Caffeine Pill Debate 
(a) The Facts 
In May 2005 the Australian media revealed that some athletes were using caffeine pills to 
enhance their performance.  Sports involved included Australian-rules football, Rugby 
Union (notably George Gregan,70 then captain of the Australian Wallabies) and hockey.71  
These revelations were set against a backdrop of controversy over the role of caffeine in 
sport.  At the beginning of 2004, caffeine had been removed from the WADA Code 
Prohibited List72 — largely a result of concerns about the lack of accuracy of testing73 but 
the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) also considered caffeine not to be a significant 
performance enhancer.74  However, a 2002 study by scientists at the Australian Institute of 
Sport (AIS) on caffeine revealed modest performance enhancing effects.75  The AIS 
published a fact-sheet on caffeine which, among other things, recommended safe 
dosages.76  If, as the Australian Wallabies claimed, the use of the pills was in accordance 
                                                
69
   It should be noted here that up until the introduction of the WADA Code there were a number of different 
operational prohibited lists according to the particular sport involved.  Reference to the ‘Prohibited List’ before 
this time is therefore a little misleading.  However, in most cases such a reference will be to the Olympic 
prohibited list unless otherwise stated. 
70
  Mark Fuller, 'Gregan Admits Taking Pre-Game Caffeine Dose', The Age (Melbourne), 18 May 
2005,<http://www.theage.com.au/news/Union/Gregan-admits-taking-pregame-caffeine-
dose/2005/05/17/1116095965523.html> at 13 September 2008. 
71
  New Zealand Sports Drug Agency, Caffeine "Almost Cheating", Press Release 19 May 2005 (2005) 
<http://www.nzsda.co.nz/news.php?type-=archive&nid=424> at 17 August 2005. 
72
  World Anti-Doping Agency, Summary Notes, WADA List Committee Meeting 4-5 September 2003, Montreal 
(2003) <http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/040903.pdf> at 14 September 2008. 
73
  World Anti-Doping Agency, Play True: An Official Publication of the World Anti-Doping Agency Issue 3, 2003, 
(2003) <http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/jan_04_en.pdf> at 14 September 2008, 4. 
74
  'Why Gregan Does Not Make a Dope', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 19 May 2005, 14. 
 These effects were valued at approximately 3%: Gregory R. Cox, Ben Desbrow, Paul G. Montgomery, Megan E. 
Anderson, Clinton R. Bruce, Theodore A.Macrides, David T. Martin, Angela Moquin, Alan Roberts, John A. 
Hawley,  Louise M. Burke, 'Effect of Different Protocols of Caffeine Intake on Metabolism and Endurance 
Performance' (2002) 93 Journal of Applied Physiology 990. 
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   The fact sheet suggested safe levels of use, warned against potential side-effects at high dosages and 
recommended use only under supervision:  Australian Institute of Sport, AIS Sports Supplement Program Fact 
Sheet: Caffeine (2005) 
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with the AIS recommendations, then, according to Professor Peter Fricker (director of the 
AIS), the dosage was ‘well within the range of the usual daily caffeine intakes of most 
members of the community.’77 
The substance involved in these events was a legal, permitted substance, used freely in the 
community without controversy.  The substance’s significance in performance 
enhancement was, by no means, universally accepted.  The dosages were no higher than 
many non-athletes consume on a daily basis.  Although there are potential side effects at 
high concentrations, there was no evidence of danger under the AIS recommendations.  
(b) The Reaction 
The revelations of caffeine pill use set off a torrent of media commentary on the issue.  
Newspaper headlines read:  
• ‘Gregan Stirs Caffeine Row – Tablet Use “Sends a Bad Message to Kids”’78 
• ‘Why Gregan Does Not Make a Dope’79  
• ‘Storm Brews Over Gregan’s Caffeine Confession’80  
• ‘Why Captain George Pops the Pills Mr 7 Per Cent’81  
• ‘Gregan’s Caffeine Use “Bad Message”’82  
• ‘Gregan Should Just Say No to Caffeine’83 and  
• ‘Children Beg Sports Stars: Don’t Pop Pills’.84  
Many high profile figures made public comment.85  The criticism focussed on the message 
that George Gregan’s comments sent to young people:  ‘Taking caffeine isn’t the worst 
                                                                                                                                              
 <http://www.ausport.gov.au/ais/nutrition/supplements/supplement_fact_sheets/group_a_supplements/caffeine> at 
13 September 2008.  Note that the fact sheet has been edited since 2005. 
77
  Professor Peter Fricker, executive director of the AIS, in Jacquelin Magnay, 'Caffeine Back in the Sporting Bad 
Books', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 19 May 2005, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/Sport/Caffeine-
back-in-the-sporting-bad-books/2005/05/18/1116361617427.html>, at 14 September 2008. 
78
   Rupert Guiness and Jim Tucker, 'Gregan Stirs Caffeine Row - Tablet Use 'Sends a Bad Message to Kids', The 
Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 2005, 50. 
79
   'Why Gregan Does Not Make a Dope', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 19 May 2005, 14. 
80
  Rupert Guiness and Peter Jenkins, 'Storm Brews Over Gregan's Caffeine Confession', The Advertiser (Adelaide), 
18 May 2005, 79. 
81
   'Why Captain George Pops the Pills Mr 7 Per Cent!' The Gold Coast Bulletin (Gold Coast City), 18 May 2005, 
15. 
82
  Guiness Rupert and Peter Jenkins, 'Gregan's Caffeine Use "Bad Message"', Hobart Mercury (Hobart), 18 May 
2005, 49. 
83
  'Gregan Should Just Say No to Caffeine', The Courier Mail (Brisbane), 20 May 2005, 16. 
84
  Samantha Williams, 'Children Beg Sports Stars: Don't Pop Pills', Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 21 May 2005, 15. 
85
  Including Australian Football League (AFL) coaches Rodney Eade and Terry Wallace (Fuller, above n 70), 
Australian Swimming coach Alan Thompson (NZADA, above n 71), ex-Wallaby players John Eales and Tim 
Horan, and Australian Schools Rugby Union administrator, Bernie Carberry (Guiness and Tucker, above n 78). 
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crime in the world, but, yes, the major problem to me is that it sends the wrong message to 
the youth of Australia or young kids playing rugby’;86 ‘athletes using caffeine tablets to 
enhance performance sen[ds] “the wrong message about sport”.87  Even the Australian 
federal treasurer at the time, Peter Costello, made comment, ‘“I can’t understand how clubs 
allow it myself.  They might say, ‘well it’s a legal drug and there is nothing wrong with 
taking it’, but gee it sends a bad example doesn’t it when you down pills like that.”’88  
David Howman, chief executive officer of WADA, entered the debate, describing the use 
of caffeine as ‘bordering on cheating.  If it’s not on the list it’s not cheating but it’s 
bordering, and it’s saying “well let’s take every step now”…’.89  
WADA indicated that it would be reviewing the decision to take caffeine off the WADA 
Code Prohibited List in light of the AIS research and the subsequent increase in caffeine 
use, while the Australian government promised to provide all information and cooperation 
to WADA to assist the review.90  Interestingly, two opinion polls were taken by The 
Sydney Morning Herald on 18 May 2005: 
 CAFFEINE TABLETS: Should professional athletes take them? 
  No way, ban them – 44% 
  Possibly but there should be a limit – 8% 
  Perhaps, if there are no long-term side effects – 5% 
 Sure, a little boost never hurts – 2% 
  Yes. They’re legal - get over it – 41% 
 Total votes: 763  Poll Date: 18/05/05 
 
 Waratahs and caffeine pills: Should they take them? 
  Yes – 44% 
  No – 48% 
  Undecided – 8% 
 Total Votes: 1851   Poll date: 18/05/0591 
                                                
86
  Carberry, on Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Renewed Debate Over Use of Caffeine in Sport, The 7.30 
Report, 18 May 2005, <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2005/s1371799.htm> at 14 September 2008. 
87
  Alan Thompson in NZSDA, above n 71. 
88
  AAP and Sydney Morning Herald, Sets Bad Example: Costello (2005) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/Sport/Sets-bad-example-Costello/2005/05/18/1116361590645.html> at 9 
September 2008. 
89
  Australian Broadcasting Corporation, above n 86.  
90
  Senator, the Honourable Rod Kemp, Minister for the Arts and Sport, Use of Caffeine in Sport  (Media Release, 19 
May 2005) 
  <http://www.minister.dcita.gov.au/kemp/media/media_releases/use_of_caffeine_in _sport> at 17 August 2005. 
91
  Sydney Morning Herald Website, Sports Poll (2005) 
 <http://www.smh.com.au/polls/sport/form/html> at 17 August 2005.  It is not being suggested here that these 
results are representative of a random sample of public opinion on the subject.  It is merely presented to show that 
the debate was not confined to authorities and sports people. 
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From those polls it seems that the criticisms recorded in the media may have been 
representative of the attitudes in the wider community, the majority of people in the poll 
voting in some way against caffeine pill use.   
2 The Mark French Affair 
(a) The Facts 
In December 2003, cleaners at the AIS cycling facility in South Australia discovered 
needles, syringes and other injecting paraphernalia in the room that cyclist, Mark French, 
had recently vacated.  Although it was not clear who had been using the materials, French 
was found guilty under the AIS and cycling federation rules of being knowingly involved 
in trafficking and use of a prohibited substance (Testicomp, a glucocorticosteroid) and 
possession of equine growth hormone.92  Shortly after the CAS finding was handed down, 
the issue came to public attention through parliamentary debate and media coverage.  
French had made allegations regarding group-injecting sessions in his room at the AIS 
residence.  These alleged group sessions, in which a number of high profile Australian 
cyclists regularly injected themselves, were mentioned in Federal Parliament by Senator 
Faulkner in June 2004.93  The focus of attention in the subsequent public debate was not so 
much on the alleged use of Testicomp by French, nor the equine growth hormone used by 
an unknown person, but on these injecting sessions.  The comments concentrated on the 
practice of injecting, rather than the substance which was being injected, the rumours 
involving widespread injecting at the AIS being largely to do with multivitamin injections 
(a permitted substance).94  
A number of separate investigations into both the specific circumstances of the French case 
and the wider allegations of a self-injection culture at the AIS resulted.  French appealed 
his sanction and in July 2005 was exonerated of all charges.95 
                                                
92
  Australian Sports Commission and Cycling Australia v Mr Mark French, AS/2004 ASC & ACF v Mark French, 
partial award pronounced by the Court of Arbitration for Sport Oceania Registry, Panel: Mr Malcolm Holmes 
QC.  Note that this decision was overturned on appeal.  See below discussion. 
93
  Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 17 June 2004, 24103-24104 (Senator Faulkner) and 
18 June 2004, 24295-24298, 24303-24305 (Senator Kemp, Minister for Arts and Sport). 
94
   It is accepted that some of the public outrage to do with this incident was generated by rumours of injections of 
prohibited substances.  However in the subsequent public debate no distinction was made between prohibited and 
non-prohibited substances and it was the practice of injecting that was the focus of the outrage:  see for example 
'Kelly Admits he Injected Vitamins in AIS Room', Geelong Advertiser (Geelong), 8 July 2004, 1 where Shane 
Kelly made extreme efforts to point out that he admitted injecting permitted substances, showing that the 
distinction had been lost in the public outrage of the incident. 
95
  The appeal panel found that Testicomp had not been proved to contain a prohibited substance and there was a 
lack of evidence to identify the person who had used the equine growth hormone.  An interesting aspect of the 
case was the decision that listing a prohibited substance on the ingredients of the product was insufficient 
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(b) The Reaction 
The French affair has been called ‘the biggest scandal…in drugs in sport in this country for 
at least a decade…’96 and ‘one of the biggest controversies to hit Australian sport.’97  Such 
was the impact of the controversy that AIS athletes became subject to random room 
searches, the AIS and AOC policy against self-injection was strengthened98 and the new 
Australian drugs in sport investigatory body, ASADA, was given wide-reaching 
investigatory powers at the AIS, the extent of which were unknown to its predecessor.99   
Some examples of the headlines and comments published include:  
• ‘Inside the Shooting Gallery’100  
• ‘Elite Cyclists Caught up in Drug Scandals’  
• ‘Bombshell allegations of widespread drug injecting by Australian cyclists have 
rocked the Olympic Team on the eve of the Athens Olympics’  
• ‘Federal Parliament yesterday heard claims six cyclists at the Australian 
Institute of Sport turned a bedroom into a ‘shooting gallery’101  
• ‘Details emerged yesterday of a second “shooting gallery” used by Australian 
Olympic cyclists while training in Germany’102 
                                                                                                                                              
evidence to prove that the product contained a prohibited substance.  Scientific testing of the product had failed to 
show that Testicomp contained glucocorticosteroids:  Appeal Partial Award pronounced by the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport Oceania Registry, Mr Mark French v Australian Sports Commission and Cycling Australia, 
11 July CAS 2004/A/651, 13. 
96
  Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debate, Senate, 5 August 2004, 25621 (Senator Faulkner, Leader of 
the Opposition in the Senate). 
97
  Melissa  Ryan and Len Johnson, Plan for Random Room Searches The Age, 19 November 2004 
<www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/11/18/1100748141209.html?from=storyIhs> at 14 September 2008. 
98
  Evidence to Senate Committee for the Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, 
Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 15 February 2005, ECITA 102-104 (Mr Mark Peters, Executive-Director of 
the Australian Sports Commission). 
99
  For example random room searches, access to athlete’s documents and computer discs in their residence. 
 Cyclist Mark French’s allegations of a drug-injecting culture at the Australian Institute of Sport have led to the 
creation of a Big Brother-style regime for scholarship holders.  And if the legislative changes to the proposed new 
drugs body, the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Agency, follow through in the same vein, all of Australia’ athletes 
could be left with fewer personal rights.   
 Jacquelin Magnay, New Doping Body Will Have Key to AIS Rooms, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 July 2005 
<http://www.smh.com.au> at 14 July 2005.   
 ASADA also has power to receive, use and disclose information from other law enforcement agencies, Australian 
Sports Drug Anti-Doping Authority Act 2006 (Cth) ss 67 and 68.  See also Senator The Honourable Rod Kemp 
Minister for the Arts and Sport, Media Release 23 June 2005, New Body Takes Up Fight Against Drugs in Sport 
(2005) 
 <http://www.minister.dcita.gov.au/kemp/media/media_releases/new_body_to_take_up_the_fight_against_drugs_
in_sport> at 5 September 2005. 
100
  Jacquelin Magnay, 'Inside the Shooting Gallery', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 10-11 July 2004, 69. 
101
  'Elite Cyclists Caught Up in Drugs Scandal', The Gold Coast Bulletin (The Gold Coast), 19 June 2004, 20. 
102
   Luke McIlveen, 'Athens Countdown 28 Days to Go: Cyclists Injected in Germany Report Reveals', The 
Advertiser (Adelaide), 16 July 2004, 1. 
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• ‘Former world champion cyclist Shane Kelly yesterday admitted to injecting 
vitamins in the room of banned rider Mark French.’103  
3 The Cannavaro Film 
(a) The Facts 
In April 2005 an Italian state television broadcaster showed footage of Italian football 
player, Fabio Cannavaro, on the night before the 1999 Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA) Cup Final.  He was seen connected to an intravenous drip of the 
drug, Neoton, administered by the Parma team doctor.104  Neoton was not a prohibited 
substance; such use apparently was common in football circles.105  The drug is used by 
athletes as an ‘integrator of vitamins’,106 a ‘restorative, a sort of multi-vitamin feed 
necessary for tired players.’107  
(b) The Reaction 
Predictably, the screening of the incident ‘caused a furore in Italy’ and was a ‘major source 
of polemic controversy’.108  The Associated Press reported ‘[v]ideo shows Cannavaro 
doping before 1999 UEFA Cup Final’ (despite also reporting that Neoton was not a banned 
substance.)109  Other news headlines read: ‘Juventus Defender Sparks Scandal after Drug 
Tape is aired on National Television’.110  Italian Olympic Committee president, Gianni 
Petrucci, said he was ‘upset’ and ‘shaken’ after seeing the footage.111  Negative comments 
                                                
103
   Geelong Advertiser, above n 94.  
104
  Paddy Agnew, 'Still Questions to Answer after Cannavaro Film Casts Doubts', The Irish Times (Dublin), 2005, 
19. 
105
  Note that the WADA Code Prohibited List, 2006 and 2008, M2 (b) ‘Chemical and Physical Manipulation’ states 
that except for legitimate acute medical treatment, intravenous infusions are prohibited: World Anti-Doping 
Agency, The 2006 Prohibited List International Standard (2006) <http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/2006_LIST.pdf> at 14 September 2008 and World Anti-Doping Agency, The 
World Anti-Doping Code: The 2008 Prohibited List, International Standard (2008) <http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/2008_List_En.pdf> at 15 January 2008.  However, at the time football had not 
signed up to the WADA and thus was not prohibited under the applicable doping rules. 
106
  Channel 4 Website, Cannavaro: I Did Nothing Wrong, 30 April 2005 
<http://www.channel4.com/sport/football_Italia/apr30a.html>> at 2 May 2005. 
107
  Agnew, above n 104. 
108
  Ibid. 
109
   The Associated Press, 'Video Shows Cannavaro Doping Before 1999 UEFA Cup Final', Associate Press 
Newswires 2005.  Emphasis added.  
110
   James Eve, 'Juventus Defender Sparks Scandal After Drug Tape is Aired on National Television', National Post 
(Toronto), 29 April 2005, S7. 
111
  SBS, The World Game Website: Cannavaro Video Troubling, 30 April 2005 
<http://www5.sbs.com.au/euro2004/index.php3?page=tn&tid=130&id=57381> at 6 September 2005. 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?   Chapter Two 
 70 
regarding the incident reached the Australian media, who took exception to injecting 
substances into athletes, whether the substance was legal or not.112  
4 Confusion Over Doping Definition in the Three Examples 
There is a constant theme running through these examples.  In each case, the public 
response to the ‘doping’ incident was to treat it as exactly that, a ‘doping’ incident.  Yet 
none of the examples actually involved ‘doping’ as defined by modern anti-doping policy, 
for none involved prohibited substances or methods.113  Public reaction was as volatile as if 
the substance/practice involved appeared on the relevant prohibited list.  Why?  In the case 
of the caffeine pill debate, it may be possible to argue that the response was a ‘hangover’ 
from the time when caffeine was a prohibited substance; public opinion just not having 
caught up on that issue.  However this explanation appears weak, since neither substance in 
the French and Cannavaro affairs had ever been prohibited. 
It seems that it was simply believed that there was something wrong with the practice in 
question.  In arguing that Gregan was setting a bad example for youth, it was simply 
assumed that there was something inherently wrong with taking caffeine pills.  The outrage 
over the ‘shooting gallery’ in the Mark French case presupposes that there is something 
intrinsically wrong with injections, regardless of the legal status of the substance.  Similar 
comments apply to the Neoton intravenous injections.114  There is obviously confusion 
regarding exactly what doping is; and public outrage is not fettered by whether a substance 
or practice is legally defined as ‘doping’.  Something else was driving public outrage at 
                                                
112
  'Italian Captain in Drug Controversy', The Age (Melbourne), 29 April 2005, 
<http://www.theage.com.au/news/soccer/italian-captain-in-drug-controversy/2005/04/29/1114635725056.html>, 
at 14 September 2008 for example. 
113
   The Mark French affair, with the focus on the ‘shooting gallery’ which involved largely multivitamins, is a little 
less clear cut.  However, the way in which multivitamin injections were treated by the public was akin to the 
practice of doping.  It was clearly not doping since multivitamin injections were not prohibited under any of the 
applicable rules at the time.  There was some suggestion that self-injection of any substance, whether it be 
prohibited or not may have been a breach of the AIS code of conduct.  See Luke McIlveen and Bronwyn Hurrell, 
'Taken By a Friend to a German Pharmacy, It was the Incident that Changed a Champion's Life. The Day Mark 
French Bought His First Drugs.' The Advertiser (Adelaide), 26 June 2004, 10.  However, in his second report to 
the ASC and Cycling Australia on the allegations, the Honourable Robert Anderson QC made it clear that there 
was no such policy despite the practice being generally frowned on at the AIS.  This was ‘corrected’ later and 
self-injection officially became a breach of AIS policy.  The Honourable Robert Anderson QC, Second Stage 
Report to the Australian Sports Commission and to Cycling Australia 27 October 2004 (2004) 
<http://www.dicta.gov.au/?a=16787> at 30 August 2005, 20-21.  Even if there had been a policy in place the fact 
that permitted substances were involved takes it outside ‘doping’.  Anderson, at 11,  made this clear when he said 
‘[m]y inquiry has been focused mainly on what may loosely be described as doping offences and only activities 
that would fall into that category in this case are activities relating to Testicomp and Equigen (ie not 
multivitamins).’  Thus, insofar as the scandal related to multivitamin self-injection, the outrage centred on 
permitted practices.     
114
  At the relevant time, intravenous injections were allowed under the WADA Code and, one presumes, under the 
football anti-doping rules.  Neoton was, and remains, a permitted substance under the Code.  Since 2004 the 
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) has added intravenous transfusions to the WADA Code Prohibited List as a 
prohibited method:  WADA Code: 2008 Prohibited List, M2.   
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this point.  Evidence of such attitudes was noted in the Anderson report, a section of which 
seems particularly apt for this discussion: 
On the one hand there are sports administrators… who believe that the public perceive the 
unsupervised use of needles by athletes as in itself a sinister and unacceptable practice.  
This is probably true and is due perhaps to the fact that so many banned substances come 
in injectable form.  On the other hand there are others…who see little difference between 
the taking of a permitted product orally and the taking of it intravenously, as long as in all 
cases the substance is a permitted substance and the rules as to disclosure are followed. 115 
The lack of clarity over what is, or should be, on the prohibited list is hardly surprising 
given the lack of transparency which exists as to how substances are chosen for the list.   
B The Criteria for Inclusion on the Prohibited List 
1 The WADA Code Criteria 
For some time now, most anti-doping policies have included a list of substances or 
methods of administration which are prohibited in the relevant jurisdiction.  The WADA 
Code has continued that tradition, the offence of doping being defined according to the 
contents of the associated WADA Code Prohibited List.116  A significant development with 
the WADA Code is that it establishes criteria by which substances and methods are 
considered for inclusion on the WADA Code Prohibited List.  Article 4.3.1 states: 
4.3.1 A substance or method shall be considered for inclusion on the Prohibited List if 
WADA determines that the substance or method meets any two of the following three 
criteria:  
4.3.1.1 Medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect or experience 
that the substance or method has the potential to enhance or enhances sport 
performance;  
4.3.1.2 Medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect, or experience 
that the Use of the substance or method represents an actual or potential health risk 
to the Athlete;  
4.3.1.3 WADA's determination that the Use of the substance or method violates the 
spirit of sport described in the Introduction to the Code.  
4.3.2 A substance or method shall also be included on the Prohibited List if WADA 
determines there is medical or other scientific evidence, pharmacological effect or 
experience that the substance or method has the potential to mask the Use of other 
Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods.  
These criteria correlate with the rationales for anti-doping rules which have been accepted 
for the last fifty years or so:  threat to health, fairness and the ‘spirit of sport’.117  Until now 
                                                
115
  Anderson above n 113, 21. 
116
  WADA Code 2008 Prohibited List, above n 114. 
117
  Organisations such as the Council of Europe in the mid 1960s based their resolutions condemning doping on 
‘health, poor example to the young and that doping was contrary to the spirit of fair play in sport’:  Barrie 
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there has been no explicit criteria applied in determining which substances and methods 
should appear on the list.   
Historically there has been surprisingly little reliable research underlying the inclusion of 
most substances on the list since the health or ergogenic effects of many of the drugs on 
the list have not been well researched.118  Dick Pound, IOC vice-president and one-time 
WADA chairperson, admits in his book that, rather than being based on reliable scientific 
research: 
The list grew like Topsy, with no generally agreed-upon criteria for why a particular 
substance was included, while another was not.  Quite often the decision was merely a 
function of a particular research interest — such as beta-2 agonists and 
glucocorticosteroids — of one of the members of the commission. 119 
It seems that anti-doping efforts were, in the past, strongly driven by the interests of 
research scientists; the list reflecting these research interests rather than an evidence-based 
approach.120  This historic problem appears to be correcting itself.121  Caffeine (discussed 
above) and pseudoephedrine are two examples; as research revealed only modest 
performance enhancing qualities, they were removed from the list.122  Having an explicit 
set of criteria to work toward will also encourage more research into the effects of the 
drugs.  These provisions therefore represent an improvement on the previous system.   
Nonetheless, the way in which the criteria have been articulated in Article 4.3 is far from 
clear.  If, in the opinion of WADA, the substance or method meets any two out of the three 
of the criteria, WADA will then consider including the substance or method on the WADA 
                                                                                                                                              
Houlihan, Dying to Win: Doping in Sport and the Development of Anti-Doping Policy, 1999 (Strasbourg: Council 
of Europe Publishing), 130.  
118
  For example Campbell Aitken, 'Lifting Your Game' (2002) 61(12) Meanjin 217, 220 states: 
The number of health problems associated with steroids might lead one to think that using steroids is extremely 
dangerous, but in fact the more serious of these effects have been observed in only one or two case studies while 
others, such as gynaecomastia, are common but essentially cosmetic.  Moreover, it isn’t always possible to attribute 
health effects to steroid use alone. 
 He also says (at 221):  
Interestingly, while there is no doubt among athletes that steroids do improve performance, few studies have been 
conducted to determine whether this is the case, and their findings are equivocal.  For practical purposes, given the 
documented willingness of athletes to use steroids, we have to assume that they really do work. 
 It is also interesting to examine the book edited by Yesalis and Bahrke, Charles E Yesalis and Michael S Bahrke 
(eds), Performance Enhancing Substances in Sport and Exercise, 2002 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) and see the 
number of chapters which conclude that there is a lack of research or evidence about the ergogenic effects of the 
relevant substance. 
119
   Pound, above n 4, 57-58. 
120
   It will be argued later in this thesis that the list was not just a result of the research interests of the scientists but 
was strongly influenced by public opinion. 
121
   There is now financial support going into research into these areas, WADA supports a number of research 
projects which attempt to further define the ergogenic and health effects of various substances on the WADA 
Code Prohibited List:  see World Anti-Doping Agency, Projects Relating to the Prohibited List (2006) 
<http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=346> at 27 September 2008. 
122
   These two substances are now on the Monitoring Program and are no longer considered Prohibited Substances.   
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Code Prohibited List.  The criteria are proven performance enhancement potential, proven 
potential to risk health and violation of the ‘spirit of sport’ (as outlined in the introduction 
to the Code).   
2 Ambiguities in the Criteria 
The first source of ambiguity is the third criteria for selection, the ‘spirit of sport.’  The 
values and concepts encompassed in the term ‘spirit of sport’ have been discussed above.  
Given the width and vagueness of the concept, it is unlikely to work effectively as a 
limiting device for the list.123  Since the ‘spirit of sport’ refers to values including fairness 
and health it is possible that this criterion could amount to nothing more than a repetition 
of the first two criteria.  No doubt the concept has been included in order to cover a 
number of situations, including where new substances are discovered and appropriate 
research is not yet available124 or where it is deemed inappropriate for athletes to use 
recreational drugs such as marijuana.125  However, it is difficult to predict when a 
substance or practice will be determined to be against the ‘spirit of sport’.  
There is further potential for ambiguity.  Even if a substance or method is determined to 
satisfy two out of three criteria, there is still discretion on the part of WADA to choose not 
to put it on the list; WADA is only bound to consider including the substance.126  Thus the 
criteria still leave a large margin for discretion on the part of WADA, adding potential 
vagueness and imprecision to the decision making process. 
Furthermore, the decision to ban a particular substance on the basis of its erogenic 
properties does not relate to any particular sport.  Given that there is now to be one 
prohibited list for all signatories, a substance can be included on the list, even if its 
ergogenic properties are limited to a number of high-profile sports.  This is particularly so, 
given that provision is made only to expand the WADA Code Prohibited List for a 
                                                
123
   The point of the criteria is to ensure that substances are not included on the list unless they have more that one 
reason for being there: not just that they are ergogenic or dangerous.  Thus a vague notion like the spirit of sport 
in many ways defeats the purpose of having these limiting devices.  It is submitted that due to the width and 
imprecision of the notion of ‘spirit of sport’, once it is shown that a substance either endangers health or enhances 
performance, the third criterion will be virtually assumed in most cases. 
124
   Such as THG the new ‘designer steroid’ in the BALCO case discussed above. 
125
  See Director Barry R McCaffrey, Combating the Use of Drugs and Doping in Sport (1999) 
<http://commerce.senate.gov/hearing/1020mcc.pdf> at 13 March 2004 regarding the case of the Canadian 
snowboarder, Ross Rebagliati.  Rebagliati eventually had his Olympic gold medal reinstated but the USA then 
lobbied strongly for the inclusion of marijuana on the WADA Code Prohibited List. 
126
  For example WADA recently decided not to add hypoxic tents to the list.  WADA had decided that the tents, 
which mimic the low oxygen environment of high altitude training, were performance enhancing and against the 
‘spirit of sport’ but still decided not to prohibit them until further research was completed: CBC, Anti-Doping 
Agency Won't Ban Oxygen Tents (2006) <http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2006/09/16/wada-hypoxic.html> at 14 
September 2008. 
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particular sport, not to delete any substances.  For example let us say that anabolic steroids 
do not have the potential to enhance performance in a sport such as shooting.  There is no 
provision in the WADA Code for anabolic steroids to be deleted from the list for 
shooting.127  This gives rise to the possibility that shooters may be suspended from their 
sport, even if the drug that they were ‘caught’ with did not help them in any way.  Since 
there are a number of substances whose ergogenic effects are not universal, the reason 
behind prohibiting the substance becomes somewhat disassociated from its operational 
prohibition in any one sport.  This disassociation extends to the WADA Code Prohibited 
List in general; it seems less important to articulate the justification for including that 
substance on the list.  Such disassociation adds to the ambiguity of the list. 
It may be argued that WADA will use the criteria in a way that does not make them 
unworkable.  However, given the influence of politics in an area of international interest 
such as doping, these concerns may not be unfounded.  History also suggests that decisions 
such as these will continue to be unclear.  For example, a number of commentators have 
criticized the inclusion of recreational drugs, such as cannabis on the WADA Code 
Prohibited List, since it is highly unlikely that such a drug would be performance 
enhancing.128  Under the criteria in Article 4.3 such substances can be included on the list 
since WADA may accept that it is danger to the health of the athlete and, given its illegal 
status in many jurisdictions, it is against the spirit of sport. 129   
The confusion over determining which substances should be on the list therefore appears to 
extend beyond the public, to the drafters of the Code.  Many of the difficulties with the 
WADA Code Prohibited List appear to arise from the attempt to place rational criteria on a 
process that appears to be driven by something other than rationality.  The public debate 
surrounding the three ‘doping’ incidents discussed above seems to spring more from the 
appearance of doping, than any rational cognition about the properties of the substance in 
question.  It will be argued in subsequent chapters that the reason for ambiguity in the 
definition of doping — including the decision about which substances should be on the 
prohibited list — is that anti-doping policy is not a result of rational reasoning at all.  Thus, 
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  Although the substance may not be tested for it would still officially be a prohibited substance. 
128
   At least not in most sports and not to any extent which would be relevant in elite competition.  The ambiguities of 
the list are added to by the inclusion of drugs which are largely ‘recreational’ rather than performance enhancing 
on the list.  As Buti and Fridman, above n 3, 47ff, point out there has been a lively debate over whether such 
substances should be included or not.  Many argue that there should be a distinction made between recreational 
drugs and performance enhancing ones.  For a good example of where this distinction has been made, see John 
Birmingham, 'No Stoner Unturned' (2006) 124(6515) The Bulletin 38. 
129
   This is also debatable but it is widely accepted that marijuana has some detrimental effects on health. 
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attempting to apply rational criteria to a process which is largely ‘arrational’ will always 
fail. 
If, in the past, the IOC Prohibited List grew ‘like Topsy’, the criteria in Article 4.3.1 of the 
WADA Code allow for the possibility of this trend continuing.  It is puzzling how such an 
important list — which athletes will be strictly held to at the risk of their careers and 
involves substantial amounts of money in drug testing — could develop in such an 
unprincipled way.  With such an unprincipled and vague approach to the list on the part of 
sports administrators, it is no wonder that it is unclear to the general public which 
substances and practices constitute ‘doping’ and which do not. 
IV WHY ALL THE CONFUSION? 
To define doping is, if not impossible, at best extremely difficult, and yet everyone who 
takes part in competitive sport or who administers it knows exactly what it means.  The 
definition lies not in words but in the integrity of the character.130 
This chapter has demonstrated that, as Pound puts it, there is still ‘no clear view of exactly 
what [we are] talking about when it comes to doping’.131  Historically there has been a lack 
of clarity about exactly what doping is:  namely the deviant behaviour and which 
substances constitute doping.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, given his previous position, Pound’s 
view seems to be that many of these issues are now settled and that a good understanding 
of what doping is, if not already arrived at, is well in the process.  The analysis in this 
chapter tells a very different story.  Far from being clear and complete, the definition of 
doping remains in confusion.  The operational definition may be obvious but this clarity 
does not extend to doping rhetoric, or to doping case law.  In light of the discussion in this 
chapter, the above quote from Sir Arthur Porrit is in many ways wildly inaccurate, yet in 
many ways very true.  It is patently clear that not everyone knows exactly what doping is; 
in fact it is more likely that no-one knows exactly what it is.  But Porrit hints at the real 
driver in doping definition:  the gut instinct about what should constitute doping and what 
shouldn’t.   
In light of the confusion over doping definition, the question arises:  why is there so much 
confusion?  This is the most significant issue for this thesis.  Pound blames the years of 
confusion on the fact that scientists controlled policy development, rather than ‘generalists’ 
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   Arthur Porritt, 'Doping' (1965) 5(3) Journal of Sports Medicine and Physical Fitness 166, 166.  
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   Ibid, 59. 
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who would have taken a more principled, ethical approach.132  Pound is right when he 
argues that the ad hoc nature of anti-doping policy produced this confusion, but the issue is 
not simple.  The influence of popular opinion on anti-doping policy cannot be discounted.  
Chapters Four to Nine will demonstrate that anti-doping policy has been strongly driven by 
public opinion and that it is only through understanding the drivers of that public opinion 
that the reason for such confusion becomes evident.   
In this chapter it can be seen that very strong reactions are prompted by practices which do 
not lie within the definition of doping.  In the three examples of ‘doping’ scandals, public 
reaction to the practice in question was the same as if the substance had been prohibited.  
In all these cases anything that ‘looked’ like doping was thought appropriate for 
punishment without reference to the legal status.  There appears to be a powerful ‘visual’ 
element — anything that has the taste or ‘stench’133 of drugs to it is open to question.  
Caffeine pills, multivitamin shots and intravenous drips of Neoton are strong reminders of 
the use of performance enhancing substances because they look like doping.  Even though 
the substances may not appear on the relevant prohibited list, the jar of pills, the 
intravenous injection and the hypodermic syringe are all paraphernalia connected in the 
minds of the public with performance enhancing substances such as anabolic steroids.134 
The strong emotional reaction to the appearance of doping is also evident in the operation 
of anti-doping law.  The combination of the strict liability rule and the operation of the ‘no 
effect’ provision in the WADA Code has led to athletes who are guilty of nothing but 
having a prohibited substance in their system being punished for doping, even though the 
substance is not ‘active’ in the sense of giving a performance advantage.  The mere 
unintentional presence of an inactive prohibited substance is enough to attract sanction.135  
This suggests that the punishment for doping is not related merely to concerns about the 
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   Ibid. 
133
   Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Thursday 5 August 2004, 25 621 (Senator 
Faulkner, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate). 
134
   Appearances also provide a clue to why drug testing is seen as the panacea to doping problems despite their 
obvious failings.  Drug testing looks like it would be the best way to detect doping because of the substances 
involved, they are look like ‘drugs’ and the best way to catch ‘drug’ use is through a ‘drug test’.  This will be 
discussed further in Chapter Nine 
135
   In an article in 2005, Manderson made these comments about the crime of drug possession in relation to illicit 
drugs: ‘The act is made so passive as virtually to vanish…  One need intent nothing in relation to the drugs: not to 
use or to sell them or even to flush them down the toilet.  Just knowing of their existence is enough’:  Desmond 
Manderson, 'Possessed: Drug Policy, Witchcraft and Belief' (2005) 19(1) Cultural Studies 36, 36.  And later, at 
38, ‘[w]hat lies beneath is undoubtedly fear of contamination.  We fear that just coming into contact with certain 
substances will taint us.  But taint us with what?...What is it, in these drugs, that the very idea of their existence 
— not their abuse, not even their use, but merely the possibility of some future use — causes us to fear their 
touch.’  These comments seem apt for performance enhancing substances too.  What is it about these substances 
that their very presence, not even their abuse or active effect, is so harmful? 
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level playing field, cheating or the health of the athlete.  There is something more powerful 
at work; when simply a whiff of doping is enough to attract the law.  In theory, what is 
repugnant about doping is that athletes intend to ‘cheat’; but, in practice, the power of the 
substance is feared to such an extent that the mere presence of it is enough to require 
prohibition. 
These visceral reactions are also demonstrated in the discussion relating to the prohibited 
list.  Decisions about what to include on the list appear to be driven less by rational 
consideration of the issue and more by a gut reaction to the spectre of doping.136  The use 
of the vague notion of the ‘spirit of sport’ in the WADA Code is appropriate in light of the 
fact that much doping law is influenced by gut reactions. 
It is clear that there is something more involved in defining doping than simple reference 
to a list of prohibited substances and methods.  Doping is not defined merely by the rules 
of the game.  In anti-doping it seems that appearance is everything; if it looks like doping 
then it is doping. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE AMBIGUITIES OF ANTI-DOPING RATIONALES 
I INTRODUCTION 
This chapter turns attention to the variety of justifications or rationales advanced for anti-
doping policy.  It will be argued that no single rationale or combination of justifications 
meets the tests of rationality and logic but, instead, represent post-hoc rationalisation rather 
than logical policy development.  There are two significant implications arising from these 
‘failures’ of the anti-doping rationales:  firstly it confirms the argument that anti-doping 
policy is full of confusion and inconsistencies and, secondly, it reveals that the 
fundamental reason for prohibiting performance enhancing substances in sport remains 
elusive. 
The Macquarie Dictionary defines rationale as ‘a statement of reasons; a reasoned 
exposition of principles; the fundamental reasons serving to account for something.’1  As 
set out in Chapter One, the World Anti-Doping Code (WADA Code) states that the 
fundamental rationale for anti-doping policy is to preserve ‘what is intrinsically valuable 
about sport’ or the ‘spirit of sport’ which is characterised by the values:   ‘ethics, fair play 
and honesty, health, excellence in performance, character and education, fun and joy, 
teamwork, dedication and commitment, respect for rules and laws, respect for self and 
other participants, courage, community and solidarity.’2  These kinds of statements are 
representative of many preambles to anti-doping codes in the past.  Here are three 
examples:  
• The sport of weightlifting involves physical health and fitness, metal 
application and dedication to training.  The use of banned substances and other 
doping methods to artificially enhance performance can endanger the health of 
athletes and is unethical, contrary to the concept of fair play and undermines 
the values of sport.3 
• Certainly we agree that no triathlete should be allowed to gain an unfair 
advantage over another, or compromise his health through the use of 
performance enhancing substances, or through other illegal methods.  Even so 
as the level of triathlon competition increases and the stakes multiply, so does 
                                                
1  
 Colin Yallop (ed), Macquarie Encyclopedic Dictionary, 2006 (Sydney: Macquarie University), 998. 
2  
 World Anti-Doping Code (WADA Code), 3. 
3  
 International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) Constitution, current in 1999:  Robert C.R. Siekmann, Janwillem 
Soek and Andrea Bellani, Doping Rules of International Sports Organisations, 1999 (The Hague: TMC Asser 
Press), 219. 
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the temptation to use artificial means to extend the limits of human 
performance.  Unfortunately, doping abuse is a very real part of that 
temptation.  It is vitally important that each of us in the ITU family understand 
that the use of performance enhancing substances and methods is contrary to 
everything we represent and espouse.4 
•
 Whereas the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code is essentially intended to 
ensure respect for the ethical concepts implicit in Fair Play [sic], the Olympic 
Spirit and medical practice and to safeguard the health of athletes.5 
Like the doping definition in the WADA Code, these statements are rhetorically impressive 
and, at first glance, suggest that the reasons behind anti-doping policy are well accepted 
and well understood.  The fact that these kinds of rationales have featured in the discourse 
surrounding anti-doping policy over a number of decades adds to the impression of 
solidarity in understanding.  On cursory reflection it appears that we know why we are 
doing what we are doing in anti-doping policy.   
However, this chapter will demonstrate that anti-doping rationales exhibit the same level of 
confusion and ambiguity as doping definition upon closer examination.  There have been 
many rationales given for banning doping in sport over the last century:  from the health of 
the athlete to the artificiality of performance enhancing substances.  The very existence of 
such a number of justifications for one policy could be seen as a puzzle in itself:  why 
would such a seemingly obvious moral issue need so many justifications to support it?  
The multitude of justifications for anti-doping policy also speaks to the fact that any 
explanation has not been satisfactory in and of itself; the more justifications suggested for a 
policy, the greater the likelihood that these rationales represent post-hoc rationalisation 
rather than logical policy development.  The argument in the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis is that this is certainly the case with anti-doping policy.  The presented rationales 
represent post-hoc rationalisation for a policy based on things other than compelling 
logical reasons for taking action. 
But it is not the mere existence of the numerous ethical positions which is problematic in 
anti-doping rationales.  A rationale supplies the fundamental reason or the reasoned 
exposition of principles for anti-doping policy.  Among all the possible justifications 
advanced, it will be shown that no single one can be found which can be called the 
‘fundamental reason’ or ‘reasoned exposition of principles’.  As much prior literature has 
shown, every justification which has been presented over the history of anti-doping 
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 International Triathlete Union Doping Control Rules and Procedural Guidelines, current 1999,  in ibid, 374. 
5 
 Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code (OMADC) current 1999, in Siekmann, above n 3, 599. 
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programmes has been roundly criticized as being unable to support current policy from an 
ethical point of view.   
This chapter concludes that, not only is there no satisfactory justification for anti-doping 
policy, such a logical reason for the policy will never be found.  This is because the policy 
is not fundamentally a rational one.  Later chapters of the thesis therefore advance an 
alternative explanation as to how anti-doping policy developed.  As Manderson writes,  
[i]t will do no good, therefore, to try and elaborate reasons for the maintenance of current 
policy, or, for that matter, to use logic to criticize it.  For it is not reason which is operative 
here…6 
II THE ANTI-DOPING RATIONALES 
A The Spirit of Sport?  
The notion that doping violates some indefinable essence of sport is not a new concept.  
From as early as 1967, with the condemnation of doping passed by the Council of Europe, 
the ‘spirit of fair play in sport’ has been a distinguishable element in anti-doping 
discourse.7  For example, in 1969, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) published 
an article in their newsletter by Dr G.M. Oza which stated that doping was ‘unnatural and 
contrary to the spirit of the Olympic Games.’8  Until 2003 that ‘spirit’ had never been 
defined and remained an ethereal and vague concept.9 
The WADA Code has now sought to give some meaning to the phrase by listing ‘values’ 
which make up the ‘spirit of sport’, as outlined above.  These sentiments did not wholly 
originate with the Code: but within the Code rationale statement it is possible to discern 
reference to a number of justifications for anti-doping policy previously relied on by anti-
doping authorities.  Rationales with particular familiarity include fair play/equality, health, 
and respect for rules.  Each of these rationales will be explained separately in the first 
section of this chapter, as well as the other commonly presented justifications.  In the 
                                                
6  
 Desmond Manderson, 'The Semiotics of the Title: A Comparative Analysis of Drug Legislation' (1995) 2 Law, 
Text, Culture 160, 173.  Manderson wrote in relation to illicit drug policy but this thesis will argue that the same 
comments apply equally to anti-doping policy. 
7 
 Barrie Houlihan, Dying to Win: Doping in Sport and the Development of Anti-Doping Policy, 1999 (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Publishing), 130. 
8  
 Dr GM Oza, 'Athletes, Doping and Olympism,' (1969) 19(30 May) Olympic Review 209. 
9 
 See also Thomas Murray, In Search of the Spirit of Sport (2007) <http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/PlayTrue_Issue3_2007_Murray_En.pdf> at 9 January 2008 who bases many of his 
arguments on the idea that doping ‘undermines the meaning of sport’.  See also Doriane Lamberlet Coleman and 
James E Coleman Jnr, 'The Problem of Doping' (2008) 57 Duke Law Journal 1743 for a discussion on the 
definition of this spirit. 
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second part of the chapter the criticisms and analysis of these justifications will be 
presented.   
B Protecting Health? 
The health argument regards doping as an unacceptably serious threat to the well-being of 
otherwise healthy individuals,10 whether the danger lies in the simple taking of 
performance enhancing drugs or the way in which they are taken (i.e. without medical 
supervision).  It is thought that the way to deal with this danger is to forbid athletes from 
using such products and methods.  As will be explained in Chapter Six, this rationale was 
particularly important in the 1960s, as concerns for athletes’ health escalated after the 
deaths of a number of athletes associated with the use of performance enhancing 
substances.11 
C Protecting the Level Playing Field or Fairness? 
As Houlihan points out, ‘[w]hile unfairness is the most common justification, it is also one 
of the most problematic.’12  The level playing field argument views the taking of certain 
substances, or indulging in certain practices, as conferring on the athlete an unfair 
advantage over other participants.  Again, the solution to dealing with this unfairness is 
considered to be prohibition with associated drug testing designed to ensure compliance.  
D Harm to Young:  Role Models? 
The idea that athletes are role models to the young who must not be seen to be taking drugs 
has been very strongly advocated, perhaps most strongly in recent times by Director Barry 
McCaffrey of the United States Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).  The 
negative role model associated with the use of recreational drugs in elite sportspeople was 
the main motivating factor for the USA’s push to have marijuana added to the WADA Code 
Prohibited List. 
ONDCP pushed the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to make marijuana a banned 
substance after an athlete who tested positive for marijuana was awarded the Olympic Gold 
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 One of the best examples of this type of argument is presented by Bob Goldman, Death in a Locker Room: 
Steroids and Sports, 1984 (South Bend: Icarus Press).  In Chapters One and Seven he recounts some of the 
terrible side effects that performance enhancing substances, particularly anabolic steroids, can (allegedly) have on 
an athlete’s body as a basis for arguing that these substances should be banned.  For further such arguments by 
Goldman, see Bob Goldman, 'Medical Effects and Side-Effects of Ergogenics in Athletes' in Ronald S Laura and 
Saxon W White (eds), Drug Controversy in Sport:: Medical and Socioethical Issues, 1991 (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin) 128, 143.  See also Dick Pound, Inside Dope: How Drugs Are the Biggest Threat to Sports, Why You 
Should Care, and What Can Be Done About Them, 2006 (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons Ltd), 36ff.  
11 
 See Dick Pound, Inside the Olympics, 2004 (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons, Canada), 55, who writes ‘[t]here is 
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12 
 Houlihan, above n 7, 110. 
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and hoisted up on the medal platform as a hero to all the world’s youth.  The IOC 
responded and marijuana is now prohibited.13 
The argument also featured in the Presidential State of the Union speech by US president 
George W Bush that same year: 
To help children make right choices, they need good examples.  Athletics play such an 
important role in our society, but, unfortunately, some in professional sports are not setting 
much of an example.  The use of performance-enhancing drugs like steroids in baseball, 
football, and other sports is dangerous, and it sends the wrong message — that there are 
shortcuts to accomplishment, and that performance is more important than character.  So 
tonight I call on team owners, union representatives, coaches, and players to take the lead, 
to send the right signal, to get tough, and to get rid of steroids now.14 
We have already seen in the last chapter these kinds of arguments at work in the media in 
relation to the caffeine pill debate in Australia.  Although the basis of these comments was 
not explicit, the message itself was clear:  caffeine pills should not be used in sport because 
it sends the ‘wrong message’ to young people.15 
E Medical Ethics? 
The main problem with regard to medical practitioners prescribing drugs for athletes 
appears to be that the doctor is helping the athlete disobey the rules of sport or to ‘cheat’.16  
Although many doctors would hold the position that assisting athletes to utilise prohibited 
substances in their preparation is against medical ethics, it is unclear whether this would be 
the case if the substances in question were not prohibited.  It may also be that use of any 
performance enhancing substance would be seen to be going against the medical ethic of 
helping sick people become well as opposed to assisting well people.  Whatever the basis, 
it is clear that the idea that doping somehow challenges medical ethics has been influential 
for some time.17  The argument for doping control on the basis of medical ethics was 
implicitly referred to in the IOC’s Medical Code:  ‘The IOC Medical Code is essentially 
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 Director Barry R McCaffrey, Combating the Use of Drugs and Doping in Sport (1999) 
<http://commerce.senate.gov/hearing/1020mcc.pdf> at 13 March 2004, 2. 
14 
 President George W Bush, State of the Union Address (2004) 
 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html> at 13 September 2008.  For similar 
sentiments see M Spedding and C Spedding, 'Drugs in Sport: a Scientist-Athlete's Perspective: from Ambition to 
Neurochemistry' (2008) 154 British Journal of Pharmacology 496, 491. 
15 
 See the discussion in Chapter Two regarding the caffeine pill debate for examples of headlines and comments 
using the role model argument. 
16 
 See also Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts, 
'Drugs in Sport: Second Report' (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990), Chapter Nine, 277–326.   
17  
 For a good example of some early discussion of the problems doping presents to medical ethics see Bill Gilbert, 
'Problems in a Turned-On World' (1969) Sports Illustrated 64.  
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intended to safeguard the health of athletes, and to ensure respect for the ethical concepts 
implicit in Fair Play, the Olympic Spirit and medical practice.’18 
F Harm to Other Athletes:  Coercion? 
The idea here is that anti-doping rules can be justified on the basis of protecting athletes 
who would rather not use such substances being coerced into similar use.  The coercion is 
thought to be due to a perception that drug taking is necessary in order to successfully 
compete with the ‘drugged’ athlete.19   
G Drugs are Unnatural? 
The ‘unnaturalness’ argument — doping should be prohibited because the substances 
involved are unnatural and dehumanising — has been highly influential in the doping 
debate since the 1960s.20  
So influential was the idea that doping rules could be justified by the artificiality argument 
that the concept was written into early definitions of doping.  For instance, as mentioned in 
Chapter Two, one of the earliest attempts at defining doping arose from the convention of 
European sports governing bodies in 1963, the definition being: 
The administration to, or use by, a competing athlete of any substances foreign to the body 
or any physiological substance taken in abnormal quantity or by an abnormal route of entry 
into the body, with the sole intention of increasing in an artificial and unfair manner his 
performance in competition.21   
Dr A F Creff of St Michael’s Hospital in Paris, in the IOC’s newsletter in 1968, proposed 
to define doping as ‘the use of any non-physiological means (it being understood that 
physiology is the science dealing with the organic functions characteristic of life), i.e., any 
means that are not fundamentally natural.’22  From the very beginning of anti-doping 
efforts in 1928, doping was defined as ‘the use of any stimulant not normally employed to 
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504. 
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 See Houlihan, above n 7, 130.  
22   Dr A F Creff, 'Thoughts on Doping' (1968) 12 Olympic Review 447.  Emphasis added. 
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increase the power of action in athletic competition above the average’,23 while the IOC’s 
first condemnation of doping in 1938 was worded thus:  ‘The use of drugs and artificial 
stimulants of any kind must be condemned most strongly…’24 
H Competition Should be Between Athletes, Not Drugs or Pharmacists?  
The rationale which seeks to justify anti-doping policy on the basis that competition should 
be between athletes rather than chemists is related to the naturalness argument.  The 
underlying reason why competition should not be between drugs or chemists is that this 
erodes the natural basis of athletic competition.  Again, this kind of argument has featured 
in anti-doping policy from very early on.  In a special edition of the British Journal of 
Sports Medicine, which reported on the 1969 symposium on Doping in Sport,  J.G.P. 
Williams, the UK representative to the Council of Europe Working Party on ‘Doping of 
Athletes’, wrote:  
If the variable is the question of the amount of doping or the type of dope, then, again, the 
essence of competition is distorted because it ceases to be a matter of the comparison of the 
performance of one man against another and it becomes instead the performance of one 
pharmacologist against another — “I can make my guinea pig run faster than you can make 
your guinea pig run”.  Although it makes a very good sport in the sense of competition 
between pharmacologists it ceases to be a sport in the sense of competition between the 
individual athletes concerned!25 
I Image of Sport? 
There are a number of different facets to the image of sport rationale but all relate to the 
way in which sport is perceived by members of the public and the effects of that public 
perception.  At a practical level, the concern is that doping leads to the public becoming 
disenchanted with sport as a product, since they may not wish to observe sports where the 
participants are suspected of taking performance enhancing drugs.  The fear is that if 
people think they are being cheated out of watching fair competition, then their interest 
will wane.26  Waning of public interest in sports competition and any associated decline in 
                                                
23   International Amateur Athletics Federation, Handbook (1927-1928) <http://www.iaaf.org/newsfiles/34661.pdf> 
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Derse (ed), Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement, 2001 (Champaign: Human 
Kinetics) 129, 142.  This links the argument to the level playing field argument.  Interestingly Carolan, above n 
19, 41 argues that the rise of professional sport has increased the importance of the image of sport in that the 
public now have greater interest in and ‘ownership of the sporting ethos’.  
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attendance would, of course, concern sports administrators and sponsors.27  This, in turn, 
would threaten the viability of modern professional sport.   
Another facet of the image argument focuses on sport as a healthy pastime and 
sportspeople as the model of good health:  the discovery of doping tarnishes that 
wholesome image.28  It is argued that people will no longer allow their children to be 
involved in sport, jeopardising the future of the industry.29  An extension of this argument 
includes a moral dimension:  sports people should provide good role models for young 
people, and doping detracts from that healthy, ethical role model.  As stated above, the 
effect of doping on young people has been of concern since at least 1966.30  This argument 
has been very forcefully put by representatives of the United States government in recent 
international negotiations regarding the inclusion of recreational drugs on the WADA Code 
Prohibited List.31 
J Discouraging Illegal Activity? 
This rationale was put forward by Buti and Fridman, who point out that in Australia (and 
other countries) possession, importation and sale of many doping agents is against the 
criminal law, and that ‘sporting organisations have legitimate concerns aimed at preventing 
their most important assets, the athletes, from the prospect of criminal prosecution.’32  
III THE CRITICISMS 
Every one of these proposed rationales have been criticized in previous literature.  So 
strong has been the criticism of each rationale that commentators such as the Canadian 
Centre for Ethics in Sport (CCES),33 Black34, and Cox35 all argue that none of these 
arguments are sufficient to justify the prohibition on drugs in sport.  Some of these analysts 
go on to suggest alternative justifications for the ban on doping, in an effort to show that 
problems relating to the justification for doping policy does not destroy the policy itself.  
                                                
27  Neville Cox, 'Legalisation of Drug Use in Sport' (2002) 2 International Sports Law Review 77, 82. 
28  Hayden Opie, ‘Legal Regimes for the Control of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport’ (1990) 12 Adelaide 
Law Review 332, 333.   
29  Cox, above n 27, 82. 
30  Houlihan, above n 7, 130. 
31  McCaffrey, above n 13.  
32  Antonio Buti and Saul Fridman, Drugs, Sport and the Law, 2001 (Mudgeeraba: Scribbler’s Publishing), 61. 
33 
 Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport, Ethical Rationale for Promoting Drug-Free Sport: Executive Summary 
(1993) <www.cces.ca/pdfs/CCES-PAPER-EthicalRationale-E.pdf> at 30 September 2008.  
34  
 Terry Black, 'Does the Ban on Drugs in Sport Improve Societal Welfare?' (1996) 31 International Review for 
Sociology of Sport 367; Terry Black and Amelia Pape, 'The Ban on Drugs in Sports: The Solution or the 
Problem?' (1997) 21(1) Journal of Sport and Social Issues 83. 
35  
 Cox, above n 27, 77. 
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Some examples of alternate justifications include protecting the joy of sport, the 
irrelevance of doping, avoidance of unnecessary risk, athletic prudence and the self-
defeating nature of doping.36  Others view the problematic nature of the justifications as 
undercutting the entire system of anti-doping rules.  For example, Fost argues that it is not 
at all self-evident that there should be a ban on drugs in sport and that, like society’s 
opposition to other activities such as pornography, ‘it is often difficult to show real danger 
or harm, and it is harder to say why these activities should be considered immoral.’37   
Whether the lack of a consistent rationale undermines the existence of the policy itself is 
not the point of this discussion.  What is important is that such a lack of consistent and 
ethically acceptable rationales shows that there is confusion at the deepest level, not only 
as to what doping is, but why it is banned.  A brief examination of some of the criticisms 
which have been levelled at the anti-doping rationales will demonstrate the unsatisfactory 
nature of the reasons behind anti-doping policy. 
A Spirit of Sport 
Even this latest articulation of the rationale for anti-doping codes has come under criticism 
from academic circles.  Savulescu, Foddy and Clayton argue that rather than doping being 
against the ‘spirit of sport’, doping practices actually harmonise with the essence of 
modern professional sport.  For Savulescu et al, sport is not purely about biological 
superiority; it involves a creative element as well.  They contend that human sport is 
distinct from horse or dog racing, where the aim is simply to find the biologically fastest 
animal, since achievement in human sport involves the competitor’s determination, 
courage, discipline, choice of training methods, and motivation.  This creative element in 
sport could include the choice to take performance-enhancing drugs.  ‘Far from being 
against the spirit of sport, biological manipulation embodies the human spirit — the 
capacity to improve ourselves on the basis of reason and judgement.’38   
Houlihan also addresses the idea that doping policies can be justified on the basis of a 
vague notion such as the spirit, ethic or value of sport.  In responding to an argument put 
by Schneider and Butcher — that drug use undermines the essential humanity of sport and 
                                                
36 
 CCES, above n 33. 
37 
 Norman Fost, 'Banning Drugs in Sport: A Skeptical View' (1986) 1986(August) Hastings Centre Report 5, 10. 
38 
 J Savulescu, B Foddy and M Clayton, 'Why We Should Allow Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport' (2004) 
38(6) British Journal of Sports Medicine 666, 666-667. 
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the athlete,39 Houlihan presents an equally attractive counter-claim:  that sport and the 
athlete is simply ‘a social construct and imposes no prior obligation on the individual’ 
including to refrain from using certain performance enhancing substances.40  
Murray, on the other hand, uses the spirit of sport concept to counter arguments against the 
doping prohibition.  For example, in response to the idea that all performance enhancers 
present similar ethical difficulties and it is, therefore, inconsistent to ban doping but accept 
fibre glass poles in pole vaulting, Murray argues that some performance enhancers 
‘undermine the meaning of sport’ (see below for discussion of this argument).  Similarly, 
he claims that ‘[d]rawing lines is not only permissible, it is essential for preserving the 
meaning of each sport and sport in general’.41  However, Murray gives no logical reason 
why doping should undermine the meaning of sport in this way.  The comparison that he 
cites is of a competitor in the New York Marathon winning by wearing roller blades.  
About this example he says:  
Does she deserve to be crowned as the winner?  Virtually everyone I’ve asked this question 
says no, she does not.  Not all means of going faster in the marathon are equal.  Some like 
roller blades — and perhaps EPO, anabolic steroids, and other drugs — undermine the 
meaning of sport.42 
It seems that Murray is claiming that a distinction can be made on the basis of general 
consensus as to what does and does not undermine the meaning of sport.  This, and the 
absence of any logical explanation as to why doping should so challenge the meaning of 
sport, suggests that the basis for the spirit or meaning of sport argument is a ‘gut feeling’ 
rather than a reasoned response.43   
As was mentioned above, the ‘spirit of sport’ concept embodied in the Code appears to be 
an amalgam of a number of justifications previously asserted for anti-doping policies.  
Thus, the arguments presented below regarding the various individual rationales, equally 
apply to the most recent justification statement in international anti-doping policy as part 
of the concept of ‘spirit of sport’. 
                                                
39 
 Angela Schneider and Robert Butcher, 'The Mesalliance of the Olympic Ideal and Doping, Why They Married 
and Why They Should Divorce' in Landry F, Landry M and Yerles M (eds), Sport...the Third Millennium (1991) 
495 quoted in Houlihan, above n 7, 121-122.  See also Schneider and Butcher, above n 26, 129ff.  
40 
 Houlihan, above n 7, 122.   
41  
 Murray, above n 9, 1. 
42  
 Ibid. 
43   This theme will be expanded later in this chapter.   
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B Protecting Health 
Despite the apparent widespread acquiescence to the health rationale, there has also been 
widespread criticism of using the desire to protect the health of the athlete as a justification 
for the prohibition of certain substances.  The most elementary objection to this rationale 
relates to the lack of evidence regarding the danger of the prohibited substances.  Although 
most people would accept that steroids and some of the other prohibited drugs and 
practices are dangerous,44 some commentators question the extent to which this is true, 
suggesting that there is little evidence that serious side-effects are common when these 
drugs are taken at therapeutic doses.45  The lack of evidence, of course, may be partly due 
to the ethical difficulties involved in forming an appropriate research design involving 
prohibited or illicit drugs.46  Whatever the reason, the evidence is lacking.  An extension of 
this argument suggests that many of the serious side-effects of performance enhancing 
substances relate not so much to the pharmacological properties of the drug itself, but the 
context in which it is taken, that is, without medical supervision with drugs often obtained 
from the black market (and therefore of unknown composition.)47 
Another objection to the prohibition on the basis of health accepts that there are health 
dangers, but takes exception to the paternalism involved in trying to protect competent 
adult athletes from their own voluntary choice to take drugs.48  This argument is not 
extended to child athletes since they are in a different category of competency.  However, 
in the adult context, it is argued that prohibiting athletes from taking performance 
                                                
44  For a good overview of the harms related to the prohibited substances, see Secretariat of the European Group on 
Ethics in Science and New Technologies European Commission Secretariat-General, European Union, Doping in 
Sport: Medical Aspects (1999) <europa.eu.itn/comm./sport/doc/ecom/gee-991111-med-ed.pdf> at 2 April 2004.  
See also British Medical Association, Drugs in Sport: The Pressure to Perform, 2002 (London: BMJ Books), 
16ff. 
45  CCES, above n 33.  See also Cox, above n 27, 81. 
46  See David Mottram, 'Does the International Olympic Committee (IOC) List Need Updating?' (1999) 27(1) Sports 
Medicine 1, 6.  Note, however that Coleman, above n 9, 1786, argues that lack of definitve evidence does not 
mean that the risks of doping should not continue to be emphasised since lack of clinical data does not definiively 
prove doping to be either dangerous or safe.  Even so, assumed risks are hardly a watertight basis for a whole 
system of prohibition. 
47  This is similar to the argument put in relation to illicit drug laws, mostly by those supporting the harm 
minimalisation approach, which suggests that the prohibition of drugs actually increases harm to athletes rather 
than decreases it.  See for example, John Burge, 'Legalize and Regulate: a Prescription for Reforming Anabolic 
Steroid Legislation' (1994) 15 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal 33, 56-57; British Medical 
Association, above n 44, 10 and Black and Pape, above n 34, 89.  
48 
 See W.M Brown, 'Paternalism, Drugs and the Nature of Sports' in William J  Morgan  and Klaus V Meier (eds), 
Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, 1988 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) 303; CCES, above n 33 and Cox, above n 27,  
81.  See also Fost above n 37, 5.  
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?    Chapter Three 
  89 
enhancing substances with the goal of protecting them from themselves, does not sit well 
within an otherwise liberal notion of individual freedom.49 
For other commentators, the health rationale presents an unacceptable inconsistency in that 
there are many other aspects of sport which also present a danger to the athlete which are 
not subjected to prohibition or regulation.  Fost points out:  ‘In many sports the risk of 
competing is greater than the risk of taking certain banned substances.’50  Brown argues, 
‘[w]e believe in the capacity of sports to promote health and fitness, but many originated in 
the practice of war and routinely involve stress and injury, sometimes death.’51  Other 
training techniques are also identified as presenting a danger to the health of sportspeople, 
yet these techniques are accepted as legitimate.52  There are also many permitted 
substances within sport which pose a danger to the health of the athlete.53  If authorities 
really were motivated by a desire to protect the health of the athlete, these other potentially 
dangerous aspects of sport would have been treated similarly. 
C Protecting the Level Playing Field or Fairness 
Buti and Fridman contend that there is a problematic assumption underlying the argument 
that performance enhancing substances create unfairness in sport:  the premise being that 
prohibited drugs do actually enhance sporting performance.54  In a similar way to the 
health rationale, there is surprisingly little evidence that many of the prohibited drugs are 
actually ergogenic aids.  Indeed, there is even less rigorous scientific evidence regarding 
the ergogenic properties of the prohibited substances than there is in relation to the health 
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 Simon Gardiner, Alexandra Felix, John O’Leary, Mark James and Roger Welch, Sports Law (3rd Ed), 2006 
(London: Cavendish Publishing), 290.  For a counter argument see Murray, above n 9, 2 who argues that 
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Medical Association, above n 44, 9-10.  See also Cox, above n 27, 83 regarding training techniques and diets. 
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 See Fost, above n 37, 7 regarding painkillers; Ivan Waddington, Sport, Health and Drugs: a Critical Sociological 
Perspective, 2000 (London: F&N Spon), 104, regarding non-steroidal anti-inflammatory Drugs (NSAIDS) and 
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consequences of doping.  Parry,55 Aitken,56 and others57 point out that, although most 
athletes and sporting officials firmly believe that steroids and other ‘so-called performance 
enhancers’58 do enhance sporting performance, scientific data to this effect is lacking.59  
The fact that there is now a universal list for all sports exacerbates this problem since not 
all substances on the WADA Code Prohibited List will enhance performance in every 
sport.60 
Furthermore, the CCES argues that something is unfair in sport only if it is against the 
rules.  So although the fairness argument may provide justification for enforcing the rule 
against doping, it does not provide a basis for the rule in the first place.61  The CCES takes 
the position that it is unclear how doping can be seen as inherently unfair, even if the rules 
permitted doping and athletes condoned it.  The inherent unfairness of doping has been 
questioned by a large number of other commentators.  Some argue that sporting 
competition itself is inherently unfair:  Houlihan contends that the essence of sport is about 
seeking advantage over other competitors,62 while Savulescu et al contend that genetic 
inequalities — finding the naturally fastest, strongest and skilled — is what sport is all 
about.63  Thus, the prohibition of drugs on this basis is at odds with the very nature of sport 
itself.64  As Mignon has put it, ‘[i]n fact, condemning doping as an artificial aid is, in the 
end, challenging a fundamental principle of sport, one which attaches it to modernity, 
namely its relation to the idea of human progress.’65  
                                                
55   Jim Parry, Ethics and Doping School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, 
<http://www.blues.uab.es/olympic.studies/doping/doping1.htm> at 28 February 2005. 
56   Campbell Aitken, 'Lifting Your Game' (2002) 61(12) Meanjin 217, 221. 
57   See for example Michael S Bahrke and Charles E Yesalis, 'Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids' in Charles E Yesalis 
and Michael S Bahrke (eds), Performance Enhancing Substances in Sport and Exercise, 2002 (Champaign: 
Human Kinetics) 33, 41 in relation to anabolic steroids.  
58  Michael Kennedy, 'Drugs in Sport: Testing at the 2000 Olympics' (2002) 34 Australian Journal of Forensic 
Sciences 25.  See also Charles E Yesalis and Michael S Bahrke (eds), Performance Enhancing Substances in 
Sport and Exercise, 2002 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) generally.  Each chapter of the book is devoted to a 
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59   JC McGrath and DA Cowan, 'Commentary: Drugs in Sport' (2008) 154 British Journal of Pharmacology 493, 
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the list.   See Chris Cooper, 'Drugs and Ergogenic Aids to Improve Sport Performance' (2008) 44 Essays in 
Biochemistry 1, 2-3 for a good discussion of the problems in proving ergogenic effects in these substances. 
60  See Chapter Four for a more detailed discussion of this issue.  
61  CCES, above n 33. 
62  Houlihan, above n 7, 110ff. 
63  Savulescu et al., above n 38, 667. 
64  See also RL Simon, ‘Good Competition and Drug Enhanced Performance’ (1994) XI Journal of the Philosophy 
of Sport, 13 cited in Gardiner et al, above n 49, 287. 
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Others have identified various aspects of modern professional sport which also create 
unfairness, but have not been prohibited.  These aspects include:  legal performance 
enhancing substances,66 access to financial sponsorship,67 expensive and contemporary 
scientific training techniques,68 advantages coming from the athlete’s country of birth or 
residence,69 and advantages arising from genetic disposition.70  As the Australian Senate 
inquiry into drugs in sport put it:  ‘the playing field has always been uneven and, with 
recent advances in knowledge and techniques, is getting more so.’71  Indeed, in relation to 
anabolic steroids, Aitken claims that there is more equal access to these performance 
enhancers than many of the expensive training techniques and equipment.  Since steroids 
are relatively inexpensive and common, more athletes would be able to use them than other 
forms of enhancement and therefore may actually be ‘fairer’.72 
Another argument against the fairness rationale is the idea that the prohibition on doping 
has not created a level playing field at all; rather it may have made the field less even.73  
Some athletes take drugs despite the doping rules, while others refrain in obedience to the 
rules.  Since some of those abstainers would probably have taken drugs if they were not 
against the rules, the difference between the two types of athletes is exaggerated.  The 
doping rules are, in effect, disadvantaging the rule-abiding athlete, by giving those willing 
to breach the rules more scope to enhance their performance beyond that of the general 
cohort.  Consequently, the playing field is actually less even than it would be without a 
prohibition on drugs.  It is argued that if all athletes were allowed to use performance 
enhancing substances, the athletes willing to break the rules would not have such an 
advantage.74  Others argue that, rather than creating an unfair advantage, performance 
enhancing substances can actually take away unfair advantages relating to genetic 
differences among sportspeople.75 
                                                
66  Fost, above n 37, 6. 
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D Harm to Young:  Role Models 
One counter-argument against using the role-model case to support the doping prohibition 
centres on the extent to which it is appropriate to designate this esteemed role to elite 
sportspeople.  Both Houlihan76 and Butcher and Schneider77 contend that it is inconsistent 
to prohibit drug-taking by athletes while ignoring the drug habits of musicians, models and 
movie stars who are equally idolised by young people. 
Moreover, even if it is appropriate to assign athletes a special job as role-models, why 
should drug-taking be inappropriate?  It is important to note here that the role model 
argument applies to all prohibited drugs, not just illicit recreational drugs.  So the 
contention is that taking any drug, whether illegal for the general population or not, is 
inappropriate in sports people.  The reasoning here is not entirely clear.  If it is because 
drug-taking is cheating, the argument is destined to come against the problems discussed 
above under the fair-play argument:  drug taking is really only cheating because it is 
against the rules and unfairness is not a basis for the rule itself.78  If the concern is that 
performance enhancing drugs would cause young people harm to their health,79 then, as 
Houlihan points out, ‘[i]n order to be consistent it would be necessary to apply the same 
argument to the dangers arising from intensive training, training while injured, and 
potentially dangerous diets.’80  Given the potential danger to adolescent bodies associated 
with participation in elite sport,81 it could even be argued that young people should not be 
encouraged to participate in professional sports at all.82  
In his 2004 State of the Union speech, US President George W Bush, claimed that athletes 
taking drugs sends the message to children ‘that there are shortcuts to accomplishment, and 
that performance is more important than character.’83  It is difficult to see how this 
reasoning applies prior to a prohibition being in place.  Certainly once anti-doping rules are 
in place, taking drugs would be an unacceptable shortcut and a slight on the character of 
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the athlete, since they would be disobeying the rules of sport.  But, again, it does not 
provide a reason for banning drug use in the first place.  As with the level playing field 
argument, there are other ‘short-cuts’ to accomplishment which are not subjected to a 
prohibition the way performance enhancing substances are.  If Bush was claiming that 
there is something inherently immoral in taking drugs,84 then, as Buti and Fridman point 
out, targeting this type of moral behaviour is inconsistent since other immoral behaviour in 
sports people is not treated similarly.85 
I contend that part of the problem with this justification is that it is largely a self-
perpetuating predicament.  Banning drugs in sport creates a need to enforce the rules by 
way of drug testing athletes.  Drug testing athletes reveals information about athlete’s drug 
taking habits.86  Once in the public domain, this knowledge then presents a certain image 
of the athlete and of the sport they represent.  Without drug testing, people would know no 
more about what drugs their favourite sports star was taking than they do about their 
favourite model, musician or movie star.  Thus the only damage to the image of the athlete 
and sport would be that of rumour and conjecture, all of which can be easily dealt with by 
public relations experts.  Testing and public dissemination of the information actually 
contribute a great deal to the image problem.  My argument, of course, depends on the 
extent to which knowledge of drug taking can come from other sources.   
Nevertheless, the case of the Canadian snow-boarder, Ross Rebagliati, is an example 
which suggests that there may be some substance to the argument.  If the IOC had not 
tested for marijuana use, there is little chance of the world ever knowing of Rebagliati’s 
drug use.87  Thus ‘an athlete who tested positive for marijuana’ would not have been 
‘hoisted up on the medal platform as a hero to all the world’s youth’.88  Instead, the athlete 
who was so ‘hoisted’ would have had a clean record as to drug use.  Without drug testing, 
Rebagliati’s marijuana use would have been only a rumour, if that.  Although this public 
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view of sportspeople may not be an accurate portrayal of the drug taking culture within 
sport, the argument here is about the message that young people receive, not about the 
public’s right to know the truth.  Children would have few role models to follow of athlete 
drug taking without drug testing. 
E Medical Ethics 
Although many doctors would hold that assisting athletes to utilise prohibited substances in 
their preparation is against medical ethics, it is unclear whether this would be the case if 
the substances in question were not prohibited.  If the ethical problem is that prescribing 
doping agents to athletes assists well people rather than helping sick people, the argument 
poses a problem.  Other aspects of modern medicine, such as cosmetic surgery, also 
present a challenge to this ideal and yet have not led to a prohibition on such treatments.89  
It is also by no means clear that the consequential ethical position would be to support 
prohibition.  Some suggest that medical ethics may compel a doctor to take a harm-
minimisation and educational approach to the problem, ‘rather than a necessarily 
prohibitive one.’90 
F Harm to Other Athletes:  Coercion 
This argument has also been identified as problematic, the criticisms best summarised by 
Parry, who responds to the suggestion that use of drugs forces others to use them: 
No, it doesn’t!  But even if it does, so does six hours in the pool per day.  All top class 
swimmers know the hours put in by rivals, and must match that to compete.  Does that 
make it immoral?  If drugs are immoral on that criterion, then so are intensive training 
levels.  In fact, there is a school of thought which sincerely holds this view:  that modern 
sport forces most athletes to become over-trained, one-dimensional people, thus denying 
the central value of sport as a joyful contest between untrained participants (i.e. their 
‘natural’ state).91 
Similarly Houlihan,92 Fost93 and Black maintain that no athlete is actually forced to use 
performance-enhancing drugs.94  There is always a choice, albeit a difficult one in the light 
                                                
89 
 It is interesting to note that the infamous doctor Robert Kerr who provided athletes with steroids in the USA in 
the 1980s in his book, The Practical Use of Anabolic Steroids with Athletes he claims that some of his patients 
used anabolic steroids to develop a ‘trim, muscular, “beach physique.”  Robert Kerr, Practical Use of Anabolic 
Steroids with Athletes, 1982 (San Gabriel: Robert Kerr), 5.  The links between performance enhancement in the 
social setting and in sport are not as tenuous as they initially appear.  There is further evidence that a major 
motivator in the use of anabolic steroids by young people is related to cosmetic reasons rather than sporting 
performance.  The trend extends to high school students. See also Charles E Yesalis, Michael S. Bahrke, Andrea 
N. Kopstein and Camille K. Barsukiewicz, ‘Incidence of Anabolic Steroid Use: A Discussion of Methodological 
Issues’ in Charles E. Yesalis (ed) Anabolic Steroids in Sport and Exercise, 2000 (Champaign: Human Kinetics), 
73-115, 105.  
90  British Medical Association, above n 44, 10. 
91  Parry, above n 55. 
92  Houlihan, above n 7, 120. 
93  Fost, above n 37, 6–7. 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?    Chapter Three 
  95 
of the pressures of modern professional sport.  Like Parry, these authors argue that athletes 
are already compelled to make many choices on the basis of what other competitors do:  
full time training, special diets and training methods, and lifestyle changes, to name a few.  
The taking of drugs is not seen as any more coercive than these other aspects of modern 
professional sport.95  As Cox maintains ‘if the clean athlete is in an intolerable dilemma 
then this is the result of the professionalisation of sport more than the legality of doping.’96 
G Drugs are Unnatural 
The criticisms of this argument can be divided into two major categories:  that prohibited 
substances are not necessarily unnatural, and that unnatural does not equate to unfair. 
The most basic issue identified with this argument is the definition of what is natural and 
what is unnatural.97  Aitken argues that erythropoietin (EPO) and anabolic steroids are 
based on endogenous substances (meaning substances from the human body eg 
testosterone) and are therefore far more ‘natural’ than permitted performance enhancers 
such as light-weight bicycles and pressure chambers.98  As Black says:  ‘the day of the 
natural athlete no longer exists, if it ever did.  Instead all athletes have been artificially 
produced…’.99  Parry also suggests that an athlete may be ‘unnatural’ by definition since, 
in order to become world-class athletes, they have to be born with certain genetic statistical 
variations.100  Savulescu et al claim that nature is not necessarily fair:  success in modern 
sport is determined by genetic differences which cannot be categorised as fair.  These 
arguments suggest that, even if it was accepted that doping agents were not natural, the 
assumption that this would therefore make doping agents unfair is equally problematic.101 
                                                                                                                                              
94   Terry Black, 'Does the Ban on Drugs in Sport Improve Societal Welfare?' (1996) 31 International Review for 
Sociology of Sport 367, 376.  Black argues that ‘only athletes in communist countries are forced to use steroids 
and that occurs whether or not the ban exists.’  Even this may not be completely accurate as there is evidence of 
some that these athletes refused to take the drugs prescribed, albeit at the risk of losing their benefits and place on 
the national squad:  see for example the story of Renate Neufeld Spassov in John Vincour, 'East German Tale of 
Tyranny', The New York Times (New York), 11 January 1979, D17.  Obviously if the athlete was a minor and was 
unaware of the contents of the drug then they were practically forced to take the drugs. 
95  See also CCES, above n 33 and Schneider and Butcher, above n 26. 
96  Cox, above n 27, 84. 
97   CCES, above n 33; Carolen, above n 19, 13 and Vernon Howard, ‘Fair Play: Ethical Issues of Doping in Sport’ in 
Ronald S Laura and Saxon W White, Drug Controversy in Sport: The Socio-Ethical and Medical Issues, 1991 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin), 56.  
98  Aitken, above n 56, 222.  Similar arguments are put forward by Houlihan, above n 7, 110-111, and Parry, above n 
55. 
99  Black, above n 94 at 370. 
100 
 Parry, above n 55. 
101  
 Again it should be noted that Murray, above n 9, argues against these ideas on the basis of the meaning and spirit 
of sport:  
The glory of sport is learning what we can do with the natural talents we have, perfecting them through admirable, 
persistent effort.  Yes, I could probably ascend the four mile climb into Fahnestock Part near my home more easily if I 
used EPO.  I could do it much more quickly on a motorbike.  But where is the satisfaction in that? 
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H Competition Should Be Between Athletes, Not Pharmacists 
There is also a problematic assumption here:  that the work of the pharmacist (drugs) is the 
controlling factor in every competition in which they are used.  In this argument doping 
agents are assumed to have the power to determine the outcome of any athletic event in 
any and every situation.  Given the above discussion it is clear that this cannot be the 
case.102  But even if the assumption were true, it is not clear why pharmacological 
technology should be singled out for condemnation.  The increasing use of sports science 
and other disciplines such as psychology, biomechanics and dietetics could lead to a 
similar argument that competition should be between athletes, not coaches or 
biomechanists and so on.  As Parry says, ‘[i]f we are so worried about removing the 
competition from the track to the lab, maybe we should look again at the ethical status of 
sports sciences more generally.’103 
I Image of Sport 
There has been comparatively little criticism of the image of sport rationale.  Buti and 
Fridman appear to accept that image is a legitimate concern but argue: 
While sporting organisations might justifiably be concerned with maintaining the 
confidence of the public in the integrity of the sports they administer, such concern must be 
managed with care, lest it develop into sinister and intrusive regulation of those who 
participate in sport.104 
Schneider and Butcher offer a more direct criticism when they reject the argument that 
tarnishing the image of sport ‘harms’ the sports watching community by cheating them out 
of watching dope-free sport.  They suggest that this is only the case if audiences expect 
sport to be dope-free.  As these commentators point out, the question then needs to be 
asked as to why audiences expect dope-free sport.105  If it is because of the anti-doping 
rules then, again, this argument cannot support the adoption of those rules in the first place.  
However, it may be that there is something more inherent in doping which makes it 
repugnant to audiences, rather than simply being a breach of sporting rules.  If this is the 
case — and this thesis will argue it is — then it appears that this inherent repugnancy has 
little to do with rationality or ethics.  This theme will be continued below. 
                                                                                                                                              
 This argument does not seem to address the issues that Savulescu et al, above n 38, raise.  
102 
 This argument is also part of the justification for the strict liability rule in doping and will be considered in more 
detail in Chapter Six. 
103 
 Parry, above n 55. 
104  
 Buti and Fridman, above n 32, 60. 
105  
 Schneider and Butcher, above n 26, 142.   
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Perhaps the strongest argument against the idea that the use of performance enhancing 
substances in sport will ruin the image of sport, is provided by the steroid researchers 
Charles Yesalis and Michael Bahrke: 
The litany of scandals appears to have had a strong effect on the public and even on the 
athletes, some of whom have spoken out.  Indeed, if sports fans were asked if they were 
against doping, many would say yes.  But a far more relevant question is whether they 
were upset enough to turn off the television and not watch sports.  Judging by the 
continuing profitability and popularity of both amateur and professional sports, most would 
probably answer no. 
If we do not have the willpower to turn off our television sets in protest of doping, will we 
have the stomach to tolerate federal arrests, prosecutions and convictions of our sports     
icons? 106 
The problem with the image argument is that the predicted effects of the public perception 
of doping simply do not appear to be coming to fruition.  Yesalis and Bahrke present a 
strong argument here.  Although there does appear to be a common perception that the use 
of performance enhancing substances in sport has reached epidemic levels, audiences still 
flock to games and watch on television in droves:  there has been no noticeable decrease in 
interest or the financial worth of the product.   
Moreover, the argument also assumes that sports loving audiences see something wrong 
with the use of performance enhancing substances, quite apart from the fact that it is 
against the rules and therefore perceived as cheating.  Since all modern audiences have 
been imbued with the idea that doping is immoral, it is impossible to tell whether 
audiences would feel this way if there was no rule against the use of such substances.  
Perhaps the best indication of the effects of the public knowledge of doping is the attitude 
of sports audiences before the prohibition on doping was established.  From all reports, 
audiences enjoyed doping fuelled performances with no particular concerns about the 
ethics of the competitors.107 
Nevertheless, it appears now that there is some validity to the concern that sports audiences 
will turn away from sport due to their dislike of doping.  Chapter One and Two 
demonstrated that public discourse about doping is overwhelmingly negative.  In the face 
of this kind of publicity, concerns that this negative image will affect sport as a product do 
                                                
106  Charles E Yesalis and Michael S Bahrke, 'Where There is a Will to Gain an Edge, Athletes Find a Way', The New 
York Times (New York), 7 March 2004, SP 10. 
107   Dimeo provides a very thorough analysis of the attitudes of audience and participants in the events such as the 
1904 and 1908 Olympic Games marathon event where it was quite publicly acknowledged that participants had 
used performance enhancing substances:  Paul Dimeo, A History of Drug Use in Sport 1876-1976: Beyond Good 
and Evil, 2007 (London: Routledge), 26ff.  Note also the image of sport argument is closely related to the role 
model argument and is considered in more detail under that heading. 
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seem reasonable.  Furthermore, the fact that these fears have not been realised as yet may 
be due to the prohibition on doping; enforcement efforts may have maintained the integrity 
of the product enough to sustain public confidence.   
Thus the image of sport is probably the strongest argument to support the prohibition on 
doping.  This argument, however, cannot be classified as a particularly rational one.  The 
argument is, in reality, based on public sentiment and there is no rational explanation for 
why the public would feel this way.  The rationality of the image argument relies on the 
other rationales for logical legitimacy.  That is, if the reason for public sentiment was due 
to the idea that athletes should be role models, then the rationality of the image argument 
would then rest on the rationality of the role model argument.  It will be concluded that 
such logic is difficult to find among the anti-doping rationales.  It will also be argued that it 
is not surprising that this, the strongest argument for doping prohibition, is not one based 
on logic. 
J Discouraging Illegal Activity 
As Buti and Fridman point out, this rationale is based on the presumption that activities 
such as importation, possession and sale of recreational drugs should attract criminal 
penalties; something which they say has been accepted as ‘undeniable truth.’108  Even if it 
is accepted that the criminal law is justified in its application here, the rationale would only 
apply to a small number of doping agents, since many substances on the WADA Code 
Prohibited List are legally available either on prescription or over-the-counter.  Anabolic 
steroids, which are subjected to criminal penalties in a similar way to illicit recreational 
drugs, are an interesting case, but since they appear to have been criminalized as a result of 
their status in sport,109 the argument does not provide justification for their prohibition in 
the first place.   
K Conclusion:  The Criticisms 
The above criticisms of the anti-doping rationales suggest the search for a watertight, 
consistent rationale is still very much in progress.110  And since it is widely accepted in 
academic circles that none of these arguments provide the fundamental reason for the 
                                                
108   Buti and Fridman, above n 32, 61.   
109   For a discussion of the influences that led to the involvement of the criminal law in the regulation of steroid use 
in the US, see Carol Kleinman and C.E. Petit, 'Legal Aspects of Anabolic Steroid Use and Abuse' in Charles E 
Yesalis (ed), Anabolic Steroids in Sport and Exercise, 2000 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) 333, 342.   
110   The alternative suggestions that have been presented by a few commentators have not gained widespread support 
and remain very much the realm of academic debate.  They have not been considered here since this discussion 
focuses on the reasons why we, as a society, prohibit doping. 
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policy, it is accurate to say that the reasons for the prohibition on performance enhancing 
substances in sport is certainly not as clear as anti-doping discourse would suggest.  There 
is obviously ambiguity and confusion when it comes to finding a reason for prohibiting the 
use of performance enhancing substances in sport.  Not only is it unclear what we are 
talking about when we talk of ‘doping’, we also don’t know why we are talking about it. 
IV ANTI-DOPING RATIONALES:  A LOGICAL ANALYSIS 
A logical analysis of the anti-doping rationales helps to highlight, not only the fact that we 
do not seem to know why we prohibit doping, but also the logical failings of the 
foundations of the policy.  Such an analysis reinforces the argument that anti-doping policy 
is based on something other than logic.   
Most commentators do not couch their criticisms of anti-doping policy in the language of 
logic; the policy is generally not explicitly labelled ‘illogical.’111  However, many of the 
criticisms which have been discussed above are akin to saying so.  Two logical fallacies 
are particularly significant here:  inconsistency and begging the question. 
A Inconsistency 
In the study of logic, the premise of the argument is a proposition which is offered as 
providing evidence or reasons for accepting the conclusion offered.  Inconsistency involves 
a contradiction in the premises of the argument.  There are a number of different types of 
inconsistency, but practical inconsistency is the relevant one for the purposes of this 
chapter.  Logic requires that ‘like cases’ are treated alike while cases which are relevantly 
different are treated differently.  If ‘like cases’ are not treated alike, then a practical 
inconsistency is said to arise.   
Throughout the consideration of anti-doping rationales above, inconsistencies have been 
identified on a number of occasions.  In most cases, the commentator did not use the term 
in the same sense as the discipline of informal logic.  However, the inconsistency revealed 
can also be said to satisfy the definition of a practical inconsistency within informal logic 
since ‘like cases’ are not treated ‘like’ doping.  That is, for most of the justifications 
advanced, it is possible to point to similar things that happen in sport which are not 
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 The exception here is Simon Barnes, Why Transition to a Clean Sport has Left us Cynical and Self Righteous 
(2003) Timesonline 
 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/more_sport/athletics/article1162321.ece> at 13 September 2008. 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?    Chapter Three 
  100 
subjected to prohibition.  In other words each time we say ‘drugs in sport are banned 
because….’, it is possible to say  ‘yes but …. is the same, but that is not banned.’   
A table is provided below to illustrate this point.  In one column is the justification, in the 
other the like case. 
 Justification for Prohibiting Drugs Like Case 
Protecting the health of the athlete:  drugs 
are dangerous to the health of the athlete. 
Elite sport itself112 — eg aerial skiing, 
marathons, repetitive injury in top level 
sport. 
Carbohydrate loading.113 
Overtraining, especially in adolescents.114 
Other supplements such as creatine.115 
Protecting the fairness of sport, the ‘level 
playing field’ argument:  drugs give an 
unfair advantage. 
Genetic inequalities.116 
Supplements and vitamins.117  
Access to financial sponsorship.118  
Scientific training techniques.119 
Advantages coming from the athlete’s 
country of birth or residence.120  
Athletes are role models, doping sets a bad 
example. 
Movie stars, musicians, models are all 
role models.121 
Other moral behaviour is not regulated 
such as extramarital affairs.122 
                                                
112  Fost, above n 37, 6.  For a compelling examination of some of the safety issues in the Tour de France see 
Mignon, above n 65. 
113  The practice can lead to hypoglycaemia, nausea, dizziness and fatigue, British Medical Association, above n 44, 
10. 
114   Pennington and Webber, above n 81. 
115   Cox, above n 27, 81. 
116  Savulescu, et al, above n 38, 667. 
117  Fost, above n 37, 6. 
118  Cox, above n 27, 83 and Burke, above n 67, 9. 
119  König, above n 68, 249. 
120  Such as advantages that skiers would enjoy raised in Austria as opposed to Belgium:  Waddington, above n 53, 
109. 
121  Schneider and Butcher, above n 26, 141 and Houlihan, above n 7, 118. 
122  Buti and Fridman, above n 85, 184.   
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Justification for Prohibiting Drugs Like Case 
Against medical ethics:  prescribing drugs 
for athletes is assisting well people instead 
of treating sick people. 
Cosmetic surgery. 
Coercion:  use of drugs by some athletes 
coerces other athletes into using drugs. 
Full time training, use of supplements, 
paid coaching.123 
Drugs give athletes an unnatural advantage. Pressure chambers, sporting equipment.124 
Role of science:  sport should be 
competition between athletes not 
pharmacists. 
Biomechanists, physiologists, 
psychologists and nutritionalists. 125 
The table above demonstrates that, for every rationale presented, like cases can be 
identified which have not been treated in the same manner.  In most cases the like case has 
not even been subjected to regulation, let alone prohibition.  Thus, basing the justification 
for the prohibition of doping on these grounds would produce a practical inconsistency.  If 
these justifications were truly the motivation behind the doping rules, it seems incredible 
that doping alone would have been banned, while the like case was allowed.  It suggests 
that there must be something about doping, above and beyond these rationales, which led 
to its prohibition. 
B Begging the Question 
Inconsistency is by far the most common logical fallacy to be found in anti-doping 
rationales.  A number of the major rationales, however, also exhibit another type of logical 
fallacy, the fallacy of begging the question. 
Begging the question occurs when the contention that is intended to be proved is used as 
evidence to support that very contention.  Here the most obvious example is found in the 
role model rationale, the argument that drug taking should be prohibited because 
sportspeople are role models for young people and drug taking in that population provides 
a negative role model to youth.  Implicit in this argument is the assumption that there is 
something wrong with taking performance enhancing substances.  Otherwise how could 
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 Parry, above n 55. 
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 Ibid and Aitken, above n 56, 222. 
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 Parry, above n 55. 
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such practices send a bad message to youth or provide a poor role model for them?  But the 
fact that there is something wrong with taking performance enhancing substances is 
exactly what the argument seeks to prove.  The argument therefore appears to be: 
Taking performance enhancing substances is bad because it provides a bad role 
model to young people.  
It provides a bad role model because taking performance enhancing substances is 
bad. 
The fallacy of begging the question is also referred to as arguing in a circle; the circularity 
of the argument can certainly be seen here.  In trying to prove that performance enhancing 
substances should not be taken by our elite athletes who are role models to our youth, the 
argument assumes that such practices are bad.126 
Circularity can also be found in the argument that the prohibition on performance 
enhancing substances in sport is justified on the basis of the rules of sport; i.e. that it is 
wrong to dope because it is against the rules.  This argument runs: 
Performance enhancing substances should be prohibited in sport because it is 
against the rules of sport. 
It is against the rules of sport to use performance enhancing substances because 
they are prohibited.127 
Obviously, the fact that some of these justifications display the logical fallacy of begging 
the question speaks to a deeper problem:  the assumptions that are at work in these 
                                                
126  
 A similar assumption is at work in the argument that these substances are prohibited because of the impact on the 
image of sport.  In a similar way to the role model rationale, this argument implicitly assumes that there is 
something wrong with taking performance enhancing substances.  Athletes using performance enhancing 
substances cannot tarnish the image of sport unless there is something wrong with taking those substances in the 
first place.  Again, this is exactly what the argument is intended to prove, that there is something wrong with 
enhancing performance this way.  So in essence the argument is: 
   
 Athletes taking performance enhancing substances is ‘bad’ because it damages the image of sport. 
  
 It damages the image of sport because it is ‘bad’ to taking performance enhancing substances.  
 
 It is, of course, possible that there are other assumptions at work in the image of sport argument.  For example, it 
may be that the argument in premised on the fact that athletes taking performance enhancing substances creates 
the impression that the competition is not fair, or that the competition is between pharmacists and not athletes 
(both of which have their own problems as discussed above), which in turn leads to this bad image.  However, by 
and large these assumptions remain unarticulated, and the argument is left to stand on its own.  On its own it is a 
circular argument. 
127  
 Although this argument is not often put so starkly, as the CCES argues, above, this is part of the assumptions 
behind the argument that performance enhancing substances are prohibited because their use is unfair. 
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arguments.  These assumptions often defy logic and are further evidence that something 
other than logic is at work in anti-doping policy. 
V WHY ALL THE CONFUSION? THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN KNOWING AND FEELING 
From the above consideration of the criticisms that have been levelled at the rationales for 
anti-doping policy by other commentators, it appears that no one rationale is unproblematic 
from an ethical standpoint.  None are adequate to explain the prohibition on performance 
enhancing substances.  Not only are the rationales for anti-doping policy ethically 
inadequate, they are also logically inadequate.  The prominence of logical fallacies in the 
arguments for doping rules suggests two things:  firstly that the discussion and arguments 
presented to support anti-doping policy are as ambiguous and problematic as doping 
definition and, secondly, that anti-doping policy is not primarily driven by logic at all. 
In addition to the criticisms presented above, in many cases the inadequacy of the 
argument is compounded by the fact that it does not go far enough in explaining why we 
prohibit drugs in sport.  For instance, the argument that sport should be a competition 
between athletes not pharmacists, has been labelled as inconsistent because there are many 
other sports sciences involved in the preparation of an elite athlete which are not targeted 
for prohibition.  A further question therefore needs to be asked:  why is it that pharmacy is 
the only science whose involvement in sport is viewed as repugnant?  What is it about 
pharmacological products that cause this reaction?  Similarly, it has been argued above that 
the image of sport justification is circular because it assumes that taking performance 
enhancing substances is somehow bad.  But the question also needs to be asked:  why are 
such practices implicitly perceived as bad? 
The inadequacy of these rationales reveals a difference between the rationales for anti-
doping policy and the reasons for the policy.  If none of the rationales fully supports our 
present anti-doping approach, then it is difficult to equate rationale with reason.  Although 
the Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘rationale’ as ‘a reasoned exposition of principles; the 
fundamental reasons serving to account for something’,128 it seems here that the rationales 
are not reasoned, nor are they the fundamental reason for prohibiting performance 
enhancing substances in sport.  As noted above, the strongest argument for the prohibition 
                                                
128 
 Yallop, above n 1. 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?    Chapter Three 
  104 
is not actually one based in reason, it is the ‘image’ argument.  Again, there is no 
indication as to why doping would create such a bad image.  It is merely assumed that it 
does.  The question needs to be asked, why would the public feel this way about doping? 
Where does this leave us then?  Firstly it can be said that, as yet, the underlying reason for 
the prohibition of performance enhancing drugs in sport is still fairly much a puzzle.129  It 
is obviously not entirely due to the ‘reasonable’ explanations usually offered to justify the 
ban.  If none of these rationales explain it, and if so many highly respected ethicists have 
failed to come up with a ‘watertight’ rationale for anti-doping policy, it is a wonder that 
such a policy can be so firmly entrenched in our modern sporting culture.  It appears that 
the apparent consensus on the fundamental rationale for anti-doping policy in the WADA 
Code is, at best, mere rhetoric and does not actually provide the reason for doing what we 
are doing in anti-doping policy. 
A wise man once said that you only need one good reason to do something.  If the anti-
doping rationales fail to provide that one good reason, then why does anti-doping policy 
enjoy such widespread, virtually unanimous support?  How could a policy with such a poor 
ethical and logical basis gain so much influence?  How could it not only get off the ground 
in the first place but continue to gain momentum to a point of unprecedented international 
agreement?  The great question of anti-doping policy therefore remains:  why is the use of 
performance enhancing substances prohibited? 
Both Houlihan and Fost point out that while there may not be a consistent ethical rationale 
for the prohibition of drugs in sport, the policy is based on widespread public sentiment.  
Houlihan argues that ‘[c]urrent policy is, though, capable of being strongly defended on 
the basis of the weight of democratic community condemnation and pervasive 
disapproval.’130  Fost is somewhat more critical of this lack of ethical justification when he 
claims: 
For some vague, inchoate reason, they [drugs] violate majority notions of acceptable 
behaviour.  For lack of a better way to express this contempt for deviance, we declare it 
immoral.  Rick DeMont, according to this view was scapegoated, not for doing anything that 
can be shown to be immoral, but so we can remind ourselves of our purity, our goodness, and 
perhaps our homogeneity.  This basis for condemning drugs has nothing to do with ethics; it is 
more properly called moralism.131  
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 The work of Maxwell J Mehlman, Elizabeth Banger and Matthew M Wright, 'Doping in Sports and the Use of 
State Power' (2005) 50 Saint Louis University Law Journal 15, 46ff is noted here who provide a number of 
factors which may have contributed to the prohibition on doping in sport.  One of their arguments fits into the 
argument of this thesis, that the ‘war on drugs’ has been highly influential. 
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Their claim appears to be that the answer to why performance enhancing substances have 
been banned in sport lies not in the rational, logical and ethical domain, but rather in the 
realm of public opinion:  ‘but a more profitable avenue for reaching a publicly convincing 
basis for current policy is to abandon the search for an a priori rationale for policy and 
concentrate on middle order justifications which are derived from social experience.’132  
Herein lies the reason that anti-doping rationales are unsatisfactory and inadequate.  
Performance enhancing substances are prohibited in sport because there is strong public 
sentiment against the use of such substances.  There may be no good logical reason for a 
ban on doping but public opinion strongly upholds such an approach.  We may not know 
why we prohibit doping but we feel that such a prohibition is right and wise.  The fact that 
the strongest argument for anti-doping policy is simply that the public image of sport is at 
risk reveals that the prohibition is linked more to what we feel than what we know.   
This, of course, is not the end of the matter.  It naturally leads to the next question:  why do 
we feel this way, why would public sentiment be so strongly against the use of 
performance enhancing substances in competitive sport?  If the reason behind public 
sentiment is discovered, then the reason for the prohibition on doping agents will be 
understood.  The next chapter will therefore present an alternative framework for 
understanding the motivations behind public opinion in doping. 
The last three chapters have painted a picture of current anti-doping policy.  In Chapter 
One the picture was one of consensus.  The public reaction to doping and the universal 
nature of anti-doping policy suggests that anti-doping policy is well established, well 
supported and well understood.  The conclusion in Chapter Two was that the ambiguities 
associated with doping definition revealed that it is certainly not clear what we are talking 
about when we talk about doping.  This chapter has revealed that it is also not clear why we 
are talking about it.  What is clear is that when it comes to doping, even though we don’t 
know exactly what we are talking about or exactly why we are talking about it, we do 
know that we don’t like it.  The next part of the thesis will examine why. 
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PART II:  EXPLAINING THE DILEMMAS — 
 THE SYMBOLISM OF ANTI-DOPING POLICY 
 
CHAPTER FOUR  
WHY THE CONFUSION? 
‘You always admire what you really don't understand.’ 
Blaise Pascal1 
I INTRODUCTION:  THE STORY SO FAR 
Chapter One argued that anti-doping policy appears to be characterised by universal 
consensus, acceptance and understanding, but that a very different situation lies beneath 
the calm surface.  In Chapters Two and Three, dilemmas relating to two fundamental 
issues were presented:  what is doping and why do we prohibit it?  These perplexities are 
revealed through a thorough analysis of the operation of anti-doping policy and the 
assumptions behind it. 
In Chapter Two, the focus of discussion turned to the definition of doping: the deviant 
behaviour and the contents of prohibited lists.  At the heart of the problem of defining 
‘doping’ behaviour is the fact that the legal definition is inconsistent with common notions 
of what constitutes the practice of doping.2  Accordingly, the operation of the strict liability 
rule in circumstances of inadvertent doping is a little puzzling in light of society’s implicit 
definition of doping; the athlete’s intention is intrinsic to the societal definition, while the 
strict liability definition treats it as entirely irrelevant.  More difficult still is the operation 
of the strict liability rule in inadvertent doping situations where the athlete does not gain 
any performance enhancing effect from the ingested substance.  Since intent and effect are 
both deemed irrelevant, situations which involve nothing correlating with our lay definition 
of ‘doping’, are nonetheless punished as ‘doping’.  It is disturbing that the legal operation 
                                                
1
   Blaise Pascal, Confusion Quotes <http://www.wisdomquotes.com/cat_confusion.html> at 11 March  2008. 
2
   Reference here is to the strict liability definition of doping. 
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of the doping rules could be so far from common notions of ‘doping’, suggesting that 
fundamental issues with doping definition persist despite all appearances of consensus.   
The second ambiguous aspect of doping definition examined was the content of the World 
Anti-Doping Code (WADA Code) Prohibited List.  It is clear that public outrage over 
‘doping’ extends far beyond those substances and practices which appear on the list.  In 
public doping discourse, permitted substances and practices are treated as if they were 
prohibited substances and practices.  Accordingly, another discrepancy between common 
notions of doping and the legal definition of ‘doping’ was identified.  It was also argued 
that, in light of the fact that the list was developed with no clearly articulated criteria or 
reasoning behind it, it is no surprise that this aspect of anti-doping policy would be 
confusing.3  The confusion is compounded by the fact that the new criteria established in 
the WADA Code leave room for further ambiguities.   
Together these two problematic aspects of doping definition — the deviant behaviour and 
the contents of the list — show a very basic problem with anti-doping policy, we simply 
don’t know what doping is. 
Chapter Three discussed a second fundamental question in anti-doping policy:  why do we 
prohibit the use of performance enhancing substances and methods in sport?  One mystery 
of the anti-doping rationales lies in the fact that even though no watertight, universally 
applicable and ethically acceptable reason for the prohibition can be discovered, the policy 
continues to enjoy wide support.  More importantly, if the rationales for anti-doping policy 
do not adequately explain the prohibition, then why do we prohibit doping if not for the 
reasons provided by the rationales?  
The point has therefore been made clearly:  many aspects of anti-doping simply do not 
make sense upon close examination.  There is no obvious explanation to be found within 
anti-doping law, discourse or rationales.  But is there some other factor to explain why 
such confusion exists?  And can this factor answer the questions:  what is doping and why 
do we prohibit it?  It is the task of this thesis to identify such an explanation.  Obviously, it 
would be foolhardy to claim that all the puzzles of anti-doping policy have one simple 
solution.  But there is one factor which provides an explanation for the existence of many 
of the confusions and dilemmas identified in the first three chapters of this thesis.  This 
chapter will introduce that factor.  
                                                
3
   This fact alone is difficult to understand in light of the importance that this list has in the lives of the athletes. 
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In each of the previous chapters certain things have been established which help to point to 
a solution to the puzzle of why anti-doping policy is not what it appears to be.  What has 
been established — at least to some degree — can be summarised in 7 points: 
• Anti-doping policy is ambiguous, despite the apparent consensus it attracts. 
• The legal definition of doping is not limited by the common understanding of 
‘doping’ and public opinion is not restricted by the legal definition of ‘doping’. 
• Anti-doping policy is not based on rational argument; a full explanation for the 
policy lies beyond the rational realm. 
• Public reaction and consensus appear to be important in shaping anti-doping 
policy. 
• Strong emotions are involved in doping discourse. 
• In both doping law and public discourse ‘gut reactions’ appear to be at work. 
• Appearances are important; how doping ‘looks’ and ‘feels’ is significant. 
These factors hardly provide a conclusive solution, but are pointers to a more cohesive 
explanation.  In order to arrive at the full solution, however, it is necessary first to consider 
three separate issues.  Although the relevance of these issues may not be immediately 
apparent, their significance will be made clear in the concluding section of this chapter.  
The chapter will be divided into four sections.  The first section will consider anti-doping 
policy as a public relations issue; the second will introduce the work of Desmond 
Manderson while the third section will examine the similarities between illicit drug and 
anti-doping policy.  The final section will bring all these issues together, revealing their 
relevance to the thesis argument. 
II DOPING AS A PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM 
An effective international anti-doping campaign was never a major priority of the IOC before 
the 1998 Tour de France scandal.  Between 1968 and 1996 approximately one in every thousand 
Olympic athletes tested positive for a banned substance at the Games.  The Olympic drug 
testing programme was widely recognised as a sham, and more effective enforcement was 
expected from national and international federations.  For Juan Antonio Samaranch and his 
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closest associates, doping was primarily a public relations problem that threatened lucrative 
television and corporate contracts that are now worth billions of dollars.4 
The IOC and the IAAF downplay the disease eating away at sport.  Late in 1988 in Lausanne 
IOC President Samaranch stated baldly, ‘The IOC is winning the war against doping.’  One of 
his widely publicised plans was for an IOC ‘flying laboratory’ to help implement random 
testing.  It was expected to cost $1million to set up and $500,000 a year to operate.  It sounded 
impressive; the IOC drugs police circling the globe, diving down to catch the bad guys.  As 
usual, it was all appearance and no substance.’5 
One of the ideas established in the first three chapters was that the prohibition of 
performance enhancing substances stems not from logical and rational arguments but from 
the fact that public sentiment is strongly against the use of these substances in competitive 
sport.  This point is extremely important and foundational for the argument of the thesis.  It 
is therefore not enough to simply state this as a fact; further evidence is needed.  This 
further evidence is to be found in both current anti-doping discourse and the history of 
anti-doping policy.    
Perhaps the most obvious evidence for the role of public sentiment in anti-doping policy is 
in the anti-doping rationales.  As concluded in Chapter Three, given the emotions aroused 
by media reports of doping, there appears to be some basis for the concern that doping 
practices may have an untoward effect on the image of sport.  The mere fact that such an 
argument has been proposed as a basis for anti-doping policy is testament to the fact that 
public opinion regarding the issue is seen as significant; significant enough, in fact, to 
underpin the whole policy.6 
The history of the development of anti-doping policy shows public opinion has always had 
a major part to play.  It is possible to see evidence of this influence in the concern 
organisations, such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), regularly showed for 
public opinion in doping.7   
                                                
4
   John Hoberman, 'How Drug Testing Fails: The Politics of Doping Control' in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse 
(eds), Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement, 2001 (Champaign: Human 
Kinetics) 241, 242. 
5
   Vyv Simson and Andrew Jennings, The Lords of the Rings: Power, Money and Drugs in the Modern Olympics, 
1991 (London: Simon & Schuster Ltd), 199. 
6
   It is possible that public opinion has been shaped by the fact of the prohibition so that, in adopting the policy (for 
other reasons) sports administrators have created an image of doping which has coloured the public mind.  Now, 
after decades of indoctrination as to the repugnancy of doping, the public no longer tolerates such behaviour and 
sports administrators have no choice but to continue with the prohibition whether they feel it justified or not.  In 
other words, public opinion, created by the prohibition, may have become the reason for the continuance of the 
prohibition rather than what it once was: the result.  Thus the question arises, has public opinion always been 
influential in anti-doping policy; was it a leader or a follower?  This is answered by the subsequent historical 
evidence. 
7
   The IOC has been chosen for this discussion since, not only is it one of the most prominent sports organisation in 
the world, but the existence of documents, such as the IOC newsletter, makes it possible to trace some of  the 
‘unofficial’ influences on the IOC’s actions. 
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From at least the 1950s, the IOC frequently informed itself about public opinion on the 
issue before taking concrete steps to deal with the use of ergogenic substances in sport.  
For instance: 
• In 1955 the IOC bulletin contained a section called ‘What Other People Say’ 
which included a statement by Pope Pius XII condemning the practice of 
‘consuming highly stimulating drugs’ in order to ‘obtain results that are beyond 
his own natural forces’ in sport.8  
• In 1962 the IOC bulletin contained an article entitled ‘The Doping’.  The 
introduction stated:  ‘This topical matter has been discussed recently in a most 
interesting manner in L’Equipe in Paris, the various points discussed seem to us 
so interesting that we are quoting herewith a few extracts of this article’.9 
• In 1963 the IOC bulletin contained an article entitled ‘Doping, The 
International Olympic Committee and the Press’ which included references to 
the way in which the ‘Press’ had contributed to the identification of doping as a 
problem in sport.10 
• In 1968 a report on the work of the IOC Medical Commission included a plan 
to draw up a more detailed report for various groups, including the press.11 
• An extremely influential article on the issue from the 1968 Sports Illustrated 
was reprinted in the IOC newsletter.12  IOC President, Avery Brundage, had 
forwarded this article to the head of the IOC Medical Commission, Prince 
Alexander de Merode.13 
• In 1969 President Brundage was asked by a journalist how the IOC was going 
to stop athletes using steroids if they stopped using them before competition.  
Brundage then wrote to de Merode enquiring whether the IOC medical 
commission was considering the impact of anabolic steroids on their 
competition.14 
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• In 1973 the IOC newsletter reprinted an article which was critical of the fact 
that the IOC had not been able to develop a test for steroids.15 
• In 1998 Juan Antonio Samaranch stated that he felt that the IOC Prohibited List 
should be cut down.  Such was the public outrage elicited by his comments that 
the IOC was forced to set up the first international doping summit as a ‘public 
relations move’ intended to ‘stop the media bloodletting’.16  Thus the World 
Conference on Doping in Sport was seen by many as a public relations exercise 
on the part of the IOC to overcome the negative press that Samaranch attracted 
with his comments regarding shortening the list in 1998.  
In retrospect, Samaranch’s candid and heretical comments were a public relations 
faux pas that called into question his commitment to the campaign against doping.  
To repair his damaged reputation, Samaranch called for a world anti-doping 
conference under his leadership what would convene in early 1999, and by 
November the IOC had published the agenda of this hastily organised event.17  
These events are just a few of the indications that the IOC has always been acutely aware 
of the fact that the use of performance enhancing substances in sport is a very live public 
issue.  The regularity with which the IOC reprinted topical articles on the subject in their 
newsletter is telling.18     
The influence of public opinion on the issue has not been limited to the IOC.  As Houlihan 
notes, it was the public outcry over the doping-related deaths in sport19 which prompted 
sports organisations to action in the 1960s:  
Until the mid 1960s, concern about doping had been limited to a relatively small group of 
specialists within sport and the private concern had not yet become a public issue.  The 
series of high profile scandals in the early to mid 1960s forced the issue on to the agenda of 
both governments and sports bodies.20 
In more recent times, it is clear that the way in which the Australian Institute of Sport 
(AIS) and the Australian Sports Commission (ASC) reacted to the allegations about 
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   Michael Bateman, 'The Freaky World of a “Steroid Bomb”' (1973) 68-69(July-August) Olympic Review 262. 
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   John MacAloon, 'Doping and Moral Authority' in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (eds), Doping in Elite Sport: 
the Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement (2001) 205, 215. 
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   Hoberman, above n 4, 266.  See also Ibid and Andrew Jennings, The Great Olympic Swindle, 2000 (London: 
Simon &Schuster), 293. 
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Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?    Chapter Four 
  112 
‘shooting galleries’ at the AIS residential facility in the French case (discussed in Chapter 
Two) was in a large measure due to the public response to the allegations.21   
The hints in Chapters Two and Three regarding the role of public sentiment in the 
development of anti-doping programmes allude to the deeper role of public opinion in 
driving ant-doping policy.  Furthermore, since there is no consistent justification for the 
prohibition on doping; there is still an unsolved puzzle:  why does the public hate doping 
so much?  This question will be left until the final section of the chapter.   
III MANDERSON’S ILLICIT DRUG LAW ANALYSIS 
It has already been foreshadowed that the symbolic analysis in the next three chapters is 
based on the work of Desmond Manderson, who has extensively analysed the history of 
illicit drug laws.  It is important at this point to explain some of the background to his 
analysis in order to show why such an approach is appropriate for anti-doping policy. 
As previously mentioned, Manderson argues: 
Undoubtedly, those involved in the formation of drug policy have often sought the 
elimination of drugs as a purely functional exercise…  Their actions, therefore, have not 
been in any conscious sense symbolic; but the very reason why certain drugs have come to 
seem so important is steeped in symbolism.22 
In order to fully understand how Manderson came to such a position, it is important to 
understand the background to his work. 
A The Background:  Drugs Politics School 
As Manderson puts it, drugs politics theory ‘is a school of analysis which…argues that 
drug laws have little to do with health risks, or the dangers of addiction.  They have 
developed rather as a means of suppressing the lower class or racial minorities.’23  And, 
‘[t]he “drugs politics school” argues that drugs laws have not been about drugs at all, but 
have reflected deeper concerns about race and difference, international relations or social 
change.’24 
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   See Chapter Two, page 71, footnote 115 for a quote from this report to the effect that sports administrators think 
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   Desmond Manderson, 'Symbolism and Racism in Drug History and Policy' (1999) 18 Drug and Alcohol Review, 
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This drugs politics theory developed from a movement in academic circles in the late 
1960s which criticised repressive drug controls.25  Himmelstein recognises four basic 
points that arose out of these criticisms: 
• There is no simple relationship between the dangers/benefits of a drug and the 
severity of its legal and moral status.26  
• The legal and moral status of most drugs varies widely, both historically and 
culturally.27 
• Repressive drug controls are substantially irrational, meaning that they do not 
achieve the desired outcome.  Instead they create black markets and are likely 
to make drug taking more dangerous.28 
• The drug control critics, ‘faced with the pervasive arbitrariness and irrationality 
of repressive drug controls have attempted to explain why some drugs come to 
be proscribed and stigmatized, while others do not.’29  
One of the three major theories presented to explain these problems associated with the 
drug laws is drugs politics theory.30  The basic assertion is that drug controls have more to 
do with the structure of class, status and power than with the inherent characteristics of the 
drug being controlled.  Accordingly, those drugs associated with the less privileged classes 
are more likely to be prohibited than those associated with privileged classes.31   
Manderson’s himself claims that his work is ‘largely in keeping with this approach of the 
drugs politics school.’32  One thing, however, distinguishes Manderson from the rest of that 
school of thought.  While most of these theorists concentrate on specific instances of the 
operation of racial oppression in our drug laws, Manderson also provides a more general 
framework of analysis:  ‘one which focuses on drugs as symbols rather than substances and 
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which is attuned to the subtleties not of pharmacology but of discourse’33 and explains 
rather than simply illustrates the way in which drugs have stood as symbols.’34  It is this 
framework of analysis which will be applied in the rest of the thesis. 
B Why Has Manderson Taken This Approach? 
Obviously there must be some reason that Manderson has chosen to follow this path; why 
he is convinced that such an analysis is useful and provides an accurate portrayal of the 
motivations behind illicit drug laws.  Understanding why Manderson considers symbolic 
analysis appropriate for illicit drug laws provides some insights as to why such an 
approach would also be useful in considering the history of anti-doping law.  
1 Failure, Lack of Logic and Inconsistency of Prohibition Policy 
Manderson makes the motivation for his approach explicit: 
my aim in exploring the assumptions behind the emotional reaction that the word ‘drugs’ 
so often provokes stems from my own belief that the legislative drug policy pursued in 
Australia has manifestly failed to reduce harm associated with drug use and has, on the 
contrary, created a climate of fear and hatred that has been enormously destructive.35  
‘Destructive’ policies here, no doubt, refer to the problems associated with the use of drugs 
purchased on the black market, overdoses arising from the use of substances of unknown 
purity, crime stemming from the high price of drugs on the black market, morbidity and 
mortality in drug users due to the lack of medical supervision, spreading of transmissible 
diseases as a result of sharing needles, and, finally, drug-related corruption in law 
enforcement organisations.36  In a number of his works, Manderson points out the many 
myths regarding the dangers posed by illicit drugs37 and demonstrates that the social and 
emotional reaction elicited by these drugs is in no way proportional to the dangers posed.38   
The inconsistency of illicit drugs policy is also a contributory factor.  Many authors have 
pointed out that the most dangerous drugs in society are not the illicit drugs but nicotine 
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and alcohol:  two drugs currently largely untouched by prohibition laws.39  These 
sentiments are echoed by Manderson.40  
Thus Manderson’s decision to investigate the symbolism of modern drug policy is based 
on his view that the prohibitive approach is both illogical and inconsistent – the policy has 
not served to protect society’s health but, instead, has increased the dangers to users of 
those particular drugs, while virtually ignoring the drugs that do pose the most danger to 
our society. 
It will do no good, therefore, to try and elaborate reasons for the maintenance of current 
policy or, for that matter, to use logic to criticize it.  For it is not reason which is operative 
here…41 
When someone behaves irrationally for a long time, we eventually stop giving them 
information and instead give them therapy.  Neither do we go on believing them if they say 
that they really want to change their behaviour.  The families of addicts know this well.  
They’ve suffered too long the promises that tomorrow will be different.  Rational 
arguments do not always work.  Therapy looks to discover the irrational motivation 
underlying destructive behaviour. 
It’s time to put our laws “on the couch”…42 
2 Results of His Historic Inquiry 
Another compelling reason Manderson presents for the importance of symbolism in 
understanding the illicit drug laws stems from the discoveries he made while examining 
the history of these laws:  namely, that a symbolic analysis simply makes sense of the 
history.  The rhetoric and debate associated with the enactment of these laws tended to 
concentrate not on the pharmacological effects of the drugs and the most effective and 
efficient ways of dealing with the undesirable use of these substances, but on the emotional 
responses to perceived evils associated with the drugs; evils more related to social fears 
than medical ones.  The workability of his theory adds weight to his hypothesis that drugs 
and drug laws are highly symbolic. 
3 Inability to Understand Drug Laws Without Reference to Symbolism 
‘Drug law and policy cannot be understood without reference to the popular pressures that 
influenced them…’.43  Not only is this framework useful in explaining illicit drug policy, 
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Manderson believes that it is impossible to fully understand the motivations behind the 
drug laws without reference to the role of symbolism. 
In his earlier research, Manderson did not claim that symbolism provides the only reason 
for its prohibition, ‘only that the symbolic meaning and association is an important element 
in accounting for social change.’44  However, in his later writing, he appears to have 
elevated that role when he claims that the prohibition on drugs dramatises the necessary 
symbolic function that drugs play in our modern society: 
The drug laws we have been considering are no more designed to outlaw drugs than the 
Inquisition wanted to outlaw the Devil.  On the contrary, they need them.  Both drugs and 
witches serve necessary symbolic functions to those who are committed to their 
oppression.45 
4 Influence of the Drugs Politics School 
Himmelstein’s account of the drugs politics school, discussed above, aids in an 
understanding of the Manderson thesis that Australian drug laws sprang from racial fears 
and social class differences.46   
C Manderson’s Theory 
It is clear from the above discussion that Manderson’s work seeks to answer the question 
of why certain drugs have been subjected to total prohibition while others have been 
regulated only to a small degree.  In seeking to understand the reasons behind the drug 
laws he: 
dared to criticise some of the assumptions that people make – that laws have developed 
with specific and rational purposes in mind, that the reason for a law’s enactment is the 
same thing as the reasons given for it, and that laws are effective tools for changing 
people’s behaviour.47 
Here Manderson demonstrates his rejection of the conservative approach to drug law.  
Although it would be impossible to adequately summarise Manderson’s work and do 
justice to the complexities of his analysis and research, some major aspects of his argument 
regarding drug laws are outlined briefly below. 
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1 What Drug Laws Are Not About 
Manderson’s starting point, in line with his understanding of the position of the drugs 
politics school, is the controversial claim that ‘drug laws, in fact, have not really been 
about drugs at all.’48  In a number of different works over a period of more than fifteen 
years, he has undertaken a detailed examination of historic sources relating to Australian 
drug laws, and has been able to illustrate that the motivation behind drug laws in Australia 
had very little to do with concerns regarding the dangers to health that the drugs pose.49  
He claims that drug laws cannot be rationalised as a response to the social problem of 
addiction.50  In short, Manderson contends that drugs are not prohibited because of what 
they do or what they are,51 or the pharmacological properties of the substance:  ‘the “drug 
problem”…has little to do with drugs per se…’,52 ‘drug policies often have very little to do 
with real considerations about drugs themselves.’53  Thus he claims that ‘drugs have been 
the subject of our laws but not their object.’54 
2 What Drug Laws are About – the Role of Symbolism 
This has been the subject of Manderson’s increasingly sophisticated drug law analysis.  
Some of his findings of most relevance to this thesis are outlined below. 
(a) Role of symbolism:  General 
Manderson contends that society’s attitudes to certain drugs are ‘steeped in symbolism’.55  
Certain drugs, he argues, became the ‘symbolic expression of other fears.’56  In this 
symbolic analysis, where drugs are revealed as an expression of ‘deep-rooted social 
fears’,57 lies the explanation for the powerful emotions58 and moral censure that specific 
drugs have attracted; emotions and censure which cannot be satisfactorily justified by 
consideration of the physical or moral dangers they present to the user. 
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He claims that drug laws have provided a stage on which social values and community 
fears are played out.  In his later writings he even goes so far as to say that drug laws 
amount to an ‘elaborate morality play staged for the public benefit’.59  In these later works 
on the similarities between witchcraft and drug laws, Manderson argues that neither type of 
law was designed to eliminate their subject at all, instead functioning to make the issues 
more public and theatrical as a drama representing society’s fears and anxieties, 
‘…offer[ing] us physical proof of the existence of this threat and of its evil power in the 
world.’60 
(b) Specific Symbols in Australian Drug Law 
Given the intense feelings in society regarding the use of illicit drugs, and the ‘surprising 
amount of support’61 the prohibition on drugs receives, the claim that drug laws are not 
about drugs at all, and target the symbols of our fears rather than the drug itself, is a 
remarkable one.  How does Manderson justify such claims?  What do the prohibited drugs 
symbolise and what evidence does Manderson present to support this analysis?  It is 
unnecessary to provide a complete account of Manderson’s arguments in order to 
understand his approach:   two of his major examples of the role of symbolism in the drug 
debate provide a sufficient example of his approach to the analysis. 
The most significant example of symbolism in Manderson’s works relates to the early 
Australian opium laws.  Through his examination of numerous contemporary sources such 
as parliamentary debates, newspapers, serial publications, parliamentary and government 
reports, legislation, parliamentary committee reports, speeches, conferences, royal 
commissions, policy statements and government department documents,62 the author 
uncovers the less obvious, more insidious reasons behind the opium laws.  He claims63 that 
the first prohibitive drug laws in Australia were motivated mainly by fear and racism 
against the Chinese population and ‘were just part of a broader current of anti-Chinese 
                                                
59
  Manderson, above n 45, 51. 
60
  Manderson, above n 36. 
61
  Ibid. 
62
  See Manderson above n 23, n 35 and n 52  for the presentation of his research findings. 
63
  As others have in relation to drug laws in countries such as the USA and Canada, for example John Helmer, 
Drugs and Minority Oppression, 1975 (New York: The Seabury Press); Richard Bonnie and Charles H 
Whitebread II, The Marihuana Conviction: A History of Marihuana Prohibition in the United States, 1974 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia), 14 and 30.  See also Jerome L Himmelstein, The Strange Career 
of Marihuana: Politics and Ideology of Drug Control in America, 1983 (Westport: Greenwood Press) 141ff.  
References to these authors can be found in Manderson’s works. 
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attitudes…’.64  Early opium laws prohibited only the smoking of opium, a habit peculiar to 
the Chinese, and left untouched the manifestations of the same drug utilised by white 
Australia (largely patent medicines).  Debate surrounding the prohibition of opium focused 
on the evils of Chinese opium dens and the sexual corruption of white Australian females 
which opium was said to bring.  Opium, then, came to be ‘a symbol — of the Chinese, of 
fears of invasion, of sexual licence, of racial impurity, of pollution and violation…’65  
Similar arguments regarding the racial motivations of illicit drug laws have been made in 
the USA and Canada.66  
The second example is the prohibition of drugs such as marijuana and amphetamines in the 
1960s and 1970s.  Concerns about recreational drug use in the 1960s and 1970s centred on 
the characteristics of the rebellious youth sub-culture rather than the dangers of the drugs 
themselves.  For example, Manderson admits that a drug like LSD (lysergic acid 
diethylamide) ‘may have been dangerous in itself, but more to the point it was a symbol of 
youth and rebellion which confronted medical and legal power.’67  Manderson therefore 
presents the same type of analysis for this era in drug law history:  drug use symbolised 
social change and youth rebellion, things which threatened the status quo and thus were 
feared by the generation in power.  Strong prohibitive laws against these particular drugs 
were a way of responding to these fears, rather than being primarily about the health of 
young people. 
D Conclusions:  Manderson 
Manderson presents an extremely compelling case in his history of illicit drug policy.  The 
evidence he presents clearly demonstrates that illicit drug policy is not a rational, 
reasonable response to well defined and well researched public health dangers of the 
various prohibited substances.  It is clear that certain drugs have been inextricably linked 
                                                
64
  Manderson, above n 33, 387.  See also Desmond Manderson, 'Disease, Defilement, Depravity: Towards an 
Aesthetic Analysis of Health.  The Case of Chinese in Nineteenth Century Australia' in Laura Marks and Michael 
Worboys (eds), Migrants, Minorities and Health, 1997 (London: Routledge) 22, 36. 
65
  Manderson, above n 22, 183.  
66
  See also Clarence Lusane, 'In Perpetual Motion: the Continuing Significance of Race and America's Drug Crisis' 
(1994) University of Chicago Legal Forum 83 generally and specifically 95-98.  For example opium laws 
directed towards the Chinese were also a characteristic of American drug law history, while marijuana has been 
linked with the Mexican people and cocaine with African Americans.  Manderson, above n 33, 384.  Although 
the symbolism relating to marijuana and cocaine was not directly at work in Australia, the indirect effects of the 
American associations have been equally strong in Australia.  As Manderson argues, much of Australian drug law 
is a direct result of international influences, largely due to the power and determination of the USA in relation to 
drug policy: see Manderson, above n 35, 115-138 and above n 52, 24-29.  Thus, not only were the early 
Australian opium laws of racial basis, but later prohibitions on cocaine and marijuana were also largely 
influenced by racial fears and concerns, albeit racial concerns in the USA rather than Australia. 
67
  Manderson, above n 35, 148. 
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with particular groups within society; this has fuelled concerns about the use of that 
particular substance.  
The force of Manderson’s case leads to the consideration of whether such an analysis 
would be equally applicable to the issue of doping.  Not only are both policies at a very 
basic level about ‘drugs’68 but many of the justifications that Manderson presents for his 
analysis could equally apply to anti-doping policy.  The justification for applying 
Manderson’s analysis will be considered in more detail in the conclusion to this chapter.  
The similarities between anti-doping and illicit drugs policy will be considered in the next 
section. 
IV THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN ANTI-DOPING POLICY AND 
ILLICIT DRUG POLICY 
Given the obvious similarities between illicit drug policy and anti-doping policy, a section 
devoted to parallels between the two may seem redundant.  However, the obvious 
similarities are often assumed to be the only ones.  In every other way the two policies are 
treated as being entirely unrelated.  Anti-doping is situated firmly within the sporting field, 
the policy being seen as one relating to fairness in sport, while illicit drugs policy is seen as 
a moral and health issue in wider society.  
A number of factors provide proof of the difference in treatment of the two issues.  For 
example, anti-doping authorities propagate the distinction between the two by emphasising 
the rationales for doping as having to do with the sporting ethic.69  Government bodies 
dealing with the two issues are generally separated:  there is a specific body to deal with 
doping in Australia, the Australian Sports Doping Authority (ASADA), while wider drug 
issues are dealt with by bodies like the Ministerial Council for Drug Strategy.70  The way 
in which doping issues are reported in the media is entirely separated from the general 
issue of drugs:  drug issues, being a subject of the criminal law, are reported as mainstream 
news while doping issues are placed in the sections containing sports news.  Even in 
academic writings the two issues are largely separated in legal, medical and other fields.71  
                                                
68
   See discussion below regarding the tendency to see the two issues quite separately. 
69
   This has already been made clear in references to the fundamental rationale statement in the World Anti-Doping 
Code (WADA Code). 
70
   Often the more general bodies have some policies on doping in sport but there is no operational force to them. 
71
   This conclusion has been reached after a brief survey of legal academic works such as: David Helipern and Steve 
Bolt, Rough Deal: Your Guide to Drug Laws, 1998 (Sydney; Redfern Legal Centre Publishing); Manderson, 
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Until recently, enforcement bodies have been totally separated as well, anti-doping policy 
has been enforced by sports bodies whereas drugs policy is a criminal matter for the state.72   
Even if there are some obvious similarities between anti-doping and illicit drugs policies, 
the differential treatment of the two issues warrants proof that they are, in reality, similar 
policies.  Such proof will be provided below.   
A Subject Matter 
By far the most obvious similarity is the fact that both types of laws are directed against 
the use of particular substances which society finds unacceptable.  Both laws prohibit 
certain practices — use, possession, aiding and abetting — with reference to a long list of 
specified substances. 
Moreover, the contents of the lists have a strong resemblance.  This point can be 
demonstrated easily by a rudimentary comparison of the 2008 WADA Code Prohibited 
List73 and the Schedule of Prohibited Substances in the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 
                                                                                                                                              
above n 33 and above n 35; Robert  Shiels, Controlled Drugs: Statutes and Cases, 1991 (Edinburgh: W 
Green/Sweet and Maxwell); SK Chatterjee, Drug Abuse and Drug Related Crimes: Some Unsolved Legal 
Problems, 1989 (Dordecht: Martinus Nijoff Publishers, Kluwer Academic Publishers); Tony  Duster, The 
Legislation of Morality: Law, Drugs and Moral Judgement, 1970 (New York: The Free Press); Keith S Bovey, 
Misuse of Drugs: A Handbook for Lawyers, 1986 (London: Butterworth and the Law Society); Alfred W McCoy, 
Drug Traffic: Narcotics and Organised Crime in Australia, 1980 (Sydney: Harper and Rowe Publishing); Don 
Weatherburn, 'Has the War on Drugs Failed?' (2001) 33(1) Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 15; D 
Cheatwood, 'Drug Policy as a Cause of Violence: The Drug War in America and Implications for Europe ' (1995) 
1 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 54; Terry Carney, 'The History of Australian 
Drug Laws' (1981) 7 Monash University Law Review 165; James Rowe, 'Pure Politics: A Historical Look at 
Australian Drug Policy' (2001) 26(3) Alternative Law Journal 125; The Hon. Michael Kirby, 'Drugs - An 
International Prohibition' (1992) 18(1) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 312; Brenden Barry, 'Drug Policy; The 
Failure of Prohibition and the Need to Reform' (1998) Australian Law Students' Association Academic Journal 92 
and Keith Evans, 'Update on the US Drug War' [1996](February 16) New Law Journal 206.   
 Medical and sports science academic writing surveyed include: Paul Dillon, Greg Cox and Maurie O’Connor, 
What’s the Score: The Facts on Alcohol, Drugs and Sport, 2004 (Canberra: Australian Sports Commission); 
Australian Sports Drug Agency, Drugs in Sport Handbook, 1993 (Sydney: MIMS); Robert Gott and Greg Pyers, 
Not Just a Game: Drugs in Sport, 1993 (Melbourne: CIS Publishers); Alex Wodak and Timothy Moore, 
Modernising Australia's Drug Policy, 2002 (Sydney: UNSW Press); Geraldine  Woods, Drug Abuse in Society: A 
Reference Handbook, 1993 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO); Michael Gossop, Living with Drugs (4th Ed), 2000 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Arena);  Margaret Hamilton, Trevor King and Alison Ritter (eds), Drug Use in Australia: 
Preventing Harm (2nd ed) 2004 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press); Robert Petersen (ed), The International 
Challenge of Drug Abuse, Research Monograph Series 19, 1979 (Washington: National Institute of Drug Abuse 
Research); ASDA and ACT Office of Sport and Recreation, Drugs in Sport: Let’s Start at the Beginning, 1993 
(Canberra: ASDA/ACT Government).   
 Other academic writings surveyed include Justin Healey (ed), Issues in Society: Young People and Substance 
Abuse, 2000 (Sydney: The Spinney Press); Jara Krivanek, Understanding Drug Use: The Key Issues, 2000 
(Sydney: WEF Associates); Barry Stimel, Drug Abuse and Social Policy in America: The War That Must Be 
Won, 1996 (New York: The Haworth Medical Press ); Robert Pinger et al, Issues for Today: Drugs (2nd ed) 1995 
(St Louis: Mosby Year Book Inc); Steve Allsop, Mike Phillips and Carlo Calogero, Drugs and Work: Responding 
to Alcohol and Other Drug Problems in Australian Workplaces, 2001 (Melbourne: IP Communications); Elaine 
Sharp, The Dilemma of Drug Policy in the United States, 1994 (Harper Collins College Publishers).  
72
   These enforcement issues have changed in the past decade.  As discussed in Chapter One, there appears to be a 
joining of forces between anti-doping and illicit drug enforcers.  
73
  World Anti-Doping Agency, The World Anti-Doping Code: The 2008 Prohibited List, International Standard 
(2008) <http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/2008_List_En.pdf> at 15 January 2008. 
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1985 (NSW).74  Of the 62 stimulants prohibited in competition in the WADA Code 
Prohibited List,75 approximately 12 of them are also listed as prohibited substances in 
NSW.  Since the Prohibited List also prohibits ‘other substances with similar chemical 
structure or same biological effect,’76 it is highly likely that the number of stimulants 
which are prohibited in both NSW and under the WADA Code is much higher than the 
approximate 20 percent identified at first glance.77  And that is only one category of drug 
on the Prohibited List.  Since cannabinoids have been included on the WADA Code 
Prohibited List,78 there are very few illicit drugs which are not prohibited in sport.79 
B Legislative Approach 
Both doping laws and drug laws incorporate the strict liability offence.  The illicit drug 
offences of possession, supplying and trafficking characteristically incorporate a strict 
liability offence.  Further, under the Drugs Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW), if a 
person is found to have in their possession a ‘traffickable’ quantity of a drug, as defined in 
Schedule 1, then they are deemed to have had the drug in their possession for supply unless 
they are able to prove otherwise.80  Thus a person can be guilty of trafficking without any 
intention of doing anything with the substance.  As discussed previously, the WADA Code 
also incorporates the strict liability offence, since the mental element of the athlete is 
                                                
74
  Section 3(1) defined ‘Prohibited Substance’ as any substance other than a Prohibited Plant, specified in Schedule 
1 to the Act. 
75
   WADA Code Prohibited List, above n 73, S6: Stimulants Prohibited In Competition. 
76
  Ibid. 
77
   It is accepted that stimulants may have a larger representation within the illegal drugs than anabolic steroids but 
the point remains that there is an overlap between the two lists. 
78
  This was added after the incident at the Nagano Winter Olympics where a snowboarder retained his gold medal, 
despite testing positive to marijuana.  It was largely through the influence of the United States that marijuana was 
added to the list: see Director Barry R McCaffrey, Combating the Use of Drugs and Doping in Sport (1999) 
<http://commerce.senate.gov/hearing/1020mcc.pdf> at 13 March 2004.  
79
   By far the most telling overlap between the substances prohibited in sport and those prohibited under state 
criminal law relates to the inclusion of recreational drugs on the doping lists.  These drugs have been included on 
the WADA Code Prohibited List despite the fact that there is little evidence that they enhance athletic 
performance.  For example, although a few studies suggest that the use of cocaine in exercise leads to little or no 
improvement in performance, and could even have a detrimental effect on athletic performance (through 
producing a sense of euphoria which distorts an athlete’s perception of their performance), cocaine remains on 
the WADA Code Prohibited List:  see Robert Conlee, ‘Cocaine’ in Michael S Bahrke and Charles E Yesalis  (Eds) 
Performance Enhancing Substances in Sport and Exercise 2002 (Champaign: Human Kinetics), 279-288 for a 
review of the literature on cocaine’s ergogenic properties. 
 Inclusion of non-performance enhancing substances in the prohibition is problematic in terms of the rationale for 
doping rules, as discussed in Chapter Two.  The commonly cited rationale for banning doping a desire to level the 
playing field does not apply to these recreational, non-performance enhancing drugs.  And it is difficult to accept 
that illicit drugs have been included on prohibited lists out of a desire to protect the athlete’s health.  Given that 
illicit drugs are already criminalised, there appears little reason to explicitly ban them in sport to protect athlete’s 
health.  The inclusion of these substances in doping lists certainly suggests that doping really is an extension of 
illicit drug policy. 
80
   Drugs Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW), s29. 
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completely irrelevant:81   even negligence, fault or intent is not to be considered under 
Article 2.2 of the Code. 
The structures of many drug and doping laws are also similar:  there is usually a blanket 
prohibition on ‘prohibited substances’ in the main text of the legislative instrument, with 
the prohibited substances listed in an attached appendix.  For instance, the Drugs Misuse 
and Trafficking Act states that ‘a person who has a prohibited substance in their possession 
is guilty of an offence.’82  A table of prohibited plants and drugs is found in Schedule 1 of 
the Act.  The similarity with the WADA Code is clear, as previously mentioned, the Code 
states that an anti-doping rule violation is ‘the presence of a Prohibited Substance or its 
Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete’s bodily Specimen’.83  The Prohibited Substances are 
found in the WADA Code Prohibited List which is updated each year by the World Anti-
Doping Agency (WADA). 
The above-mentioned similarities between the structure of doping and drug laws may, of 
course, spring from a common desire to incorporate the most efficient approach as having 
a single and fairly compendious list circumvents the need for endless repetition and 
continual amendments to the body of the statute.  The use of the strict liability offence may 
also arise from a shared need to reduce the burden on enforcement bodies.  However, the 
history of anti-doping policy — as revealed in the subsequent symbolic analysis — shows 
that the drafting similarities are not simply the coincidental result of a desire for efficiency.  
C Penalties 
To suggest that penalties for drug related offences and doping offences are similar is a 
somewhat contentious proposition for there can be no comparison between life 
imprisonment and the death penalty84 and suspension from sport.  One should not trivialise 
the seriousness of a drug related sentence in comparing them to doping sanctions. 
Nonetheless, there is a similarity between doping sanctions and drug related penalties, in 
that the sanctions imposed for both offences can be characterised as severe or even 
draconian.85  Punishments relating to drug offences are some of the harshest in criminal 
                                                
81
  WADA Code, Article 2.1.  It should be noted that there are other doping offences, such as Article 2.2 (‘Use of’) 
which would involve consideration of the mental element.  See discussion in Chapter Two. 
82
  Section 10(1). 
83
  Articles 1 and 2. 
84
   Well known examples are Australians, Schapelle Corby and the ‘Bali Nine’, who all who received severe 
penalties for importing marijuana and heroin (respectively) into Bali:  news.com, Bali Nine (2008) 
<http://www.news.com.au/index/0,10121,31317,00.html> at 30 September 2008. 
In relation to doping the Rugby Football Union Disciplinary Hearing said: ‘The Regulations are draconian and 
meant to be.  It is not for us to comment further on that, still less to seek to re-write them.  We must apply them, 
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law.  Doping offences are mostly civil in nature and the worst outcome is life suspension 
from involvement in a voluntary sporting competition.  Nevertheless, it has been pointed 
out that the severity of such a sanction should not be underestimated:  a doping conviction 
can bring a premature end to an athlete’s career and thus affect their ability to work.86   
D Use of Criminal Law and Approach to Enforcement 
One area of overlap between doping and drug laws is the use of the criminal law to 
penalise those who supply prohibited substances to others.  Use of the criminal law in 
illicit drug policy is well known; the involvement of the criminal law in doping less so.   
Of particular significance is the use of the criminal law to penalise the supply and 
importation of anabolic steroids.87  In Australia, ‘anabolic and androgenic substances’ are 
listed under Schedule 8 of the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956 (Cth) (along 
with many of the ‘hardest’ illicit drugs) and attract severe criminal penalties.  In other 
countries, such as under the Controlled Substances Act88 in the United States, the criminal 
offence of importing and distributing anabolic androgenic steroids attracts large monetary 
penalties and imprisonment.89   
The criminalisation of anabolic steroids primarily for their use in sport provides a strong 
link between doping and drug laws, as it is an example of a doping substance that has been 
treated in the same way that the traditional ‘illicit’ recreational drugs have been.  And, with 
the increasing involvement of the criminal law in doping, there appears to be an increasing 
acceptance that doping agents should be treated as other ‘drugs.’90 
                                                                                                                                              
faithfully.  The only option open to us was to suspend the player for a period of two years’:  Rugby Football 
Union Disciplinary Panel, Rugby Football Union Disciplinary Panel Judgement: Paul Price (2007) 
<http://www.rfu.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/RFUHome.Community_Detail/StoryID/16981> at 20 June 2007. 
86
  Antonio Buti and Saul Fridman, Drugs, Sport and the Law, 2001 (Mudgeeraba: Scribbler’s  
 Publishing), 128-129.   
87
   In the Australian context doping is not against the criminal law but it is in some countries, such as Italy, France 
and Belgium: see European Commission, Member's Legislation on Doping (1999) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/sport/action_sports/dopage/dopage_en.html#legal_aspects> at 13 March 2008.  There was 
controversy over the application of Italy’s anti-doping laws at the 2006 Turin Olympics:  Nathaniel Vinton, NY 
Times: I.O.C. Stops Fighting Doping Laws in Turin (2005) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/29/sports/othersports/29ioc.html> at 13 March 2008.  For further discussion 
on the use of the criminal law in anti-doping policy see Christopher McKenzie, The Use of Criminal Justice 
Mechanisms to Combat Doping in Sport (2007)  
 <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=slej> at 13 March 2008. 
88
  Controlled Substances Act (CSA), Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 1970 
(USA). 
89
  For an example of the penalties involved in the Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO) case see US 
Department of Justice, Press Release: Department of Justice, Media Release: February 12 2004: Four 
Individuals Charged in Bay Area with Money Laundering and Distribution of Illegal Steroids (2004) 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/February/04_ag_083.htm> at 13 September 2008. 
90
   It is also interesting to note that both illicit drug policy and anti-doping policy use drug testing as part of 
enforcement/prevention.  The significance of the use of these kinds of tests in anti-doping will be discussed in 
Chapter Six. 
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E Level of Control by Medical Practitioners 
Another point of similarity worth mentioning is the way in which medical practitioners 
exhibit some level of control in both drug and doping related issues.  
Medical practitioners act as gatekeepers in both areas, since they have the power to provide 
legitimised access to the substance which would otherwise be prohibited.  For example, in 
Switzerland and in the United Kingdom, members of the medical profession are able to 
allow limited access to heroin maintenance programmes for people addicted to heroin.91  In 
a similar way, the medical profession has the power to legitimize the use of some doping 
substances through the Therapeutic Use provisions of the WADA Code.92 
F Rhetoric and Societal Reaction 
Doping convictions and drug related convictions tend to raise the ire of the public in a way 
that many other laws do not.  Of particular interest here is one similar aspect of the rhetoric 
associated with doping policy and drug policy:  the use of war or battle analogies.  Some 
examples of the language used to refer to drug policy include:  
• politicians declare the need for a ‘war on drugs’93 or that they are getting ‘tough 
on drugs.’94 
• titles of articles include the ‘US Drug War’;95 ‘The Drug War and the American 
Jewish Community:  1880 to 2002 and Beyond’96 and ‘Has the War on Drugs 
Failed?’97 
• drug users have been labelled an ‘addicted army of foot soldiers who obey 
without question, and under penalty of death, the order of their capos’98 
Similar rhetoric is found in the doping debate: 
                                                
91
  Drug Policy Alliance, Drug Policy Around the World Overview: Switzerland  
 <http://www.drugpolicy.org/global/drugpolicyby/westerneurop/switzerland/> at 13 September 2008 and Drug 
Policy Alliance, Drug Policy Around the World: England 
 <http://www.drugpolicy.org/global/drugpolicyby/westerneurop/england/> at 13 September 2008. 
92
  WADA Code, Article 4.4.  The power is not unlimited in either case and is, of course, subject to a large degree of 
supervision and accountability.  For example, WADA may review the granting of a therapeutic use exemption to 
any athlete by the international federation. 
93
  The Hon. Michael Kirby, 'Drugs - An International Prohibition' (1992) 18(1) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 312. 
94
  Tough on Drugs, the National Illicit Drug Strategy, Australian Federal and State Governments, 1997 (1997) 
<http://www.nationaldrugstrategy.gov.au> at 13 September 2008. 
95
  Keith Evans, 'Update on the US Drug War' [1996](February 16) New Law Journal 206. 
96
  Abraham Abramovsky and Jonathan I. Edelstein, 'The Drug War and the American Jewish Community: 1880 to 
2002 and Beyond (the Law's Treatment of the Disadvantaged: the Politics of the American Drug War)' (2002) 
6(1) Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 1, 1. 
97
  Don Weatherburn, 'Has the War on Drugs Failed?' (2001) 33(1) Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 15. 
98
  Victorian Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 22 November 1983, 2113, quoted in James Rowe, 'Pure 
Politics: A Historical Look at Australian Drug Policy' (2001) 26(3) Alternative Law Journal 125, 128. 
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• anti-doping authorities are often said to be involved in the ‘fight against 
doping’99  
• The ONDCP in the USA is ‘Combating the Use of Drugs and Doping in 
Sport’100 
Furthermore, although anti-doping programmes are usually referred to as the ‘war on drugs 
in sport’, in one case, the IOC’s desire to develop their anti-doping programmes has been 
referred to as a hope to ‘push forward in the War on Drugs’.101  This is more than a mere 
slip of the pen:  as will be clear from the subsequent analysis, drug policy and doping 
policy are so intimately connected that they are, in reality, both part of the ‘war on 
drugs’.102 
G Continued Commitment to the Prohibition Model 
Another fundamental similarity is that a prohibitionist approach is taken to both issues.  
The historical significance of the adoption of a prohibitionist model will be considered 
below.  At present it suffices to note that in both policies regulated but limited access to 
specified substances has been rejected and the substances have instead been absolutely 
prohibited.103 
                                                
99
 The Copenhagen Declaration where stakeholders adopted the WADA Code as the basis for the fight against 
doping:  Antonio Rigozzi, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Giorgio Malinverni, 'Doping and the Fundamental 
Rights of Athletes: Comments in the Wake of the Adoption of the World Anti-Doping Code' (2003) 3(AUG) 
International Sports Law Review 39, 39;  Frank Oschutz, 'Harmonization of Anti-Doping Codes Through 
Arbitration: The Case Law of the Court of Arbitration for Sport' (2002) 12 Marquette Sports Law Review 675, 
681. 
100
  McCaffrey, above n 78. 
101
  Jim Ferstle, 'World Conference on Doping in Sport' in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (eds), Doping In Elite 
Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement, 2001 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) 275, 283. 
102
   Another similarity between the two is the influence of politics in shaping the relevant policy such as international 
conventions like the WADA Code and the international drugs conventions.  The role of politics in both these 
aspects is a topic on its own and won’t be covered here.  
103
  There are, of course, exceptions in both fields: some substances are only restricted, rather than prohibited.  The 
rationale for the use of a prohibitionist approach is similar as well:  to protect the health of would-be drug-users 
and to protect the health of others.  In the case of illicit drug laws, the stated aim is to protect people from 
themselves by stopping them from using illicit drugs and also protecting the rest of society from the effects of 
illicit drug use (such as property crime, prostitution and violence).  See for example New South Wales, Second 
Reading Speech, State Drug Crime Commission Bill and Miscellaneous Acts (State Drug Crime Commission) 
Amendment Bill, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, Thursday 17 October 1985, 8086 (Barry 
Unsworth, Minister for Transport and Vice President of the Executive Council).  Similarly, the prohibition on 
doping substances is, in part, justified on the grounds of preventing harm to the athlete from the prohibited 
substances, preventing harm to other athletes (in the form of being coerced into drug use) or the wider society:  
Angela Schneider and Robert Butcher, 'An Ethical Analysis of Drug Testing' in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse 
(ed), Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement, 2001 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) 
129, 136 to 142. 
 The moralist argument for these prohibitionist policies also demonstrates similarities in approach.  In the drug 
debate the issue is protection of the moral well-being of society, in the doping debate it is the protection of the 
moral well-being of the institution of competitive sport.  In illicit drug policy, the issue is the protection of the 
purity of, and essential elements of, good society (such as the family unit); in doping policy, the issue is 
protection of purity of the competition and the essence of sport. 
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Many have argued vehemently against the prohibitionist approach in both drug law and 
doping law.104  In both cases, the argument has been put firstly that the prohibitionist 
approach is simply not working:  the usage rates of illicit drugs and doping substances do 
not appear to be decreasing.105  Secondly, the approach is said in both cases to be doing 
more damage than good.106  However, for a number of reasons, the arguments against 
prohibition have always met with resistance and the prohibitionist approach has remained 
in favour.  It has been a pro-active decision by drug and doping authorities to pursue the 
prohibitionist stance on the issue.107  
H Historic Trends 
An examination of the trends and patterns of various eras in the histories of the two 
policies reveals startling similarities.  Since the subsequent analysis of doping law will 
dwell at length on the role of symbolism in the development and history of doping law, at 
this stage it is not appropriate to focus on the details of the history of either type of law.  
Instead, in broad brush strokes, the major movements in both will be compared.  This 
meta-level examination of the history of doping and drug law will sufficiently demonstrate 
their commonality. 
                                                
104
  In relation to drug policy see Alex Wodak and Timothy Moore, Modernising Australia's Drug Policy (2002); 
Eugene Oscapella, 'Witch Hunts and Chemical McCarthyism: the Criminal Law and Canadian Drug Policy…are 
we Doing Ourselves More Harm than Good by the Criminal Prohibition of Popular Psychoactive Drugs?' (1996) 
118 Humanist in Canada 20; Brenden Barry, 'Drug Policy; The Failure of Prohibition and the Need to Reform' 
(1998) Australian Law Students' Association Academic Journal 92 and Tony Parsons, 'The Myth of Drug 
Prohibition' (1999) October The Law Institute Journal 57. 
 And for doping policy see John Burge, 'Legalize and Regulate: a Prescription for Reforming Anabolic Steroid 
Legislation' (1994) 15 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal 33 and Robert Dawson, 'How Not to 
Stop the Cheats' (2003) 4 October New Scientist 23. 
105
   Hoberman states that doping has reached ‘epidemic proportions’ although his arguments focus on the politics of 
doping control rather than intrinsic problems with prohibitionist policy: Hoberman, above n 4, 241.  Other 
commentators recognise that the present system of drug testing in sport has failed to effectively decrease drug use 
among athletes: see R.Craig Kammerer, 'Drug Testing in Sport and Exercise' in Michael S Bahrke and Charles E 
Yesalis (eds), Performance-Enhancing Substances in Sport and Exercise, 2002 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) 
323, 323; Jim Ferstle, 'The Evolution and Politics of Drug Testing' in Charles E Yesalis (ed), Anabolic Steroids in 
Sport and Exercise (2nd ed) 2000 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) 363, 366.  See also Barry, above n 104, 95.  
Burge, above n 104, 35 states ‘[d]espite vigorous enforcement, however, steroid legislation has had no 
discernable effect on the rate of use.’  Yesalis and Bahrke claim that ‘performance-enhancing substance use in 
Olympic sport has remained unchanged for years…’:  Charles E Yesalis and Michael S Bahrke, 'Issues, 
Concerns, and the Future of Performance Enhancing Substances in Sport and Exercise' in Charles E Yesalis and 
Michael S Bahrke (eds), Performance Enhancing Substances in Sport and Exercise, 2002 (Champaign: Human 
Kinetics) 351, 354. 
106
   It is contended that the prohibition actually increases the risk to those who persist in using the prohibited 
substances firstly because they are unwilling to seek medical advice and secondly through risks of purchasing 
impure drugs on the black market: Wodak, above n 36, 93.  It has also been suggested that regulated access to 
illicit drugs and doping agents may actually minimise the harm to the drug user: J Savulescu, B Foddy and M 
Clayton, 'Why We Should Allow Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport' (2004) 38(6) British Journal of Sports 
Medicine 666 and Burge, above n 104, 33. 
107
  For an example of the kind of arguments put forward for the continuing prohibitionist stance in doping see 
Sebastian Coe, We Cannot Move from the Strict Liability Rule (2004) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/drugsinsport/2373729/We-cannot-move-from-strict-liability-
rule.html> at 13 September 2008.  
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Rowe108 and Reynolds109 provide succinct summaries of the major movements in the 
history of Australian drug policy.  The following summary of the history of the two 
policies will focus on the significant periods identified by these authors; developments in 
doping history in these periods will be compared. 110 
1 Late Nineteenth Century 
Although the sale, labelling and use of chemical substances had been regulated to some 
degree since the 19th century through instruments such as the various Poisons Acts,111 
most legal historians identify the 1870s to 1890s as the introduction of illicit drug laws in 
the modern sense.  Early laws targeted opium only when smoked, so cannot be 
characterised as absolute prohibitions.  However, the use of the criminal law to regulate 
chemical substances was a forerunner to modern illicit drug laws.  During this period in 
doping history, various substances  such as alcohol, heroin, strychnine and cocaine  
were in use in athletic events.112  Even if these practices elicited condemnation in some 
quarters, such condemnation was by no means widespread, and there is little evidence of a 
‘doping debate’ at this stage in history.113  
2 Post World War I 
This was the next major period in the development of drug policy.  The 1920s and 1930s 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five.  It suffices at this stage to point out that in both 
drug and doping policy there was marked activity in this period. 
3 The 1950s and 1960s 
It was not until the 1950s that the next major period of drug policy arrived:  ‘drugs did not 
seem to be an issue of great concern.’114  At this stage there was increasing concern over 
                                                
108
  Rowe, above n 98. 
109
  Reynolds, above n 39.  The following summary of the major developments on illicit drug laws is taken from a 
number of sources such as Manderson, above n 23; Evans, above n 95; Terry Carney, 'The History of Australian 
Drug Laws' (1981) 7 Monash University Law Review 165 and Barry, above n 104, 92. 
110
  Houlihan, above n 20, Terry Todd, 'Anabolic Steroids: The Gremlins of Sport' (1987) 14(1) Journal of Sport 
History 87; Jan Todd and Terry Todd, 'Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic 
Movement' in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (eds), Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the 
Olympic Movement, 2001 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) 65 and Catherine Ordway and Simon Rolfe, 'Drugs in 
Sport' [1998](November) The Law Society Journal of South Australia 16. 
111
  See Carney, above n 109, 181. 
112
  See Houlihan, above n 20, 33. 
113
  Paul Dimeo, A History of Drug Use in Sport 1876-1976: Beyond Good and Evil, 2007 (London: Routledge), 26 
and 28 provides a detailed discussion of attitudes towards two famous doping incidents in the early nineteenth 
century which, contrary to the usual presumptions made about these events, demonstrated that there was little 
criticism of the practice at that stage.  Dimeo, 32, suggests that by the early nineteenth century ‘the wider social 
receptiveness towards drugs was becoming more cautious’.  See also Ordway and Rolfe, above n 110, 16.  
114
  Reynolds above n 39, 76. 
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the use of heroin and morphine and pressure was brought to bear on the international stage 
for tougher prohibitions on these and other drugs.  Rowe identifies the international 
adoption of the 1961 Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs as ‘the defining moment in 
modern international drug control’.115  From that time onwards, the push towards 
increasing prohibitions was realised as more international drug treaties and national drug 
laws (with ever increasing penalties) were enacted.  Many authors have identified this 
period of time as one in which social change and youth rebellion, including 
experimentation with drug taking, was met with fear, resistance and increasing prohibition 
on drug use. 
Patterns which can be identified in doping policy in this period are reflective of the 
patterns identified in the history of drug policy.  Very little is said of doping during the 
1930s and 1940s.116  Although some concern was raised after drug use became evident 
during the Olympic Games in the 1950s,117 most authors agree that it was not until the 
1960s that doping was seen as a serious issue in sport.118  The history of anti-doping policy 
in the 1960s will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.  
4 Recent Developments 
The most recent period of drug policy has been characterised by intense debate over the 
best approach to drug control, and experimentation with new strategies.119  As mentioned 
above, there has been a growing recognition of the failure of the ‘war on drugs’ to date and 
a realisation that prohibition may not be the best approach to the problem.120  Thus the 
                                                
115
  The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, opened for signature 30 March 1961, ATS 1967 No. 31 (entered in to 
force 13 December 1964); Rowe, above n 98, 127.  Emphasis added. 
116
   No doubt because the war took attention away from both elite sport and doping. 
117
  Prokop, L, ‘Drug Abuse in International Athletics’ (1975) 3(2) Journal of Sports Medicine 85-87, quoted in 
Dimeo, above n 113, 54.  
118
  For example, Buti and Fridman, above n 86, 30 and World Anti-Doping Agency, A Brief History of Anti -Doping 
<http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=312> at 13 September 2008. 
119
  This is particularly true of Europe and to a lesser degree Australia.  See Rowe, above n 98, 127, emphasis added. 
120
   Proponents of this argument include references in above n 104.  Since the late 1990s a number of countries, 
including the Netherlands and Switzerland, have introduced government regulated supply of heroin to people 
addicted to the drug.  The Netherlands permit purchase of cannabis in approved coffee houses and have made the 
supply of cannabis for medicinal purposes legal, as also in Canada:  see Australian Institute of Criminology, 
Illicit Drugs and Alcohol: International and Overseas Responses (2007) 
<http://www.aic.gov.au/research/drugs/international/> at 14 March 2008.  NSW also held a brief experiment with 
a medically supervised injecting room in Kings Cross which caused great controversy:  The Australian, Injecting 
Room to Stay Open (10 December 2006), 
 <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20903523-29277,00.html>  at 14 March 2008. 
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debate is polarised:  one side pushes for stronger control,121 the other proposes a complete 
rethinking of the prohibitionist stance.   
In the wake of the doping scandal of the 1998 Tour de France, a new era in anti-doping 
policy also arrived, as discussed in Chapter One.122  The result of the widespread 
international dissatisfaction with anti-doping efforts by bodies such as the IOC, has been a 
high level of cooperation between governments and international sporting bodies, the 
introduction of WADA and the WADA Code.  Although it can be argued that this latest 
wave in anti-doping policy has been in the opposite direction to drug policy developments, 
in the present era drug policy and doping policy still have much in common:  the 
recognition of past failures and exploration of new ways of approaching the issue. 
I Conclusion:  The Similarities Between Doping and Illicit Drugs 
For many years these two types of policies have been distinguished.  Doping has been seen 
as a problem related to the ethic of sport, while drug policy has been firmly grounded in 
either the criminal justice or health arena.  Similarities between illicit drug policy and 
doping policy are, however, more than a series of mere coincidences.    
The above survey of similarities provides strong evidence that the issue of doping has been 
treated very similarly to the issue of illicit drugs.  Recent events in doping history suggest 
that there may now be a growing tendency to treat doping as part of the wider issue of the 
abuse of drugs in society.  The subsequent analysis will show that doping is not a separate 
issue to illicit drug taking and that the tendency towards combining the two issues is 
therefore more appropriate than most people recognise.   
The further importance of these similarities will be discussed below.  The remaining 
section of this chapter will connect some of the ideas presented in this chapter. 
 
 
                                                
121
   Although often this is more rhetorical than practical.  For a good discussion of the realities of Australian federal 
government drug policy under John Howard see Alex Wodak, Is the Howard Government Tough on Drugs? 
Social Research Briefs Number 7 (2004),  
 <http://nchsr.arts.unsw.edu.au/pdf%20reports/SRB07.pdf> at 14 March 2008. 
122
  See Ferstle, above n 105, 279. 
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V PUTTING IT TOGETHER:  WHAT EXPLAINS THE 
DILEMMA?:  THE ROLE OF SYMBOLISM IN ANTI-DOPING 
POLICY 
Up until this point the evidence and discussion in this chapter has been presented in 
disconnected sections.  But there is a link between them, as the below discussion will 
demonstrate.  Perhaps the best way to begin putting these sections together is to consider 
the implications of each of the three issues discussed above. 
A Public Opinion 
The first issue examined was the role of public sentiment in the development of anti-
doping policy.  The significance of this is quite obvious.  It has been argued that anti-
doping policy was largely driven by scientific interest, particularly in the development of 
drug tests.123  Others have argued that the driving concern was the health of athletes and 
preserving the integrity of competition.  Neither explanation provides a complete picture of 
the development of anti-doping policy.  The history cannot be understood without an 
appreciation of how public opinion has influenced decision-makers. 
The role of public opinion can help to explain why the ‘image of sport’ argument is the 
strongest of all the rationales presented for anti-doping policy.  If public opinion has been 
important in the imposition of the prohibition on doping, then it is natural to justify the 
adoption and maintenance of such a policy with concerns relating to that public opinion.   
Another puzzling aspect of anti-doping policy is also explained by the influence of public 
opinion; the continued widespread support that it commands.  It has been noted in Chapter 
Three that, given the lack of ethical and logical justification for a total prohibition on these 
substances, it is surprising that the prohibitive approach seems as popular as ever.  When it 
is understood that the prohibition is largely a result of public opinion, it is much less 
surprising that the approach would attract widespread support. 
It is also not surprising that the policy is marked by confusion.  One would hardly expect a 
policy strongly driven by public sentiment to be particularly clear or logically defensible, 
since public opinion is not concerned with logic.  
                                                
123
   See Dick Pound, Inside the Olympics, 2004 (Mississauga: John Wiley and Sons Canada), 57. 
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Thus, the influence of public opinion can explain a number of factors in anti-doping policy.  
There is, however, much that it cannot tell us.  Although it may not be surprising to find 
that a policy driven by public opinion is not rational or clear, it is not necessarily the case; 
it depends on how public opinion is formed.  There are policies with strong public support 
which also have a rational basis.  If the main factor in shaping public opinion is exposure 
to reasoned debate, then the resultant policy may well be reasonable and rational.  On the 
other hand, emotive and sensationalist media reporting may produce unreasonable and 
irrational policies. 
Clearly it is important to consider the origin of public opinion in any public policy; anti-
doping policy being no exception.  Here there are two important questions to be answered:  
why are such strong emotions caused by doping and why is public opinion like this?  
B Manderson’s Analysis 
Manderson’s symbolic analysis can provide a way of determining what is behind the 
strong public sentiment that has been so influential in the development of anti-doping 
policy.  Since public opinion cannot be traced back to rational argument — since there 
does not appear to be any rational argument for anti-doping sentiment — there must be 
some other influence behind its formation.  Since the symbolic analysis undertaken by 
Manderson provided an explanation for an irrational policy such as illicit drug law, so a 
similar analysis could provide an answer to the general question: what drives public 
sentiment in anti-doping? 
It is important to justify further the use of Manderson’s analysis in anti-doping, particularly 
since, as noted above, this policy has been treated quite separately from illicit drugs.  
Unfortunately, much of the justification for applying this framework lies in the actual 
application of the analysis; examination of the symbolism of doping reveals the importance 
of that symbolism.  However, a number of factors point to the appropriateness of this 
approach in anti-doping.  
Manderson’s case in relation to illicit drug law is a compelling one, particularly in light of 
the evidence that he presents.  His theory provides a cogent explanation of the evidence 
provided, making the application of such an argument in a related field a natural step.   
Furthermore, Manderson’s justifications for his analysis have parallels in anti-doping 
policy.  Manderon believes that modern illicit drugs policy has failed in its apparent 
objectives:  to reduce the harm related to the use of drugs in society.  Similarly, it has been 
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forcefully argued that anti-doping policy has failed in its objectives.124  Manderson also 
argues that the policy cannot be explained by logical argument.  This point has been made 
in relation to anti-doping policy in Chapter Three.  He identifies many myths perpetuated 
about the dangers of illicit drugs and that the reaction to these drugs is in no way 
proportional to the dangers involved.  Reliable research into the frequency and seriousness 
of the dangers of doping substances is also troublingly scant.  A final parallel between 
arguments about illicit drugs policy and anti-doping policy is the problem of inconsistency; 
the inconsistencies in both policies have been pointed out previously.  Equally compelling 
is the close resemblance between the two types of policies, examined in the third section of 
this chapter.  This close relationship warrants a similar analysis.    
These factors provide some justification for the application of the symbolic analysis to 
anti-doping policy.  And this type of analysis promises much.  In understanding that it is 
symbolism which has driven public reaction — and therefore anti-doping policy — and the 
specific symbolism involved, it becomes clear why anti-doping policy is in such a 
confused state.  It is no surprise that there is a lack of clarity regarding exactly what doping 
is and why it is prohibited, since the basis for decision-making relates more to the symbols 
involved than the pharmacology of doping.  So, too, the reason why certain aspects of sport 
have been prohibited, while others have been untouched, will become clear.  These points 
will be considered further after the symbolism of doping has been examined in Chapters 
Five to Seven.   
C The Similarities Between Illicit Drug Policy and Anti-Doping Policy 
It has already been shown that one of the implications of those similarities justifies the 
application of the Manderson-style analysis.  However, the similarities have wider 
implications for the thesis. 
At the most general level, the similarities noted above demonstrate that there is a strong 
link between illicit drugs and doping and suggests that anti-doping policy may, in reality, 
be a sub-variety of illicit drug policy.  More specifically, the close resemblance suggests 
those involved in the adoption and development of anti-doping policy were strongly 
influenced by these connections, whether consciously or not.  These administrators appear 
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   Whether that is deterring the use of performance enhancing substances in sport, protecting athletes’ health, 
making competition fairer or protecting the image of sport.  See for instance Terry Black, 'Does the Ban on Drugs 
in Sport Improve Societal Welfare?' (1996) 31 International Review for Sociology of Sport 367; Terry Black and 
Amelia Pape, 'The Ban on Drugs in Sports: The Solution or the Problem?' (1997) 21(1) Journal of Sport and 
Social Issues 83 and Burge, above n 104. 
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to have viewed the use of performance enhancing substances in sport as part of the same 
issue as illicit drug use.  This is a slightly novel claim, given that the usual accounts of the 
history of anti-doping policy tend to concentrate on the unique issues which drugs in sport 
raise, such as fairness of competition.   
Most significantly, the similarities between the two types of policies reveal the starting 
point for the symbolic analysis to be performed in Chapters Five to Seven.  These anti-
doping/ illicit drug links can therefore provide a pointer to the answer to the specific 
question that this thesis will answer:  what is the symbolism which drives the public 
abhorrence of the use of performance enhancing substances in sport?  In the initial chapters 
of the thesis, appearances seemed to be extremely important in anti-doping policy.  The 
links between the two policies show us what doping may ‘look’ and ‘feel’ like. 
Given the above analysis, it appears that symbolism in doping may have something to do 
with illicit drugs.  The conclusions resulting from the examination in the following 
chapters will show just that — the major symbolic influence in early anti-doping policy 
was that associated with illicit drug use.  Furthermore, the historic investigation of early 
anti-doping policy will show that this symbolism led to the adoption of a regulatory model 
based on illicit drug policy.  The adoption of such a system is not only evidence of the 
power of illicit drug symbolism in anti-doping policy but has also served to perpetuate 
those links with illicit drugs.  
D Summary:  Putting it Together 
In the introduction to this chapter some propositions were presented arising out of the 
discussion in Chapters One to Three.  At that point the connections between the statements 
were unclear.  Now they make more sense.  Below is a table of the statements made and an 
explanation of the connection to the argument of the thesis. 
Statement Connection 
Anti-doping policy is ambiguous, 
despite the apparent consensus it 
attracts. 
This is because it is largely driven by public 
opinion based on the emotions arising from 
symbolism associated with doping; a basis which 
creates ambiguity. 
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Statement Connection 
The definition of doping is not 
confined to the common 
understanding of ‘doping’ and public 
reaction is not restricted by the legal 
definition of ‘doping’. 
This demonstrates the ambiguity in doping 
definition.  The confusion is a result of the 
influence of public opinion (driven by emotions 
not legal definitions).  The influence of emotion 
in public opinion is as strong today as it was in 
the early days of anti-doping policy and even 
operates on the legal definition of doping. 
Anti-doping policy is not based on 
rational argument; a full explanation 
for the policy lies beyond the rational 
realm. 
It is impossible to explain anti-doping policy 
without reference to the emotions involved as a 
result of the symbolism of doping. 
Public reaction and consensus appear 
to be important in shaping anti-doping 
policy. 
The development of the policy can’t be 
understood without reference to public opinion. 
Strong emotions are involved in 
doping discourse. 
 
This is not surprising in light of the role of public 
opinion:  something driven by strong public 
opinion will naturally attract widespread support, 
whether it is a sensible policy or not. 
In both doping law and public 
discourse ‘gut reactions’ appear to be 
at work. 
They are. This is more influential than reason.  
The gut reaction is produced by symbolism in 
doping. 
Appearances are important; how 
doping ‘looks’ and ‘feels’ is 
significant.  
How doping ‘looks’ and ‘feels’ is explained by 
symbolism, particularly illicit drug symbolism. 
The argument of the thesis to this point can therefore be summarised quite simply: Anti-
doping policy is not what it seems  under the placid surface of consensus lie 
fundamental ambiguities.  Upon deeper analysis it is not clear exactly what doping is or 
why we prohibit it.  There appears little rational basis for such a policy.  Anti-doping 
policy can be explained by the influence of public opinion; sports administrators desire to 
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protect the image of sport which is damaged when the public believe that athletes are using 
performance enhancing substances.  The image of sport is damaged by doping because 
there is strong public sentiment against the use of doping agents by sportspeople.  The 
reasons behind this public sentiment can be explained by reference to the symbolism 
associated with doping; symbolism is therefore one of the main driving forces behind the 
development of anti-doping policy.  It is not so much about pharmacological properties of 
prohibited substances, nor the ethics of the targeted practice, but about what the practices 
and methods represent in the minds of the public.  At least in the initial stages of anti-
doping policy, this symbolism appears to be largely about illicit drugs.125   
It should be noted here that others have pointed out the importance of understanding anti-
doping policy within the wider context of society’s attitude to drugs.  For instance, the 
sociologist, Ivan Waddington, argues: 
It is clear that the strong emotions aroused by drug use in sport cannot be adequately 
understood without reference to processes within the wider society which have little to do 
directly with sport.  In this connection, it is suggested that public attitudes towards the use 
of drugs in sport have been ‘contaminated’, as it were, by the widespread public concern 
about the possession, sale and ‘abuse’ of controlled drugs in society more generally.  These 
activities, it should be noted, are not only illegal in their own right in most western 
societies but are also widely held to be associated with other forms of criminal activity and 
with a wide variety of other social problems, with physical and psychological addiction, 
with dangers to the ‘moral’ health particularly of young people, and with severe risks to 
health including the risk, in the case of injecting drug users, of hepatitis and, more recently 
and even more anxiety-arousing, AIDS.  It is suggested that the generally emotive response 
to the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport is to be explained, at least in part, by 
reference to the widespread public concern — ‘moral panic’ would not perhaps be too 
strong a term  — relating to other patterns of ‘drug abuse’ within society generally. 
It is therefore important to locate the concern about drugs in sport within the context of this 
wider concern about the use of controlled drugs in society more generally.  More 
specifically, it is important to recognise how public attitudes and anxieties towards the use 
of controlled drugs in society generally have ‘spilled over’ into the sports arena and have 
influenced anti-doping policies in sport.126 
The role of symbolism in anti-doping policy has not, however, been fully examined.  The 
task of this thesis is to provide a fuller account of this symbolism.  Indeed, this thesis will 
argue that not only is anti-doping policy to be understood with reference to these wider 
attitudes but that from the 1920s anti-doping policy has been more about symbolism than 
sport.  
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   It will be argued later in the thesis that the symbolism of doping changed in the 1970s and that although illicit 
drug symbolism was still operational in the doping debate, other symbolism became equally important.  
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   Ivan Waddington, Sport, Health and Drugs: a Critical Sociological Perspective, 2000 (London: E & F Spon), 
111-112.  See also Dimeo, above n 113, generally, for another example.  It will be argued in Chapter Six that in 
the 1950s and 1960s there was a much stronger tendency to see doping in sport as part of the wider issue of drugs 
in society and that this tendency had a large influence on the banning of such practices.    
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Consequently, the next three chapters of the thesis will provide a symbolic style analysis of 
the anti-doping laws.  This will be divided into three significant time periods in the history 
of anti-doping policy:  the first being the 1920s and 1930s, the second the 1960s and 
finally the 1970s.  The remaining chapters of the thesis will consider how the symbolism 
identified helps to explain the dilemmas identified in the first few chapters, as well as how 
it may impact on the future of anti-doping policy. 
Doping symbolism will be examined by way of analysis of the sentiments and language of 
anti-doping discourse, as found in the official documents of sports administration bodies 
such as the IOC and in public sources such as newspaper articles.  It is noted here that the 
examination will be limited to documents printed in English.  This, of course, is a potential 
shortcoming of the analysis since anti-doping policy has been developed through 
influences from a number of different regions in the world.  Other authors have undertaken 
studies in the history of doping and anti-doping policy using sources in languages other 
than English, such as Dimeo127 and Hoberman.128  From their work it appears that the 
emotions and sentiments expressed in the English sources accurately represent the tone of 
the debate.  Given the strong influence that the UK and the US129 had in this area, English 
sources are particularly useful in discovering the symbolism associated with doping.  
Furthermore, as the next chapter will argue, many of the terms used in the official sources 
borrowed American and English phrases — ‘dope’, ‘stimulants’ and ‘pep pills’ — use of 
American slang phrases once again demonstrating the influence of American public 
sentiment in the debate.  Thus, although the analysis will, in some ways, be limited by 
language, the documents chosen for analysis still provide an accurate portrayal of anti-
doping discourse.  
A few other comments regarding the methodology of the study need to be made before 
beginning the analysis.  The first relates to the term ‘performance enhancing substances 
and methods’.  The focus of the analysis of this thesis is on substances rather than methods.  
This is not an oversight.  Performance enhancing methods in sport were not really an issue 
until the mid 1980s when blood doping became more widely known.130  This is well after 
the time periods which are the focus of this thesis.  Furthermore, the addition of ‘methods’ 
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   Dimeo, above n 113. 
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  Hoberman, above n 4 and John Hoberman, Testosterone Dreams: Rejuvenation, Aphrodisia, Doping, 2005 (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press). 
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   This will be discussed in the next three chapters. 
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   The first method to be part of modern anti-doping discourse was blood doping, which became widely known after 
the US cycling team admitted using it in the 1984 Olympics, see Todd and Todd, above n 111, 83. 
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to the list of prohibited substances came about after anti-doping policy took on a life of its 
own and was not a part of original anti-doping policies.  Nevertheless, as will be argued in 
Chapter Eight that the methods that are prohibited in sport also hold strong reminders of 
illicit drug use and, as such, can be seen to be originating from a similar source:  illicit drug 
symbolism.  The term ‘performance enhancing substances’ will be used in this thesis 
although much of the analysis would apply equally to the prohibited methods. 
Secondly, the thesis focuses on amateur sport — particularly Olympic sport — and does 
not consider anti-doping policy in professional sport specifically.  There are a number of 
reasons for this.  Most importantly, anti-doping policy began with amateur and Olympic 
sport131 and the IOC has continually been looked to for leadership in anti-doping policy.132 
Indeed, as will be discussed in the next chapter, when anti-doping policy first began, rules 
prohibiting doping were discussed within the context of the professionalisation of sport.  
The idea of amateurism and the rich symbolism inherent in the Olympic Games, provides 
fertile ground for the subsequent analysis.  Still the issues arising from the use of, and 
prohibition on, performance enhancing substances in professional sport are different to 
those in amateur sport.  Furthermore, most other authors who discuss anti-doping policy 
concentrate on Olympic and other amateur sports.  In order to engage with these 
commentators and consider the role of symbolism in anti-doping discourse, a similar focus 
is warranted. 
Finally, the analysis will be limited to documents and has not included personal accounts 
of the developments in anti-doping history.  This has been done purposefully; the focus of 
the study is on public opinion at the time of the developments and not on individual’s 
views of the issue.  Moreover, personal accounts could be tainted by more than thirty years 
of indoctrination regarding the evils of doping and thus would not accurately reflect the 
views of doping in the 1920s, 1960s and 1970s.  Thus, the most useful historical sources 
for this account are the newspaper articles and official documents which will be analysed 
in the following chapters. 
The analysis will begin in the next chapter with an examination of the symbolism of 
doping in the era the first anti-doping rules were passed:  the 1920s and 1930s. 
                                                
131
   Professional sports such as baseball in the US have been slow to take the same approach to doping as Olympic 
sports.  See for example Dick Pound’s view of the matter: Dick Pound, Inside Dope: How Drugs Are the Biggest 
Threat to Sports, Why You Should Care, and What Can Be Done About Them, 2006 (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons 
Canada), 128ff. 
132
   Houilhan, above n 20, 131ff.  This does not mean that the IOC has always provided that leadership.  
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?  Chapter Five 
139 
CHAPTER FIVE  
THE GENESIS OF ANTI-DOPING POLICY 
If any person shall administer a drug or stimulant internally or by hypodermic methods 
prior to a race, or shall use in any race any application, electrical or mechanical, other than 
whip or spur, this offender shall be ruled off the turf.1 
[International Amateur Athletic Federation Agenda item 1928]…a proposal to suspend from 
amateur athletics any person involved in giving competitors “drugs or stimulants internally 
by hypodermic or other methods.”2                                    
I INTRODUCTION 
Many historic accounts date the beginning of anti-doping policy from the 1960s but the 
first anti-doping rules were actually enacted in the late 1920s and 1930s.  These first rules 
were far from the comprehensive anti-doping programmes characteristic of the 21st century 
and are best described as prototypes.  Since they were the product of original ideas about 
doping, these early attempts at regulating the use of performance enhancing substances 
provide useful insights into the reasons behind the rules.  By the 1960s, when anti-doping 
policy blossomed, the early rules had already created a status quo in favour of total 
prohibition.  Therefore, the discourse surrounding the first prohibition — where 
assumptions generated by the status quo were not at work — provides rare insight into the 
influences at work in the development of anti-doping policy. 
This chapter will demonstrate the powerful influence of symbolism on early anti-doping 
policy.  The chapter will be divided into a number of sections.  In the first section, the text 
of the first anti-doping rules will be set out.  In the second, some historic background to 
these developments will be provided.  Then an analysis of the symbolism associated with 
doping will be undertaken, followed by a discussion of the significance of the type of 
regulation adopted.  The chapter will close with a consideration of the role of this 
symbolism in the amateur/professional issue.  A similar pattern will be followed in the 
other chapters in this Part in relation to their respective time periods:  Chapter Six will 
consider the symbolism of doping in the 1950s and 1960s, while Chapter Seven will 
consider the same in the 1970s.   
                                                
1
   Rules from the Florida Horse Racing Commission, 'Race Officials Join in the U.S. War on Doping: Promise to 
Stamp Out Peril to Turf Sport', Chicago Daily Tribune (Chicago), 13 December 1934, 26. 
2
   Proposal to be considered by the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) in 1928, Wythe Williams, 
'Parade of Athletes Will Mark Opening of Olympics Today: Olympic Athletes Parade Today', The New York 
Times (New York), 28 July 1928, 9. 
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II THE GENESIS OF THE PROHIBITION ON DOPING 
A 1912 Olympic Marathon 
Although the first international sports federation to pass a rule banning the use of drugs 
was the IAAF (International Amateur Athletic Federation, as it then was) in 1928,3 there 
appears to have been at least one anti-doping rule before the 1928 prohibition.  In the 
Official Report of the 1912 Stockholm Olympic Games there is a section entitled ‘General 
Regulations for the Officials for the Marathon Race.’  Part of the text of that section states:  
‘Competitors must not, under penalty of disqualification, take drugs of any kind, either at 
the start, or during the progress of the race.’4   
The intention behind this rule and the zeal with which it was enforced is unclear.5  It seems 
unlikely that there had been similar rules against drugs in previous Olympics since there 
are at least two doping incidents in Olympic competition which did not lead to 
disqualification.6  Nevertheless, it appears that by 1912 there was a sufficient level of anti-
drug feeling to establish such a rule.7  However, since the significance and origin of this 
1912 rule is unknown, the discussion in this chapter will focus on the two subsequent anti-
doping rules. 
B 1928  International Amateur Athletics Federation 
The first recorded rule limiting the use of drugs at all events within a jurisdiction was 
passed by the IAAF.  At the time of the 1928 Amsterdam Olympics, the IAAF congress 
passed a resolution condemning the use of stimulants in sport: 
 
 
                                                
3
   World Anti-Doping Agency, A Brief History of Anti-Doping <http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=312> at 13 September 2008; International Athletics Associations 
Federation, Drugs in Sport <http://www.iaaf.org/mm/Document/imported/42026.pdf> at 4 April 2008.   
4
   Lord Desborough, The Olympic Games of Stockholm 1912 (1912) 
 <http://www.la84foundation.org/6oic/OfficialReports/1912/1912.pdf> at 13 September 2008, 112.  Athletes were 
also to be subjected to medical examination regarding their fitness to compete. 
5
   There is no explanation provided within the rule and it has not been considered in any historic examinations of 
anti-doping rules. 
6
   Paul Dimeo, A History of Drug Use in Sport 1876-1976: Beyond Good and Evil, 2007 (London: Routledge), 26-
28, examines incidents from the 1904 and 1908 Olympic marathon in which two competitors used drugs to aid 
their performance.  Thomas Hicks was not disqualified at all despite the fact that it was commonly known that he 
had received strychnine and brandy.  Dorando Pietri was disqualified, not for doping, but for being physically 
supported over the finish line.  Dimeo reports that this was a very unpopular decision by the officials of the 
Games. 
7
   Since the Swedish Olympic Committee was in charge of all the sports at these Games, it is, of course, possible 
that this rule was entirely a product of the Swedish influence which has always been strongly anti-drug:   
'Sullivan Explains Olympic Games Rules', The New York Times (New York), 14 April 1912, C9. 
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Doping 
(Comp. Section 22) 
The Council having studied the question of doping in its sessions during the Olympic 
Games proposed to the Congress that a rule should be made prohibiting the use of drugs or 
stimulants in athletic competitions.  The congress voted unanimously that such a rule 
should be introduced.  Whereupon a lively discussion ensued as to the text to be adopted in 
this respect.  The various propositions and amendments were handed over to the Council 
which was asked by the Congress to present a definite text to be adopted by the Congress 
at the next day’s meeting.8 
The definitive text which was accepted by the Council reads as follows: 
Doping is the use of any stimulant not normally employed to increase the power of action 
in athletic competition above the average. 
Any person knowingly acting or assisting as explained above shall be excluded from any 
place where these rules are in force or, if he is a competitor, be suspended for a time or 
otherwise, from further participation in amateur athletics under the jurisdiction of this 
Federation….9 
C 1938  International Olympic Committee 
Ten years later, in 1938, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) also officially 
condemned doping.  The minutes of the XXXVth Session in Cairo on Thursday, 17 March 
recorded: 
 Doping of Athletes. 
Reply: 
The use of drugs or artificial stimulants of any kind must be condemned most strongly, and 
everyone who accepts or offers dope, no matter in what form, should not be allowed to 
participate in amateur meetings or in the Olympic Games.10 
D Other Anti-doping Rules 
Although it is somewhat difficult to pinpoint when other international sporting federations 
first passed anti-doping resolutions, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) states that 
after 1928 other federations soon followed the IAAF’s example.11 
 
 
                                                
8
 International Amateur Athletics Federation, Handbook (1927-1928) <http://www.iaaf.org/newsfiles/34661.pdf> 
at 25 May 2006, 55. 
9
 Ibid, 39 and 41. 
10
  International Olympic Committee, 'Sessions of Thursday, March 17th, 1938, Morning and Afternoon' (1938) 37 
Bulletin Officiel du Comite International Olympique 29, 30.  The background to this condemnation, discussed 
below, was an enquiry into a number of aspects of the professionalisation of sport:  Maxwell J Mehlman, 
Elizabeth Banger and Matthew M Wright, 'Doping in Sports and the Use of State Power' (2005) 50 Saint Louis 
University Law Journal 15, 22 explain that the issue of drugs had arisen for the IOC as early as 1933. 
11
  World Anti-Doping Agency, above n 3.  
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III BACKGROUND:  DOPING AND DRUGS BEFORE THE 
PROHIBITION 
The point has been made many times that doping has a long history dating back to the 
Roman gladiators.  Apparently very little moral censure attached to these practices in early 
times; it is really only in the last century that the use of such substances has been frowned 
upon.12  However, it is difficult to isolate exactly when attitudes towards such behaviour 
began to change.  In this respect the work of Paul Dimeo is instructive; the following 
summary is largely taken from his work.  The background information will provide a 
framework for understanding the symbolism of doping in the 1920s and its significance in 
the development of anti-doping policy. 
A Doping in Sport 
1 Pre World War I 
Dimeo summarises the use of performance enhancing substances in this period by saying:  
there is not a great deal of evidence on drug use in this period.  However, it is clear that the 
myth of the ‘golden age’ of equal competition based on talent alone does not fit with 
reality.  The examples of alcohol use, coca and kola tonic drinks, oxygen, cocaine and 
strychnine use all show that some athletes were willing to try stimulant drugs to gain that 
extra edge over their competitors…  There is no evidence of widespread drug use…13 
Dimeo’s point — that the use of drugs was not widespread — is an important one.  The 
relative unimportance of drug use in terms of the number of athletes involved actually 
highlights the importance of the issue for rule-makers.  For instance, the 1912 Olympic 
marathon rule gains significant import in light of the fact that these practices were not 
widespread:  if it was relatively uncommon for such a thing to happen, there must have 
been a strong feeling generated by the practice in order to generate such a rule.   
Nevertheless, it is clear that performance enhancing substances were being used by some 
athletes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  Some of the examples of the 
types of substances in use at that time include: 
                                                
12
   See for example Prince Alexandre de Merode and Don H Caitlin, Doping: An IOC White Paper, 1999 (Lausanne: 
International Olympic Committee), 8; Barrie Houlihan, Dying to Win: Doping in Sport and the Development of 
Anti-Doping Policy, 1999 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe), 33 and Charles E Yesalis and Michael S Bahrke, 
'History of Doping in Sport' in Charles E Yesalis and Michael S Bahrke (eds), Performance-Enhancing 
Substances in Sport and Exercise, 2002 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) 1, 1. 
13
   Dimeo, above n 6, 32.  
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• The tonic drink, Vino-Kolafra — a drink containing the stimulant, kola — was 
freely advertised and promoted as a performance enhancer for athletes in 
athletic magazines in the late 1800s.  The drink was reportedly used by college 
athletes in the US and UK.14 
• In the mid 1890s the English cycling trainer, ‘Choppy’ Warburton, allegedly 
gave his charge, Arthur Linton, strychnine, trimethyl and heroin.15  
• The 1904 official St Loius Olympic Games Report relates an incident during 
the marathon where the winner, Thomas Hicks, was administered substances to 
help him to continue:  ‘As Hicks approached the twenty-mile post, his color 
[sic] began to become ashen pale, and then another tablet of one-sixtieth grain 
strychnine was administered him, and two more eggs, besides a nip of 
brandy.’16 
• In 1908 the leader of the Olympic marathon, Dorando Pietri, was given 
‘stimulants’ to help him finish the race.17   
• A British long distance swimmer, Jabez Wolffe, was given doses of oxygen 
during his attempts to cross the English Channel.18 
It was not only human athletes who were taking advantage of these types of substances.  In 
fact, the term ‘doping’ appears to have been more commonly associated with horse racing, 
where the use of performance enhancing substances appears to have been much more 
common.  So problematic was the use of substances such as heroin, cocaine, caffeine and 
strychnine in horse racing in the 1930s that routine saliva testing, pioneered in 1911 by an 
Austrian chemist, was introduced by racing officials in many jurisdictions.19 
                                                
14
   Dimeo, above n 6, 24. 
15
   Ibid, 26.  Dimeo points out that there had been rumours surrounding the mysterious mixture that Warburton had 
been giving his cyclists but that it was quite possible that he was employing the placebo effect and that the 
mixture did not contain any known performance enhancers. 
16
   Charles JP Lucas, The Olympic Games 1904 St Loius MO USA (1904)  
 <http://www.la84foundation.org/6oic/OfficialReports/1904/1904lucas.pdf> at 13 September 2008. 
17
  Commentators have claimed that the substance involved was strychnine, however, Dimeo, above n 6, 28, disputes 
the accuracy of those claims.  
18
   For which he received strong criticism:  Dimeo, above n 6, 29.  Oxygen therapy does not usually fit the modern 
criteria of doping since it does not involve ‘drugs’ but, as argued previously, the definition of doping was once 
wider than it is now.    
19
  See for example L.F. Addis-Smith, 'The Changing Pattern of "Doping" in Horse Racing and its Control' (1961) 9 
New Zealand Veterinary Journal 121, 121, 'Swope Give Stand on Drugging Evil', The New York Times (New 
York), 10 October 1935, 35; Bryan Field, 'Hialeah to Adopt 'Dope Box' System', The New York Times (New 
York), 14 October 1933, 19 and 'Florida Adopts Salivary Test for Horse Doping', Chicago Daily Tribune 
(Chicago), 12 October 1933, 26. 
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Another important element in anti-doping history before World War I (WWI) was the 
beginning of research into the ergogenic effects of various substances.  Both Dimeo20 and 
Hoberman21 examine the substances used in detail and it is unnecessary to do so here.  
Some of the substances which were studied in this regard included coffee/caffeine,22 
strychnine,23 narcotics,24 oxygen,25 hormones,26 Pitbury leaves,27 coca,28 alcohol, tea, 
cocaine (from coca leaves), chocolate (theobromine — from cocoa beans), nicotine, 
morphine, opium, digitalis,29 testosterone (testicular extracts),30 kola nuts,31 marijuana,32 
milk, mint water, lemonade33 and bicarbonate soda.34   
2 1918 to 1920s and 1930s  
The most important difference between the pre and post war periods was the development 
in sports science that took place from the 1920s.35  At this time sport became much more 
scientific:  old perceptions about the fixed capacity of the body gave way to an 
understanding of the potential for enhancing performance, resulting in the establishment of 
exercise physiology as an independent discipline.36  
This new body of science had applications in training and coaching techniques.  More 
relevantly, it also led to an increase in research into the ergogenic effects of doping agents.  
Further impetus for such research came from the potential military applications of these 
substances.  By 1941, a review article listed the substances which had been studied at that 
stage as ‘alcohol, alkalies, ammonia chloride, Benzedrine, caffeine, cocaine, coramine, 
                                                
20
   Dimeo, above n 6. 
21
   John Hoberman, Mortal Engines: the Science of Performance and the Dehumanisation of Sport, 1992 (Ontario: 
The Free Press), 100ff. 
22
   Ibid, 111, 112. 
23
   Ibid, 110. 
24
   Ibid, 116. 
25
   Ibid. 
26
   Ibid, 117. 
27
   Ibid, 118. 
28
   Ibid and Dimeo, above n 6, 20. 
29
   Ibid, 120. 
30
   Ibid, 123. 
31
   Ibid, 125. 
32
   Ibid, 127. 
33
   Dimeo, above n 6. 
34
   Ibid, 19.  There is some debate between Dimeo and Hoberman regarding the extent to which the research into the 
effects of these drugs was driven by a desire to enhance athletic performance.  It seems likely that the focus of 
research was more towards industrial and health applications (the combating of fatigue for instance) than 
enhancement of athletic performance.  However, it is clear that athletic performance was a measure that was used 
in experimentation and that there was some cross-over between research and practices on the sporting field. 
35
  In addition to Hoberman and Dimeo, see Roberta J Park, '‘Cells or Soaring?’: Historical Reflectons on ‘Visions’ 
of Body, Athletics, and Modern Olympism' (2007) 24(12) The International Journal of the History of Sport 1701 
and Rob Beamish and Ian Ritchie, 'From Fixed Capacities to Performance-Enhancement: The Paradigm Shift in 
the Science of 'Training' and the Use of Performance-Enhancing Substances' (2005) 25(3) Sport in History 412. 
36
   Dimeo, above n 6, 34. 
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digitalis, gelatine, glycine, fruit juices, hormones, lecithin, metrazol, oxygen, phosphates, 
sodium chloride, sugars, ultraviolet rays and hormones.’37  Although this sort of research 
went on world wide (particularly in the US and Germany) conclusions were by no means 
unanimous.   
These developments correlated with the increasing importance being placed on sport in 
society at the time.  Boxing and other sports increasingly involved prize-money and 
gambling.38  Horse gambling was becoming more organised and gaining in social 
acceptability at this time, particularly in the USA, after the financial strain of the great 
depression.39  The beginning of the modern Olympic Games in 1898 provided a focus for 
athletics and other sports which added to the competitive nature of these activities.  
A lack of consensus on the part of the scientists regarding the ergogenic properties of 
performance enhancing substances did not hold athletes back from experimenting with 
these substances.  As Dimeo states, ‘the American situation was characterised by 
experimentation by athletes with stimulants and a background of scientific research.’40  He 
aptly sums up this period:  ‘Sport was becoming modernised, the application of science 
was central to that process, and Germany was one of the leading lights.’41  
B Attitudes to Doping 
Dimeo traces a number of public criticisms during the period before the first official anti-
doping rules:42   
• The New York Times published a stern warning in 1895 in response to rumours of 
the use of kola nuts and coca by cyclists.   
• The National Cyclist’s Union in England banned the trainer, Choppy Warburton, 
for his alleged doping of cyclists in the late 1890s.   
Significantly, Dimeo also demonstrates a lack of public criticism where it might be 
expected.  For instance, the doping events of the 1904 and 1908 Olympic marathons 
                                                
37
   P. Karpovich, ‘Ergogenic Aids in Work an Sport’ (1941) 12(2) Research Quarterly for the American Physical 
Education Association, 432–450, 432 cited in Dimeo, above n 6, 37.  See Dimeo, above n 6, 37 for the outcomes 
of the review. 
38
   Tom Donohoe and Neil Johnson, Foul Play: Drug Abuse in Sports, 1986 (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc), 4 and 
5. 
39
   Californian State Library, History of Gambling in the United States 
<http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/97/03/Chapt2.html> at 13 September 2008. 
40
   Ibid, 39.  Hoberman states that during the interwar period in Germany, the use of drugs became widespread: 
Hoberman, above n 21, 134. 
41
  Dimeo, above n 6, 42. 
42
   See also Hoberman, above n 21, 131ff for a detailed examination of attitudes to doping in Germany between 1920 
and 1940. 
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mentioned above — which subsequently have received much negative attention — were 
not accompanied by widespread condemnation.43   
Dimeo does, however, relate one incident which suggests that even at that time there was a 
perception that admissions of doping would not be looked on favourably by the general 
public.  The English football team, Arsenal, used ‘pep pills’ to aid their performance in 
1925.  Dimeo reports that the team manager feared the public response should news of the 
use of the pills be leaked to the media.  As Dimeo says, ‘Knighton’s unwillingness to 
publicise his ventures at the time does suggest a much more complex situation in which 
risks were taken by people in authority knowing full well that bad publicity and criticism 
would follow if the story were to leak out.’44   
Thus, although it seems that for most, doping was not a particularly contentious or 
important issue, there were some critics, mostly from the public or medical profession.  
Scientists and athletes involved were not overly troubled by concerns of ‘cheating’ in their 
doping research or practice.45 
C Attitudes to ‘Drugs’ 
This chapter argues that attitudes to doping were actually part of the wider attitude to the 
non-medical use of ‘recreational’ drugs.  A summary of the developments in illicit drug 
policy at this time will be provide background for this discussion. 
It was in the late nineteenth century that illicit drug laws began with the introduction of 
prohibitions on the smoking of opium, particularly by the Chinese community.  At a 
similar time the ‘Temperance Movement’ was gaining support, (discussed below), the 
campaigners addressing alcohol and other ‘habit-forming drugs’46 such as opium and 
cocaine.  By 1928 there were a number of international conventions regarding the 
prohibition of drugs in place and commitment to these principles was increasing 
internationally, mostly through the influence of the US.47 
Dimeo also examines the influence of the ‘anti-fatigue’ movement — ‘a new discipline of 
the body that focused on the problem of fatigue and had grand designs of social reform and 
                                                
43
   Dimeo, above n 6, 26 - 28. 
44
   Dimeo, above n 6, 44. 
45
   Dimeo, above n 6, 26 and Hoberman, above n 21, 132. 
46
   Dimeo, above n 6, 31. 
47
  For a good summary of these events see Keith Evans, 'Update on the US Drug War' [1996](February 16) New 
Law Journal 206. 
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modernising zeal.’48  These ideas led to the modernisation of sport — sport being seen as a 
redeeming practice from indolence and fatigue.  These beliefs explain why scientists 
studied the energising effects of various substances and why athletes were keen to harness 
these powers.49  Clearly, from this point of view ‘drugs’ were positive agents, the powers 
of which could help to improve society. 
D Conclusions:  Two Points of View 
Two separate attitudes are identifiable at this point.  On the one hand there was the 
influence of modernism and progressivism which saw competitive sport as something to be 
encouraged and developed through the use of scientific knowledge.  For this group, doping 
in sport was an issue of experimentation and research; the potential of such substances was 
exciting rather than dangerous.   
On the other hand, for another group in society, performance enhancing substances were 
viewed with suspicion, especially with regard to their associated health risks, particularly 
their addictive properties.  To that group doping was a dangerous and unacceptable form of 
cheating.  The use of performance enhancing substances in sport created fears of where 
such practices may lead in the future.50 
In the early twentieth century, these two points of view appeared to be in balance.  
Obviously by the late 1920s anti-doping sentiment had gained momentum enough to 
establish the first rudimentary anti-doping rules.  Why was it that anti-doping sentiment 
became the dominant one in this way?   
IV DOPING SYMBOLISM 
The subsequent analysis of symbolism demonstrates that in early anti-doping discourse the 
use of performance enhancing substances symbolised another form of non-medical use of 
‘drugs’, namely recreational drug use.  The choice of language, the regulatory approach 
and the drugs involved are all evidence of the fact that sports administrators must have 
been influenced by this symbolism.     
                                                
48
   Dimeo, above n 6, 29. 
49
   As Dimeo, above n 6, 31, states: ‘The ideology of modernity and progress that was linked to industrial 
productivity and the rationalising impulses of European and American cultures provided a backdrop to the 
development of drug use in sport.’ 
50
   It should be noted that it is not being suggested here that doping in sport was a prominent issue in society or that 
it was a mainstream concern.   
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A Language of Anti-Doping Rules and Discourse 
Important historic evidence supporting the claim that performance enhancing substances 
symbolised illicit drug use is found in the language used in the first anti-doping rules. 
The early anti-doping rules have been set out above.  Within the text of these rules, there 
are three terms which stand out:  ‘doping’, ‘drugs’ and ‘artificial stimulants’.  The historic 
significance of these terms will be considered below. 
1 ‘Doping’ 
(a) Meaning Within Sport  
From at least 1923, the use of performance enhancing substances in human sport51 was 
referred to as ‘doping’: 
• In 1923 Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the modern Olympic movement, made 
a speech in Rome where he criticised a number of aspects of sport:  ‘the 
intrusion of politics into sports, the increasingly venal attitude towards 
championship, the excessive worshipping of sport, which leads to belief in the 
wrong values, chauvinism, brutality, overworking, overtraining, and doping.’52   
• The minutes of the 1928 IAAF meeting referred to ‘the use of drugs or 
stimulants in athletic competition’ as ‘doping’.53 
• When, in 1933, The New York Times reported ‘[a]ssertions that Japanese 
swimmers in the 1932 Olympic Games were administered “oxygen or some 
stimulant” were under investigation’.  The headlines read ‘Charges Japanese 
“Doped” Swimmers.’54 
• When the IOC first condemned the use of performance enhancing substances, it 
referred to the practice as ‘doping’: 
Doping of athletes. 
                                                
51
   It was used in horse racing before this:  '"Dope" An American Term', The New York Times (New York), 7 April 
1901, 19. 
52
  French National Centre for Scientific Research, Pierre de Coubertin, 1923 Speech in Rome, Expert Committee of 
the French National Centre for Scientific Research, Doping and Sports: Collective Expert Assessment (1998) 
<http://www.cnrs.fr/cw/en/pres/compress/dopage/dopage2.html> at 13 September 2008. 
53
 IAAF, above n 8, 39 and 41. 
54
  The Associated Press, 'Charges Japanese 'Doped' Swimmers', The New York Times (New York), 14 January 1933, 
16. 
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The use of drugs or artificial stimulants of any kind must be condemned most 
strongly…55 
A number of authors have explained the etymology of the word ‘dope’.  Ordway states: 
It is thought to come from the word ‘dop’, which originated from a South African drink made 
of an extract of walnuts, with xanthines (found in caffeine) and alcohol added.  The drink was 
intended to improve endurance in ceremonial dances.  There is no suggestion that the drink or 
the word ‘dop’ had any moral restrictions to its original use.56 
Voy and Deeter claim that the word first appeared in the English dictionary in 1889 when 
it meant a narcotic mix of opium used for racehorses.57  It is clear from a brief survey of 
newspaper articles from the turn of the century that the term was used commonly to refer 
to horse racing.  In 1901 The New York Times published an article entitled ‘“Dope” an 
American Term’: 
“dope” meant a mysterious something that made slow horses fast and cowardly horses brave 
and in general was something that put in the power of the Yankees contingent to so control 
results that they could make any horse win they were disposed to favour.  That they were 
believed is not surprising, for in this country the same means of swindling the unsuspecting 
public has been in general use ever since the use of stimulants other than old-fashioned alcohol 
was invented.58 
By 1902 the term was becoming more widely known, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported 
a case involving the use of ‘stimulants’ as a ‘doping’ case:  ‘Ruling of Harlem Judges in 
Gazzolo “Doping” Case Causes Wide Discretion’.59  By 1934 it was reported that race 
officials were joining ‘in U.S. War on Doping.’60    
Yesalis and Bahrke note that the term had come into use for human athletes in the early 
twentieth century to ‘describe certain methods designed to augment the functional 
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efficiency of athletes by means of highly active drugs.’  By the mid twentieth century it 
was used to refer generally to ‘any method of improving athletic performance temporarily, 
either during training or in conjunction with competitive meets.’61  
(b) Meaning Outside Sport 
Use of the word ‘doping’ was not confined to the sporting context and its meaning outside 
the athletic field is highly significant.  In the late 19th century, the word became associated 
with recreational drugs.  It is also thought to come from the Dutch word ‘doop’ which 
means ‘thick dipping sauce’, due to the practice of smoking semi-liquid opium 
preparation.62  Although it was specifically applied to opium,63 it was also used to refer to 
all sorts of recreational drugs.64 
Despite Ordway’s contention that the word did not have moral restrictions on its original 
use,65 this was certainly not the case when the term was used outside the sporting context.  
Headlines from US newspapers just after WWI refer to the ‘dope menace’, the ‘dope evil’ 
and the ‘dope conventions’.66  In a 1940 article entitled ‘Dope Fiend’ Mythology, A.R. 
Lindesmith described many common stereotypes about ‘drug addicts’,67 referring to ‘dope-
crazed killer’, ‘dope fiend rapist’,68 ‘dope peddler’ (drug dealer)69 and the ‘boot and shoe 
dope fiend (impoverished drug user).’70  Abramovsky and Edelstien say ‘[t]he last quarter 
of the 19th century marked the high tide of popular drug use in America, the epoch 
remembered as the “dope fiend’s paradise”.’71  It appears that ‘dope fiend’ was a 
derogatory term used for drug addicts of all sorts; particularly associated with criminal 
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behaviour attributed to them.  Thus, from the early 1900s the term ‘dope’ had become a 
general (derogatory) term for recreational drugs.72  Its use in the sporting context is 
therefore highly suggestive of the assumption that use of performance enhancing 
substances was akin to recreational drug use.  
B ‘Stimulants’ 
The term ‘stimulant’ is not commonly used in everyday language now, but from the early 
1900s through to the 1960s, the word appeared frequently in newspapers and other 
documents.  The term was one which was significant in the 1928 IAAF rule and in the IOC 
1938 condemnation of doping.  Since there is little explanation of the rules in the relevant 
text, reference needs to be made to extrinsic material in order to define the term.   
Unfortunately, as Hoberman points out, there was no clear definition of the term, even 
while it was in use:  ‘But what do these terms actually mean?  Cabanis and his readers 
seem to share a colloquial definition of ‘stimulant’ so self-evident that only a handful of 
substances is ever mentioned.’73  Hoberman later discusses the distinction which was made 
in the 1920s and 1930s between ‘nutrients’ and ‘stimulants’: 
In the meantime those who talked in terms of nutrients and stimulants overlooked the fact that 
the term ‘stimulus’ remained unclarified and almost meaningless.  Doping was, in fact, 
virtually synonymous with stimulation.  But it was easier to assume than to demonstrate the 
efficacy, let alone the mechanism of any given ‘stimulant’.  The very concept of the stimulus 
had been one of the classic problems of physiology since the seventeenth century and was still 
being debated in the 1920s and 1930s.  Inadequate understanding of the entire subject had not, 
however, prevented the spread of fashionable terms like ‘stimulant cells’ and ‘cell stimulation’.  
In short, the nutrient/stimulant distinction was hopelessly blurred by the impossibility of 
defining these terms in a consistent and contrastive way.74 
Hoberman’s examination of the work of early sports scientists supports his argument 
regarding the confusion relating to the phrase ‘stimulant’.  Substances considered as 
‘stimulants’ in this context included alcohol, coffee, tea, cacoa beans, cocoa nuts, 
morphine, cocaine, strychnine, opium, digitalis, tea, quinine and others.75 
It is impossible to know exactly which substances the rule-makers had in mind when they 
drafted the first doping rules.  The substances which were commonly used at the time 
included strychnine, alcohol, caffeine, cocaine, heroin and nitroglycerine, thus it is highly 
likely that these are the substances that the first rules were directed towards.  As will be 
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discussed below, many of these substances had been subjected to moral censure outside of 
sport, and this would have had a significant effect on views of the use of that particular 
substance within sport.  Further, the very term ‘stimulant’ had a symbolism of its own, 
linked with illicit drugs.76 
Use of the term ‘stimulant’ to refer to drugs of abuse was common in the period, some 
examples of this nomenclature include:   
• In 1893 a newspaper article entitled ‘Use and Abuse of Stimulants’ said: 
Ask any conscientious competent doctor which two of the remedies in the 
pharmacopoeia he regards as most useful to mankind and he will in all probability say 
opium and alcohol – opium first and alcohol a close second. 
But should you press him further with the question, which two drugs are most 
dangerous to mankind, he will surely reply opium and alcohol, or alcohol and opium to 
save himself from being paradoxical. 
At any rate, it is an unquestionable fact that these two drugs have done incalculable 
good and immeasurable mischief.77  
• An advertisement from The Times in 1914, ‘The Abuse of Alcoholic 
Stimulants’, read: 
Under continuous mental or physical strain the habit of resorting to stimulants in the 
form of different alcoholic beverages with food, between meals, and at less and less 
intervals during each day after day, is readily formed until the habit becomes a 
necessity, then a craving, and ultimately a masterful power over the whole mental and 
physical energies.   
This is the general trend of present day life – and undoubtedly the habit of resorting to 
alcoholic beverages or narcotic drugs as a temporary stimulant has grown and become 
a natural ordinary daily routine; spurring on the jaded faculties, acting for a time as a 
forcer of expending energy, but with what ultimate result?... 
When the desire or apparent need for stimulants or narcotics is found to be gradually 
creeping on and repeating, then is the time to recognize the need and value of the 
Turvey Treatment. 78 
• In 1902 an article in The New York Times entitled ‘Prohibition and 
Stimulation,’ the author wrote:  
Not alone in the increasingly keen competition of breadwinning and the progressive 
narrowing of the lives of the wage-earning class in the large cities is found the reason 
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for the craving for artificial stimulation which is magnified into an evil of greater 
magnitude by the advocates of prohibitive legislation than all other evils combined.79   
 The article later reported on a study by Dr A P Grimnel who ‘made a critical 
study consumption of stimulants...chiefly the narcotic drugs…’.  Morphine, 
opium, paregoric, laudanum, cocaine, chloral and Indian Hemp were referred to 
in the article.  
• In 1926 an article in The New York Times, ‘Says Opium Critics Exaggerate 
Evils’, reported on a statement made by the Royal Opium Commission of 1893-
1895 regarding the use of opium in India:   
opium almost everywhere in India is the common domestic medicine of the people, 
that it is extensively used for non-medical and quasi-medical purposes and that the 
non-medical uses are so interwoven with the medical uses that it would not be practical 
to draw a distinction between them in the distribution and sale of the drug; that as 
regards the use of opium, as a stimulant, the practice of taking the drug in pills or 
infusions is of old standing and is generally followed in the moderation and without 
injurious consequences…80 
• An advertisement in the Chicago Tribune in 1927 for Postum, a drink for 
‘nervous’ people read:   ‘Then so many add to the confusion by taking regular 
doses of caffeine – a drug stimulant – at mealtime.’81 
• A 1927 article in the Chicago Tribune regarding the effects of the alcohol 
prohibition stated that ‘[n]umerous authorities contended that prohibition of 
intoxicants would drive an ever increasing number of persons to seek 
satisfaction of their craving for stimulants by indulgence in narcotic drugs.’82 
• In 1933 the Chicago Daily Tribune referred to ‘doped horses’ as having been 
administered a ‘narcotic stimulant’.83 
• In 1928 Columbia University Professor Mason ‘called attention 
to….unleisurely, hurried, distracted, noisy and feverish’ activities including ‘the 
artificial stimulants and feverish pumped-up gayety of the “wild party”; the 
“thrills” so insistently demanded by the younger generation…’84   
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• When The New York Times reported on the introduction of the ‘dope box’ in 
France and England to test horses for the use of performance enhancing (or 
inhibiting) substances, the tests were said to determine whether horses had been 
‘stimulated.’85  
• In 1934, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported stories of a horse drugging 
syndicate which had attracted the attention of Federal Narcotics Commissioner, 
Harry Ainslinger, whose officers had ‘arrested several needlemen at tracks in 
Chicago’ in an effort to eliminate the ‘use of stimulants of any sort for 
horses’.86 
Examination of these examples clearly demonstrates that the term ‘stimulant’ was closely 
linked with the non-medical, recreational ‘abuse’ of drugs and ‘narcotics’.  ‘Stimulant’ was 
used interchangeably with ‘narcotic’ or ‘drug’ and referred to a number of different 
substances including alcohol, marijuana, caffeine, cocaine, opium and other narcotic drugs.  
Furthermore, the term ‘stimulant’ also referred to the way in which those substances were 
used.  This is obvious in the above example from the Royal Commission on Opium — 
opium could be used in a number of ways, the way attracting the most moral censure was 
as a ‘stimulant.’   
‘Stimulant’, therefore, was a way of describing what is today referred to as ‘recreational 
drug use’:  the terms encompassing both the type of drugs used and the intent with which 
they were used.  This is an important point in relation to the symbolism involved in 
‘stimulant’ use in sport.  If the term ‘stimulant’ was roughly equivalent to our modern 
expression ‘recreational drug use’, then use of the term in the early anti-doping rules has 
further significance.  For at one level ‘stimulant’ was an obvious reference to particular 
substances which were subject to criminal prohibition outside of sport, strongly suggesting 
that the use of these substances on the sporting field held strong reminders of the ‘abuse’ of 
such drugs in society.  But at the more general level, the lack of self-control and the 
immoral life-style associated with the ‘drug addict’ were bound up in this word ‘stimulant’.   
C Other ‘Drug’ Symbolism 
Another significant word used in the early anti-doping rules was ‘drugs’.  This, too, was a 
highly symbolic word.  The word did, of course, refer to substances used in a medical 
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sense:  ‘medicine’ might be an equivalent term.  But in everyday language, the word also 
referred to ‘habit-forming’ substances.  A number of the examples provided above in 
relation to ‘stimulants’ and ‘doping’ also refer to ‘drugs’, ‘drug evil’ and ‘drug 
stimulant’.87  One of the advertisements above provides an interesting example.  When 
referring to the medical use of opium and alcohol the term ‘remedy’ is used, while 
speaking of the dangers of these substances ‘drugs’ is used.  Four further examples confirm 
the point that ‘drug’ had connotations of illicit drugs: 
• A headline in The New York Times in 1923 entitled ‘1,500,000 Drug Users in 
America, He Says’ examines the ‘narcotic drug evil’.88 
• A headline from 1926 reads ‘Foes of Drug Evil Call a World Meeting: Conference 
on Narcotic Education at Philadelphia Next Month Will be the First of Its Kind — 
Campaign Will Warn Public of the Disastrous Effects of Addiction.’89 
• Headlines from The Times refer to the ‘Drug Habit’:  ‘Growth of the Drug Habit, 
United States Statistics’,90 ‘A Victim of the Drug Habit’, referring to people who 
were ‘addicted to the habitual use of narcotic drugs’.91 
• In 1928 The New York Times reported on plans by the Anti-Narcotic Union to 
organise a world-wide effort against ‘the spreading evil of drug addiction’ 
including a world conference.  It was reported that Mussolini would attend the 
conference and quoted him as saying:  “I think very well of the world program as 
outlined…I always enjoy working with America and shall continue to throw all my 
force against this great drug evil which is threatening the world.” 92 
In the references provided above there are other indicators of the symbolism involved in 
doping in the very early years of anti-doping policy.  A significant indicator of the 
connection between the ‘immoral’ practice of recreational drug use and doping is found in 
an article from 1928 which appeared in The New York Times regarding the IAAF congress.  
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It states:  ‘the federation also shelved, until August 6, other debative subjects such as the 
proposal to suspend from amateur athletics any person involved in giving competitors 
“drugs or stimulants internally by hypodermic or other methods.”’93  In anti-drug discourse 
the image of the hypodermic syringe was commonly associated with the recreational use of 
drugs.  For instance: 
• In a 1914 article the author wrote ‘[i]t is rare to see a coloured or a Chinese 
hypodermic fiend.  White women, when once addicted to drugs, very frequently 
resort to the hypodermic syringe’.94 
• In 1913 a criminal investigation was undertaken by Newark police into an assault.  
The newspaper reported it as the ‘Needleman Case’, as the victim alleged that she 
had been stabbed with a hypodermic syringe and possibly injected with a narcotic 
drug.95  Similarly, in 1920 the Chicago Daily Tribune reported on an assault 
allegedly with a hypodermic syringe which turned out to be a pin.  The headline 
read:  ‘Needleman? Huh! He Jabbed Girl with Pin; $100.’96  The implicit 
suggestion here is that being jabbed with a hypodermic syringe is much more 
serious than a pin because of what the hypodermic syringe would contain:  narcotic 
drugs. 
• In 1914 it was reported in The New York Times that the Senate committee on Public 
Health was considering a bill to make it harder to get ‘habit drugs’.  Among the 
proposals was one to make it unlawful to supply anyone with hypodermic syringes 
without a prescription.97 
• A report on a book by Mr Charles B Towns stated:  ‘The hypodermic syringe, he 
thinks, has been the chief creator of the drug habit in this country.  Anyone could 
buy it cheaply and without question, and except in New York, can do so still.’98 
• An article in a magazine from Portland in the 1920s presented a ‘Table of Common 
Dopes’.  The columns of the table read ‘Name of Dope’, ‘What it is’, ‘How 
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Generally Taken’ and ‘Effects’.  The five ‘dopes’ were opium, morphine, heroin, 
cocaine, marijuana and three of them were identified as being taken by injection.  
This also reveals the significance placed on the route of entry of the drug, probably 
because it increased the visual impact of the imagery created.99 
The hypodermic syringe, therefore, was strongly connected with the use of habit-forming 
drugs.  As a consequence of the focus on the route of entry, the mere mention of the 
syringe held strong reminders of illicit drug use — even though the apparatus obviously 
had other legitimate medical applications.  Thus in many of the cases above, the 
hypodermic syringe stood for narcotic drugs.  For example, in the ‘needleman’ case it 
appears to have been assumed that being stabbed with a hypodermic syringe meant being 
injected with a narcotic drug.   
In articles set out above, terminology such as ‘needleman’ and ‘hypodermic’ and ‘pill’ 
were also used in relation to doping in sport.  With such a strong connection between the 
image of the hypodermic and recreational drug use, use of these terms in the doping 
context further established the link between these two forms of non-medical drug use.100    
Another strong indicator of the close association between performance enhancing 
substances in sport and recreational/illicit drug use comes from a newspaper article quoted 
above regarding the involvement of the Federal Narcotics Bureau in the horse doping 
problem:  ‘Race Officials Join in U.S. War on Doping.’101  Use of the term ‘war on doping’ 
— a term which referred to attempts to deal with the use of recreational drugs in society — 
and the involvement of Harry Ainslinger — the Federal Commissioner of Narcotics — 
reinforced this link between doping in sport and recreational drug use.  
D Performance Enhancing Substances 
In examining the symbolism involved in doping in the 1920s and 1930s, an important 
factor to consider is the type of doping substances that gave rise to this form of regulation.  
Consideration of the symbolism attached to the substances confirms that, and explains 
why, the use of performance enhancing substances in sport symbolised illicit drug use so 
strongly. 
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Unfortunately there was no list of prohibited substances accompanying the first anti-
doping rules, making the relevant substances difficult to identify.  Later accounts identify 
the drugs which had been in use in sport up until the 1920s and 1930s as follows:  
• In the late 1800s:  ether and sugar cubes, caffeine and alcohol, caffeine, cocaine 
and strychnine, heroin, nitrogylercine in cycling;102  milk-punch champagne, 
belladonna, strychnine and morphine in pedestrianism103 and opium-based drugs in 
swimming. 104 
• In the 1900s:  cocaine, strychnine, caffeine, nitrogylcerine and alcohol in boxing;105 
narcotic drugs in horse racing; alcohol and strychnine in the marathon,106 cocaine 
in ‘bicycle riders, prize fighter and race horses.’ 107  
Significantly, a large number of these substances had, by 1928, been subjected to 
regulation outside the sporting context.  Many were ‘illicit’ drugs in the sense that they had 
been identified as dangerous, habit-forming drugs, and their use had been censured in 
society by way of prohibition, being strongly associated with the negative symbol of drug 
addiction.108  
Morphine, being a derivative of opium, had been the subject of criminalisation since the 
turn of the century.109  Some have argued that this prohibition sprang from racial 
misunderstandings.  Whatever the motivation for these rules, opium was a drug which had 
caused widespread concern in the community and had been the target of sensationalist 
journalism.   
The same can be said for alcohol:  even though the prohibition on alcohol was nearing its 
end in the US in the late 20s and early 30s, the issue of alcohol use still attracted 
sensationalist press coverage.  For example, on 22 March 1925, an article was published in 
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the Sunday New York American which was headed ‘Death Among the Poppies’.  Below the 
headline was a picture of the Grim Reaper walking among a field of poppy flowers, all of 
which bore a skull on the flower.  In his hand was a cane with a bulb on the end with the 
word ‘Dope’ written on it.  The first paragraph of the article stated ‘[o]pium and whiskey.  
Those are the words that stand for human misery, failure, shame and ruined lives.’110   
Cocaine had similarly attracted extremely sensational, negative press coverage in the years 
before the 1928 doping rules.  Campaigns against cocaine were largely based on 
disinformation arising from associations made between the recreational use of the 
substance and the black American population of the Southern states of the USA.  These 
misconceptions helped to ensure cocaine’s eventual illicit status.111  Cocaine’s reputation 
as a dangerous illicit drug had become an international phenomena thanks to its inclusion 
in the 1912 International Opium Convention.112  The use of the same substance in sport 
could not be divorced from these kinds of associations.  
Heroin had also gained a negative reputation, since by the 1920s it had become the drug of 
choice for recreational drug users, at least in the USA.113  It was added to the Hague 
convention in 1919, and its production in the USA was prohibited in the 1920s.114  Even 
caffeine, although not subjected to regulation, had been condemned as an immoral 
‘stimulant’ at times.115 
There were other substances used at the time to increase performance such as chocolate, 
sugar, UV rays and oxygen.116  The use of these substances by sportspeople attracted 
various levels of criticism.  However, they were not identified as illicit drugs in the same 
way as the substances considered above.  Nevertheless, the presence of such a number of 
illicit drugs in the athletic pharmacopoeia coloured the public perception of the practice of 
doping:  doping was identified strongly with these substances and was condemned in the 
same manner. 
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111
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112
   The International Opium Convention, The Hague, opened for signature 23 January 1912, ATS 1920 No.20 
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   Ibid. 
114
   Similarly, access to strychnine had been tightly controlled through legislation such as the Arsenic Act 1851 (UK):  
Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, The Evolution of Pharmacy Theme E, Sheet 1: The Control of 
Harmful Substances <http://www.rpsgb.org.uk/pdfs/museve1.pdf> at 1 April 2008. 
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   See for example Balzac’s treatise on stimulants, in Hoberman, above n 21, 113. 
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   See Hoberman, above n 21 and Dimeo, above n 6 generally. 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?  Chapter Five 
 
 160 
E Conclusions on Symbolism 
The sports officials who first proposed rules to regulate the use of performance enhancing 
substances in sport used the heading ‘doping’ and incorporated the terms ‘artificial 
stimulants and drugs.’  In using these terms, they must also have been familiar with the 
connotations that the words had outside the sporting field.  Yet they chose the same word 
to describe the use of drugs in sport, something we now see as a very distinct practice to 
‘illicit’ drug taking.  Thus from the very beginning of anti-doping policy, it is clear that 
symbolism was extremely influential in the adoption of a prohibition on doping.  It was not 
the simple fact that these substances effected sporting performance that led to their 
prohibition.  It was also that ‘artificial stimulants’, ‘drugs’ and ‘dope’ were involved.  It is 
no wonder that the response to such practices was to adopt a total prohibition.  
V THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PROHIBITION POLICY 
Sports administrators in the 1920s could have chosen to allow free use of performance 
enhancing substances or adopted a partial restriction on the use of some of these 
substances.117  Instead, the first doping rules in sport were total prohibitions on the use, 
acceptance or offering of any drug or artificial stimulant in athletic competition.  The 
choice is highly significant for two reasons.  Firstly, it confirms the argument presented 
above regarding the role of symbolism in doping.  Secondly, it reinforces this symbolism 
by strengthening the association between doping and illicit drugs.  The importance of the 
mode of regulation will be demonstrated below through a consideration of some aspects of 
prohibition policy and doping policy in the relevant time period.  
A The Temperance Movement and Prohibition Policy 
In the 1920s and 1930s there was a growing international consensus (led by the US) 
regarding illicit drug policy.  It was, of course, the period of the prohibition on the sale of 
                                                
117
   So ingrained is the prohibitionist approach that we have come to accept that it is the natural approach to drugs in 
sport.  There are, however, other possible approaches to the use of performance enhancing substances and 
methods in sport, ranging from unrestricted access, to athlete participation based on health parameters, to varying 
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Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport' (2004) 38(6) British Journal of Sports Medicine 666; John Burge, 
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Angeles Entertainment Law Journal 33.  Given the problems inherent in a system based on total prohibition, both 
our initial and continued commitment to prohibition is, perhaps, not as natural and rational as we assume.  It is 
appropriate therefore to question why this model of doping regulation was chosen at the outset.  In relation to 
illicit drug prohibition see Alex Wodak and Timothy Moore, Modernising Australia's Drug Policy, 2002 
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Research on Heroin Prescription' (2002) 176(9) Medical Journal of Australia 449.   
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alcohol in the United States:  after decades of lobbying by the Temperance Movement,118 
the 18th Amendment to the US Constitution was passed which allowed the passing of laws 
establishing a nationwide prohibition on alcohol.119  Prohibition in the US ended in 1934 
when the 21st Amendment was passed.  The US prohibition was not unique:  the 
Temperance Movement was successful in gaining a prohibition on alcohol in a number of 
other countries such as Canada, Russia, Iceland, Norway, Finland and parts of Australia.120 
Prohibition policy and the influence of the Temperance Movement were not limited to 
alcohol.  As discussed above, by 1928 there were already a number of international 
agreements prohibiting certain substances, as well as growing international support for 
extending prohibition policy in relation to other habit-forming drugs.  
Although the prohibition on drugs and alcohol are seen as distinct policies, they stemmed 
from the same views; the forces that led to the prohibition on alcohol also led to a 
prohibition on other drugs.121  The ideas of the Temperance Movement have been linked 
with the spirit of ‘progressivism’122 which viewed moral problems as a legitimate area for 
legislation.123  It was thought that by criminalising ‘gambling, pornography, drug abuse, 
prostitution…’, the law would serve as a guardian for common morality124 and deal with 
the social problems which arose from the abuse of alcohol and other drugs.  It is no 
coincidence that the first international efforts towards prohibition on drugs came about 
during the ‘dry years’ of the Unites States.  As Justice Kirby put it:  
The prohibition spirit lingered on in that country.  It has now turned to the international fora 
where, especially after the Second World War, the voice of the United States was so powerful.  
What failed nationally in that country as a strategy against abuse of one drug became the 
strategy internationally against another.125 
This was the era in which the anti-doping rules were set.  Given the power of the 
‘prohibition spirit’, it is no wonder that the natural response to reports of the use of 
substances in sport (such as alcohol, morphine, opium and cocaine) was to pass rules 
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prohibiting them.  The prohibition of drugs in sport was an identical response to what was 
seen as the same issue:  the abuse of ‘drugs’, this time in sport.  The significance of the 
adoption of a total prohibition as the regulatory model for doping in sport gains even 
greater significance when a few contextual factors are taken into account. 
B The Background of the Doping Prohibition 
The IAAF, the first international sports federation to prohibit drugs, was founded and 
headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden.  It had Swedish office bearers — the president and 
honorary secretary/treasurer — from its initiation in 1913 until 1946.126  Sweden has often 
been compared to the US in terms of the strength of their commitment to drug 
prohibition.127  Sweden, like other strongly prohibitionist Scandinavian countries such as 
Finland128 and Norway,129 have long maintained a very strong commitment to the total 
prohibition of recreational drugs, aiming for a ‘drug-free’ society.130  There can be little 
doubt that the delegates of the IAAF from Scandinavian countries, and Sweden in 
particular, had a great influence on the decisions of the IAAF.131  Given the strong 
prohibitionist background of the members of the organisation, it is not surprising that the 
chosen approach to the regulation of ‘stimulants’ incorporated a prohibitionist approach. 
The 1938 IOC condemnation of the use of ‘drugs or artificial stimulants of any kind’ had a 
similar background of international commitment to prohibitive drug policy.  Although it 
could be argued that international drug policy would hardly affect the decisions of a sports 
administration body, it must be remembered that the IOC was made up of members from 
multiple countries, each a product of the prevailing attitudes of their home country.  At the 
time, Henri de Baillet-Latour from Belgium was president and Swede, J Sigfrid Edstrm, 
was vice president.  Interestingly, Edstrm was also the IAAF president in 1928.  Both 
these countries were signatories to at least one of the international drug treaties in 1938, 
and had consequently enacted prohibitive drug laws.  Moreover, almost every country 
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represented on the IOC at that time was a signatory to these conventions.132  Thus, the 
home countries of the IOC delegates had committed themselves — at least theoretically — 
to the principle of prohibition in relation to drug policy.  It is hardly surprising, with this 
background, that the delegates should so readily view ‘drug use’ in sport as an evil which 
needed to be prohibited. 
C Conclusions:  The Significance of Prohibition Policy 
As stated above, the choice of a total prohibition on performance enhancing substances is 
highly significant in two ways.  Firstly, it confirms the identification of doping substances 
as ‘illicit drugs’ and provides further evidence of the argument presented above.  Total 
prohibition policy was one which had been used and advocated for many substances which 
were perceived as habit-forming, dangerous or immoral and thus was seen as a policy 
about the moral vices of drinking and illicit drug taking.  In light of the historical and 
geographical background, the fact that a prohibition policy was adopted without apparent 
debate or controversy shows that ergogenic substances were unanimously viewed as 
‘drugs’.133  The evidence provided above regarding the symbolism of doping shows why 
this would be the case  the substances involved, the way in which they were used and the 
language chosen to describe doping practices all show that performance enhancing 
substances were ‘drugs’ in the same sense as those subject to the international prohibition 
policy.  Application of the prohibition policy confirms this identification.     
The second major significance of the adoption of a total prohibition policy was to reinforce 
the link between doping and illicit drugs.  Since prohibition was a policy used for alcohol 
and other ‘habit-forming’ drugs, the implicit message in choosing this kind of approach 
was that doping was akin to other forms of illegitimate, non-medical drug taking.   Thus 
the association and symbolism was perpetuated.   
 
                                                
132
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VI THE STATED RATIONALE:  AMATEURISM VERSUS 
PROFESSIONALISM  
A Introduction 
An examination of the minutes of meeting of the IOC in the years surrounding its first 
public condemnation of doping reveals that doping was viewed as just one of a number of 
issues relating to the amateur status of athletes at the Olympic Games.  At the IOC meeting 
in 1937 at Warsaw, the IOC ‘began the examination of the different questions on the 
Agenda relating to amateurism.’134  A number of issues were discussed there, including the 
status of gymnastic instructors and ski instructors; Olympic winners who received prizes 
from their national governments; professional sports writers and doping.  A committee was 
appointed to consider the issues and asked to prepare a report for the next year’s meeting in 
Cairo.135   
The minutes of the Cairo meeting state: 
The President read the report of the committee which had been instructed to express its 
views on certain customary practices, so as to enable the International Olympic Committee 
to judge whether these were compatible with the principle of prohibition of making good 
the loss of earnings. [sic]136  
Each of the issues were addressed, doping being the sixth issue of the report.  
The view of doping as a threat to the amateur nature of athletics appears also to be a 
significant motivator for the IAAF rule in 1928:  the doping competitor being suspended 
from ‘amateur athletics under the jurisdiction of the Federation’.  Associated newspaper 
reports refer to ‘the proposal to suspend from amateur athletics any person involved in 
giving competitors “drugs or artificial stimulants internally by hypodermic or other 
methods.”’137   
Thus the first anti-doping rules were explained at the time in terms of a breach of the 
amateur ethos in sport.  Where does this leave the symbolic analysis?  
B Is Symbolism Redundant? 
The discourse of amateurism appears to provide an explanation for the development of 
anti-doping policy without the need to refer to the symbolism of doping.  However, when 
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   International Olympic Committee, 'Minutes: Session of the 9th June (Morning) 1937' (1937) 35 Official Bulletin 
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these issues are examined in more detail, it becomes clear that symbolism also played an 
important role in the professionalism argument. 
The amateur ethos in sport was considered to be at odds with the use of ‘drugs and 
artificial stimulants’.  Why this is the case is generally not articulated and, unlike the case 
of earning of money for performances or entering full time training which are quite 
blatantly against the amateur concept, is not self-evident.  One can extrapolate that the 
issue had to do with the ‘seriousness’ the athlete showed in resorting to the use of such 
substances.138  But, again, it is not clear why taking performance enhancing substances 
should be seen as taking sport too seriously.  Indeed, since little time or effort was involved 
in taking a pill or tonic, there could be an argument that doping was less serious than 
training.  It is necessary to consider the question of why doping should be contrary to the 
spirit of amateurism.  This section of the chapter will argue that, rather than the amateur 
issue making a symbolic analysis redundant, the argument has much to do with the 
symbolism associated with doping. 
C Amateur Ethos 
1 The Rhetoric 
The 1894 Olympic Congress in Paris, which founded the modern Olympic Games, was 
convened to discuss the issue of amateurism and the unification of sports rules.139  
‘Amateur’ was defined as: 
Any person who has never participated in open competitions, who has never taken part in a 
competition in return for money or prize money of whatever origin, in particular if it were 
entrance fees, who has never challenged professional athletes and who has never been a 
sport teacher or a coach for money will be considered an amateur.140 
Sports historians have identified a number of ideas, evolved in the Victorian era, which 
characterise the amateur ethos.141  
• ‘Play for plays sake rather than for profit’;142 ‘pursuit of the activity as an end in 
itself…with a corresponding downgrading of achievement, striving, training and 
specialisation.’143 
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   Martin Polley, 'The Amateur Ideal and British Sports Diplomacy' (2006) 26(3) Sport in History 450, 454 and 
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• ‘Politeness, decency, fair play, “gentlemanly behaviour”’;144 ‘the masking of 
enthusiasm in victory and disappointment in defeat’;145 ‘a chivalrous attitude of 
“friendly rivalry” towards opponents.’146 
• ‘Contained competitiveness’; ‘gracious winners’ and ‘good losers.’147 
• ‘Voluntary association, active and ethical participation and repudiating both 
professionalism and gambling.’148 
• Self-reliance.149 
The ethos also incorporated a concept of the perfect athlete:150 
Amateurism was aesthetic as well as environmental.  The amateur sportsman came to stand 
for the ideal type of new English gentleman….[t]he social elite who pioneered modern 
sports believed in a neo-classical norm of human proportion, balancing height, weight, 
muscle development and mobility.  Central to this was the idea of equilibrium both 
between different elements of the human anatomy and the inner self.’151 
 
These are some of the images behind the amateur ethos.  However, by the 1920s it became 
clear that the ideal was not being lived out. 
2 The Reality 
It has already been noted that the 1920s saw somewhat of a scientific revolution in sport, 
including amateur sports.  The application of the scientific method to sports was certainly a 
challenge to the amateur ethos, since these represented blatant attempts at achievement.  
Even more fundamental contradictions within the amateur code were evident by the 1920s.  
Although amateurs supposedly ‘abhorred…the corruption of money’,152 it became clear 
that amateurs were receiving ‘considerable sums of money as a reward for their sporting 
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Amateurism and the Bloodstock Industry 1945-75' (2004) 21(2) International Journal of the History of Sport 277 
for a fuller explanation of the Corinthian ideal. 
151
   Richard Holt, 'The Amateur Body and the Middle-Class Man: Work, Health and Style in Victorian Britain' (2006) 
26(3) Sport in History 352, 363. 
152
   Ibid, 365. 
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achievements’153 in the form of expenses, ‘first class travel, boot money and testimonial 
games’.154  Bale puts this aptly: 
But the fact that the commonplace definition of an amateur was ‘someone who doesn’t get 
paid’ did not prevent the principle of ‘no material gain’ being extremely difficult to 
enforce.  Financial gain from sport could clearly be obtained without being seen to 
contravene the amateur rules.  Such contravention is usually thought of in terms of 
‘shamateurism’ or underhand ‘expenses’.155 
 
Furthermore there is evidence to suggest that ‘ungentlemanly’ competitiveness was as 
evident in amateur athletes as professionals: 
I found after professional games that professionals don’t boil over if another player has 
played badly.  I think the professionals realise that if a player has reached a certain ability 
they can be excused their off days.  Amateurs niggle, they always tend to mention a bad 
performance.156 
 
Thus the amateur ethos was more rhetoric than reality even by the time of the first anti-
doping rules.   
D Professional Sport 
Sports which were commonly identified as professional at this stage included:  horse 
racing, cycling, football,  cricket,157 boxing (prize fighting) and baseball.158  
Like the amateur ethos, it is important to consider a few characteristics of professional 
sport at this time in order to understand the distaste in which amateurism held professional 
sportspeople.159   
Some of the realities of professional sport included: 
• Professional athletes were often very poorly paid, only making enough money for a 
meal, while amateurs were extremely well looked after.160 
• Professional sports were viewed with great suspicion: 
                                                
153
   John Bale, 'Amateurism, Capital and Roger Bannister' (2006) 26(3) Sport in History 484, 485. 
154
   Polley, above n 141, 454. 
155
   Bale, above n 153, 485. 
156
   Dilwyn Porter and Stephen Wagg, 'Introduction' (2006) 26(3) Sport in History 345, 347. 
157
   Riordan, above n 141, 472. 
158
   US Diplomatic Mission to Germany, Sports in America: Baseball (2006) <http://usa.usembassy.de/sports-
baseball.htm> at 4 April 2008. 
159
   There is obviously class issues involved: only aristocratic gentlemen could afford to be true amateurs, thus 
professional athletes were largely drawn from non-aristocrats.  See Riordan above n 141 for a discussion of 
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A common thread of the late nineteenth century debate over the introduction of 
professionalism into many sports was a concern that professionals, whose 
livelihoods were at stake either would commit fouls to avoid defeat or be 
susceptible to corruption to ensure it.161  
• Professional sports were often linked with ‘vices’: gambling, corruption162 and 
alcohol.  Polley states of the British Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service: 
‘officials would assume that every amateur was a gentleman and every professional 
a drunken embarrassment.’163  
• Professional athletes were not viewed in the same romantic way as amateurs, the 
Corinthian ideal did not apply to them:  ‘Professional sportsmen continued to have 
specialised bodies and were not necessarily physical models for the rest of 
humanity.’164  
Thus, although professional sports were becoming more popular in the 1920s, there was 
some stigma attached to the professional athlete, at least from the view of the proponents 
of amateurism. 
E The Role of Doping Symbolism:  Why Were Drugs Contrary to the Amateur Ethos?  
Like many societal attitudes, it is difficult to pinpoint one reason why the use of 
performance enhancing substances was seen as contrary to the amateur ethos.  Bryson 
provides a number of reasons why both professionalism and drugs were seen in this light; 
arguing that they represent: 
a triumph of rationality or instrumental reasoning.  The sole goal becomes winning.  All 
efficacious means are employed to achieve this.  There are of course other key examples of 
this technocratic rationality in sport.  Professionalism is underpinned by this logic as are 
the increasingly ‘scientifically’ devised training, dietary and psychological regimes which 
elite athletes pursue today.165   
No doubt the technocratic rationality and the unveiled desire to win played a large part in 
making doping appear contrary to the amateur spirit.166  But, as Bryson points out, there 
were other aspects of sport which were examples of ‘technocratic rationality’ which 
remained unaddressed at the time of the first anti-doping rules.   
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Furthermore, at the time a certain amount of training had come to be acceptable even in 
amateur sport.  In the IOC minutes of the meeting where doping was condemned in 1938, 
it was stated that a two week training camp was allowed for amateur participants in the 
Olympic Games.167  Thus some disruption to the athlete’s normal life had come to be 
accepted.  In light of the fact that this type of effort was allowed, why should taking a pill 
or a shot be viewed as taking things too seriously if stopping work and attending a two 
week training camp was not?  The taking of performance enhancing substances at the time 
would have involved very little ‘effort’ — since at this time they were short-acting 
substances which required only a dose at the time of competition and not ongoing 
application.168  In fact, doping has often been characterised as athletes attempting to take a 
‘short cut’ to achievement. 169  It is difficult to reconcile this view with the idea that doping 
involved too much effort.   
It is here that the significance of the divide between amateurism in theory and practice is 
important.  There were a number of aspects of the amateur ethos that were being 
challenged at the time, particularly the idea that sport should be played for the love of the 
game and not out of any desire for achievement.  We know that the IOC’s first 
condemnation was couched in terms of the desire to protect the amateur characteristic of 
the Olympic Games.  The two aspects that were considered worthy of protection were the 
payment of Olympic athletes and doping.  There is a certain element of inconsistency here, 
since the IOC was running a competitive sporting festival where achievement was 
celebrated through the awarding of gold medals and athletes were encouraged to strive to 
achieve to the best of their ability for their national and personal pride.  All this is contrary 
to the notion of participation for the love of the game and the downgrading of 
achievement.170  Thus the IOC, simply through organising the Olympic Games, was, in 
many ways, contributing to the erosion of the amateur ethos.  Additionally, although the 
1920s and 1930s saw a growth in the application of the scientific method to sport, sports 
science was not condemned as contrary to the amateur ethos in the same way doping was.   
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The singling out of doping therefore, again, shows the importance of the issue and needs 
further explanation.  There must have been some additional elements which singled doping 
out for condemnation. 
1 The Health Aspect 
Part of the motivation behind the amateur code was based in the ‘Victorian obsession with 
health’.171  As Holt points out, professional sport was not seen as being conducive to public 
health — it involved watching sport in polluted, crowded places.  Amateur sport, on the 
other hand, was seen as a useful way to maintain and improve public health since its focus 
was on producing athletes balancing perfect health of mind and body rather than 
achievement.172 
It seems that the use of performance enhancing substances was assumed to be contrary to 
these health-inducing goals of amateur sport.  These assumptions need exploring; for it was 
not as natural for doping to be seen as unhealthy as one would immediately assume.  Since 
most of the drugs used in sport were harnessed for their ‘stimulant’ properties, doping 
could be seen as a positive thing for the health of the athlete by the anti-fatigue movement:  
a ‘useful as a way to ‘solve’ fatigue’.173  And since research was being undertaken, it could 
ensure minimal damage was done to the athlete.  Moreover, as Dimeo explains, in at least 
one doping incident — the Thomas Hicks affair — the use of these substances was seen as 
the reason for his survival rather than a danger to his health.174   
The predominance of the anti-doping message based on the health argument is difficult to 
understand in light of these factors.  However, when the connection between doping and 
illicit drug taking is taken into account, the health assumptions are much easier to explain.  
Drug takers were viewed as particularly unhealthy.  One particularly vivid example is 
found in a newspaper article in 1925: 
The drug habit is formed so quickly that it is FIXED [sic] before the miserable victim 
knows it.  Even as he says to himself “I can stop when I like” he is beyond all hope of 
stopping. 
The grip that the poison fastens upon its victims is one that the strongest will ever born in 
man is powerless to release.  It is the GRIP OF DEATH [sic] and it holds until death.  
                                                
171
   Holt, above n 151, 358.  
172
   Associated with this was the regulation of violent play:  Ibid, 362. 
173
   Ibid, 18.  See also Harry L Hillman, 'Athletics Helpful to American Youth: Overindulgence is Bad, but Wise and 
Moderate Performances Aid to Preserve Health ', The New York Times (New York), 17 September 1910, 14 
where moderate athletics is advocated for health along with living a ‘clean’ life.  
174
   Dimeo, above n 6, 25.  In that case the dangerous aspect of the situation was the running of the marathon. 
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Be warned by this picture, young and old.  Drugs mean slow death for the body, quick 
death for the spirit.  And any death, however painful, is infinitely better than the slow death 
and the long drawn-out agony of the drug fiend.175 
Since doping was a form of drug taking, it must also be a drain on the health of the athlete.   
More specifically, one of the most repugnant aspects of illicit drug taking seemed to be its 
habit-forming tendency; habitual drug taking was seen as leading to an exceptionally 
unhealthy and unbalanced life — the drug was all-encompassing for the taker.  The 
dangers of addiction to these drugs were very prominent in anti-drug discourse and spilled 
over into anti-doping discourse as well.176  Indeed, the common phrase for recreational 
drugs at the time was ‘habit-forming’ drugs.  One example of this focus is found in an 
article from the New York Medical Journal in 1914: 
The conspiring individuals, being familiar with the habit forming action of the drugs, 
believe that the increased number of “fiends” will create a larger demand for the drug, and 
in this way build up a profitable business…  When once the drug has taken hold on these 
people, they will do anything to acquire a supply.177 
Drug-taking, particularly when it involved the kinds of drugs used by athletes, was seen as 
a potentially all-encompassing practice. 
Contrary to this, the amateur ethos ideally produced a healthy, balanced lifestyle.  It 
entailed the idea that sport should not be the focus of athlete’s lives but simply one 
enjoyable part of a healthy, balanced existence.  Since the use of performance enhancing 
substances in sport was indistinguishable from other forms of drug taking, it was natural to 
assume that doping would be a habit-forming practice and that it was likely to become the 
focus of the athlete’s life to the exclusion of all other things.  This would bring an end to 
the balanced life of the perfect amateur.178  
In many ways, therefore, the health aspect of amateurism was implicitly affected by doping 
symbolism:  doping was drug taking and drug taking was unhealthy. 
                                                
175
   New York American, above n 110.  Emphasis in original. 
176
   See The Times, above note 78, for example:  
Under continuous mental or physical strain the habit of resorting to stimulants in the form of different alcoholic 
beverages with food, between meals, and at less and less intervals during each day, day after day, is readily formed 
until the habit becomes a necessity, then a craving, and ultimately a masterful power over the whole mental and 
physical energies. 
177
   Lichtenstein, above n 64, 67. 
178
   See Boje, above n 61, 458 for an example of the issue of addiction in a discussion on the use of cocaine in sport:  
‘A warning must also be uttered as regards the acute intoxicating effects of this substance when used in large 
doses, as well as its chronic action which engenders addiction.  Cocaine should hence never be used in connection 
with athletics and every infringement of this prohibition should be severely punished.’  The issue of addiction 
was also prominent in anti-doping discourse in the 1960s as will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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2 The Clash Between Amateurism and Doping 
Perhaps the strongest influence of the symbolism of doping in the amateur issue was the 
clash between the symbol of illicit drug use — the dope addict — and the Corinthian 
athlete.  This clash can be clearly demonstrated by comparing the following passages: 
He who would try a deadly drug of whatever name — opium, morphine, cocaine — might 
far better put a pistol to his head and blow out his brains, so far as happiness is concerned, 
and apart from the question of sin. 
The Bible pronounces suicide a sin.  It might have pronounced the use of drugs a sin ten 
times greater, had that use prevailed when the Bible was written. 
The suicide with pistol or knife kills only HIMSELF.  He may inflict sorrow on others but 
it passes.  
The drug fiend tortures his family, ruins, degrades and disgraces himself.  And frequently 
sinking to the lowest depths, his degradation takes the form of seeking with malicious 
Satanic ingenuity, to inflict the drug curse upon others.179   
 
A drug addict…suggests to many a vicious and rather disgusting person who, however 
wretched his condition may be, has brought it upon is own head.180 
The new male body, advocated by doctors and the proponents of amateur sport alike was a 
neo-classical norm of human proportion, balancing height, weight, muscle development 
and mobility.  The ideal athlete was neither too tall nor too small, too thin nor too fat.181   
The contrast between these passages is clear:  the user of illicit drugs was morally destitute, 
repulsive, unhealthy and dangerous to themselves and others.  The amateur athlete was 
clean, healthy and physically beautiful.  It is no wonder that exception was taken to 
amateur sportspeople — the pinnacle of health, self-discipline and beauty — debasing and 
‘dirtying’ themselves by use of drugs. 
3 Professional Sports and ‘Drugs’  
Drug taking was seen as being contrary to the spirit of amateur sport partly because of the 
divide between amateur and professional sport.  As Hoberman states, doping was seen as a 
practice associated with professional sports.182  He provides an example of the coach of the 
                                                
179
  New York American, above n 110.  Emphasis in original. 
180
   John Hoberman, Testosterone Dreams: Rejuvenation, Aphrodisia, Doping, 2005 (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press), 182 quoting a Lancet article from 1937. 
181
   Holt, above n 151, 366.  
182
   For instance, Beamish and Ritchie state ‘unlike track and field which was governed by a strict code of 
amateurism, cycling has been thoroughly professionalized early on and winning was the rider’s unabashed goal.  
Performance-enhancing substances have a long and open history in the sport.’ Above n 35, 423.  Hoberman, 
above n 180, 183 refers to the use of performance enhancing substances in professional cycling as ‘long-
established doping practices of the European professional cyclists.’  A number of the references cited above 
provide evidence for the use of ‘doping’ in horse racing and Dimeo notes some evidence of doping in 
professional football in the UK.  See above n 6, 42.  It has also been noted above that there is some suggestion 
that drugs were used in boxing and one can only assume that this applied to both professional and amateur 
boxing. 
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French cycling team in 1960 who said “[m]any pros are drugged, of course, but we don’t 
drug amateurs.”183   
Even in the professional/amateur divide the symbolism of illicit drugs played a role.  For 
many professional sports were not only associated with the use of performance enhancing 
substances but were also strongly linked with the use of illicit recreational drugs.   
(a) Professional Cycling  
Professional cycling was probably the sport most widely associated with the use 
performance enhancing substances.  Many of the substances used in professional cycling 
were the ones which had been subjected to criminal prohibition outside sport.184  The 
significance of this has been noted above:  the association with illicit drugs would 
undoubtedly have stained the reputation of cycling and subsequently professional sports in 
general.  The same can be argued of other professional sports such as boxing.185 
(b) Horse Racing 
Horse racing was one of the first professional sports and, as Addis Smith wrote in 1961, 
‘has been referred to as the Sport of Kings.  Yet, in spite its antiquity and its favour in high 
places, it has often been plagued by numerous forms of corrupt practices.’186   
Newspaper articles at the time, and expert commentary since, show that horse doping was 
quite a high profile problem in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  Addis-Smith states that the 
‘[d]oping of horses in the early 1930s in U.S.A. was so widespread that breeders 
complained frequently of impotency…’187 Thus doping and the professional sport of racing 
                                                
183
   Hoberman, above n 180, 183, says: ‘A cultural apartheid separated drug-free amateurs from professional athletes, 
whose right to use drugs was taken for granted…assumed that professional athletes enjoyed tacit exemption from 
the ethical standards that applied to amateurs.’  He was speaking specifically about the 1950s but there is no 
reason to think that the situation in the 1920s and 1930s would have been different.  See also Arthur Porritt, 
'Doping' (1965) 5(3) Journal of Sports Medicine and Physical Fitness 166, 166 and Patrick Mignon, 'The Tour de 
France and the Doping Issue' (2003) 20(2) The International Journal of the History of Sport 227.  Mignon reveals 
some of the doping practices of professional cycling in the Tour de France.  Why drugs were more acceptable in 
professionals is not entirely clear.  It may be partly a recognition of the physical demands of professional sport.  
And, of course, the arguments that were put forward regarding the amateur ethos did not apply to professionals: 
striving for achievement was integral.  However, the discussion above regarding the link between illicit drug 
symbolism and the professional/amateur issue must have played a part as well.  The image of the professional 
was not as ‘clean’ as the amateur, thus illicit drug imagery was not viewed as producing as much of a clash with 
the image of the professional.  
184
   See Mignon, above n 183, who provides an account of riders admitting to the use of cocaine and other drugs. 
185
   Although there is not a lot of evidence regarding drug use in boxing, authors such as L Prokop, above n 102, state 
that cocaine and heroin were used in boxing in the late eighteen hundreds.  The use of cocaine is confirmed by a 
more contemporary source: see Towns, above n 107. 
186
   Addis-Smith, above n 19, 121. 
187
   Ibid, 122.  No doubt one of the objections to doping in this sport was its effect on betting  doping added an 
unknown and unquantifiable influence on the race, which would have been unacceptable to the punter and 
bookmakers alike. 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?  Chapter Five 
 
 174 
were strongly connected, the word ‘doping’ being common in horse racing before it was 
widely used in the sports context. 
Doping in horse racing was closely associated with the wider issue of ‘narcotics’.  Reports 
that narcotics traffickers were supplying their drugs to race tracks led Federal Narcotics 
Commissioner, Henry Anslinger, to meet with the racing commissioners in 1933188 and to 
instigate an extensive investigation of doping in race horses.  This led to the arrest of more 
than one hundred owners, trainers and attendants for possession of illegal drugs.189  One 
newspaper reported similar arrests in 1933: 
At the same time information leaked out in New York City that prisoners among nearly a 
thousand drug peddlers rounded up in a nationwide drive against the drug evil last week 
have admitted to federal authorities their connections with gangs doping horses at more 
than a dozen of the bigger tracks.190 
Use of the illicit drug laws and enforcement agencies in horse racing presents a compelling 
case for arguing that horse racing had a reputation associated, not only with doping, but 
also with illegal narcotic drugs.191   
This kind of reputation in one of the major professional sports of the time would have 
affected the reputation of professional sports in general.  Implicitly, amateur sports 
administrators feared that if their sport allowed professionals to compete, then all the 
negative aspects of professionalism, including an association with illegal narcotics, could 
not be far behind.192  Visions of drug busts by the likes of Harry Anslinger’s officers could 
not have been an attractive prospect for sporting officials. 
(c) English Football 
The main association between football and drugs was the ‘abuse’ of alcohol by 
professional footballers in the UK.  Dixon and Garnham assert that in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century ‘the early professional (footballer) was regularly cast as a 
                                                
188
   Chicago Daily Tribune, above n 83. 
189
   Chicago Daily Tribune, above n 1. 
190
   Ibid. 
191
   The fact that the practice of drugging horses was referred to as ‘doping’ is no coincidence, the same substances 
which had been singled out for censure and prohibition in wider society had made their way into the racing world.  
And the same enforcement agency investigated and dealt with the use of ‘narcotics’ in the horse racing world.  
Not only did horse ‘doping’ have connotations of illicit drug use by morally depraved human beings, it also 
symbolized the disreputable side of the horse racing world where horses were used as a means of making money 
without reference to their best interests. 
 These events took place in the USA but it is clear that ‘doping’ in horses was not confined to America: see The 
New York Times, above n 51.  It is also quite plausible that events in the USA horse racing scene could have 
influenced the considerations of the IOC and IAAF as Avery Brundage, an American, was a high standing 
official in both these organisations during the 1930s (president of the US Olympic Committee in 1929, vice 
president of the IAAF in 1930 and president of the IOC in 1952) who, during his tenure as IOC President, was an 
outspoken supporter of the preservation of the amateur ethos of the Olympic Games. 
192
   Vamplew and Kay, above n 147, 378. 
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drunkard in the press, sometimes with good reason.’193  They go on to provide a number of 
examples, such as a statement from 1896 to the effect that many people thought of the 
professional footballer as ‘a person beneath contempt — a vagabond who spends his whole 
time in a public house except for an hour and a half, when he is called upon to earn his 
wages.’194  It is clear from the evidence they present that the public had a strong perception 
that English professional footballers were abusers of alcohol.   
As noted above, at this time alcohol was identified as a dangerous substance of abuse, 
being the subject of criminal prohibition in many countries around the world.195  Thus, 
another professional sport, with which performance enhancing drugs had also been 
associated,196 had a public image with strong links to criminally regulated substances.  
4 Conclusions:  Why Not Doping For Amateurs? 
Clearly the decision to prohibit doping in sport was a multifactorial one.  One factor which 
should not be discounted is the role of doping symbolism.  As we have seen above, the 
image of the illicit drug taker was strongly associated with the use of performance 
enhancing substances in sport.  Consequently the image of the ‘doper’ was seen as 
contradictory to the amateur ethos in sport.  Since drug taking was habit-forming and 
unhealthy, since drug takers were physically and mentally the antithesis of the perfect 
amateur, and because there were strong links between many professional sports and the 
illicit drug trade  drug taking could not be accepted in amateur sport.  All of these 
images and associations played a contributory role in producing the ‘abhorrence’ in which 
amateurism held professional sport.  The symbolism of doping also helps to explain why 
this aspect of sport was seen as warranting prohibition, while other things which equally 
chipped away at the amateur ethos were not. 
                                                
193
   Pamela Dixon and Neal Garnham, 'Drink and the Professional Footballer in 1890s England and Ireland' (2005) 
25(3) Sport in History 375, 375. 
194
   Ibid, 377.  Dixon and Garnham go on to argue that this public perception may not have been justified and that it 
may have been a result of a lack of understanding by middle class journalists of the role of alcohol in working 
class society.  Whether this image reflected reality is beyond the scope of this chapter, the important point being 
made here is that there was a firm connection in public opinion between professional football and abuse of 
alcohol. 
195
   This is true even in the UK despite there being no official policy of prohibition on alcohol:  Edmund Grosse, 
'Teetotal Propaganda: The Sober Use of Alcohol', The Times (London), 15 July 1919, 8; 'Alcohol: From the 
British Medical Journal', The Times (London), 23 December 1871, 10; 'The Temperance League: Effect of 
Alcohol on the Human Body', The Times (London), 31 January 1924, 14 and 'Two Sides of Prohibition: 
Arguments For and Against the Sale of Liquor, First Year's Experience', The Times (London), 3 July 1920, 45. 
196
  Dimeo, above n 6, 42-45. 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?  Chapter Five 
 
 176 
Hence, even the amateur/professional issue, which on the face of it seems to provide an 
explanation for the first anti-doping rules quite apart from symbolism, was also influenced 
by this symbolism.   
VII CONCLUSIONS:  ANTI-DOPING POLICY IN THE 1920S 
AND 1930S 
‘Dope is a dirty word as Aldous Huxley once said.’197   
Choice of language is significant.  The use of words such as ‘dope’, ‘hypodermic’ and 
‘artificial stimulants’ in the first anti-doping rules demonstrates that, from the 1920s, 
perceptions and beliefs about the use of performance enhancing substances in sport have 
been heavily influenced by the symbolism associated with illicit recreational drugs.   
The short examination of the history of doping in sport shows that there were two 
competing attitudes to the use of these substances in the 1920s.  The forces of modernism 
and the excitement associated with technological advances in sport viewed the use of such 
substances in a positive, if somewhat cautious light.198  Whereas the influence of the 
Temperance Movement made the use of anything identified as a ‘drug’, particularly the 
habit-forming variety, to be viewed as highly dangerous.   
The analysis of doping symbolism presented in this chapter helps to explain one influence 
in the eventual prevalence of anti-doping sentiment.  The use of language such as ‘dope’, 
‘drugs’ and ‘stimulants’ is highly suggestive of a symbolic association between doping in 
sport and illicit drug taking.  The adoption of the prohibition policy, particularly in light of 
the timing and geographical origin of anti-doping rules, confirms that this association was 
highly influential in the formation of anti-doping policy.  Although the first rules were 
couched in the language of ‘professionalism’ and ‘amateurism,’ even these concepts had 
strong connections to illicit drug use.   
The anti-doping rules of the 1920s and 1930s were not comprehensive, or even 
enforceable, policies.199  These rudimentary rules, however, provided the basis on which 
modern anti-doping policies were built.  When anti-doping policy took off in the 1960s, the 
                                                
197
   Silver et al, above n 66, 7. 
198
   This is true even for amateur sports where striving for achievement was supposedly frowned upon.   As we have 
seen, the amateur ideal did not always meet with the reality of amateur sport. 
199
   Drug tests were not available until the 1960s and a lack of funding on the part of sports federations would have 
prevented any real enforcement of the ‘rules’.  This is why it is often said that it was not until the 1960s that anti-
doping policy began. 
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IOC used this condemnation as the initial basis for their Prohibited List.200  Similarly, the 
symbolism at work in the 1920s and 1930s provided a basis on which the symbolism of 
anti-doping in the 1960s was built.  Many of the themes that were foreshadowed in this 
time period would be fully illuminated in the 1960s.  The 1950s and 1960s were pivotal 
years in the history of anti-doping policy and the influence of symbolism of performance 
enhancing substances in sport in that period will be considered in the next chapter. 
                                                
200
   This will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE 1950S AND 1960S:  ANTI-DOPING TAKES OFF  
The drugs are potentially dangerous, he said.  A high-pitched person can be stimulated to 
“violent behaviour”, he explained.  Drug addicts, he added, might get their start in taking 
amphetamines during high school and college athletics.1 
I INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Five considered the first anti-doping rules.  While it is true that rudimentary anti-
doping rules were adopted in the late 1920s, most commentators point to the 1960s as the 
time when anti-doping efforts began in earnest.  The rules adopted in the 1920s and 1930s 
remained dormant through lack of enforcement until the late 1960s.2  Moreover, the whole 
issue of performance enhancing substance use in sport appears to have retreated into the 
background during this time.  Wolf Lyberg, in his history of the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) says ‘[i]n the minutes of the IOC…not a word could be found on 
medical problems [including doping] until the 1961 session in Athens, where a passage 
turned up under the heading “doping”’.3  This apparent cease-fire in the ‘anti-doping war’ 
continued until the 1950s.     
This chapter therefore examines the role of doping symbolism in the development of anti-
doping policy in the 1950s and 1960s, possibly the most significant time period in anti-
doping history.  The picture is somewhat more convoluted than the 1920s.  Whereas in the 
1920s and 1930s the issue of doping did not occupy a major place in the public mind, in 
the ‘50s and ‘60s a variety of groups, all with slightly different agendas and approaches, 
began working on the problem.  The media also became increasingly interested in the 
issue.   
                                                
1
  Robert Plumb, 'A.M.A. to Study Drugs in Sports; Use in Four-Minute Mile Hinted', The New York Times (New 
York), Thursday 6 June 1957, 1. 
2
   See also J.G.P. Williams, 'Dope in British Sports' (1969) 4(2) British Journal of Sports Medicine 128, 128, who 
stated that prior to the 1960s the IOC had a ‘nebulous sort of regulation forbidding the use of doping, but as an 
instrument of control it was quite valueless.’  
3
  Wolf Lyberg, Fabulous 100 Years of the IOC: Facts, Figures and Much, Much More, 1996 (Lausanne: 
International Olympic Committee), 375.  This is due to a number of factors, chief among which is the fact that 
attention was focused on World War II (WWII): sport and doping were much less important issues.  Dimeo 
summarises the history of re-emergence of sport post WWII and the formative effect that the war years had in 
terms of the application of performance enhancement research for military purposes into the sporting context:  see 
Paul Dimeo, A History of Drug Use in Sport 1876-1976: Beyond Good and Evil, 2007 (London: Routledge), 87ff.
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In seeking to understand the drivers of anti-doping policy, it is important to keep the 
complexities and multi-faceted nature of such a history firmly in mind.  As previously 
mentioned, Dimeo points out that ‘[t]he early discourses on anti-doping, from the mid 
1950s onwards can be interpreted in a number of ways…’.4  This chapter presents one 
particularly important interpretation which emphasises the role of symbolism in this most 
formative period in anti-doping policy.    
As will be demonstrated in this analysis, it is no coincidence that anti-doping policy got 
serious in the 1950s and 1960s:  a time when attitudes towards the use of recreational drugs 
in society were also changing.  The primary example of this change is the case of 
amphetamines, the main sports drug of the time.5  While amphetamines were becoming 
increasingly identified as ‘illicit drugs’ in wider society, the connection between doping in 
sport and illicit drug taking, established in the 1920s, became stronger.  Thus, social 
concerns over illicit drug taking affected sport as well.   
As with the previous chapter, this chapter will begin with a brief account of the anti-doping 
rules in the 1950s and 60s followed by an outline of some important historical events 
which had implications on attitudes to doping in this era.  The symbolism of doping will 
then be examined, followed by a consideration of how symbolism fits with some of the 
alternative explanations for the developments in anti-doping policy.  The final section of 
the chapter will present conclusions on the influence of symbolism. 
II ANTI-DOPING GETS SERIOUS:  THE 1960S 
REGULATIONS 
As interest and concern about doping increased in the 1950s, a number of conferences 
were held in Europe in which the issue of doping was addressed.6  Many had substantial 
                                                
4
   Dimeo, above n 3, 130. 
5
  Although anabolic steroids were available and becoming more widely used in this time frame, amphetamines 
were identified as the main sports drug by rule-makers while anabolic steroids were not addressed until the 1970s.  
This may be partly due to the fact that illicit drug symbolism was not as strong in the steroid debate.  Since 
steroids did not rate much of an official mention until the 1970s they will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
6
   Dimeo, above n 3, 89ff, again provides an invaluable outline of the significant events here.  He points out that the 
first of these conferences, in Oslo in 1952, included members of the IOC and representatives from fourteen 
countries.  This demonstrates one of the mechanisms by which a consensus of opinion on the matter was reached.   
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impact on anti-doping policy but it was the IOC decisions of the late 1960s which were to 
become the most operationally significant ones.7  
A Early Regulations by Various Stakeholders  
In 1962 two Italian organisations — FMSI (Federazione Medico-Sportiva Italian or the 
Italian Sports Medicine Association) and UVI (Unione Velocipedistra Italiana or Italian 
Cycling Federation) — agreed on an anti-doping programme which entailed testing, 
education and funding.  The agreement established a definition of doping8 which included 
‘a ‘preliminary list of prohibited substances…(1) amphetamine and its derivatives; (2) 
substances similar in action to amphetamine; (3) anti-MAO2; (4) caffeines.’9  The BASM 
(British Association of Sports Medicine) developed a similar list in the early 1960s which 
included alcohol, amphetamines, cocaine, narcotics, hormones and strychnine.10 
Other significant anti-doping policy developments which were precursors to the IOC’s 
decision of 1967 included: 
• Anti-doping legislation passed by the Austrian, French and Belgian governments.11 
• A convention held by the Council of Europe (CoE) (in conjunction with a 
subcommission of the IOC) in 1963 where a definition of doping was produced 
which was later used by the IOC.12 
• The 1964 International Doping Conference convened by FMSI in Tokyo where the 
same definition of doping was adopted. 
• Introduction of testing in Italian football and British cycling.13   
                                                
7
   Barrie Houlihan, Dying to Win: Doping in Sport and the Development of Anti-Doping Policy, 1999 (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe), 32, states that the IOC Prohibited List was ‘to become the benchmark list of banned 
substances and practices’. 
8
   One that would strongly influence the first international meeting held by the CoE (Council of Europe) in 1963: 
Dimeo, above n 3, 91.  See Chapter Two for a consideration of early definitions of doping.  
9
   Ibid. 
10
   Dimeo, above n 3, 92. 
11
   Ibid and Jan Todd and Terry Todd, 'Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic 
Movement' in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (eds), Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the 
Olympic Movement, 2001 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) 65, 67. 
12
   Houlihan, above n 7, 130.  This definition appears to have been influenced by the definition produced by the 
Italian organisation, FMSI, in 1962:  Dimeo, above n 3, 91.  The CoE also passed a strong condemnation of 
doping in June 1967 after the death of Tommy Simpson in the Tour de France (also as a result of the refusal of 
cyclists to undertake doping tests).  One of the resolutions adopted there was to request the IOC to establish an 
international commission which would educate, study doping patterns and maintain a list of proscribed drugs and 
activities: Todd and Todd, above n 11, 67.  
13
   Due to doubts about the reliability of the tests, no consequences attached to a positive finding at that stage:  
Arnold Beckett, GT Tucker and AC Moffat, 'Routine Detection and Identification in Urine of Stimulants and 
Other Drugs, Some of Which May Be Used to Modify Performance in Sport' (1967) 19(4) Journal of Pharmacy 
and Pharmacology 273.  See also Houlihan, above n 7, 132. 
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B IOC Decision of 1967 
In May 1967 the IOC decided to amend their rules to deal with the problem of doping.  
The minutes stated: 
The standard entry form, as proposed, was discussed and adopted....  Sir Arthur Porritt 
(New Zealand) addressed the meeting specially on the problems of doping, sex tests and 
anabolic steroids and proposed that contacts should be taken up with the Organizing 
Committee for the Olympic Games so as to make sure that the medical machinery to cope 
with these problems would be available, and advised the inclusion of some technical 
doctors on the medical staff, as was done during the World Cup for Football.  Furthermore, 
a list indicating the main drugs to be regarded as dope should be published (Annex la).  In 
connection with anabolic steroids, a resolution was presented (Annex lb) which was 
adopted for release. 
And later: 
Annex 1a 
Doping 
As a consequence of the new I.O.C. Entry Form 
1. An official medical set up will be established at the Olympic Games for dope-testing.  
This will consist of international specialists (from F.I.M.S.) working with the profession 
locally at the site of the Games 
2. The following drugs are included amongst those constituting “dope” (the list is not 
exhaustive): 
— Alcohols. [sic] 
— Amphetamines and Ephedrine. 
— Cocaine. 
— Vaso dilators. [sic] 
— Opiates (Opium, Morphine, Heroin, Pethedrine, Methadin). [sic] 
— Cannabis (Hashish).14 
This prohibited list was to be enforced by way of drug testing, to be introduced at the 1968 
Mexico Games.  The details were published in the IOC newsletter in 1968.15 
It appears these developments were based on the IOC’s 1938 condemnation of doping16 
(see Chapter Five) and that their legal force was derived from a contractual agreement 
between the IOC and the athlete contained in the Olympic Games entry form.17 
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   International Olympic Committee, ‘Extracts of the Minutes of the 65th Session of the International Olympic 
Committee’ (1967) 98-99 (May-August) Bulletin du Comité International Olympique 89, 94.  This was 
followed by a note about anabolic steroids which will be considered in the next chapter. 
15
   Ibid, 95.  
16
   In support of this is the fact that the text of this anti-doping rule was republished in the IOC bulletin in 1962 
under the heading ‘Eligibility Rules of the International Olympic Committee’, International Olympic Committee: 
'Eligiblity Rules of the International Olympic Commitee' (1962) 80(November) Bulletin du Comité International 
Olympique 44, 45.  See also Sir Arthur Porritt, 'Doping in Sport' (1969) 4(2) British Journal of Sports Medicine 
105.  It appears that there was no explicit rule against doping adopted in 1967.  To lawyers, it may appear 
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III HISTORIC BACKGROUND 
A Interwar Period 
The developments in the rules relating to doping came on a background of changes in 
sport, doping and drugs which began in the post WWII period.   
Sport began to be taken more seriously after WWII.  The Olympic Games, postponed 
during the war, were relaunched in 1948 and many returning soldiers, particularly in the 
US college system, became involved in amateur and professional sports.18  There was also 
increasing scientific19 and media interest in sport at this time and more money became 
involved.20  Sport was also beginning to be used as a political tool more:  as the Cold War 
developed, the sports field became an arena where political systems attempted to show the 
superiority of their system.21 
Military research undertaken during and after WWII on the performance enhancement 
capabilities of pharmacological substances had direct application on the sporting field.22  
The use of similar substances in sport appears not to have been seen as particularly 
problematic:  ‘The immediate post-relief and austerity would not have engendered 
concerns about using the sorts of stimulant drugs that had helped soldiers and pilots.  
Health issues about drugs were not foremost in the minds of the public readjusting to 
normal civilian life.’23   
Furthermore, returning WWII soldiers involved in sport brought with them the practice of 
utilising pharmacological agents to enhance their performance.  This was particularly true 
of amphetamines which had been commonly used by soldiers: 
                                                                                                                                              
somewhat unusual for such an invasive procedure as urine testing.  These IOC doping rules were not, however, 
drafted by lawyers, and at the time they were written, the legal implications of such rules were beyond the 
imagination of most of the IOC delegates.   
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   Arthur Porritt, 'Doping' (1965) 5(3) Journal of Sports Medicine and Physical Fitness 166, 167 and Sir Arthur 
Porritt, 'Doping in Sport' (1969) 4(2) British Journal of Sports Medicine 105, 108. 
18
   Dimeo, above n 3, 61. 
19
   Rob Beamish and Ian Ritchie, 'From Fixed Capacities to Performance-Enhancement: The Paradigm Shift in the 
Science of 'Training' and the Use of Performance Enhancing Substances' (2005) 25(3) Sport in History 412, 424. 
20
   Dimeo, above n 3, 61. 
21
   For some examples of the reporting of Soviet sporting aims at the Olympics see 'Rivalry Between US and Russia 
to Enliven Helsinki Competition: Cold War of Sports Will Start Simmering When Soviet Claims of World 
Records Are Put to Stern Test at Olympics', The New York Times (New York), 6 July 1951, S5; 'Russia 
Announces Plan to Enter Select Teams in 1952 Olympics: Cites Only Helsinki Events, Calling for All-Out Effort 
to Raise 'the Sports Glory of the Soviet Fatherland', The New York Times (New York), 28 December 1951, 24; 
Harrison E Salisbury, 'Pep Talks by Soviet Press Urge Red Athletes to Annex Crowns: Opening of Olympic 
Competition Noted in Call for Russian Sportsmen to Demonstrate 'Superiority Over Bourgeois Countries', The 
New York Times (New York), 1952, 22.  For an in-depth analysis of the role of politics in sport see James A.R. 
Nafziger and Andrew Strenk, 'The Political Uses and Abuses of Sports' (1977-1978) 10 Connecticut Law Review 
259.  
22
   Dimeo, above n 3, 46ff. 
23
   Dimeo, above n 3, 53. 
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Following the return of the veterans to college, the use of amphetamine ‘pep pills’ became 
quite common among professional and intercollegiate athletes.  Since the high school 
athlete and coach are influenced by the professional and intercollegiate athlete, the 
amphetamines became popular even in interscholastic athletics.24 
As Dimeo points out, the use of amphetamines in sport was reflective of their use in wider 
society:  ‘Amphetamines were not simply seen as a ‘doping’ substance at this time but an 
acceptable and legitimate public medicine.’25   
B 1950s 
Much of this began to change in the 1950s.  In sport, the entrance of the USSR into the 
Olympic Games had heightened the Cold War tensions surrounding amateur sport and the 
potential of sport as a political tool became apparent.26  This further politicalisation of 
sport led to what was later referred to as a chemical arms race in doping.27  A number of 
authors have highlighted the pressure on athletes to remain competitive with their Cold 
War rivals.  Since there was a common perception that their opposites were using 
performance enhancing substances, that pressure resulted in experimentation in doping 
substances.28  This process 29 began in the 1950s as the ‘rumour mill’ began to churn with 
stories of drug use.30     
There was a mixture of attitudes to doping in sport in the 1950s.31  Early on, some athletes 
openly used drugs without apparent guilt.32  On the other hand, from as early as 1952, the 
use of such substances to enhance sports performance was identified as problematic at 
sports conferences:  this sort of discussion became increasingly common in the 1960s.33  
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   Max Novich, ‘Use and Misuse of Drugs to Improve Athletic Performance’ in K. Kato (ed) Proceedings of 
International Congress of Sports Sciences 1964, Tokyo, The Japanese Union of Sports Sciences, quoted in 
Dimeo, above n 3, 62. 
25
   Dimeo, above n 3, 62. 
26
   Ibid, 53.  See also Rob Beamish and Ian Ritchie, 'The Spectre of Steroid: Nazi Propaganda, Cold War Anxiety 
and Patriarchal Paternalism' (2005) 22(5) The International Journal of the History of Sport 777, 784 and Nafziger 
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   Jay Stuller, 'Sports Science: Finding Man's Limits', Chicago Tribune (Chicago), 3 August 1980, B1. 
28
   Dimeo, above n 3, 71ff, points out that this perceived pressure was on both sides of the Cold War but that 
subsequent Western discourse has emphasized the use of substances by communist countries and retold the story 
of the development of steroids in a way which makes Western athletes the innocent victims.  This theme will be 
returned to in Chapter Seven. 
29
   The process related to both stimulant drugs and anabolic steroids: Bob Goldman, Death in a Locker Room: 
Steroids and Sports, 1984 (South Bend: Icarus Press), 1-2 (Preface by John Ziegler).  This issue will be dealt with 
more fully in the next chapter. 
30
   Many of the examples in this chapter are evidence of this process.  See also Dimeo, above n 3, 54. 
31
   John Hoberman, Testosterone Dreams: Rejuvenation, Aphrodisia, Doping, 2005 (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press), 183ff argues that the early 1950s was an age of innocence regarding drug use, that at that time 
doping was viewed as an innocent practice.  Dimeo, above n 3, 87, regards this view is not entirely accurate, there 
being some condemnation even at this stage. 
32
   Ibid, 186. 
33
   Dimeo, above n 3, 89. 
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By the late 1950s, the issue began to attract more negative attention.  In Europe there was 
concern over the use of ergogenic substances in cycling and football.  Italian researcher, 
Vernerando, began gathering data on doping and developing screening tests.  In 1957 
claims arose that runners who had recently broken the four minute mile had used 
amphetamine tablets (commonly known at that time as ‘pep pills’).  The American Medical 
Association (AMA) formed a committee to consider the issue, and debate appeared in the 
media.  Although most sports officials denied any knowledge of the practice, a number of 
sports federations claimed to have rules to deal with the use of these substances.34 
This change of attitude coincided with increasing concerns about the use of drugs such as 
amphetamines outside sport.  As stated above, in the 1940s and early 1950s, these drugs 
were widely available and seen as ‘useful and safe stimulants’.35  By the early 1960s they 
were identified as dangerous drugs of addiction and subjected to the criminal law in an 
increasing number of jurisdictions. 
C 1960s 
The 1960s saw an outworking of the changes mentioned above.  Sport was now serious 
business and Cold War politics were well and truly a part of international sport.  The use of 
performance enhancing substances was no longer viewed as benign; the rhetoric 
surrounding the issue was becoming increasingly condemnatory.   
The use of stimulant drugs was well known in the 1960 Rome Olympics and concerns 
were fuelled by reports that the death of the Dutch cyclist, Knud Jensen, was related to the 
use of such drugs.36  Anabolic steroids were also a factor at the 1960 Games although their 
use was quite limited until four years later.37   
In the mid 1960s reports reached the media38 that doping was rife, particularly among 
professional cyclists in Europe.  In 1965 the great cycling champion, Jacques Anquetil, 
stated ‘[e]veryone in cycling dopes himself.  Those who claim they don’t are liars’.39  So 
much concern was generated by these reports that conferences were held in Tokyo and 
                                                
34
   Plumb, above n 1.  The existence of the rule about doping appears to have given some comfort even though those 
rules lay in disuse. 
35
   Dimeo, above n 3, 67.  See also PBS, A Social History of America's Most Popular Drugs 
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/buyers/socialhistory.html> at 13 September 2008 and 
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 13.  
36
   Considered in more detail below. 
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   Dimeo, above n 3, 75 -77. 
38
  Examples will be considered below. 
39
   Dimeo, above n 3, 60.  Anquetil later also said ‘anti-doping law is idiotic’: Patrick Mignon, 'The Tour de France 
and the Doping Issue' (2003) 20(2) The International Journal of the History of Sport 227, 241. 
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Brussels.40  At these conferences the latest research regarding the effects of doping 
substances on performance and health, the morality of the issue and how to define and deal 
with the problem were discussed.41  The issue of how to detect doping was a particular 
challenge.  Although Italian scientists had been working on similar tests, it was British 
scientists who first trialled drug testing in 1966 at the soccer World Championships and 
cycling’s Tour of Britain.42  
Even though there had been a number of previous efforts at establishing a workable anti-
doping policy, it is generally acknowledged that it was 1967 before such a policy was 
launched.  Responding to the amphetamine-associated death of British cyclist, Tommy 
Simpson, in the 1967 Tour de France,43 the CoE adopted a resolution condemning doping.  
Earlier that year, the IOC had produced its first Prohibited List and announced that drug 
testing would be introduced at the Olympic Games in 1968.  The first competitor to be 
sanctioned for doping in Olympic competition was the Swedish pentathlete, Hans-Gunnar 
Liljenwall, banned in 1968 for alcohol use.44 
The 1960s were a decade of immense change in other aspects of society.  The post WWII 
baby boom era had produced a number of these changes, and the 1960s were a period of 
social upheaval.  Major events, such at man’s first walk on the moon, fuelled the modernist 
belief in the power of science to accomplish great feats and improve lives.  However, the 
baby boomers were beginning to doubt their ordered, mechanistic world and the youth 
rebellion and counter-culture revolution which dominated the news in the late 1960s had 
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begun.45  One aspect of that rebellion was the increasing use of recreational drugs, leading 
to an increase in severity of criminal sanctions relating to their use.      
The 1960s also saw the introduction of new chemical analysis procedures which aimed to 
identify drugs in the body fluids of animals and humans.  Such tests had application not 
only in drug safety and efficacy, but were also used to detect ‘drugs of abuse’ in various 
groups within society, athletes being one of them.46  
Dimeo summarises the changes in the 1950s and 1960s as including: 
changing social perceptions of the value of science and technology; anxieties over drug use 
in youth cultures; professionalism and nationalism in sport; the modernising rational-
scientific approach to sports performance; the rising profile of sports stars in the media.  At 
the same time, a number of journalists were beginning to realise that drugs provided 
scandal and a story.47  
IV SYMBOLISM OF DOPING 
This background history makes it possible to appreciate more fully the power of 
symbolism in anti-doping policy in the 1960s.  There are two particularly important aspects 
of the symbolism of doping in this time period:  the association of doping agents with the 
power of science and their association with illicit drugs.  The association between doping 
and illicit drugs, established in the 1920s, appears to have waned a little in the 1950s as 
doping was identified in a more positive light.  But in the 1960s illicit drug symbolism 
once again became extremely significant and the association between these two types of 
non-medical drug use became even more influential than in the 1920s. 
A The Power of Science and Drugs 
Beamish and Ritchie demonstrate that one of the reasons for the growing importance of 
sport was a paradigm shift from the theories of conservation of energy to performance 
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   For a good discussion of the issues surrounding drug use at this time see Desmond Manderson, From Mr Sin to 
Mr Big: A History of Australian Drug Laws, 1993 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press).  Verner Møller, 'Knud 
Enemark Jensen's Death During the 1960 Rome Olympics: A Search for Truth?' (2005) 25(3) Sport in History 
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   Arnold Beckett and M Rowland, 'A Specific Method for the Determination of Amphetamine in Urine' (1964) 16 
(Supplement) Journal of Pharmacy and Pharmacology 277; Arnold Beckett and M  Rowland, 'Urinary Excretion 
Kinetics of Amphetamine in Man' (1965) 17 Journal of Pharmacy and Pharmacology 628; Arnold Beckett and M 
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Ephedrine and its Congeners in Urine by Gas Chromatography' (1965) 17 Supplement Journal of Pharmacy and 
Pharmacology 104S.  
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capacities during this period.48  From WWII, the view of human performance changed and, 
as Beamish and Ritchie put it, ‘modern world-class sport now locates human performance 
within an ontological conception that permits, and indeed promotes the continuous, 
scientifically assisted enhancement of athletes’ performance capabilities.’49  Thus the 
1960s was an era in which science and sport experts alike had come to accept that there 
were ways in which the capacity of an athlete to perform could be permanently increased 
rather than temporarily boosted. 
This paradigm shift was in the context of a predominately modernist world view where 
‘modern scientific enterprise… promised such widespread benefits to humanity’.50  Thus 
drugs were naturally seen as powerful agents capable of bringing about significant changes 
in the human.51   
An extremely influential article, published by Sports Illustrated in 1969, demonstrated this 
view: 
Furthermore, we have all been sold on the efficacy of drugs.  We believe that the 
overflowing pharmacopoeia is one of the unquestioned triumphs of the age.  We have been 
sold on drugs empirically because we have tried them and enjoy the results.  We have been 
sold countless magazines and newspaper stories about wonder drugs — many of which 
later turned out to be less than wondrous — by massive pro-drug campaigns mounted by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, by TV actors dressed in doctor’s coats and by real doctors 
many of whom are very quick with the prescription pad.  Generally, we have accepted 
rather uncritically the central message of this persuasive pitch — drugs are good for you.  
These days it is a cultural reflex to reach for a vial, an atomizer, a capsule or a needle if 
you suffer from fever, chills, aches, pains, nausea, nasal congestion, irritability, the 
doldrums, sluggishness, body odour, obesity, emaciation, too many kids, not enough kids, 
nagging backache or tired blood.52 
It was a combination of the beliefs described above that set up one aspect of the symbolism 
of doping in the 1960s:  performance enhancing substances symbolised the transforming 
power of science and drugs.  Not only were these drugs seen as effective but they were also 
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assumed to be the sole determinant of a sporting competition.53  A number of newspaper 
articles from the era demonstrate this symbolism.    
In 1965 the famous Australian swimming great, Dawn Fraser, published an article in the 
Chicago Tribune which opened: 
I feel quite certain that Russian observers went home from the Melbourne Olympic Games 
under the firm impression that Jon Hendricks and I used ‘pep pills’ to boost our 
performances.  We expected it really.  After all, we had furnished the evidence.54 
Fraser went on to relate a number of incidents in which she, Hendricks and their coach 
organised a ‘little pantomime’ for Russian observers at their training sessions.  Fraser 
complained of feeling unwell before getting in the pool.  She continued: 
I swam the first six laps very fast and the seventh much slower.  On the eighth I pulled up 
altogether — and floundered to the side of the pool not far from the Russians.  They moved 
close as I gasped to Harry, “I don’t think I can do anymore”.  Harry produced a bottle full 
of aspirin and a glass of water.  He looked around craftily and gave me a couple of tablets.  
“They ought to fix you” he said loudly. 
I waited a little while, then went back and finished the workout as hard as I could.  The 
improvement was dramatic and the Russian women seemed very impressed.  They 
whispered a lot and took copious notes.  Later Hendricks pulled the same gag.55 
The trick was only possible because of what the bottle of aspirin symbolised to all 
involved:  such a joke would not have been possible if there was not widespread belief in 
the power of drugs.  Here the bottle of aspirin symbolised a potion with transforming 
powers reminiscent of Dr Jeckyll and Mr Hyde or the Incredible Hulk.56 
An earlier example of this symbolism is found in a 1957 article from The New York Times 
by Robert Plumb.57  This article reported suggestions that the four-minute mile (by then 
achieved by twelve athletes) ‘might have been run by athletes temporarily made super-
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athletes by the use of drugs.’  This extract, and the Fraser article, capture the language and 
tone of other articles around this time. 
Further evidence of the power of the symbolism of drugs as powerful transforming potions 
is found in the fact that athletes continued to believe in the transforming power of drugs, 
despite assertions by medical authorities to the contrary.  For instance, the BASM 
published a statement regarding amphetamines which read ‘[n]o known chemical agent is 
capable of producing both safely and effectively an improvement in performance in 
healthy human subjects.’58  Yet athletes continued to use amphetamines.59 
An even more telling example of the power of drugs is the power of the placebo effect.  In 
an article published in the IOC’s bulletin in May 1962 by Professor Giuseppe La Cava, 
General Secretary of the Fédération Internationale de Médecine Sportive, claimed:  ‘I can 
testify to one case when in the finals of an Olympic competition, an athlete, who anxiously 
requested a shot of camphor, was given distilled water with the same results.’60  This 
anecdote reveals the immense power of the belief in drugs, more significant than the 
chemical effects of the drug.  
The idea that ingesting a chemical substance could turn an average athlete into a 
superhuman is the basis for Fraser’s pantomime.  The unwavering belief in the power of 
doping agents has been pervasive throughout anti-doping history despite, in many cases, a 
lack of credible evidence of such an effect.       
B Doping in the 1950s and 1960s:  from ‘Medicine’ to ‘Drugs’ 
1 Doping in the 1950s and early 1960s:  ‘Medicine’ 
Now, whenever the term drug is mentioned in common parlance, people tend immediately 
to conjure up ideas of sleazy dens and slant-eyed maidens, of the spirit of the East and all 
manner of nefarious intrigue and sexual deviation!  Which is most regrettable, because 
nobody has clearly distinguished, at any rate in the scientific or medical circles, between a 
medicine and a drug.  The Oxford dictionary under “drugs” refers to medicine and under 
“medicine” refers to drugs!  Now this may seem like bandying words but it really is 
relevant because drugs which are causing anxiety in the present context are, in fact, 
invaluable medicines if they are used properly.  It is very, very difficult to convince people, 
especially politicians, of this point.  They seem to have the idea that there are things called 
“medicine” which are splendid and save life, and things called “drugs” which are villainous 
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and lead people to eternal damnation.  There are, as it were, “goodies” and “baddies” as in 
the television comedies.  Actually this is very far from being so – in fact it is rather the 
intent with which these things are used that lead to them conferring benefits or leading to 
addiction.61 
There is a significant difference between the terms ‘drugs’ and ‘medicine’.  While drugs 
tend to be those associated with illicit drug culture, ‘medicine’ tends to connote the 
socially acceptable, medically-indicated use of drugs.  The view of doping in the 1950s 
was largely one which identified performance-enhancing substances as ‘medicines’.  Two 
aspects of this view will be explored below.  
(a) Performance Enhancing Substances as Positive Agents  
In the 1950s public debate regarding the use of performance enhancing substances was 
fairly limited:  interest in the issue was mostly confined to the medical and scientific 
communities.62  Research was undertaken into the ergogenic effects of doping substances; 
early studies on amphetamines characterised them as useful substances with few side 
effects.  Set out below are a number of examples of the way in which scientific studies at 
the time reported on the use of performance enhancing substances.  Used as a medicine, 
under medical supervision, these substances were viewed as helpful in enhancing 
performance without danger. 
For example, two famous studies by Smith and Beecher, in 1959 and 1960, on the effect of 
amphetamine sulfate and secobarbital on athletic performance, did not contain any 
negative comments on the subject of the use of such drugs.  Moreover, much of the 
language is neutral, or even positive, in reporting the use of amphetamine in this way:  the 
study subjects being said to have ‘definitely benefited by the amphetamine’.63   
Similarly, a 1962 review article of the effects of caffeine and amphetamines on human 
performance concluded: 
Both from the standpoint of physiological and psychological cost, amphetamines and 
caffeine are rather benign agents.  Except for reports of insomnia, the subjective effects of 
amphetamines in normal doses are usually favourable…  Caffeine is somewhat less 
benign….  At dose levels that clearly enhance performance, the amphetamines seem not 
only more effective than caffeine, but less costly in terms of side-effects.64   
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(b) Doping as a Medical Problem  
The positive views associated with doping agents in the above studies were not universally 
shared.  However, even when doping was discussed as a problem in sport, the discussion 
was mostly located within a medical or scientific genre rather than a criminal justice one.  
Examples are provided below. 
A 1962 article from the IOC newsletter regarding anti-doping programmes in Switzerland 
stated: 
Practically speaking, it is necessary to describe as doping any use of medicines which 
permit the athlete to reach his goal by artificial means.  In this sense, medicine means all 
substances and patents enumerate on the most recent lists A,B and C of the International 
Medicine Control Officer, which consequently, are obtainable at chemists.  Considering the 
practical difficulties, one might envisage the temporary limitation of doping substances 
delivered only on presentation of a prescription.65 
Medical language was prominent in this discussion and the taking of any medicine by an 
athlete could only be legitimized by a medical script. 
A 1962 article in the IOC bulletin read: 
As for the sanctions punishing this offence they are difficult to apply because the addicted 
to drugs is rarely found out.  When he or the guilty parties, who give or supply the drugs, 
are discovered, it ought to fall within the competent medical profession to prosecute the 
responsible parties on the charge of illegal medical practice and to apply severe sanctions, 
going as far as imprisonment or attempt to injure a person’s health.  This penalty may give 
cause to reflection with the facetious advisers.66  
At this point in time it was assumed that the source of doping agents was the medical 
profession, and that doping was therefore a problem of medical ethics.  In this passage the 
‘guilty’ party was the person who had supplied the drug, rather than the person who took it 
and the appropriate method of punishment was through the usual disciplinary procedures 
of the medical profession.  The athlete was seen as a passive recipient in the process: 
Athletes do because they have far more access to drugs than most of us.  They do not have 
to stand around in waiting rooms, at pharmacy counters or on street corners for their fixes.  
Drugs are brought to them, and usually provided free of charge.  The athlete gets free 
professional advice from physicians and assisting trainers as to what drugs to take, and 
when and how….  While physicians and trainers will often bridle at the suggestion (drug 
has become a four-letter word for them as well as others), the general pattern seems to be 
that the more closely one is associated with the medical profession the larger one’s drug 
consumption.67  
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A similar sentiment was expressed in the IOC newsletter in 1962:  ‘Let us save young 
athletes who are often in the hands of trainers with what might be termed somewhat elastic 
consciences.’68  And in 1969:  ‘Nearly every sport has been contaminated by the 
experiments of doctors, trainers and masseurs in their quest for the philosopher’s stone.’69 
This kind of language correlates with the ‘medical’ view of doping, where doping agents 
are medicines which can be used either ethically or unethically by the medical profession.  
The symbolism of performance enhancing substances as ‘medicines’ rather than ‘drugs’ 
was consistent with the wider view of drugs.  Dimeo states:  ‘The paradigm of the 1940s in 
which drugs offered opportunities in sport and society, gave way to a new paradigm in 
which drugs were something to be feared and regulated.’70  By the 1960s the symbolism 
was to change again.  
2 Doping in the 1960s:  ‘Drugs’, ‘Addiction’ and ‘Drug Addicts’  
The Chairman mentions the use in certain sport circles of a pharmaceutical product called 
Amphetamine Sulfate (PEP pills) which is nothing else but a dope or a drug.  Mr Brundage 
draws the attention of the members upon the seriousness of the case and requests them to 
speak of this matter in their respective countries.71 
By the late 1960s, a new ‘drug epidemic’ had begun throughout the Western world.  The 
history of the pattern of drug use in the late 1960s has been well documented.  The rising 
use of recreational drugs such as marijuana and amphetamines was associated with 
increased criminalization of these drugs.72   
(a) Doping:  Dangerous and Evil 
In strong contrast to the positive views of performance enhancing substances in the 
scientific literature of the 1950s, by the 1960s, doping was regarded as both dangerous and 
evil.  Some of the language characteristic of the debate is provided below. 
It also includes poisonous drugs.  Even under expert medical attention, excessive use of 
dope may lead to disastrous results…  In fact dope may not be beneficial to human life; it 
may do us more harm.  A doped athlete may have a high degree of uncertainty:  drugs dull 
the mind and senses.  A severe narcotic effect may slow down the general responses of an 
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athlete….  They may become lazy and indifferent towards leading the life of a sportsman.  
They may lose their natural smartness and intelligence. 73 
In the last aspect one must deplore the error of claiming the right to dispose 
unconditionally of his body and thereby to submit it to obvious risks and obtain results that 
are beyond his natural forces to ABSORB GRAVELY NOXIOUS SUBSTANCES.  SUCH 
IS THE CASE WHEN CONSUMING HIGHLY STIMULATING DRUGS WHICH 
BESIDES BEING LIKELY TO CAUSE HARM OF A POSSIBLY IRREPARABLE 
NATURE TO THE SYSTEM, ARE LOOKED UPON AS A KIND OF FRAUD BY 
SPECIALISTS.  In such cases, the responsibility of spectators, organisers and the press is 
very serious when they encourage this risky practice.74 
Drug taking “has killed and will kill more young people than thalidomide has produced 
monsters”, an international conference at Uriage, near Grenoble, was told by Professor 
Boissier, of the Paris Medicine Faculty.  He urged that athletes should be warned of the 
risks they were running in taking drugs.  The conference, which had as its theme “Doping 
is the cancer of sport”, tonight passed a motion formally condemning doping…75 
(b) Doping:  the Problem of Addiction and Athletes as Drug Addicts 
In the early to mid 1960s there were an increasing number of references to the problem of 
drug addiction in doping discourse, reflecting concerns in society regarding recreational 
drug use.76  In fact, the discourse on doping was extremely reminiscent of the discourse 
surrounding illicit drugs from the turn of the century, considered in the previous chapter.  
One particularly poignant example of the similarities between doping discourse and illicit 
drug discourse is extracted below in Figures 2 and 3 in the form of two cartoons, one from 
the 1960s and one from the 1920s.  
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Figure 2:  1960s Dope Cartoon77 
The first cartoon, from the 1960s, pictures a cyclist being congratulated after winning a 
race and in place of his head, a big circle with ‘DOPE’ written on it appears.  This cartoon 
implicitly suggests that ‘dope’ was the only reason that this cyclist won the race.  The form 
of the cartoon is exactly the same as the cartoons from the 1920s picturing ‘dope’ as a 
separate character of its own, as shown below.  The link between illicit recreational drugs 
and doping is obvious in the use of similar ways of representing the issues in cartoon form. 
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Figure 3:  1920s Dope Cartoon78 
Below are a number of examples from anti-doping discourse which show that doping was 
viewed as a problem of drug addiction and the doping athlete as a drug addict:  the 
association also being reflected in the language used. 
Medically, of course, there is a further danger, although it is hard to prove, that habitual 
use, particularly with increasing doses of drugs, can lead to addiction.  And this of course 
is not only in the forefront in this context of sport but also of the national wellbeing in 
many countries – America is very much up against it at present, while in Great Britain it is 
a growing problem (or if it is not a growing problem it has been brought to light very much 
more in the last year or two)….  In America and other places, the mere word “dope” has a 
sinister and unpleasant meaning.  And this is really appropriate, for morally, mentally and 
physically a man can become a wreck through this misuse of drugs.79  
Such are the ways of the press, the whole thing was magnified and blown up in the national 
papers to such an extent as to make it appear that many British athletes and sportsmen were 
little more than “junkies”…’80 
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It is not for one moment suggested that everyone who plays football, who runs or who 
swims competitively has his fix before he starts!’81 
Well then, what is dope?  It is a preparation of a drug, which forms habit, such as that of 
narcotics or of opium.  Its use produces pleasure and stimulation.  It is used also to deprive 
of sensibility.  Before a race, dope is given to a horse to depress or stimulate it temporarily:  
this may spoil or improve the speed.  The idea behind doping is to impregnate an organism 
with a foreign substance in order to obtain the desired appearance, performance, property, 
etc.  In popular terms, dopes are stimulating substances.  In slang dope is referred to as a 
harmful drug taken by a narcotic addict.  In short, doping conquers fatigue due to physical 
and metal [sic] labours, for a certain period.82 
Habitual use of any drug potent enough to improve physical performance is likely in the 
long run to damage health.  Continued use of stimulants (or depressants) automatically 
leads to increased dosage and so a habit is set up which is the first stage of addiction.83 
The second last extract, from the Olympic Review in 1969, demonstrates a confused mix of 
references to the use of drugs for performance enhancement and the use of drugs for 
recreational purposes.  The intermingling of these two issues, today regarded as quite 
separate, is typical of the doping debate at the time.   
Correlating with the changing symbolism of doping from ‘medicine’ to ‘drugs’ came a 
change in focus from the medical profession to the athlete in terms of responsibility.  The 
athlete was no longer a passive recipient, but the main actor making moral choices about 
the use of ‘drugs’.  For example, in a 1969 British Journal of Sports Medicine article, 
Goulding considered the supply of doping agents: 
Once the young people get on to these drugs then they are into the market where, because 
control in the factories and in the shops is difficult to exercise, there is always some in 
circulation, and they can buy them on the black market.  There is perhaps a tighter control 
here now which has been achieved to a small extent by another act — the Drugs Prevention 
and Misuse Act – of a year or two ago, which has effect this way:  if the police make an 
arrest or search and they find one of these youngsters who has got this sort of tablet in a 
handbag or a pocket when they have no good and sufficient reason for possessing them, 
then they can be picked up and that is prima facie an offence.84 
An article in the IOC newsletter in 1968 called ‘Thoughts on Doping’ read ‘“[h]omo 
Ludens”:  who survived up to the beginning of the century has been replaced by another 
type of man, for whom the end justifies the means including those that might kill him.’85  
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And further:  ‘Doping is ‘a form of moral deception in which the athlete is achieving his 
results not on his own merits, but artificially, and in a manner contrary to the code of 
sportsmanship…’86 
The use of performance enhancing substances was now seen as part of the wider issue of 
drug ‘abuse’ within society.  In the period between the 1950s and 1960s doping had moved 
from an interesting challenge for science, to a problem of medical ethics, to a dangerous 
and immoral practice.  The ‘sports doper’ in the late 1960s symbolized a more sinister 
form of non-medical drug use:   the recreational drug user. 
C Amphetamines in the 1950s and 1960s:  From ‘Pep Pills’ to Illicit Drugs  
More specifically, the treatment of the use of amphetamines in sport also changed 
substantially between the 1950s and late 1960s.  This, and the fact that amphetamines were 
then the main doping agents in sport, makes the public debate surrounding amphetamines 
particularly useful for illustrating the role of illicit drug symbolism in the doping debate.   
In the 1950s, amphetamines had been commonly used for twenty years for a variety of 
disorders including ‘inability to sleep, epilepsy, migraine, depression and hyperactivity in 
children.’87  They were sold as an over-the-counter inhaler known as Benzedrine,88 thus 
giving rise to one of its street names, ‘Bennies’.89  Although in the 1930s and 40s use was 
sporadic, in the 1950s and 1960s ‘amphetamines gained acceptance as an appetite 
suppressant for weight loss programs and youth experimentation with a variety of drugs, 
including amphetamines, became more widespread.’90  Amphetamines in the 1950s and 
1960s were used by a wide range of people — bored housewives, truck drivers, people 
who worked long hours and businessmen91— and known by various names:  ‘tonics’ (for, 
people who felt low and needed an energy boost)92, ‘benzies’ and ‘dexies’93, ‘go-pills’ (in 
the military),94 uppers, copilots, speed, zip, crosstops and crank (on the street).95  The name 
‘pep pill’ was employed by students who used them to stay awake in all-night study 
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sessions.  In the sporting context, the only particularly negative view of amphetamines 
related to their potential to extend the athlete beyond the natural limits of their body.       
By 1967, with their increasing use by young people, amphetamines, along with marijuana 
and LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide), became associated with youth rebellion and the 
counter-culture movement feared by parents of the baby-boomer generation.96  They were 
criminalised in most jurisdictions during the 1960s.97  Like the language used to describe 
doping in general, in the late 1960s amphetamines were constructed as dangerous drugs 
and associated with the problems of addiction and overdose.  
1 Amphetamines in the 1950s and early 1960s:  ‘Pep Pills’  
Although there may have been some concern about the health implications of the use of 
stimulants such as amphetamines in the 1950s, the view of such practices was far from the 
criminal drug addiction model that was prevalent in the late 1960s.   
One example of the neutral language used in relation to amphetamines can be found in the 
article by Dawn Fraser extracted above.  Dawn refers to ‘pep pills’ in her charade rather 
than using their scientific name or some of the other colloquial names listed above.  This 
term, which was commonly used in sport at the time,98 had relatively positive associations 
of clean-cut university students using pills to improve their academic performance.99  ‘Pep 
pills’, in academia and sport, were linked with striving to achieve socially desirable goals.  
Furthermore, Dawn and her associates do not appear to be disturbed by the idea that the 
Russians would assume that they were using amphetamines.  The fact that she was willing 
to be connected with such a substance certainly suggests that she and her associates, at 
least, did not see the drugs in a particularly negative light.      
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The use of the innocent phrase ‘pep pill’ extended to the medical and scientific literature as 
well.  For example, in 1964 Ariëns referred to amphetamines and methamphetamine as 
‘so-called “pep pills”’.  Like most other medical/scientific discussions of doping with ‘pep-
pills,’ the main danger considered was the fact that amphetamines could confuse the 
signals of exhaustion in the athlete and lead to the athlete going beyond their natural limits: 
The healthy organism offers natural resistances against overloading.  The feeling of fatigue 
plays an important role here:  it is as it were a warning signal.  As a result of the use of 
weckamines this warning signal is put out of action.  The result of this is that the 
physiological limits are extended with all the risks involved.  It may lead to complete 
exhaustion and severe damage to the organism.  The use of these drugs may be compared 
to putting a fire alarm signal out of order with intent to go quietly to sleep, thinking that 
there will be no alarm and accordingly no fire.100 
Although in general medical literature concerns were beginning to be raised about the 
addictive nature of amphetamines, this was not the major focus of discussions in the late 
1950s and early 1960s in the sporting literature.  The ‘risk of addiction and also dangerous 
intoxications’ were mentioned only in passing by Ariëns:  no real attention was given to 
this aspect of amphetamine use, while the danger of over exertion was concentrated on at 
length.  This appears to be common in the medical literature regarding doping at this stage.  
Goulding, in 1969, repeated the same pattern, ‘[t]here is a feeling of excitement and 
anticipation and a carelessness and determination in throwing off fatigue and herein lies 
the danger.101  Even at that late stage, Goulding was able to claim that ‘it may well be safer 
to drive under the influence of amphetamine (even though the legality is dubious) than run 
the risk of falling to sleep at the wheel.’102  Amphetamine is even compared with caffeine 
and theophylline by Goulding ‘[w]hen people were given tablets of caffeine almost the 
same reaction was found as is obtained with an amphetamine!’103   
Evidence of other non-judgemental, neutral language appears in an article published on 
Sunday, June 9, 1957, in The New York Times, under the headline ‘Sport Physicians to 
Check on Pills’.  It reported that the American College of Sports Medicine was appointing 
a committee to investigate the use of ‘pep pills among athletes.’104  Although there are a 
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few phrases which convey shocked disapproval — the college was to investigate charges 
of widespread use of pep pills among athletes’ and Dr Wolffe was said to be ‘shock[ed]’ 
by the reports105 — the tone of the article is not one of the outrage so characteristic of later 
discussions.  The practice is referred to as ‘taking’ or ‘using’ amphetamine pills rather than 
‘abusing’ them, there is no mention of ‘cheating’ and the athletes are not described as 
‘drug cheats’ or ‘drug users’.  The neutral tone even borders on approval:  ‘Professor 
Cureton credited the performance of Australia’s Olympic swimming team to fine training 
plus fortification with vitamins, wheat germ oil – and, in at least one case, pep pills.’106 
A second report of interest came three years later under the headline ‘Girls in Olympic 
Swim Trials Accused of Taking Pep Pills.’107  This 1960 article does not demonstrate quite 
so much neutrality regarding the practice of amphetamine doping.  The swimmers are 
‘accused of taking pep pills’, Ruuska ‘charged’ both the named American swim clubs and 
the Australian 1956 Olympic female swimmers of using pep pills and claimed that the 
American clubs he named were ‘guilty’ of the ‘charge’.  The words chosen in the 1960 
article have connotations of illegality — charge, accused, guilty.  Within three years there 
had been a change in tone from one of mild surprise and disapproving interest (almost 
                                                                                                                                              
The college’s move followed the decision of the American Medical Association to inquire further into the report made 
by Dr Herbert Berger, Staten Island Drug Authority, last Wednesday, Dr Berger said the drugs were widely used in 
boxing, and he hinted that they might be a factor in the frequent cracking of the four-minute mile barrier by track men. 
He said it [the committee] would try to determine the effect of amphetamines (including Benedrine and Dexedrine) and 
tranquilizers on athletic performance, and their effects on health. 
The ethics involved in the use of these drugs also will be considered, he added. 
Professor Cureton credited the performance of Australia’s Olympic swimming team to fine training plus fortification 
with vitamins, wheat germ oil – and, in at least one case, pep pills.  He named David Tyler, backstroke champion as 
one using pills. 
A physiologist, Professor Cureton, said that the pills would increase the oxygen capacity of the lungs and aid athletic 
performance.  Dr Wolffe said, however, that the college knew of no controlled experiments that had been made with 
these drugs on athletes. 
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…Ruuska said the Santa Clara (Calif.) Swim Club, Multanomah Swim Club of Portland, Ore. and the Los Angeles 
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…Ruuska said he did not think the boys used pep pills. 
Ruuska said ‘Some of the girls were swimming thirty seconds faster than their best previous times. 
“Those things just don’t make sense,” he said.  He also charged Australian women swimmers have been using pep 
pills.’ 
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ambivalence) to shock and outrage.108  This subtle change became more obvious in the 
1960s.   
2 Amphetamines in the 1960s:  Illicit Drugs 
By the late 1960s, amphetamines had been criminalised in many jurisdictions.  
Accordingly, they were now viewed as illicit recreational drugs in wider society and 
associated with youth rebellion.   
(a) Amphetamines in Sport in the 1960s 
By the 1960s, amphetamines had become associated with a number of incidents in sport 
with serious medical consequences.  The death of Knud Jensen has been mentioned above 
while Tommy Simpson’s death will be discussed below.  Other significant events included 
the death of a professional cyclist from amphetamine poisoning in 1948, a cyclist being 
admitted to psychiatric hospital from complications of amphetamine use in 1956, and two 
cyclists being taken to hospital in 1962 and 1963 with amphetamine poisoning.109  
On one level, it may appear unsurprising that amphetamines became seen as extremely 
dangerous substances in sport.  On another level it needs further explanation.  For example, 
the two most prominent events — Jensen and Simpson’s death — are not the 
straightforward amphetamine overdose cases they have come to be reported as.110  Jensen 
died on August 26, 1960, when he collapsed during the 100 kilometre road race at the 
Olympic Games in Rome on a typical Roman summer day of 34 degrees.  He sustained a 
fractured skull and was admitted to hospital with a temperature of 41 degrees where he 
died 2 hours later without having regained consciousness.111  Although later reported as an 
amphetamine-related death, Møller points out that it is not even clear that Jensen had 
amphetamines in his system when he fell.  There were also a number of other factors 
which contributed to his death, possibly much more than any amphetamine did.112   
The other incident of concern was the death of Tommy Simpson who fell from his bike 
during the 1967 Tour de France.   
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In the searing heat Tommy Simpson began weaving across the road before slipping off his 
bike.  After ordering onlookers to “put me back on my bike,’ Tommy continued only a 
short distance before he collapsed and lost consciousness.113   
Mouth-to-mouth artificial respiration administered by Dr Pierre Dumas, chief of the tour’s 
medical services, met with partial success, and Simpson was taken from Mount Ventoux 
by helicopter to hospital in Avignon.  He died there at 5.40 p.m. today…114 
Although it is clear that Simpson had been using amphetamines — he was well known for 
using these substances in his cycling and amphetamines were found in his system and in 
his riding jersey115 — it was later found that other factors, such as the severe heat, 
dehydration and diarrhoea, contributed to his fatal collapse.116   
Out of the many contributing factors in these deaths, only amphetamines/drugs have been 
targeted for prohibition.  Why amphetamines should be so targeted in these, and other 
doping events, needs further explanation.  It can be partially accounted for through 
understanding the impact of the drug symbolism of amphetamines in the 1960s. 
(b) What Did Amphetamines Symbolise Outside Sport in the 1960s?  
On 28 June 1967, the day before the start of the 1967 Tour de France, the front page of The 
Times reported that the musician, Mick Jagger, had been found guilty of possessing four 
tablets containing amphetamine sulphate and methylamphetamine hydrochloride.117  
Ronald Faux and Keith Richards had been found guilty of smoking Indian Hemp and using 
heroin.  On 30 June 1967, The Times reported that the three had been sentenced to jail for 
these offences.  The same edition reported Tommy Simpson’s efforts in the first stage of 
the Tour de France.118 
Not two weeks after these rock stars were imprisoned for the use of amphetamines and 
methylamphetamines, the same substances were discovered in the body and possessions of 
Tommy Simpson.119  This coincidence clearly demonstrates why the language associated 
with amphetamine use in sport changed over the period; the Rolling Stones incidents show 
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the place that amphetamines had come to hold in the public mind.  Instead of being 
associated with clean-cut college students, these drugs were now part of the rebellious, 
uncontrolled world of rock and roll. 
(c) The Changing Symbolism of Amphetamines in Doping Discourse 
The changing view of amphetamines is reflected in the language used to describe the 1960 
death of Knud Jensen and the 1967 death of Tommy Simpson.  As noted above, in 
newspaper articles from the late 1950s to early 1960s,120 amphetamines were usually 
referred to as ‘pep pills’.  In an article regarding Jensen’s death, Dr Howard A Rusk wrote:  
‘The drug, Roniacol, which he gave them is not a so-called “pep” pill.  It is a form of 
nicotinic acid, which is one of the vitamin-B complexes.’121  The use of such neutral terms 
was consistent with the legal status of amphetamines, in both society and sport.122     
However, when The Times reported the death of Simpson,123 he was not said to have ‘used’ 
‘pep pills’, he ‘had drugs’.  Gone are references to the seemingly innocent ‘pep pills’:  
Simpson’s death was not said to be partially attributable to his use, or misuse of ‘pep pills’ 
or ‘amphetamines’ but due to a ‘drug overdose.’  The connotations arising from the word 
‘drug’ and ‘overdose’, with associated images of illicit drug use and youth rebellion, are 
substantially different from that of ‘pep pills.’  Drug addicts and ‘junkies’ use ‘drugs’ and 
die of ‘overdoses.’124  
Sometimes the concerns relating to amphetamines as illicit drugs were made explicit.  This 
link is apparent in the 1957 article mentioned: 
The drugs are potentially dangerous, he said.  A high-pitched person can be stimulated to 
“violent behaviour”, he explained.  Drug addicts, he added, might get their start in taking 
amphetamines during high school and college athletics.125 
It is clear here that the primary concern was the fact that young people may start taking 
amphetamines in the sporting context and that this may, in turn, lead to addiction and 
violence.  What prompted the medical authorities to raise the alarm regarding 
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amphetamine use in sport was not exclusively the sporting issue of unfairness or the 
creation of ‘super-athletes’, it was the wider issue of drug addiction, an issue no different 
to that outside the sporting context.   
In 1957, amphetamines were largely legal and their transformation into ‘evil’ illicit drugs 
had only just started.  As amphetamines became increasingly demonised because of their 
links with ‘drug addicts,’ those associations spilled over into the sporting context.  By the 
1967 death of Simpson in the Tour de France, the transformation of amphetamines from 
‘pep pills’ to ‘drugs’ was complete.  ‘In the 1940s and 1950s they were a panacea for all 
manners of ailments, by the 1960s they were a social tragedy.’126 
V SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REGULATORY MODEL 
The influence of illicit drug symbolism in the developments in anti-doping policy in the 
1960s is reflected in the form in which anti-doping rules took at this time, particularly the 
total prohibition, drug testing and prohibited lists.  
A Total Prohibition 
Although the prohibition on alcohol ended in the 1930s, total prohibition was still the 
favoured approach to recreational drug regulation between the 1930s and the 1960s.  The 
1960s witnessed a strengthening of that approach with an associated increasing of criminal 
penalties.  Similarly, the 1960s anti-doping rules were also total prohibitions:  the system 
put in place in the 1920s and 1930s was accepted as the appropriate approach.  No doubt 
the acceptance of this approach was partly due to the fact that this represented the status 
quo.  But the reinvigorated commitment to prohibition policy on illicit drugs outside of 
sport was also highly influential.  The parallel strengthening of the prohibition policy on 
the use of performance enhancing substances in sport was a natural response to the 
problem of ‘drug abuse’ inside sport.     
B Prohibited List and the Prohibited Substances 
The adoption of a list of prohibited substances was also reminiscent of illicit drug 
regulation.  A total prohibition with a list of prohibited substances attached in a schedule 
has been the form of many national drug laws since the Poisons Acts of the nineteenth 
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century.127  Moreover, such an approach had been part of international illicit drug 
regulation since the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.128   
An even more significant factor is the contents of the list.  Of the six categories listed in 
the 1967 IOC list (alcohol, amphetamine and ephedrine, cocaine, vasodilators, opiates and 
cannabis), the large majority of them had been, or were at the time, subjected to the 
criminal law outside of sport.  The list reads much like a schedule from illicit drug laws.129  
This could be, of course, simply a coincidence caused by the fact that the same substances 
were used in both contexts.  However, the role of illicit drug symbolism here is 
demonstrated by a number of factors considered below.   
Firstly, there is significance in what was left out of the IOC Prohibited List:  there were 
other substances and methods which had been used to enhance performance in sport,130 not 
targeted by these early lists.  For example, caffeine and ‘hormones’ were on prohibited lists 
produced by the CoE and the BASM respectively but did not feature on the IOC list.131  
Similarly, sodium bicarbonate had been studied and used for its ergogenic potential and yet 
did not make the list.132  Oxygen therapy133 and high altitude training134 were also being 
experimented with were not included on the list.  The fact that these non-illicit forms of 
performance enhancement were left off the IOC’s first Prohibited List, while the drugs 
which had been subjected to criminal prohibition were all included, demonstrates the 
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significance of the view of doping as an illicit drug problem.  This is particularly so in light 
of the lack of scientific basis to these prohibited lists, as discussed in Chapter Two.  
The second factor is the adoption of drug tests which had been devised for illicit drug 
detection.  This will be discussed in more detail below but it could be argued that the 
contents of the lists were largely driven by the availability of drug tests.  Since the tests 
available at the time were illicit drug ones, these were the drugs included on the list.  
Evidence for this assertion is found in the fact that steroids became prohibited substances 
once tests were devised.  Even the fact that illicit drug tests were considered appropriate 
for doping agents is testament to the link between doping and illicit drugs.135  The adoption 
of a prohibited list could have been delayed until specialist doping tests could be 
developed.  Instead, a list was published containing mostly illicit drugs.  Since the need for 
action was driven strongly by illicit drug symbolism, it is unsurprising that the adoption of 
such a list would be acceptable in the sports context.   
C Drug Testing 
Techniques used in drug testing in sport ‘were based on a multitude of analytical 
procedures primarily developed for the investigation of metabolism, pharmokinetics and 
toxicology.’136  Furthermore, the experts who developed sports drug testing first worked in 
the detection of amphetamine abuse in wider society: Arnold Beckett, in 1979, wrote: 
We at Chelsea College were brought into the sphere of dope control in sport almost by 
accident.  From about 1958 we had been carrying out work on drug distribution and 
metabolism and elimination in man…  We were concentrating especially in the field of 
sympathomimetic amines and narcotic drugs.  This work necessitated the development of 
analytical techniques for determining very small amounts of drugs and metabolites in 
biological fluids.137   
The adoption of such techniques, again, suggests that drug use in sport symbolized drug 
use in other settings such as the use of illicit recreational drugs.  The implications of 
adopting these kinds of tests in sport will be considered more in Chapter Eight. 
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These aspects of the regulatory form provide further evidence of the role of the symbolism 
of illicit drugs.  
VI THE ROLE OF SYMBOLISM IN ALTERNATE 
EXPLANATIONS 
A Stated Rationales 
As with most policies, there were a number of reasons given for the developments in anti-
doping policy in the 1960s.  For instance, the CoE justified their condemnation of doping 
in 1967 on ‘grounds of health, poor example to the young and that doping was contrary to 
the spirit of fair play in sport.’138   
In Chapter Five it was pointed out that even the stated rationales for anti-doping in the 
1920s was strongly influenced by the symbolism associated with doping.  The same is true 
of the 1960s.   
1 Health 
Dick Pound claims that in the early 1960s, when the IOC Medical Commission first began 
its work ‘[t]here is no doubt that the initial concerns were related almost entirely to the 
health of the athletes.’139  A number of examples of statements which reveal the health 
rationale as the primary motivation for the policy are provided below. 
• An article published in the IOC bulletin in May 1962 entitled ‘Severe Measures 
Taken Against Doping in Italia As Well’ ended:  ‘Let us save our youths and teach 
them that the use of toxic products may poison them in the long run.  It is the duty 
of all of us to do so.’140 
• Later that year, the same bulletin published an article about the ‘War on Doping in 
Switzerland’ and included these words:  ‘A particularly important problem is that 
of trainers who, without the slightest knowledge of even the rudiments of medicine, 
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and with no moral scruples, poison their protégés by making them absorb noxious 
drugs.’141 
• In 1962 an article was published in the IOC bulletin written by Professor Giuseppe 
La Cava.  He wrote regarding amphetamines, ‘the most dangerous’ sports drug: 
These indeed only apparently increase the individual’s overall output, by causing the rapid 
and complete consumption of energy reserves through nervous stimulation.  Furthermore, 
while they eliminate the premonitory sensations of fatigue, they do not eliminate fatigue 
itself or its toxins; thus the natural signal which distinguishes fatigue, a physiological 
phenomenon, from exhaustion, a pathological one, fails to appear, with frequently tragic 
consequences.142 
• A 1963 article in the IOC bulletin stated: 
At the present time, sport is affected by a real menace and evil:  the practice of doping.  It 
prevails in professional as well as in amateur sport.  This evil must be fought.  Doping 
provokes a false feeling of well-being which may lead the athlete to a state of auto-
intoxication resulting from the physical effort he has made.  It may also cause a 
physiological intoxication through the taking of a drug having damaging effects on the life 
and health of the athlete.  Drugs capable of increasing the physical and mental output of the 
athlete should certainly be prohibited.143 
• In 1966 Albert Dirix, a sports medicine specialist with the Beligian Olympic 
Committee wrote: 
Doping has always been in the forefront among the present day problems in the field of 
Sports Medicine.  In recent years, this evil has assumed such large proportions both within 
and outside the world of sport, that it seems absolutely essential to fight against it with 
every possible weapon; in default, we shall be faced with a problem which has certain 
analogies with morphomania and alcoholism.144 
• In 1969 Sir Arthur Porrit wrote of the practice of doping:  ‘It is, in other words, 
dangerous or toxic.  If it were given in such a small dose that it is not toxic it would 
be quite valueless for the purpose for which it was taken.  And this is an essential 
fact – that doping is a dangerous pastime.’145 
The extracts above identify a number of different concerns regarding the effects of 
performance enhancing substances on the health of the athlete.  Firstly, in two of the 
examples, there is the idea that drugs, particularly stimulants such as amphetamines, posed 
a real danger of overexertion by disabling the body’s warning system.  In one, there is 
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reference to the addictive nature of doping:  the problem of morphomania and alcoholism.  
There are also several extracts which refer to a general, unidentified danger:  ‘toxic’, 
‘poison’ and ‘noxious’ being some of the words used in association with doping.  The 
health risks associated with doping were unproven and unclear at the time 146 (and in many 
cases still are) and yet it seems there was widespread acceptance of the imminent health 
dangers of doping.  It is clear that another influence was at work, at least part of which was 
the view of doping as a form of illicit drug taking:  references to alcoholism and 
morphomania make this connection clear.  Like the dangers of addiction to recreational 
drug use, the doping athlete is seen as risking enslavement to the practice of doping.  
Furthermore, reference to doping agents as a non-specific danger is also driven by the 
assumption that all doping substances are dangerous drugs, just as all recreational drugs are 
dangerous ones.  As discussed in Chapter Five, the idea that doping was harmful to the 
health of the athlete was strongly influenced by the clash of images between the drug 
addict and the Corinthian athlete:  one the epitome of health and cleanliness, the other the 
antithesis of it. 
2 Fairness  
Health was not the only rationale presented for anti-doping policy at this stage; fairness 
also rated a mention.  Bound up in the notion of fair play was the idea of a sporting ethic 
which was transgressed by doping practices.  Some examples of the kinds of statements 
made in this regard include: 
• ‘Of at least equal importance is the need to try to retain the ideal of pure sporting 
competition and prevent sporting ideals and values from becoming falsified…doping must 
be regarded primarily as a sporting and not a medical problem.  Doping is unfair in any 
case, but not necessarily injurious to health.  Doping may therefore also be regarded as a 
dangerous fraud.’147  
• ‘Doping is an evil — it is morally wrong, physically dangerous, socially degenerate and 
legally indefensible’148   
• Where in the circles of sportsmen and publicity about sport there is argument against 
doping, emphasis should be laid on the intrinsic objection, namely the unfairness of 
breaking an agreement in a backward manner.  This is stressed by the fact that ineffective 
and medically harmless artificial means used in an attempt to increase the performance are 
concerned as dope and therefore rejected as well.  It is the ethical and not the toxicological 
violation that counts for sportsmen.149 
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• The taking of medicinal substances…seems to be a common occurrence in some circles, 
just as drug-taking appears quite normal to many young people today.  In both categories 
those concerned refuse to make a personal effort by relying on the unnatural ease and 
artificial source of energy induced by a product which conceals their deficiencies.150  
These examples demonstrate a mix of references — fairness, cheating, moral degradation, 
fraud, unsportsmanlike behaviour — making it difficult to ascertain the precise argument.  
However, there is certainly the idea that doping is cheating because doping substances 
cause an athlete to perform far better than normal.  The assumption here is that the doping 
substance has been effective, so effective that it determined the outcome of the 
competition.  In light of the paucity of evidence for this assumption, this kind of belief is 
somewhat surprising.151  However, in light of the discussion above regarding the 
symbolism of doping which associated it with the power of science and drugs, the 
continued belief in the determinant effects of doping are more understandable.152  
3 Role Model to Young 
As noted above, the CoE’s 1967 condemnation of doping was based on health, spirit of 
sport and role model to the young.153  The connection to illicit drug symbolism is clear, the 
terminology being reminiscent of the ‘war on drugs’.154  If doping was purely a problem of 
sports ethics, with no implications outside the sporting context, then this kind of argument 
should equally apply to all breaches of the rules of sport.  The fact that this particular 
breach was seen as presenting a bad role model suggests that there was a general concern 
regarding young people taking these substances, not just that sport would be contaminated.   
B Other Explanations 
There are other potential explanations for the way in which anti-doping policy developed 
in the 1960s which was not as clearly part of the anti-doping discourse of the time. 
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1 Amateurism 
Amateurism was discussed in detail in Chapter Five.  Even though major inroads into the 
amateur ideal had been made, the issue was still alive in the 1960s.155  As in the 1920s and 
1930s, drugs were seen as a real threat to that ideal:  ‘it is certain that our present code of 
amateurism could never bless such all-out efforts.’156 
As discussed in Chapter Five, part of amateurism was the Corinthian ideal of the perfect 
sporting body.  This ideal was also still operative in the 1960s.  For example, in the IOC 
bulletin in 1969 this was published: 
I would prefer to class the athlete as a ‘better race’ on the surface of the earth.  The future 
generations would inherit their characters and therefore a continuity of good human society 
would be maintained.  I would never wish then, that we should be deprived of such fine, 
healthy persons as a result of doping.157 
The symbolic clash between the image of the ideal sportsperson and the drug addict was 
even more significant in the 1960s, as fears relating to recreational drug use had become 
something much more prominent in the public mind. 
2 Role of Scientists 
Another factor which Dimeo regards as essential to the understanding of the history of 
anti-doping policy at this point is the role of individual scientists and their influence on the 
ethical debate.158  However, Dimeo also points out that these scientists did not work in an 
ethical or emotional vacuum; they too were influenced by their idealistic notions of sport:  
‘They were proselytisers as well as fanatics.’159  Scientists too, were affected by the clash 
of images between drug addicts and their ideals of pure sport.160  
3 Regional Differences  
One aspect of the history of the development of anti-doping policy in the 1960s which 
needs to be addressed is the regional differences in ‘behaviours, attitudes, institutional 
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responses and outcomes’ identified by Dimeo.161  Doubtless, Dimeo is correct in his 
assertion that different nations approached and dealt with the issue in different ways.  
However, the symbolism discussed above was operational across borders in the 1960s:  
each approach was influenced to varying degrees by the symbolism associated with 
doping. 
Dimeo demonstrates a major difference between both the level of doping and commitment 
to anti-doping sentiment in the USA, Britain and Europe at this time.  The USA was the 
country where doping was most common.  Dimeo suggests this is because of the American 
entrepreneurial spirit and the influence of returning veterans.162  The US has, until very 
recently, been accused of being very half-hearted in their anti-doping activities.  Britain, on 
the other hand, Dimeo identifies as being very strong in their anti-doping sentiment even 
though doping was not as prevalent in the UK.163  Dimeo also states that European 
countries such as East Germany and the USSR were ambivalent to doping at this stage.  
Although, of course, these attitudes were a result of a number of factors, one part of the 
explanation is to be found in the balance between the influence of illicit drug symbolism 
and other influences such as Cold War political motivations.  As outlined above, all nations 
were keenly aware of the political implications of success at this level of sports 
competition.  Associated with the desire to win political points through international sport 
was the perception that drugs were needed to compete (driven by the symbolism of the 
power of drugs).  The desire to curb the use of performance enhancing substances in sport 
would have been naturally hampered if authorities saw the use of such substances as 
necessary to achieving the all-important sporting victories.  Although in the US, illicit drug 
symbolism and anti-drug, pro-prohibition sentiment was strong — as evidenced by the 
number of US newspapers in the above examples — it is clear that the desire to win in 
international sport was stronger.164  Thus Cold War fears outweighed the influence of 
doping symbolism.  Support for this contention can be found in the fact that it was not until 
the Cold War was over that the US became much more pro-active in their anti-doping 
efforts.165 
                                                
161
   Dimeo, above n 3, 122. 
162
  Ibid, 122-123. 
163
   Ibid, 123. 
164
   This is particularly clear in the discussion of the use of steroids in the next chapter. 
165
   It is generally agreed that up until this point, the US was seen as not taking anti-doping seriously despite strong 
anti-doping rhetoric.  See for instance Dimeo, above n 3, 117 quoting one-time IOC president Lord Killanin: 
‘However, he remained sceptical about activities in the USA where the authorities were unwilling to address the 
problem: there were no drug testing facilities in the whole country even by the early 1980s.’  See also Robert Voy 
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A similar thing can be said of East Germany and the USSR.  Cold War political 
motivations were just as strong and illicit drug symbolism was probably not as influential 
in these regions since they did not have the same history of prohibition sentiment.  
Britain, on the other hand, had not been strongly prohibitionist in its approach to illicit 
drug policy.166  Why would anti-doping sentiment be stronger there?  Firstly, since it was 
not one of the political superpowers at the time, Cold War politics did not play as 
important a role in Britain as the US.  Thus, British sports authorities were in a stronger 
position to deal with the issue free from these political influences.  However, as Dimeo 
identifies, the strength of anti-doping sentiment in Britain can be largely traced to the 
influence of the amateur ethos in that country.  Unlike the US, where the national 
significance of professional leagues had weakened the importance of the amateur ethos, the 
ideal image of the Corinthian athlete was still strong in Britain.  As discussed above, the 
clash between the image of the drug addict/user and the ideal athlete was a significant 
influence in the anti-doping debate.  There is good evidence that British attitudes to doping 
were influenced by drug addiction language.  One particular example is provided above:  a 
1969 reference to the press making British athletes out to be no better than ‘junkies’167 and 
doping as athletes getting their ‘fix’.168  Furthermore, even in the late 1950s, when pep pills 
in sport were first reported, the British used the language of drug abuse.  For example, the 
reports discussed above of Dr Herbert Berger’s view that the four minute mile was 
achieved through the use of amphetamines was reported in much more sensationalist drug 
related language in The Times than in The New York Times:  ‘Dangerous Drug Use by 
Athletes’, ‘most of the abuse was in boxing’169 and ‘“Pep” Drug Charge Awaits 
                                                                                                                                              
and Kirk Deeter, Drugs, Sport and Politics, 1991 (Champaign: Leisure Press) generally for the attitude of the 
United States Olympic Committee (USOC) to drug testing US athletes.  It was not until the formation of United 
States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA: see Chapter One) that US sports authorities began to be seen as getting 
serious about the issue:  Laura S Stewart, 'Has the United States Anti-Doping Agency Gone Too Far?  Analyzing 
the Shift From 'Beyond Reasonable Doubt' to 'Comfortable Satisfaction' (2006) 13 Villanova Sport and 
Entertainment Law Journal 207, 224.  It is also interesting to note that US anti-doping efforts have been strongly 
influenced by anti-drug language, suggesting that illicit drug symbolism has played a major role in US anti-
doping efforts, even if they may have been somewhat delayed compared to other countries.  See for example 
Director Barry R McCaffrey, Combating the Use of Drugs and Doping in Sport (1999) 
<http://commerce.senate.gov/hearing/1020mcc.pdf> at 13 March 2004 as a good example.   
166
   The United Kingdom has long seen drug addiction as a medical problem rather than a criminal one:  see 
Australian Institute of Criminology, Illicit Drugs and Alcohol, International and Overseas Responses: United 
Kingdom <http://www.aic.gov.au/research/drugs/international/uk.html> at 28 June 2008 and J. E. Glancy, The 
Treatment of Narcotic Dependence in the United Kingdom (2001) <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1972-01-01_4_page002.html> at 28 June 2008.  
167
   Williams, above n 2, 129. 
168
   Ibid, 133.  For another example of the British attitude to doping as relating to drug addiction see Adolphe 
Abrahams, 'The Use and Abuse of Drugs by Athletes' (1958) 55(1) The British Journal of Addiction 23.  It is 
significant that this article on doping was published by the Journal of Addiction. 
169
   'Dangerous Use of Drugs by Athletes: "Pep Up Pills" Condemned', The Times (London), 6 June 1957, 10. 
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Inquiry’.170  It is no wonder that the use of such substances was condemned so strongly 
when their use, seen as a type of drug abuse, appeared so incongruous with the image of 
the pure athlete.  As Dimeo put it: 
The influence of amateurism and the traditional public school mentality made drugs seem 
antithetical to sporting competition.  Lord Lonsdale’s view that using stimulants was ‘un-
English’ typified a middle- and upper-class understanding of what sport was for and what it 
was all about.171  
Thus, even the regional differences in anti-doping sentiment can be seen, at least in part, as 
due to the varying importance in doping symbolism. 
VII CONCLUSIONS   
Outside sport, in 1958, the problem of teenage doping in Britain had not yet come to the 
fore; the pop groups were only just beginning to set national trends among the youth, and 
the almost open market of pep pills, purple hearts and even narcotics through the coffee 
bars, strip clubs and ‘love-ins’ was not yet established…  Within a few years drug taking 
spread in Britain, and a black market for pep pills was soon established.  Drugs that offset 
fatigue in all-night jive and rock sessions could easily be tried out to offset fatigue in sport, 
and be found efficacious…the general permissiveness of society does little to discourage 
youngsters, whether competing in sport or not, to seek new thrills and experiences.172 
It is usually the doping-related deaths in sport which are identified as the catalyst for anti-
doping policy in the 1960s.  On one level the causes of these events are uncomplicated:  
athletes got sick or died, apparently from the use of amphetamines and other doping 
products.  Something needed to be done.  However, as Dimeo points out, the history of 
anti-doping is complicated173 and a simplistic cause and effect does not adequately explain 
the events and decisions.   
There are a number of factors, even in these tragic deaths, which need further explanation 
and demonstrate clearly the role of symbolism.  The medical evidence in the two most 
public cases — Jensen and Simpson — revealed that there were other factors involved in 
the deaths:  Knud Jensen appears to have died of heat stroke,174 while other contributing 
factors in Simpson’s death included complications arising from dehydration brought on by 
the heat and diarrhoea.175  Yet these stories have been constructed as being simply due to 
amphetamine use.  Why?   
                                                
170
   '"Pep" Drug Charge Awaits Inquiry: Dr Berger Silent', The Times (London), 8 June 1957, 5. 
171
   Dimeo, above n 3, 123. 
172
   R.G. Fisher and H.E. Robson, '"Doping" in the 1958 Empire and Commonwealth Games, Cardiff' (1969) 4(2) 
British Journal of Sports Medicine 163, 163.  See also Dimeo, above n 3, 109. 
173
   Dimeo, above n 3, 134. 
174
  Fredericksen, above n 111. 
175
   Dimeo, above n 3, 128.  See also Mignon, above n 39, 231 and Fotheringham, above n 116, 179ff. 
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Moreover, Knud Jensen’s death has been identified as the first in Olympic history.176  
Jensen’s death was actually preceded by the death of the Portuguese marathon runner, 
Francesco Lazar, at the 1912 Stockholm Olympics.177  Why was this death ignored and 
Jensen’s death remembered as the first?  When rumours circulated that Jensen and his team 
mates had been given amphetamines, the IOC set up a study on the issue of doping.178  
Why was no similar action taken after Lazar’s death?  Furthermore the marathon has 
obvious health implications and, in fact, commemorates an incident in which the runner 
died.179  Why has such an event had a permanent and elevated position in the Olympics?   
The Tour de France is a gruelling event.  One rider has claimed: 
The riders reckon that a good Tour takes one year off your life, and when you finish in a 
bad state, they reckon three years…  You can’t describe to a normal person how tired you 
feel…  In 1987, when I finished in a really bad way it took until the end of November to 
recover, by that I mean until I could wake up and not feel tired as if I had already done a 
day’s work.180 
Yet when Tommy Simpson died, it was drugs which were blamed, not the strenuous nature 
of the event.  It has been said that the significant factor in Tommy Simpson’s death was 
that it was televised.  Like the televised coverage of the Vietnam War,181 it has been argued 
that the visual impact of Simpson’s death led to action.  But television coverage is only 
part of the answer.  The coverage of Vietnam led to demands that the war be ceased, not a 
total prohibition on the use of the weapons that caused the carnage.  Why did the television 
coverage of a death in the Tour de France not lead to demands for the cessation of the 
Tour, rather than of the drugs involved?  As Dimeo stated ‘[b]y the time the rationale for 
anti-doping was firmed up in the 1960s it was the drugs – and wider social misuse of drugs 
– that were seen as the real culprits.’182  It is a narrow view which focuses only on the use 
of performance enhancing substances. 
Finally, even if the deaths of Jensen and Simpson had been what they have been made out 
to be — attributable only to amphetamine use — there were also other approaches to 
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   'First Death of Modern Olympics', Chicago Daily Tribune (Chicago), 27 August 1960, B1. 
177
   Lord  Desborough, The Olympic Games of Stockholm 1912 (1912) 
 <http://www.la84foundation.org/6oic/OfficialReports/1912/1912.pdf> at 13 September 2008, 839. 
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  'Olympic Unit Plans to Check on Doping', The New York Times (New York), 4 March 1962, 174. 
179
   Chicago Daily Tribune, above n 176. 
180
  Mignon, above n 39, 228. 
181
  See for example David Culbert, 'Television’s Impact on Decision-Making in the USA, 1968: The Tet Offensive 
and Chicago’s Democratic National Convention' (1998) 33(3) Journal of Contemporary History 419, 419–499. 
182
   Dimeo, above n 3, 90.  He was referring to the wider issue of highly competitive sport but the sentiment is 
equally applicable in this context. 
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dealing with the problem.  Savulescu, Foddy and Clayton183 suggest that one alternative to 
a total prohibition and drug testing is to have medical checks for athletes, their 
participation relying on satisfaction of health criteria.  It appears that this possibility, 
although it had been utilised previously in the 1912 Olympic marathon in Stockholm,184 
was not even entertained.185 
It is clear that there were hidden assumptions and attitudes influencing decision making 
about anti-doping policy.  The combination of the symbolism of the power of drugs and the 
associations between doping in sport and the recreational use of dangerous drugs of 
addiction in society worked strongly together. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the role of symbolism is in the changing symbolism 
associated with amphetamines.  When amphetamines were freely available drugs which 
were viewed in a positive light, anti-doping sentiment was weak.  By the end of the 1960s, 
recreational drug use was a high profile public issue and amphetamines had become illicit 
recreational drugs.  Doping then became an issue.  Just as amphetamines had been 
demonised in the years between the early 1950s and late 1960s, so too doping in sport had 
been demonised.  The seeds of symbolism planted in the 1920s began to grow and bear 
fruit.  This symbolism fed into public fears regarding the use of recreational drugs by 
rebellious youth in the 1960s.   
It was not just that Knud Jensen and Tommy Simpson died.  It was not just that they died 
competing.  It was not just that they died enhancing their performance.  It was that they 
died of drugs; the same drugs that were being used in ‘coffee bars, strip clubs and ‘love-
ins’:  illicit drugs.186  Their deaths were linked with amphetamines, ‘… possibly the most 
destructive of the drugs being abused.’187  This is the same drug which, about a decade 
earlier, was labelled as more benign than caffeine.188 
Anti-doping discourse in the 1950s and 1960s, like the 1920s and 1930s, was dominated by 
illicit drug symbolism.  The links with illicit recreational drugs had set in place a total 
prohibition on performance enhancing substances in sport in the 1920s.  It led to the 
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   J Savulescu, B Foddy and M Clayton, 'Why We Should Allow Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport' (2004) 
38(6) British Journal of Sports Medicine 666. 
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   Desborough, above n 177, 112. 
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expansion of that system in the 1950s and 1960s with the introduction of prohibited 
substances lists and drug testing.  Illicit drug symbolism, therefore, had enormous 
influence in these two time periods.  As will be shown in the next chapter, illicit drug 
symbolism remained operative into the 1970s, but doping and anti-doping discourse was to 
change significantly, and, with it, the symbolism associated with performance enhancing 
substances.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SYMBOLISM IN THE ‘SECOND CHAPTER’ OF ANTI-
DOPING HISTORY 
I INTRODUCTION 
Dianabol, Dianabol  
It’s the gateway to fame. 
With Dianabol you’ll win them all 
Unless the others are using the same.1 
Androgenic anabolic steroid use presented the major issue in anti-doping policy in the  
1970s.2  The song above demonstrates two ideas which characterised doping discourse in 
the 1970s:  a strong belief in both the power of steroids and the prevalence of their use.  
Steroids were fundamentally different to the drugs that had been used before in sport:  
they were not ‘race day drugs’.3  While stimulants and narcotics, which had been used in 
sport between the 1870s and 1970s, were designed to boost the athlete’s performance on 
the day of competition because they were substances with a short active life, steroids 
were designed to enhance long-tem strength and were best used in the training period.  
The issues that steroids raised for anti-doping policy were therefore quite distinct from 
those that were dealt with in the 1950s and 1960s and discussed in the previous two 
chapters, warranting treatment in a separate chapter of the thesis.   
In light of these differences, the way in which steroids were dealt with by the sporting 
authorities is particularly telling.  Symbolism was equally, if not more, important in the 
developments in anti-doping policy in the 1970s than in previous time periods.  While 
illicit drug symbolism still played an important role, a new kind of symbolism, one based 
on nationalist patriotism, began to emerge.  Woven into both of these issues was the 
continuing theme of the power of drugs, but in this era the power of drugs took on an 
even more sinister aspect than in the 1960s.   
                                                
1 
 The chorus of a song entitled ‘Dianabol, Dianabol’, composed by the American shotputter, Al Feurbach: Neil 
Amdur, 'Mounting Drug Use Afflicts World Sports', The New York Times (New York), 20 November 1978, C1. 
2   Although the correct technical name of anabolic steroids is ‘anabolic androgenic steroids’, ‘steroids’ or ‘anabolic 
steroids’ will be used here for ease of reference.   
3   Rob Beamish and Ian Ritchie, 'From Fixed Capacities to Performance-Enhancement: The Paradigm Shift in the 
Science of 'Training' and the Use of Performance Enhancing Substances' (2005) 25(3) Sport in History 412, 423. 
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This chapter will consider the symbolism of doping in the 1970s and the way in which it 
influenced anti-doping policy.  As with the previous two chapters, the 1970s steroids 
regulations will be examined, some historical background explored, and then the 
symbolism of steroids considered.  Again, the significance of the regulatory regime will 
be discussed and the role symbolism has played in other interpretations of this historical 
period.  Conclusions are presented in the final section of the chapter.   
II 1970S STEROIDS REGULATION 
Even by 1967 anabolic steroids were beginning to be an issue for sports officials.  The 
1967 International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) Prohibited List, set out in Chapter Six, 
included a statement saying that steroids were regarded as being within the definition of 
doping.  The statement read in part:  
Summary on anabolic steroids 
Anabolic steroids have been increasingly used in sport since at least 1963.  Their effect is 
to facilitate muscle building by utilising ingested protein to a maximum.  By using these 
drugs in conjunction with a high protein diet and strengthening exercises, a dramatic 
increase in body weight and strength can be achieved.  The advantages that such changes 
can have to sporting activities requiring power are obvious. 
The drug is taken during the training period, that is to say not at the time of a 
championship or meeting. 
The harmful side effects are few.  Basically, in the male, they are: 
1. Jaundice. 
2. Fluid retention (leading possibly to increased blood pressure). 
3. Impotence. 
4. Failure or reduction in spermato genesis. 
5. Acne. 
In the female: 
6. Hirsutism. 
7. Menstrual disturbances. 
In adolescence: 
8. Stunted bone growth. 
Because the drug is not taken at the time of a championship or meeting detection is 
difficult.  Detection, however, is theoretically not impossible.  The details of detection 
would require the close co-operation of an expert endocrinologist with specialized 
laboratory facilities.  Probably the most informed department in Britain on this subject is 
that of Professor Prunty of St. Thomas Hospital.4 
                                                
4
   International Olympic Committee, ‘Extracts of the Minutes of the 65th Session of the International Olympic 
Committee’ (1967) 98-99 (May-August) Bulletin du Comité International Olympique 89, 95. 
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The prohibition on the use of steroids by the IOC was introduced in the 1970s.5  Exactly 
when this prohibition was instigated is difficult to pinpoint since there a number of 
different dates suggested in the various accounts.6  Technically it could be argued that 
steroids were actually included on the IOC Prohibited List in 1967 for, although they did 
not appear on the actual list with the other prohibited drugs, Item Three on the list stated:  
‘The I.O.C. considers that the use of anabolic steroids (except for medical purposes) 
constitutes “doping ” from the olympic [sic] viewpoint.’7  However, the preponderance of 
opinion seems to be that it was the mid 1970s when steroids were banned in Olympic 
Sports.  Other sports federations had prohibited steroids in the years previously as well.8 
Whatever the date of the prohibition, by 1976 steroid testing had been introduced.9  The 
IOC was the first sports organisation to introduce steroid testing10 and the tests to be used 
were those introduced in the British Journal of Sports Medicine in 1974.  The details of 
the testing were elucidated by the head of the IOC Medical Commission, Prince 
Alexander De Merode, at the October meeting of the IOC of the same year11 and it was 
                                                
5
   It seems that the IAAF (International Amateur Athletics Federation as it then was) were the first to prohibit 
steroids (1970) although it was not possible at that stage to take action on the prohibition due to deficiencies in 
testing:  Arnold Beckett, 'Problems of Anabolic Steroids in Sport' (1976) Nov-Dec(109-110) Olympic Review 
591, 597.  Beckett states that the IOC banned the use of steroids in 1974.  However, one article from The Times 
newspaper from 1970 suggests that the IOC had banned steroids before 1970.  The article states: ‘the official 
world record holder in the shot,  Randy Matson, of the United States, has admitted to me that he took steroids 
before they were banned by the International Olympic Committee’: Neil Allen, 'Official Wants to Ban Shot 
Event', The Times (London), 15 April 1970, 14.  This could be referring to the statement on steroids in 1967.  It 
should also be noted here that the focus of this chapter will be on Olympic sport since the IOC has been the focal 
point (although not necessarily the leader) for anti-doping policy up until the creation of the World Anti-Doping 
Agency (WADA).  
6
   Paul Dimeo, A History of Drug Use in Sport 1876-1976: Beyond Good and Evil, 2007 (London: Routledge), 112 
states that the IOC added them to their Prohibited List in April 1974 after experimental steroid testing was carried 
out at the 1974 Commonwealth Games in Christchurch.  Hunt, on the other hand, dates the inclusion of steroids 
on the list as May 197:  Thomas M. Hunt, 'Sport, Drugs and the Cold War:  The Conundrum of Olympic Doping 
Policy, 1970 - 1979.' (2007) XVI Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies 19, 28.  Beckett and 
Cowan state ‘[t]he work [of developing a test for steroids by Raymond Brooks] became sufficiently advanced so 
that the IOC Medical Commission was able to include anabolic steroids amongst the banned classes in April, 
1975’:  A H Beckett and DA Cowan, 'Misuse of Drugs in Sport' (1979) 12(4) British Journal of Sports Medicine 
185, 189.  Beckett and Cowan provide the details of the listing but do not cite the meeting at which this decision 
was made while Hunt quotes Prince Alexander de Merode as saying ‘the reason for this is that the progress of the 
scientific work proposed gives complete guarantee as to the accuracy of the results that can be obtained: Hunt, 
this note, 28. 
7
   International Olympic Committee, above n 4, 34. 
8
  Three examples are: weightlifting [International Olympic Commitee, 'Within the International Federations' 
(1974) 80-81(July-August) Olympic Review 374], athletics [F W Holder, 'Anabolic Detection and Enforcement' 
(1975) 9(2) British Journal of Sports Medicine 98, 98] and rowing [International Olympic Committee, 'Within the 
International Federations' (1974) 85-86(November - December) Olympic Review 632]. 
9
   It is not surprising that the actual prohibition is unclear since the IOC was not a legally sophisticated organization 
at this point in time.  The point has been made previously that Dick Pound claims that it was not until the 1990s 
that the IOC Medical Code became a legal document: Dick Pound, Inside the Olympics, 2004 (John Wiley and 
Sons: Mississauga), 69. 
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   Dimeo, above n 6, 113.   
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  Jan Todd and Terry Todd, 'Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic Movement' in 
Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (eds), Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement, 
2001 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) 65, 72. 
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announced in the media that these tests would be used at the next Olympic Games.12  
There was some experimentation with the tests at the 1970 and 1974 Commonwealth 
Games in Edinburgh and Christchurch but no sanctions applied at that stage.13  The 
prohibition on steroids was therefore first operational at the 1976 Olympic Games in 
Montreal and ‘led to five further disqualifications including medal winners.’14   
There is little to suggest that the adoption of the prohibition on, and testing of, steroids 
was a controversial issue; a number of sports organisations had prohibited these 
substances and it seems that the IOC accepted the need to introduce testing as soon as 
possible, partly from the interest that the public were taking in the issue.15   
The year 1974 also saw a new development in the IOC doping rules.  Up until this point 
the rules against doping were contained in the athlete’s entry form.  The IOC minutes 
formalised them in Rule 26(a) – Medical.  It read: 
 1. Doping is forbidden.  The IOC will prepare a list of prohibited drugs. 
2. All Olympic Competitors are liable to medical control and examination, in conformity with 
the rules of the Medical Commission. 
 3. Any Olympic competitor refusing to take a doping test or who is found guilty of doping shall be eliminated.  If 
the Olympic competitor belongs to a team, the match or competition in question shall be forfeited by the team.  
After the explanations of the team have been considered and the case discussed with the International Federation 
concerned, the team in which one or more members have been found guilty of doping may be disqualified from 
the Olympic Games.  In sports in which a team may no longer compete after a member has been disqualified, the 
remaining members may compete on an individual basis in agreement with the IOC…16 
The need to reformulate the anti-doping rules arose from a perception that the former rule 
was ambiguous.  Lord Killanin in 1974 stated at a press conference:  ‘This rule concerning 
doping is not very clear.  We have therefore amended its format without making 
fundamental modifications to the rule itself.’17  This extract clearly demonstrates that, 
although the issue of steroids had pushed anti-doping sentiment to a new level of intensity 
— warranting a reinforcement of the rules — there were to be no fundamental changes to 
the regulatory scheme established in the 1930s to 1960s.  
                                                
12
   '1976 Olympians to Get Steroids Tests', The New York Times (New York), 7 May 1974, 40. 
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   Neil Allen, 'Drug Takers Not to be Punished', The Times (London), 17 July 1970, 12 and Terry Todd, 'Anabolic 
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  International Olympic Committee, 'New Rules' (1974) 85-86 Olympic Review 585; Todd and Todd, above n 11, 
73.   
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Olympic Review 289, 291. 
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III HISTORIC BACKGROUND 
A Sport 
As sport became more important and lucrative, there was added incentive to improve 
athlete’s training and preparation procedures via scientific methods.18  Unlike the other 
periods considered so far, this era was characterised by systematic application of these 
methods on a national basis.  The political significance that sport was assuming gave 
national governments the impetus to contribute to efforts in these areas.  There were major 
developments in many areas of sports science during the 1970s, including the introduction 
of strength training through the use of weight training,19 the introduction of talent 
identification systems20 and the development of specialised training facilities for potential 
national athletes.21   
Another significant development in sport was the increasing international importance of 
the Olympic Games.  The Olympics provided a focal point for international sport like no 
other event.  It was therefore natural for nations harbouring ambitions on the world sports 
stage to view the Olympics as an opportunity to demonstrate their superiority.22  
Furthermore, there was more money involved in the Olympics through negotiations over 
television rights and also early sponsorship deals.23  Although far from the rich and 
powerful organisation that it is today, the IOC was beginning its transformation from an 
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impoverished ‘rich boys club’24 to one of the worlds’ richest and most powerful 
organisations. 
Amateurism continued to be a major issue in Olympic sport in the 1970s.  During the 
1960s and early 1970s, Avery Brundage was the president of the IOC:  ‘A great advocate 
of amateurism’.25  Despite Brundage’s best efforts to maintain the official position of the 
IOC on amateurs, the introduction of athletes from national institutes — where athletes 
trained full time — and the involvement of athletes who were paid unofficial 
endorsements and appearance fees, made the rift between the ideal Olympic athlete and 
the reality of the situation even wider than in previous generations.26  Only three years into 
the 1980s the IOC were forced to change their rules regarding the participation of 
amateurs at the Olympics.  
However, the greatest characteristic of international sport in the 1970s was the effects of 
the Cold War:  ‘the Olympic Games came increasingly to focus tensions between two 
nuclear powers with ideologically opposed political and economic structures.’27  For 
instance, when the USSR announced that it would send a team to the 1952 Helsinki 
Olympics, it was reported in The New York Times: 
Soviet Sports said that the Olympics require athletes to “redouble their efforts to heighten 
their mastery in order to be fully prepared to meet the strongest athletes in the world and to 
emerge from this with honor to raise still higher the sports glory of the Soviet 
fatherland”.28  
Headlines in the same paper read ‘Rivalry Between US and Russia to Enliven Helsinki 
Competition:  Cold War of Sport Will Start Simmering When Soviet Claims of World 
Records Are Put to Stern Test at Olympics’.29  As Dimeo notes, with the successes of the 
Soviet athletes, the USA became more and more determined to fight back on the sporting 
stage.  Later in the Cold War, one athlete was quoted as saying ‘[t]he East-West thing is 
the big thing now.  There’s no more true sport involved’30  and: 
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the tragedy is that the drug situation is only part of the real problem.  What we have in 
amateur sport is several power-hungry countries that are still desirous of using the world 
athletic stage to promote their individual brand of propaganda – rules, morals and athletes 
be damned.31 
Such nationalism took amateur sport to a new level of importance,32 with the powers of 
sport science being harnessed to enhance the nation’s sporting achievements.  As Beamish 
and Ritchie state:  
The Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War transformed international, 
world-class, high performance sport as approaches to training, the use of scientific 
knowledge to enhance performance and the resources directed towards the pursuit of the 
liner record changed dramatically…two of the central reasons [for what Roger Bannister 
described as ‘a strange period in the history of sport’ where ‘every country seeks to 
enhance national prestige by physical achievements’] were the strategic political 
objectives that particular national leaders held and the concomitant increased allocation of 
resources directed to world-class sport.33     
In 1970 Dr Georg van Opel wrote the following words, which give a taste of the flavour of 
Olympic Sport at that time:  
There is no longer any room at the Olympic Games for the development of free 
individuality and for contests among free persons.  The political comparison of nations in 
the sports field has brought by force the transformation of the lover of sport (amateur) into 
the national athlete and puppet in the struggle of power politics.  The step-by-step 
adaptation to the national passion for self-assertion in sport is the gradual loss of freedom 
and human dignity in sport.  The national athlete is an agent commissioned by the state, a 
man enslaved by his mission, a manipulable tool to the state and propaganda.  The national 
athlete must train and win.34 
B World 
The tensions on the sporting field created by the Cold War were obviously part of a much 
wider social phenomenon which characterised the 1970s.  As dominant as these political 
issues were, there were other issues in the wider social setting which had some effect on 
sport and anti-doping policy in the 1970s.   
The increasing use of recreational drugs by young people in the 1960s continued into the 
1970s, as did the backlash against it.  This resulted in a continued pattern of increasing 
criminal penalties for illicit, recreational drug use.  Parents of teenagers were still vitally 
concerned about the drug habits of their children and such concerns obviously had a huge 
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impact on their attitudes towards drug use in sport.  The 1970s image of a drug user 
appears to have been similar to the late 1960s, with a strong association between drug 
users and the rock and roll and rebellious youth cultures.  The hippie movement of the 
1970s, strongly associated with psychoactive (and illegal) drugs, was also a major concern 
for many people.  The characterising features of this movement were a rejection of 
traditional living and an adoption of alternative lifestyles. 
Attitudes to science had also begun to change.  It was not that science was viewed as 
lacking power; it was the motivation behind the power that was a concern.  As Beamish 
and Ritchie point out, as a result of the experiences of the Nazi experiments in World War 
II (WWII) and the role of science in the nuclear arms race of the Cold War, science was 
no longer seen as the beneficial force it was once viewed to be.35  Similarly, Dimeo 
suggests that catastrophes such as those caused by the drug, thalidomide, had affected 
public opinion regarding the danger of medical drugs.36 
Thus in the 1970s there were political tensions arising from the Cold War, concerns about 
recreational drug use and a rejection of the modernist optimism about science and drugs.  
All of these affected the symbolism associated with doping.  
C Anti-Doping 
1 Doping in the 1970s 
In order to understand anti-doping in the 1970s it is necessary to first understand the 
history of the development and spread of steroids in the 1950s and 1960s.  Researchers 
such as Yesalis37 and Hoberman38 have documented the early experiments into the use of 
male hormones to enhance physical performance, but most agree that it was the mid 1950s 
before testosterone was first used as a performance enhancing substance in competitive 
sport on any scale.39  At the 1952 Olympics, it was alleged by the US weightlifting team 
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coach that the team from the USSR was using ‘hormone stuff to increase their strength.’40  
This allegation was confirmed by Dr John Ziegler, the doctor for the US weightlifting 
team at the 1954 World Championships.  Upon returning to the US, Ziegler worked with 
Ciba Pharmaceuticals to develop a drug which would use the strength benefits of 
testosterone41 while limiting the unwanted androgenic effects.42  After trialling them 
himself, Ziegler introduced the drug to three weightlifters.43 Although the results of these 
experiments were inconclusive, Bob Hoffman, coach to the American weightlifting squad 
for the 1960 Olympics, was persuaded to try some members of his squad.44  The 
subsequent achievements of these athletes led to news about the efficacy of steroids 
spreading.   
At the 1960 Olympics Games in Rome, steroid use was apparently limited to the Soviet 
strength athletes and a few American weightlifters,45  while at the 1964 Games most 
strength sports were involved.46  By the 1968 Mexico Olympics, use had spread to other 
track and field events to such an extent that an unofficial survey by Dr Tom Waddell, a 
US athlete, estimated that over one third of the US Olympic team had used steroids at the 
1968 pre-Olympic training camp.47  The use of these drugs accelerated and a similar 
survey taken by (then) discus world champion, Jay Silvester, at the 1972 Munich 
Olympics revealed that two thirds of those athletes questioned had previously used 
steroids.48  By 1978 the steroids expert, James Wright, estimated that over 90 percent of 
athletes in strength-related sports were using steroids.  There is also evidence that steroids 
were being used in the less strength-dependent sports such as track and swimming.49 
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It is alleged that after the instigation of steroid testing at the Olympics in 1976 (see 
below), many athletes turned to testosterone to aid their performances.  Testosterone could 
not be detected at this stage, and thus could serve as a replacement for steroids at the time 
of competition.  The use of testosterone for this purpose was documented in the former 
East German doping programme, State Plan 45.50  
2 The Introduction of Steroid Testing 
One important part of the history of steroid regulation was the apparent lag between 
official knowledge of the use of these substances and the extension of the prohibition on 
doping to cover them.51  It is clear that the IOC knew about the issue of steroids in the 
early 1960s52 and that by 1967 the issue was important enough to warrant a statement by 
the IOC.  Further evidence of the growing concern over steroid use is provided by Dimeo 
who relates a number of media reports in the early 1970s regarding the use of steroids in 
sport.  Particular interest was taken in athletes who were willing to admit use.53  In 
addition, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of studies and conferences were 
held to examine the question of whether steroids did, in fact, enhance performance.  The 
results of such studies varied greatly.54  It was not only the efficacy of steroids which 
drove concerns over steroids, reports of the health dangers of steroids were a feature of 
anti-doping discourse at this stage — despite there being a lack of evidence to support 
such dire warnings.55   
Despite the assumed dangers of steroids to athletes, it was not until 1976 that steroid 
testing was introduced into the Olympic Games.  The IOC was criticised for slowness in 
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introducing a ban on steroids in their competition.  For instance, David P Webster, a 
Scottish weightlifter, in 1974, published a pamphlet which read: 
I find it distressing that national and international officials will not make a very strong 
stand in this matter…  For example, why are anabolic steroids not included in the IOC 
Medical Commission list of doping substances?  The list produced for its meeting in 
Munich on 19th May 1971 did not contain anabolic steroids.  The fact that at the time it 
was difficult to trace the drug should not in my opinion have prevented the inclusion on 
such a list.  Surely the definition of doping is sufficient to make the use of steroids 
illegal.56 
And in an article in the Sunday Times (later reproduced in the IOC’s Bulletin) entitled 
‘The Freaky World of a “Steroid Bomb”’, Michael Bateman wrote: 
The number of athletes who use anabolic steroids to build up strength and muscle like so 
many battery-fed hens is increasing at an alarming rate, and the Medical Commission of 
the International Olympics [sic] Committee, who have been meeting in Moscow, confess 
they don’t know the answer…[s]o the Olympic Committee are left in the absurd position 
of turning a blind eye to the coaches and athletes and national executives who encourage 
the use of a drug which is used completely against the Olympic sporting ethos.57 
There have been a number of reasons suggested as to why the IOC was ‘slow’ to introduce 
steroid tests.  Dimeo contends that ‘scientists were too busy arguing about strength effects 
and health issues to bother with the technical aspects of testing’.58  Todd suggests:  
The first was that throughout most of the sixties the use of anabolic steroids was still little 
known to most sports officials.  The second, and perhaps more telling reason, was that 
there was then no way to test for the presence of such drugs.  The IOC was also influenced 
by prevailing medical opinion, which maintained that these hormonal substances provided 
no athletic advantage….59 
On the other hand, the drug testing expert, Arnold Beckett, was surprised when the IOC 
did prohibit steroids on the basis of the new steroid tests since, at the time there were still 
some doubts regarding their reliability.60  Furthermore, the ban on steroids was introduced 
at a time when official medical opinion held that steroids did not enhance athletic 
performance and when the health consequences were unclear.61  Thus, rather than being 
tardy in introducing steroid testing, the IOC could actually be seen as being premature in 
introducing steroid testing. 
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IV SYMBOLISM 
A Steroids as Illicit Drugs 
The point has been made above that steroids were a fundamentally different type of drug 
to those previously used in sport.  One difference between steroids and previous doping 
agents is that steroids had not previously been subject to prohibitions outside sport culture.  
Anabolic steroids, when introduced to sport in the 1960s, were drugs specifically 
developed to enhance muscle development.  As such, they had limited clinical and 
therapeutic use outside of sport and no known psychotropic effects which would make 
them attractive to recreational drugs users.  Steroids were therefore ‘medicines’ rather than 
‘drugs’ and had not been used as recreational drugs the way in which amphetamines or 
alcohol had been.  
Given the differences, it is even more significant and surprising to find that, like the 
previous two eras considered, illicit drug symbolism was still a very strong influence in 
the 1970s.  Although steroids were not originally illicit drugs, the discourse surrounding 
their use in sport adopted much of the same illicit drug language characteristic of doping 
discourse.  Thus steroids came to be seen as illicit drugs in the same way that 
amphetamines and narcotics were.   
Some examples of the language used in discussions of steroid use in the 1970s include: 
• ‘Dope Tests to be Carried Out At Christchurch’62 
• ‘Wider Olympic Drug Abuse is Seen:  More devious drug abuses are a certainty for 
the 1980 Olympics at Moscow, according to top medical advisers with the United 
States Olympic Committee’63 
• ‘Four Athletes Banned as Dope Test War Begins’64 
Chapters Five and Six included a detailed discussion of some of these terms:  ‘dope’, 
‘dope war’, ‘drug abuse’.  The inclusion of these terms, so intimately connected with illicit 
drugs, demonstrates the role that illicit drug symbolism had in the prohibition of steroids 
in the 1970s.  The connection between the issue of illicit drugs and steroids in the 1970s 
doping discourse is even more transparent:  
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Drug Convictions Rise:  Prosecutions for drug offences involving heroin, cocaine, 
opium and cannabis shot up last year…Professor Arnold Beckett, an expert on drugs 
in sport, yesterday gave a warning of the dangers racing cyclists and heavyweight 
athletes of the abuse of stimulants.  He told the British Pharmaceutical Society 
Conference at Leeds that anabolic steroids were increasingly used by heavy-weight 
athletes.  These drugs could endanger lives.65  
‘Responsible people in sport are terrified by the use of drugs.  At a time when the whole 
nation is concerned about the use of drugs such a statement is wicked.’66 
In both these extracts, the use of steroids in sport is seen as part of the overall problem of 
the ‘use of drugs’ and ‘drug offences’, again reinforcing the image of steroids as illicit 
drugs. 
Another significant way in which steroids were identified as illicit drugs relates to the 
focus on the route of entry of the drug.  As was the case with narcotic drugs in the 1920s 
and 1930s, the various routes of entry for steroids are often mentioned in these articles.  
The following two examples of media comments will serve to illustrate this point:   
• ‘Just as a natural rise in testosterone turns scrawny boys into burly men, steroids 
administered by patch, pill, needles or salve can dramatically increase an athlete’s 
bone and muscle mass…’67 and  
• ‘Although they have been banned internationally, steroids, which are taken in 
tablets, and through injections, have remained a major source of controversy.’68 
So strong was the association of pills and syringes, in the sporting context they came to 
symbolise steroids just as the hypodermic syringe had come to symbolise heroin and other 
narcotic drugs outside sport.  For example, an article in 1972 stated: 
John Lear, the British Olympic weightlifting coach posed the question:  “How does one 
deal with a sport in which cheating is so prevalent that it is no longer be considered 
cheating?  My future role as a coach at international level has already been described as 
that of a ‘needle’ man.  It is a role I will continue to reject.”69 
The phrase ‘needleman’ was one which had been used in two articles mentioned in 
Chapter Five.  In the 1920s the term meant someone who injected another with illicit 
‘drugs of abuse’.  The use of the same term in this context is therefore highly suggestive 
of the role illicit drug symbolism played in the demonisation of steroids. 
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Thus needles, syringes and pills have come to symbolise steroid use more than any other 
doping agent in sport.70  And syringes and pills make steroids into an illicit drug in the 
public mind; a drug like heroin or cocaine.   
Thus anti-drug sentiment and illicit drug symbolism extended to this new type of drug 
used in sport.  The construction of steroids as illicit drugs was, in some ways, a natural 
step in light of the fact that steroids used the same route of entry into the body.  The fact 
that steroid-related anti-doping discourse used the same language which had characterised 
discussion of the use of illicit drugs in the sporting context in the 1930s and 1960s, 
reinforced this association with illicit drugs.  
B Cold War Connections 
The historical association between steroids and communist countries in the Western press 
has been so strong that Beamish and Ritchie claim that ‘[s]teroids were more than a Nazi 
drug:  they were also the atomic bomb of the cold war…’71  An examination of some of 
the media reports of steroid use in sport during the last 40 years reveals just how common 
that link has been.  Some facets of the link between steroids and communist athletes will 
be considered separately below.  
1 The Origin of Steroids 
The fact that Dr Ziegler developed the drugs in the USA did not stop the Western media 
from constructing them as ‘communist drugs’.  Ziegler claimed to have developed steroids 
to enable US athletes to keep up with their Soviet counterparts: 
The first time I was exposed to anabolic steroid use was during the 1956 World Games.  
The Russians were using straight testosterone.  What caught my attention was the young 
athletes having to be catheterized…so they could urinate.  This procedure is usually used 
for old men who have prostate trouble.  The Russians were abusing the drugs heavily….I 
came back to the United States after they won everything, and I told the head of the 
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American athletics committees back in the 1950s that Eastern Bloc countries and Russians 
were going to use every trick to win, especially the strength sports.72 
The construction of the development of steroids as a response to use by communist 
athletes, as Dimeo demonstrates, is an oversimplification and one which he regards as: 
fitt[ing] all too easily with other historical simplifications.  People in the West do not want 
to imagine that Americans and Europeans deliberately set out to cheat in sports.  It is 
easier and cosier to place steroids in the context of exploitative, inhumane, totalitarian 
regimes.  The explanation of why ‘our boys’ felt compelled to take steroids lies almost in a 
militaristic sense of doing their duty for their country.73   
2 Steroids and Cold War Rivalries 
Not only were steroids viewed as communist in origin, the continued use of steroids by 
Western athletes was often explained by a need to compete with the suspected steroid 
habits of communist athletes.  Here are three such examples: 
• Jere Van Dyk, US middle-distance runner from the early 1970s, reported:  ‘In the 
United States, athletes take steroids by choice, but the effect is quite similar to an 
arms race; if the Soviet throwers are getting so many steroids a day, an American 
must have pill parity or lose…’.74   
• ‘The rationalisation in some Olympic sports is that “they” are doing it, “they” being 
the Communist nations.  Some Western athletes make the taking of anabolic steroids 
sound patriotic, like hoisting the flag.’75   
• ‘after hearing of some of the things presently happening in Eastern Europe, the West 
must realize it is years behind in sports medicine.  Not wanting to lose in the next 
Olympics, the West is countering by quickly developing different tests to use for 
disqualification.’76 
Western athletes were not viewed as willing culprits in the steroid game, they were 
coerced into drug use by the communist athletes who were using more and better steroids 
than the West:  ‘If they could be sure East Germany and the Russians aren’t taking 
anything, our athletes would stop..’.77   
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Furthermore, reports of steroid use by communist athletes were far from neutral in their 
tone.  As will be discussed below, reference was frequently made to the disfiguring side-
effects of steroid use:  enlarged shoulders, increased body hair, acne and deepened voices, 
as well as the increased aggression and competitiveness of the steroid-using communist 
athletes.  For example: 
We would be in the locker room with these female swimmers….and we would have to 
check the symbol on the door to make sure we had the right bathrooms.  These swimmers 
– they were huge.  They had shoulders like Dallas Cowboys, hair growing all over their 
bodies.  It was quite startling….  They would spit on the floor…  They would look at you 
like they wanted to rip your tongue out…78 
The intense rivalry of the Cold War was played out on the international sports field,79 and 
repeated reports which focussed on these types of behaviours and physical characteristics, 
made the gulf between East and West athletes seem even wider and increased the tensions 
between them as the Cold War progressed.  Much of that gulf was attributed to steroids.  
Steroids were definitely part of the Cold (Sports) War.80  The influence of the Cold War 
associations and the transforming power of steroids will be discussed below.  
3 Cold War Language in Reports of Steroid Use 
The final mechanism by which steroids were constructed as primarily ‘communist’ drugs 
was through the employment of language connected to the Cold War.  The steroid issue 
was described as a ‘chemical technology race’81 and imagery of the arms race was also 
employed.  For example:  
• ‘In the United States, athletes take steroids by choice; but the effect is quite similar 
to an arms race…’82;  
                                                
78
   Quote from an unnamed US athlete in Steven Ungerleider, Faust's Gold, 2001 (New York: St Martin’s Press), 1. 
79
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• ‘International Olympic Committee drug testing is about as effective as international 
nuclear arms control….our Soviet and other Eastern European Olympic adversaries 
have employed modern pharmacology to achieve their avowed battleground of 
sport’ and  
• ‘Nuclear arms-limitation advocates have wisely come to the realization that our 
greatest chance for salvation from annihilation is through world-wide dissemination 
of the scientific truths about the dangers of nuclear weapons…’83 
Sometimes a fight between good and bad science was set up.  One article from 1996 read:  
‘Women swimmers, too, suffered immeasurably from the freakish performances of the 
East German lab rats before the Berlin Wall fell…’84 
It was the East, whose scientists developed steroids, verses the West, whose scientists 
worked on developing tests to detect steroid use.  As quoted above: 
After hearing of some things presently happening in Eastern Europe, the West must realize 
it is years behind in sports medicine.  Not wanting to lose in the next Olympics, the West 
is countering by quickly trying to develop different tests to use for disqualification.85 
4 Conclusions on Steroids as ‘Communist’ Drugs 
It is little wonder that Beamish and Ritchie claim that steroids were the ‘atomic bomb’ of 
the Cold War.  Steroids came to be so closely linked with communist countries by the 
Western press that these drugs, like the people who (allegedly) used them, were something 
to be feared and beaten.  The feared chemicals needed to be controlled and the 
technological race won by the powers of good scientists in the West. 
C The Transforming and Dehumanising Power of Steroids 
The power of drugs was a theme in the symbolism of doping in the 1960s and was equally 
apparent in the 1970s.  Like the 1950s and 1960s, there was still a strong belief in the 
power of drugs but it was now viewed with more suspicion: 
There were stories of women who had morphed into masculine forms and tales of ghoulish 
medical conditions, all after the athlete’s body had been used as toxic pumps to turn out 
gold medals.  Anabolic steroids, that was the culprit they said. 
No one should dismiss the anecdotes – some of which conjure images of bubbling beakers 
in a dark basement…86  
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The change in attitude was attributable to a number of factors.  As stated above, events of 
WWII had changed views of science.  An even more significant development was a subtle 
shift in the view of the effects of drugs in sport.  Whereas the debate about the use of 
stimulants in the 1960s saw the transforming power of drugs as affecting the performance 
of the athlete, in the 1970s steroids were viewed as transforming the athlete themself.  The 
reported changes created by steroids were not simply physical changes; the whole athlete 
somehow became an artificial person.87  One athlete stated:  ‘I could either go on steroids 
or quit completely.  I decided to quit completely.  It wouldn’t have been me throwing, it 
would have been a completely different organism.  There would have been no personal 
challenge in it.’88 
Other examples are set out below. 
• It will be a case of whether the public wants to see a natural performance, or to be 
entertained by clones and human robots…’89 
• Months before disgraced sprinter Ben Johnson was exposed at the Seoul Olympics, 
Moneghetti saw the Canadian super-star at an event in Perth.  Says Moneghetti, 32:  “We 
were in the same room, and I watched, fascinated, as he stood there and was dribbling 
down his chin.  At the time I didn’t understand what it was all about but later a friend told 
me it was the side effects of drugs.  When he was caught at the Games the following year it 
all made sense.90 
• Women swimmers, too, suffered immeasurably from the freakish performances of the East 
German lab rats before the Berlin Wall fell.  Now the same allegations have been levelled 
at China, which produces rough-stroking women with titanic strength.91 
• But that alone cannot possibly explain how they could have a whole bunch of swimmers 
improve dramatically in waves, just like the East Germans.  The ones here are different 
than in Barcelona, and we probably won’t see the same in Atlanta.’92 
In these extracts, steroids are seen as changing innocent, healthy athletes into lifeless, yet 
powerful athletic machines.  The athlete loses their individuality and they become one 
insignificant segment in an army of machines.  They appear subhuman:  they no longer 
have normal emotions, ethics, psychological frailty or sexuality.93  At the same time, they 
are superhuman in their athletic capacity.   
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As will be discussed below, the effectiveness and side effects of steroids have been vastly 
overstated.  The question then needs to be asked:  why was such a picture accepted by the 
public?  The use of language and the emphasis on unusual side-effects was certainly a 
mechanism of dehumanisation in these articles.  However, there were three main factors 
creating an environment in which the message found fertile ground.  Firstly, little was 
known about steroids since they were a relatively new drug.  Unlike cocaine, heroin and 
strychnine — which were known in sport since before the turn of the century — there was 
little history attached to steroids within sport.  Moreover, steroids were not at this time 
‘illicit’ recreational drugs and their use outside sport was limited to increasing growth and 
strength in unusual disease states.  The other major doping agents of the time had a much 
wider range of uses and thereby were much more familiar to the public.94  The public, 
therefore, had not been exposed to information about the use and abuse of steroids.  This 
allowed an aura of mystery to be created around them.  These drugs, therefore, provided 
fertile ground for the seeds of speculation, rumour, scandal and hysteria.  Secondly, as 
noted in the previous chapter, when steroids first captured international attention — the 
1960s — society was characterized by a thorough belief in the power of science.  Finally, 
the process of linking steroids to athletes from socialist political systems served to exploit 
the mistrust and misunderstandings created by the Cold War. 
The linking of steroids with athletes from communist cultures, where the athletes looked 
and acted differently, allowed steroids to come to be seen as chemicals which transformed 
the athlete into an automaton programmed to excel in sport for the sinister goals of the 
communist leaders.  Brigitte Berendonk, famous for her role in exposing the East German 
doping system, said this:  ‘The GDR, the system that I escaped from, had created 
monsters.  These were not real people, just engineered experiments.’95 
This reference to unusual characteristics of steroid users was particularly notable in 
reports of suspected steroid use in communist athletes.  As was seen above, the reporting 
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of the use of steroids by these athletes, particularly the East Germans, was often 
accompanied by a recitation of the athlete’s unusual physical characteristics (wide 
shoulders, body hair, deep voices) and the serious and ‘aggressive’ behaviour: 
• “Most of the East German women swimmers are built just like men” said Mrs Boglioli 
[US Olympic swimmer] at a news conference in West Long Beach, N J.  “They’re all 
just huge girls who are muscular and strong and have hair all over their bodies.  
Personally, I wouldn’t like to look like them.  I hope US girls never have to start taking 
steroids and male hormones in order to compete.”96 
• The East Germans appear far more serious, politely deferring much of their private 
thinking to coaches.97 
• Hard-faced female pachyderms the communists had prepped for the weight events.  All 
sorts of unusual musculature…’98 
A similar tendency has been noted by Magdalinski, regarding the way in which the 
Chinese women swimmers were pictured in the 1990s.   
Figure 1 presents a distorted image of a Chinese swimmer, which has been deliberately 
widened to overemphasise the size of the athlete and her musculature.  Her shoulders are 
enormous and she appears to almost burst from the confines of her swimsuit.  The identity 
of the swimmer is not revealed; her identity is immaterial for she simply is representative 
of a faceless, centralised, undifferentiated system where individual needs are subsumed to 
the collective, an image typical of Western representation of the communist world.99 
The emphasis on these unusual aspects of the body and behaviours of these alleged steroid 
users reinforced the idea that steroids were to blame for creating ‘monsters’ who showed 
no emotion and whose bodies and minds had been ‘chemically manipulated’ for political 
ends.  The relationship between belief in the power of steroids and the effect of such 
caricatures can be represented in diagram form below in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
96
   'Soviet and Romanian Seek Asylum in Canada', Chicago Tribune (Chicago), 30 July 1976, C3. 
97
   Amdur, above n 19. 
98
   Bill Mayer, Swimmer Slowly Earning Deserved Accolades (2005) 
<http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2005/may/08/swimmer_slowly_earning/> at 13 September 2008. 
99
   T Magdalinski, 'Drugs Inside Sport: The Rehabilitation of Samantha Riley' (2001) 17(2) Sporting Traditions 17, 
26. 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation?  Chapter Seven 
 238 
Figure 4:  Dehumanising Power of Steroids 
 
Thus, the transforming and dehumanising power of steroids was produced by the mistrust 
of science and drugs which had begun in this era and also closely connected with the anti-
communist symbolism of steroids. 
D Conclusions on Symbolism 
There were three major symbols at work in doping discourse relating to steroids in the 
1970s.  The first was the adoption of illicit drug symbolism:  by the use of illicit drug 
language and an emphasis on the use of syringes and pills, steroids became a drug to be 
feared in society in the same way as cocaine and heroin.  The second aspect of symbolism 
was the ongoing image of drugs as extremely powerful and evil agents.  This fed into the 
idea that steroids were capable of transforming athletes into monsters with superhuman 
powers but subhuman qualities.  By far the most obvious and, perhaps influential, 
symbolism was their construction as communist drugs.  The association between drugs 
and communist athletes not only contributed to the idea that steroids created monsters but 
had the more direct effect of making steroids something to be condemned and controlled.  
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V SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REGULATORY MODEL 
The point has been made that the regulatory model adopted in relation to doping was one 
which was based on the illicit drug model.  In the 1920s this meant a total prohibition.  In 
the 1960s, the extra dimension of drug testing was added, again based on the illicit drug 
tests.   
In the 1970s, steroids were slotted into the already existing regulatory regime.  However, 
steroids were fundamentally different substances to the doping agents that came before 
them.  Stimulants, narcotics, alcohol and the other drugs which were included on the first 
prohibited lists were short-acting drugs,100 the ingestion of which aimed to enhance 
performance on the day on which it was taken.  Steroids were long-term drugs which were 
used in training.  There is great significance in the fact that the same regulatory system 
was used for the control of steroids as other agents.  It reinforces the argument that 
steroids were viewed in the same light as other doping agents.  If doping agents, including 
steroids, were illicit drugs, then illicit drug regulation should be applied.  The further 
implications of using this model for steroid testing will be considered in Chapter Nine.   
VI OTHER EXPLANATIONS 
As with each of the previous eras considered, there are other interpretations of the 
developments in anti-doping policy at this point in time.  It was previously argued that in 
the 1960s the predominate rhetoric of anti-doping policy related to the health of the 
athlete.  By the 1970s, there had been a subtle shift in emphasis.  Health was still a major 
concern but arguments about the unfairness of doping were equally important at this point.  
Issues relating to amateurism were also still evident, although not as explicit as in the 
1920s and 1960s.  Again, it is possible to see the influence of symbolism at work in these 
alternate explanations.   
A Health 
Much time was devoted in both academic and popular publications to the health dangers 
associated with the use of steroids by athletes.  Some examples are set out below. 
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An article in The Times in 1972 entitled ‘Drugs Put British Athletes Health at Risk’ read:  
How nutsy must one be to risk liver damage, testes atrophy, prostate and kidney damage 
and potential cancer?  They don’t tell you about the Texas discus-thrower who’s now 
neither a man nor a woman.  Or a bald 14-year-old bodybuilder in Connecticut.  Or the 
Arkansas shot-putter who will be dead by the time you read this…101 
A 1974 article in the IOC bulletin read ‘[t]hese substances are in no way without 
pathological side effects and for that reason are often considered as doping agents.’102 
In 1975 the British Association of Sports Medicine (BASM) held a special symposium on 
steroids in sport, the editorial of their journal stating:  
In the past few years, developments in complicated biomedical techniques, increasing 
awareness of the hazards of overdosage of hormones, and a spread of the use of steroids 
by athletes, have justified this association in organising another symposium on doping, 
this time devoted to the use, abuse and detection of anabolic steroids in sport.103 
And one of the articles in that journal read:  ‘I am left in no doubt about the vital necessity 
of stamping out the use of anabolic steroids by our athletes, in the interests of their own 
health and well-being.’104 
An article by Dr Jacques Pellizza, printed in the IOC bulletin in 1973 stated: 
the athlete who uses — and frequently misuses — anabolic steroids is liable to terrible 
after-effects…  To close let us also point out that a male athlete using anabolic substances 
always runs the major risk of causing a prostatic tumour due partly to the dose and partly 
to the individual susceptibility.  This last factor is impossible to predict and so-called 
“medical” supervision is unable as yet to detect it…105 
In 1976 Beckett wrote in the IOC bulletin: 
Biochemical studies demonstrate side effects of Anabolic Steroids [sic] such as gonadal 
and pituitary suppression, and hepatic and prostatic involvement.  In addition, 
psychological effects should be considered.  The muscle bulk increase due to Anabolics 
[sic] is due mainly to water retention.106 
The potential health dangers of steroids were a legitimate and significant issue to consider.  
However, the point has been made by a number of authors that the health consequences of 
steroids were often overstated with little evidence to support these exaggerated claims.107  
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Early in the 1970s there seemed to be a balance in the views expressed about these health 
dangers.  Later in the 1970s there was a growing clamour from ‘scaremongerers’.108  Even 
today the evidence for the health implications of the use of steroids remains largely 
anecdotal; sound long term studies on their effects are still lacking.109 
It is important to consider the question of why such an overstatement of health dangers did 
not raise strong and prominent objections.  Part of the explanation lies in the influence of 
the symbolism identified above.  Firstly, it is clear from the above discussion that steroids 
were identified as illicit drugs.  Thus, steroids must also be exceptionally dangerous 
substances.  It would therefore be natural to highlight any possible dangers of the drugs.  
Secondly, the view of steroids as powerful, transforming and dehumanising substances fed 
these concerns:  drugs which make healthy athletes into artificial monsters simply must 
leave some permanently defacing marks on the athlete.   
More pivotal still was the association of steroids with communist regimes.  As Dimeo 
points out, the idea that steroids were ‘communist’ drugs correlated with Westerner’s 
views of the nature of totalitarian governments.110  Beamish and Ritchie’s study of the role 
of Cold War anxieties in steroid discourse provide particularly valuable insights: 
The emerging threat of Communist totalitarianism and the remarkable and rapid success of 
east bloc athletes engendered a fear that in its quest for world domination, the USSR 
would use the same coldly calculating, instrumental-rationality that the Nazis had 
exploited in their quest for world supremacy.111 
[Steroids] were also the atomic bomb of the Cold War – the unprincipled use of science to 
further political goals without apparent concern for human consequences…the fear of 
dictatorial control of human beings in the unrestricted pursuit of power had become even 
more ominous in view of the use of raw power by Russia throughout most of its history.112  
Thus, in popular Western view, it would stand to reason that communist governments, 
which saw the individual as expendable in the national cause, would use drugs which had 
dire consequences for the user.  Again, this would lead to a focus on and exaggeration of 
any potential side effects. 
Thus each of the symbolic associations identified above had some contributing part to 
play in the health explanation for the prohibition on steroids.  
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B Level Playing Field 
The role of symbolism can also be seen in the idea that the prohibition of steroids was 
based on the argument that they affected the fairness of sporting competition.  As noted 
above, this argument became even more important in the 1970s than in the 1960s.  Some 
examples of the kind of arguments focussing on the ‘cheating’ aspect of steroids are 
provided below: 
• “The suggestions [that British athletes should take drugs to compete] is 
irresponsible and amoral — and I rather imagine illegal.  It is a contradiction of 
sport.  Taking drugs is a deliberate breach of the rules which athletes agree to 
accept.  It is cheating…”113 
• ‘How does one deal with a sport in which cheating is so prevalent that it is no 
longer considered cheating?’114 
• ‘Apart from making a joke of Olympic records in the field events…’115 
However, in a similar way to the health argument, the fairness argument was often 
overstated in the steroids debate of the 1970s.116  It has been noted a number of times in 
this thesis that drugs are assumed to have such a marked effect on athletic performance 
that they are assumed to be the single reason for an athlete’s success, even though there is 
often little empirical evidence to support these ideas.117  This is particularly true of 
steroids.  These doubtful assumptions are clearly demonstrated in the examples above 
even though the statements were made at a time when the ergogenic properties of steroids 
were severely in doubt.118   
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The symbolism considered above helps to explain why the fairness issue was overstated in 
such a way.  There was the strong belief in the power of drugs, particularly in the ability to 
harness this power in a sinister way.  Thus the public and athletes alike were willing to 
reject the empirical evidence presented to them by the scientific world and continue in 
their firm belief that steroids worked, the belief in the power of drugs outweighing their 
trust in science.   
There was also the Cold War association.  Beamish and Ritchie put it succinctly:  
Although there was no doubt that the Soviets had some fine athletes, the success of 
Communist athletes ‘had’ to be attributable to something more.  Rumours quickly spread 
that their success rested heavily on the cold and calculated use of male hormones and these 
rumours touched upon some of the deepest anxieties of the post-war western-psyche…119  
In looking for an explanation for the success of their enemy — which did not accept the 
superiority of their system — it was natural to overplay the role of steroids.  Not only 
were they associated with communist countries, they also served as a symbol of the 
inhumane methods associated with those systems. 
C Amateurism 
There is evidence of some vestiges of the image of the ideal amateur sportsperson in the 
steroid debate of the 1970s:  
• “If we are going to compete, it’s best that the USOC (United States Olympic Committee) 
find a doctor who understands sports medicine”, said Willye White.  “If we’re going to 
compete against synthetic athletes, we must become synthetic athletes”.120 
• Dr John B Anderson, the head physician for America’s Olympic delegation at Innsbruck 
and Motreal, warned yesterday that efforts to manipulate the lives of athletes by beating the 
medical testing machines and computers of the International Olympic Committee would be 
intensified between now and 1980s.  …opponents insist that intensive research into drug-
related areas destroys the spirit of amateurism and is not worth the price for success.121 
• Whatever spirit of amateurishness there was in the Olympics seems to have vanished years 
ago.  Prof. Becketts’s pamphlet, Doping; which he produced for the Munich Olympics, 
lists an amazing range of drug abuses in sport….Professor Beckett’s own view of sport is 
happily amateurish…122  
• During a recent question-and-answer session on the future of the Olympic movement, 
Monique Berlioux, the secretary of the International Olympic Committee, was asked to 
name the committee’s greatest challenge in the next 20 years.  Challenges, not challenge, 
Mrs Berlioux said:  “the growing influence of politics and sport”, she replied, “and the 
manipulation of athletes with drugs and the fabrication of an artificial human being.”123 
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Again, symbolism had a role to play in this issue as well.  The contrast between the image 
of the illicit drug user and the ideal Corinthian amateur was still very much in operation.  
In many ways this contrast was exaggerated in the steroid issue since, as noted above, 
steroids not only altered the performance of the athlete but were seen as altering the 
athlete themselves:  steroids had the power to dehumanise the user, making them into a 
monster rather than the ‘better race on the surface of the earth’.124  
VII DISCUSSION:  THE STEROID MYTHS AND THE PUZZLE OF 
STEROID REGULATION 
It is important to consider the impact of the symbolism of steroids in anti-doping 
discourse.  It has been demonstrated above that symbolism has played a role in many of 
the explanations for anti-doping policy in the 1970s.  From the above discussion it has 
also become obvious that there are a number of anomalies in doping discourse in the 
1970s relating to steroids.  In fact doping discourse led to a number of steroid myths.  
Furthermore, there is one fundamental puzzle relating to steroid regulation which needs 
some explanation.  Again, the symbolism of steroids can help to explain this puzzle.  In 
this section myths of steroid discourse arising from the influence f the symbolism 
discussed above will be considered and the role of symbolism in explaining the 
fundamental puzzle of anti-doping policy. 
A Steroid Myths 
1 Steroids Make Winners 
(a) The Myth 
For years there has been a curtain drawn across locker rooms of world class athletes.   
Athletes who went behind the curtain emerged bigger, stronger, faster, and most of all 
winners.  But there were only glimpses of what lies behind the curtain, whispers and 
sometimes angry accusations.  Then, last September, the curtain was thrown open when 
Ben Johnson, the world’s fastest human, the world-record holder in the 100 meters was 
stripped of his Olympic gold medal at Seoul…125 
Ken Patera, a US weightlifting champion referring to his Russian rival said in 1971:  ‘Last 
year, the only difference between me and him was that I couldn’t afford his pharmacy bill.  
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Now I can.  When I hit Munich next year, I’ll weigh in about 340 pounds, maybe 350.  
Then we’ll see which are better – his steroids or mine.’126  
Taking steroids, it is assumed, will automatically change a mediocre athlete into a 
‘winner’.  For example, one article in the 1970s stated:  ‘Basically athletes who use 
stimulants, steroids, painkillers, etc are looking for an easier or quicker road to success.’127  
It is possible to see such an assumption at work in many public discussions of suspected 
steroid use by athletes who have shown rapid and large improvements in performance.  
The message is clear in the case of the East German female athletes.128  After revelations 
of systematic doping in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) came to light, there were 
widespread calls for the women to have their medals removed and the medals given to the 
‘real winners’.  Australian runner, Raelene Boyle — who believes that she ‘lost to drugs’ 
— and Australian swimmer, Lisa Curry-Kenny, were among those who were the ‘rightful 
winners’.129  The American press made similar claims:  The New York Times stated that 
Shirley Bastoff, a great US swimmer in the mid 1970s, ‘would have won four gold medals 
and would have broken four world records if the playing field was level.’130 
It is clear, then, that the public are convinced that steroids create winners.   
(b) The Evidence 
It is surprising how little is actually known about the effect of anabolic steroids on 
athletes.  Despite a number of empirical studies, knowledge regarding the effects, side 
effects and patterns of use of steroids is relatively limited.  As Bahrke and Yesalis state: 
Although the vast majority of the athletic community accepts that anabolic steroids 
enhance exercise capacity and performance, and although there is far more research on the 
performance-enhancing effects of anabolic steroids than any other performance-enhancing 
substance except perhaps amphetamines, the extent to which enhancement occurs and the 
factors influencing such effects remain incompletely understood and documented.131 
Similarly public health researcher Campbell Aitken states: 
Interestingly, while there is no doubt among athletes that steroids do improve 
performance, few studies have been conducted to determine whether this is the case, and 
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their findings are equivocal.  For practical purposes, given the documented willingness of 
athletes to use steroids, we have to assume that they really do work.132 
Even within stereotypical steroid discourse there is internal inconsistency which negates 
such an idea.  It has been claimed by many within elite sport that steroid use has, at 
various times, reached ‘epidemic proportions’,133 since many athletes are unwillingly 
coerced into using steroids because ‘everyone else is doing it’.134 
If steroid use is as widespread as it appears, then it simply cannot be that using steroids 
will automatically make an athlete a ‘winner’.135  Steroids cannot be the difference 
between winning and losing if a number of competitors in the field will also be using 
steroids.  As Yesalis observes: 
If you’re not close to it, you don’t know how powerful some of these substances are.  It’s 
not the difference between finishing first and finishing sixth.  It’s the difference between 
finishing first and not even being invited to the meet.  You can’t afford to give away that 
kind of edge.136 
One particularly compelling example relates to the performance of the East German 
female swimmers in the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games.  What is generally overlooked is 
the fact that at this stage, the East Germans were the only nation who had a comprehensive 
strength training regime for their female athletes.  In fact, in the 1976 Olympic Report it 
was reported with surprise that ‘the East German coaches accept the principle that women 
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can be subjected to almost as much stress in training as the men’.137  The Chicago Tribune 
gave more details: 
“In East Germany the men and women athletes are treated the same”, Schramme (the head 
of the East German swimming programme) said during a recent news conference, 
explaining the country’s formula for success.  He really means it:  East German women 
swimmers carry the same workout schedule as the men and spend as much as 25 per cent 
of their training in out-of-the-water programs such as weightlifting and other body-
building exercises. 
By contrast, Shirley Bastoff of Mission Viejo, Cal., who is considered America’s top 
woman swimmer, works out five hours daily.  Only about 30 minutes, or roughly 10 per 
cent of her time, is spent with weights, and the lifting is more diversion than serious 
conditioning. 
Many American women athletes, particularly swimmers, say they will never adopt serious 
weight-training methods, that the effects of seeing themselves with broader shoulders 
would create further complications in a social life already inhibited by rigid practice 
schedules.138 
By the 1980s and 1990s elite swimming programmes around the world stressed the 
importance of weight training.139  Research since the 1970s has shown that strength 
training can have performance enhancing effects in swimming and most elite swimming 
programmes utilise such methods.140  Weight training could have been as significant, if 
not more so, than the use of steroids in the success of the East German athletes.141 
In light of the lack of certainty regarding the extent to which steroids can enhance athletic 
performance, the claims that steroid use ensures success and the implications that steroids 
are the reason behind unexpectedly heroic athletic performances are, at best, unproved.   
2 Steroids Use Leads to Serious Medical Complications 
(a) The Myth 
The ergogenic effects of steroids were not the only aspect of steroid-related discourse that 
was not backed by scientifically rigorous evidence.  Throughout the history of the use of 
steroids in sport there has been a strong focus on the dangers of steroid use.  This has been 
discussed above.  
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(b) The Evidence 
Leading researchers agree that very little is actually known about the long term effects of 
steroid use, despite the fact that a number of health problems have been associated with 
steroid use by the popular press in the past.  One thing that these authors agree on is the 
fact that the more serious side effects of steroid use have been very rare — only one or 
two reported cases.142  Aitken contends: 
The number of health problems associated with steroids might lead one to think that using 
steroids is extremely dangerous, but in fact the more serious of these effects have been 
observed in only one or two case studies, while others, such as gynaecomastia, are 
common but essentially cosmetic.143 
Bahrke and Yesalis agree:  ‘Although anabolic steroid use has been associated (mainly 
through case reports) with a number of adverse and even fatal effects, the incidence of 
serious effects thus far reported has been extremely low.’144 
In his book, The Practical Use of Anabolic Steroids with Athletes, Robert Kerr, a 
Californian physician, who openly admitted prescribing steroids and other performance 
enhancing drugs to athletes, wrote: 
You’ve heard the guys at the gym talking about those terrible side-effects from “steroids”.  
You know – the liver or kidney failure or the baldness, or even worse…the sterility.  Let 
me say that in sixteen years of working with anabolic steroids and thousands of patients, 
I’ve never seen any of these side-effects happening to any of my patients.  Now, I don’t 
mean that these medicines are absolutely safe – like any medication, there is always a 
chance for side-effects.  But in my practice they have thus far been extremely remote.145 
If, as discussed above, steroid use is widespread, it is obvious that the number of serious 
complications of steroid use in no way matches, or even represents, the presumed number 
of athletes presumed to take steroids.  As a Swedish coach pointed out in 1984: ‘[steroids] 
have been used, and sometimes abused, by 20 million people since 1960, and I am 
wondering:  Where is the damage?’146 
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3 Steroids Were ‘Communist’ Drugs 
(a) The Myth 
The characterising of steroids as ‘communist’ drugs has been discussed extensively above.  
(b) The Evidence 
After the early 1990s it was difficult to maintain that steroids were purely an Eastern Bloc 
problem.  Testimonies in the Dubin enquiry and similar enquiries in the UK and Australia 
clearly revealed that steroid use was a firmly entrenched practice in a large number of 
Western countries as well.147  As Voy and Deeter wrote in 1991: 
We know that the Soviets and East Germans used drugs to aid performances on the playing 
fields for years.  We must also remember, however, that the appeal of anabolic-androgenic 
steroids has always been global.  Indeed, Western athletes (as exposed in part by the Ben 
Johnson affair) have always been equally active in the anabolic-androgenic steroid scene. 
And they still are.148 
Moreover, in 1984, Voy claimed that US athletes were even greater users of performance 
enhancing drugs (including steroids) than athletes from those countries which formed the 
communist bloc:  ‘Our abuse of (performance enhancing) drugs in this country is actually 
a little higher than in the Eastern Bloc countries.’149 
Another distinction that is commonly made between steroid use in the East and West 
relates to the level of freedom of choice in the use of steroids.  It is commonly recognised 
that many athletes in the former communist states did not take steroids willing.  Evidence 
from the former East Germany demonstrates as much, in that steroids were administered 
to athletes without an explanation of the nature of the substance, and often to child 
athletes.150  In distinct contrast to this, there is a common perception that athletes in the 
West have always had complete freedom in their choice to use steroids.  This difference in 
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the level of choice regarding steroid use is another way in which steroids have been 
characterised as ‘communist’ drugs.151  
There is, of course, a huge ethical, moral and legal distinction between the situation of 
steroid use in fully-informed adult athletes, and the administration of steroids to under-age 
athletes without their knowledge.  However, the characterisation of Western athletes as 
completely ‘free’ in their choice of steroids can be challenged, on the basis that steroid use 
in athletes is often ‘coerced use’ due to the various pressures on athletes.152  Furthermore, 
it seems that steroid use in the East and West arose from similar motivations.  Although it 
seems that many athletes feel they had little choice in the matter, commentators such as 
Fost and Parry claim,153 in perhaps an unworldly way, that no athlete is forced to take 
steroids, since there is always a choice not to participate in elite sport at all.154  Leaving 
aside the athletes who did not suspect that they were being given steroids, just like their 
Western counterparts, athletes in East Germany did have a choice whether to be involved 
in elite sport.155  In both situations the motivating factor was similar:  the glory of winning 
and the material rewards that accompanied it.  The material wealth that accompanies 
athletic achievement in the West is a familiar phenomenon.  Perhaps less well known is 
the fact that excellence in athletic performance was rewarded in East Germany in a similar 
way, though perhaps not on the same scale:  ‘If they wanted their careers “and to remain at 
their top-ranking government schools”, athletes had no alternative but to take the drugs 
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(many steroids) despite concerns about side-effects including liver-problems.’156  Thus, 
the characterisation of steroids as ‘communist drugs’, due to perceived forceful 
administration of the drug by communist leaders, is also based on questionable 
assumptions. 
B The Puzzle of Steroid Regulation 
A number of points have been made that, when considered together, make the prohibition 
on steroids in the early to mid 1970s difficult to understand on a purely rational basis.  
Firstly, the point has been made that at the time steroids were regulated in sport, the 
official medical opinion was that ‘there is no conclusive scientific evidence that extremely 
large doses of anabolic-androgenic steroids either aid or hinder athletic performance’ and 
‘[t]he administration of anabolic-androgenic steroids to healthy humans below the age 50 
in medically approved therapeutic dosages does not of itself bring about any significant 
improvements in strength, aerobic endurance, lean body mass, or body weight.’157     
Given the fact that steroids were viewed as ineffective to give a performance advantage at 
the time, it seems puzzling that the sports community should be so strongly united on the 
issue of prohibiting steroid use.  The IOC was able to add them to their Prohibited List 
without any apparent debate.  As Pat Connolly said:  
the credibility gap between doctors, researchers, administrators, officials, athletes and 
coaches has become as wide as the grand canyon.  The gap began when steroids were 
banned even though doctors were still insisting that they (anabolic steroids) were placebos.  
We banned a placebo?158   
It has been noted above that both the health rationale and the fairness/cheating rationale 
was overstated in doping discourse at that time.   
It is clear that the regulatory model which had been previously adopted and extended to 
cover steroids was not one that was going to appropriately deal with the issue of steroid 
use.  Also clear was the fact that the IOC and other doping authorities were keenly aware 
of the action of steroids159 and that in-competition testing alone was not going to deter the 
use of steroids in training.    
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An article in The Times in 1973 stated: 
The claim of an infallible detection test has been met with some skepticism in sporting 
circles where it was pointed out that the steroid treatment can be halted weeks or even 
months before an event and the taker could still be reaping the benefit when all traces of 
the drug had been expelled from the body.160 
And, in 1976, Professor Arnold Beckett wrote: 
The problem of preventing anabolic steroid misuse is different from the one involving 
stimulant drugs.  If the latter are taken just before a competition, they will give a positive 
result in a urine sample taken immediately after the sporting event.  However, a 
competitor may take anabolic steroids during training, and then discontinue their use two 
to three weeks before a particular event; a urine sample collected at the event may not 
show a positive result even though the competitor may still be having an advantage at least 
in weight from the drug misuse.161  
In 1976, Prince de Merode, head of the IOC Medical Commission, wrote: 
In view of the very nature of doping with anabolics, which are usually administered during 
training and not necessarily in direct connection with a competition, it will be necessary to 
define the mechanisms by which this test can be carried out in a framework other than the 
actual competition (without, however, excluding the possibility of tests during 
competition).  This, however, raises very considerable difficulties, whose organisational 
and financial aspects are not the least formidable by any means.162  
The final factor which adds to the puzzle of steroid regulation lies in the fact that steroids 
were prohibited before an accurate detection test was available for them.  It has been said 
that the IOC did not prohibit steroids until the mid 1970s partly because they were waiting 
for a test by which they could enforce such a ban.163  However, as Dimeo points out, dope 
testing specialist, Arnold Beckett, ‘was surprised’ when the IOC prohibited steroids in 
1974 ‘given that “at the time the gas and liquid chromatographic/mass spectrometric 
methods had not been developed sufficiently.”’164   
Thus when steroids were prohibited it was not clear that they actually enhanced 
performance, and their dangers were unproven.  Furthermore, the prohibition was brought 
in before there were accurate testing procedures for steroids and the testing regime 
adopted was clearly inappropriate for the way in which steroids were used.  
Many of these anomalies have been examined above and it has been shown that steroid 
symbolism is one of the reasons behind the adoption of steroid prohibition and testing in 
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this environment.  However, the combination of these factors also reveals the strong role 
that public opinion played in the regulation of steroids.  Given the powerful symbolism at 
work and the IOC’s historic awareness of public opinion, it comes as no surprise that 
authorities were eager to do something about the problem of steroids.   
C Conclusions:  Myths and Puzzles 
This discussion on the myths and puzzles of steroid regulation demonstrates that the 
symbolism of steroids is not just a theoretical phenomenon but had significant practical 
effects on anti-doping policy in the 1970s.  It is also further evidence of the fact that 
public opinion has played a major role in the developments in anti-doping policy — even 
in situations where official opinions were contrary to public opinion.   
VIII CONCLUSIONS – STEROID SYMBOLISM 
From the beginning, the Olympic Games have been an intense, deliberately manipulated 
medium of powerful cultural images, mythology, symbols and meanings, so it is not 
surprising that words such as ‘drugs’, ‘banned list’ and ‘steroids’ carry potent, symbolic 
significance which reaches well beyond the precise objects these nouns represent.165 
The last three chapters of this thesis have been devoted to exploring the symbolism 
associated with words such as ‘drugs’, ‘banned list’ and ‘steroids’ and the effects  
symbolism had in the development of anti-doping policy.  This chapter has concentrated 
on the symbolism associated with steroids in doping discourse in the 1970s.   
The main point of this chapter is that steroids were fundamentally different to the doping 
agents previously known in sport.  These drugs were developed specifically for sporting 
application and thus had never had an application in recreational, illicit drug use.  Steroids 
were not ostensibly illicit drugs.   
Furthermore, steroids were training drugs, whereas the previous doping agents had been 
short-term drugs, used only on race day.  Steroids, on the other hand, did not have to be 
used at the time of competition, their use could be stopped a few weeks out from 
competition and the athlete would still be able to gain advantage from their (supposed) 
benefits. 
Steroids were different, but much of the symbolism associated with them was not.  
Steroids, despite their history, became seen as illicit drugs both through the use of illicit 
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   Beamish and Ritchie, above n 18, 778. 
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drug language and the strong association between steroids and the paraphernalia 
associated with illicit recreational drugs.  The symbolism of drugs as powerful agents was 
clearly a theme of 1970s doping discourse but the power of steroids was now seen as 
extremely dangerous and negative, transforming innocent athletes into artificial monsters. 
The most powerful symbolism of steroids was the connection between steroids and 
communism.  In narratives about the origin of steroids, the reasons given for steroid use 
by Western athletes and the explanation of their effects, they were characterised as drugs 
used by communist athletes.  This symbolism had a number of effects, from the 
demonisation of steroids to the emphasis on cheating and the exaggeration of their 
negative health effects.   
So, in the 1970s sports authorities were presented with a new drug and new issues to deal 
with in anti-doping policy.  The development and use of these substances presented an 
opportunity to rethink and revise the whole anti-doping approach.  No rethinking or 
revision was undertaken.  Instead, the same approach was applied and the existing model 
extended to steroids.  A new drug was here but no new approach was taken.   
The decisions about performance enhancing substances in sport made in this decade 
provide some of the most poignant examples of the influence of symbolism in anti-doping 
policy.  The strong influence of symbolism can help to explain some of the seemingly 
futile steps which were taken to deal with the new problem of steroids in sport, since many 
of the developments were driven more by fear created by the symbolism of steroids than 
by rationality.   
Similarly, many of the puzzling aspects of modern anti-doping policy highlighted in the 
first part of the thesis can also be explained by the influence of symbolism.  The next part 
of the thesis, Part III, will explain exactly how symbolism has created the confusions in 
anti-doping policy today.   The next chapter will begin with an analysis of the role of 
symbolism in creating the problems identified in Chapters One, Two and Three. 
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PART III:  THE ROLE OF SYMBOLISM IN  
ANTI-DOPING HISTORY 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
SYMBOLISM:  THE SOLUTION 
I INTRODUCTION 
As previously mentioned, the framework of this thesis can be compared to a mathematical 
algorithm:  the first three chapters set up the problem.  The second part — the symbolism 
chapters — is equivalent to the working out of the problem.  This chapter is like the 
statement of the ‘solution’, while the final chapter will be the ‘QED’ at the end, the 
statement which shows the proof is complete and describes the implications of what has 
gone before. 
In the last three chapters a number of aspects of the symbolism associated with the use of 
performance enhancing substances in sport have been presented.  In Chapter Five it was 
argued that in the 1920s and 1930s the use of performance enhancing substances in sport 
was strongly symbolic of illicit drug use and this symbolism was highly influential on the 
adoption of a total prohibition on performance enhancing substances.  Although the 
rationale for anti-doping policy at that stage was couched in terms of amateurism, the 
symbolism of doping also had a part to play in that issue.  This helped to tip the balance in 
favour of a total prohibition rather than unrestricted access or other forms of regulation.   
Chapter Six demonstrated the symbolism associated with doping in the 1960s.  
Performance enhancing substances represented the power of science and drugs; this power 
was largely viewed as neutral of positive in the 1950s and early 1960s.  More importantly, 
the link between illicit recreational drug use and doping was even stronger in the 1960s 
than in the 1920s.  This is particularly the case with amphetamines; changing attitudes 
towards these substances was demonstrative of the change in society’s attitudes towards 
doping agents in general.  Between the 1950s and late 1960s, amphetamines went from 
being useful and effective medical aids to dangerous and evil recreational drugs associated 
with the rebellious youth of the 1960s.  Simultaneously doping went from being a 
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relatively benign practice to a dangerous and evil ‘cancer’ in sport.1  Finally, in Chapter 
Seven, it was demonstrated that the power of science was seen in a much more suspicious 
light than earlier decades and steroids were now viewed as being capable of changing 
normal, healthy athletes into supercharged inhuman robots.  But the most important aspect 
of the symbolism associated with steroids in the 1970s was the links made with athletes 
from communist countries, making steroids not only something to be wary of but 
something to be feared, controlled and prohibited. 
In the early part of the thesis it was argued that, despite the fact that anti-doping policy 
appears to attract such consensus presently, there are many ambiguities and difficulties 
lying beneath the calm exterior.  On the closer analysis presented in Chapters Two and 
Three, it becomes apparent that two fundamental issues are still unclear:  what exactly is 
doping and why do we prohibit it?  The task of this chapter is to demonstrate how the 
symbolism presented in Chapters Five, Six and Seven provides explanation for many of the 
ambiguities of the anti-doping war identified in the first three chapters.  In order to 
cogently explain how symbolism helps to explain these ambiguities, the symbolism 
discussed in the previous three chapters will be condensed into three types of symbolism.  
This will be demonstrated in the first section of this chapter.  In the next section of the 
chapter the issues raised in each of the first three chapters will be re-examined and the 
question of how symbolism helps to explain these ambiguities will be considered. 
II THE THREE LAYERS OF SYMBOLISM 
Although, of course, the picture presented by the symbolism of doping is highly complex, 
the analysis of the last part of the thesis reveals three broad areas of symbolism operating 
which can be summarised into three main types — doping as a medical drug, doping as 
illicit drugs and specific symbolism.  These types are represented as layers in the diagram 
below in Figure 5.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
1
   'Drug Warning to Athletes', The Times (London), 28 January 1963, 8. 
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Figure 5:  Pyramid of Symbolism  
The first layer of symbolism, called here ‘performance enhancing substances as medical 
drugs’, refers to the way in which performance enhancing substances have been identified 
as ‘drugs’ at the most basic level.  ‘Drugs’ in the medical sense, despite the previously 
mentioned disenchantment with science characteristic of the post-modern movement, are 
still viewed by most of the population as powerful substances which can change the 
biological makeup of a person.  As ‘drugs’ in this sense these substances take on all the 
power of medical science. 
The belief in the power of drugs has been at work throughout the ‘war on doping,’ and it is 
one of the most basic assumptions at work in anti-doping policy.  If performance 
enhancing substances were not powerful ‘drugs’ which had the ability to alter an athlete’s 
performance, then there would be no concerns about the level playing field or unfair 
advantages.  Any substances which athletes chose to ingest would have been viewed in the 
same light as some of the early doping attempts2 and would attract the same level of 
                                                
2
   Examples were raw eggs, ether, sugar and chocolate:  see Paul Dimeo, A History of Drug Use in Sport 1876-
1976: Beyond Good and Evil, 2007 (London: Routledege), Chapter 2 and John Hoberman, Mortal Engines: the 
Science of Performance and the Dehumanisation of Sport, 1992 (Ontario: The Free Press), Chapter Four. 
PERFORMANCE 
ENHANCING SUBSTANCES 
AS ILLICIT DRUGS
PERFORMANCE ENHANCING SUBSTANCES AS 
MEDICAL DRUGS 
PERFORMANCE 
ENHANCING 
SUBSTANCES AS 
SPORTS DRUGS
Symbolism relates to specific substances 
which are used in sport.
This type of symbolism creates rationales for 
anti-doping programmes relating to the level 
playing field and health.
Symbolism relates ‘doping’ to ‘drug taking’
and athletes to ‘drug addicts’.
This type of symbolism relates doping to 
the war on drugs.
Symbolism relates to the power of drugs to 
change the athlete into a superhuman 
monster.
This type of symbolism relates to the power 
of the drugs to be determinative factor in 
competition.
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scepticism.  These chemicals would be placed in the same category as the superstitious 
activities of sportspeople:  for example Australian Test cricketer, Steve Waugh, always 
took a lucky red hanky to the crease when batting.   
The second layer of symbolism is the connection between performance enhancing 
substances and illicit, recreational drug taking.  This symbolism arises from a number of 
sources.  Firstly, the substances involved in doping have traditionally been ‘illicit drugs’.  
This was particularly true at the beginning of anti-doping efforts, where almost all 
substances used for boosting athletic performance had been subjected to criminal 
prohibitions in the recent past and were recognised as ‘narcotics’ or ‘stimulants’.  Even in 
the 1960s, the large majority of substances on the first prohibited lists were illicit drugs and 
connected with the growing illicit drug culture of the late 1960s.  By the 1970s these 
prohibited lists had grown to include non-illicit substances which were legally available 
either with or without a prescription.  But, by this stage, the link between illicit drugs and 
performance enhancing substances had been well established.  Today there is still a huge 
overlap between illicit recreational drugs and prohibited performance enhancing 
substances.  So when athletes are reported as using performance enhancing substances, the 
public imagines them as engaging in activities that look exactly like illicit drug taking. 
The final layer of the symbolism which has been explored in this thesis has been labelled 
‘performance enhancing substances as sports drugs’ in the diagram and refers to the 
specific symbolism associated with the various substances and methods on the prohibited 
list.  Two very important substances in this layer are anabolic steroids and amphetamines; 
the specific symbolism associated with these drugs has therefore also been examined.  
None of these layers would be enough to drive anti-doping policy in isolation; they operate 
together in a highly complex web of interaction.  If performance enhancing substances 
were just seen as medical drugs, then it is doubtful as to whether there would be any 
perceived need to prohibit their use.  Instead, any performance enhancing effect would be 
treated as other performance enhancers in sport — such as equipment and nutrition — 
while any dangers to the health of the athlete could be controlled by medical professionals, 
as is done in medical practice every day.  If performance enhancing substances were only 
perceived as illicit recreational drugs, then it is unlikely that there would be a separate 
prohibition on them in sport.  Instead, the issue would simply be part of the ‘war on drugs’ 
and dealt with from a criminal enforcement perspective.  And finally, if performance 
enhancing substances were seen as simply sports drugs, and there was no influence of the 
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‘medical drugs’ symbolism, then it is unlikely that the belief in their power would be 
strong enough to warrant a prohibition.  The diagram which separates these layers is 
therefore somewhat misleading in that respect, but it certainly assists in clarifying these 
three forces at work.  The true picture is really more like a conglomerate rock than a 
sedimentary one. 
Thus the three layers of symbolism work together to contribute to making prohibited 
substances ones to be feared and hated.  Having examined these three layers it is now 
possible to examine how this symbolism has contributed to creating some of the major 
difficulties in anti-doping policy today.  
III QUESTIONS RAISED IN CHAPTER ONE 
A Why is There Such Strong Consensus in Anti-Doping Policy? 
Given the difficulties and uncertainties of anti-doping policy identified in Chapters Two 
and Three, the strong consensus that anti-doping policy presently attracts requires some 
explanation.  There are many contributing factors creating the consensus but part of the 
explanation is found in the symbolism of doping. 
At a very general level, it is clear that anti-doping policy is not a rationally based system 
but that public opinion and strong emotions have played a major role in the development 
and continuance of anti-doping policy.  These powerful emotions are largely driven by the 
symbolism of doping.  This leaves little room for rational argument and attempts to 
introduce logic and rationality into the debate are often ineffective.  It is very difficult to 
swim against the tide of public opinion and accept and approve doping, however, since 
symbolism has created such strong feelings in the public.  Objections to anti-doping policy 
are viewed with great suspicion and the proponent of such an argument is viewed as a 
betrayer of the good fight against this dangerous evil. 
These general comments can be illustrated by reference to some of the specific symbolism 
of doping.  Steroids are a particularly good example of two of the three layers of 
symbolism at work:  medical drugs and sports drugs.  Since steroids were seen as being 
capable of turning good, healthy athletes into sub-human automatons — due largely to 
medical drug symbolism — arguing that there is little evidence to support their dangerous 
reputation is unlikely to attract much favourable attention.  Such an argument would be 
dismissed as a mere failure of scientists to prove what is so blatantly clear from newspaper 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation? Chapter Eight 
 260 
articles which describe the physical changes apparent in steroid users.  How could you 
argue that a drug with such dehumanising powers was safe to use?  Furthermore, given the 
strong association between communist regimes and steroids — the specific symbolism of 
steroids or ‘sports drug’ symbolism — in the 1970s arguing that steroid use should be 
allowed would have been very difficult and could even have been seen as sympathising 
with communist regimes.  These were communist drugs, why would anyone else want to 
allow their use except to help the ‘enemy’ win political points?  A dissident would need to 
be very confident of their position to object to the prohibition of steroids with such images 
being associated with them. 
B Why So Serious About a Leisure Activity? 
The point was made in Chapter One that sport, whether elite or social, is essentially a 
leisure activity for the majority of the public.  The public outrage that is elicited by the 
issue of the use of performance enhancing substances in sport is out of all proportion with 
the importance of sport in the normal spectator’s life.3  One reason for the passion involved 
is, of course, the growing importance of sport in general, particularly with regard to the 
patriotism and the money involved.  Apart from these factors though, the symbolism of 
doping plays a major role here, particularly the second level of symbolism in the 
symbolism pyramid above. 
Having seen the significant role that illicit drug symbolism has played in the development 
of anti-doping policy, it now becomes clear that the public response to ‘doping’ is not just 
a response to ‘doping’; it is also, and primarily, a response to the issue of illicit drug use in 
society.  The use of performance enhancing substances in sport is taken seriously because 
illicit drug use is taken seriously.4  
C Why Are All Substances Treated the Same Under Anti-Doping Law While They are 
Treated in a Different Way  in the Media? 
As has been discussed in previous chapters of the thesis in respect to the World Anti-
Doping Code (WADA Code), there is now only one prohibited list for all sports and one set 
of sanctions applying to that list.  Although there are exceptions, such as the Specified 
Substances provisions in Article 10.3 of the Code, a doping violation in relation to any 
                                                
3
   It is recognized that many spectators do feel that sport is an extremely important part of their lives — one only 
has to witness the riots and hooliganism at football matches to be aware of this.  However, the argument here is 
that, in terms of the effects on the spectator’s human needs such as food and shelter and even for their well-being, 
elite and spectator sport is not necessary.  
4
   The reason why this is the case is beyond the scope of this thesis but the work of the drugs politics school, 
referred to in Chapter Four, is noted here. 
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substance or method on the WADA Code Prohibited List will automatically result in the 
imposition of a two year or life time sanction, depending on the number of previous 
offences by the athlete.5  In previous anti-doping policies there was sometimes a graduated 
schedule of applicable sanctions according to the type of substance involved:  the lighter 
sanctions being applied to substances such as pseudoephedrine.6  This approach has since 
been dropped in the Code, and universal sanctions have been adopted, not just for all sports 
but for all substances.  Since the specified substances provisions only apply where the 
athlete is able to prove that their use of the specified substance was not intended to 
improve their performance, the intentional use of a stimulant such as ephedrine or 
nikethamide is treated exactly the same as the intentional use of a steroid.  Moreover, all 
substances on the WADA Code Prohibited List are subject to disqualification from the 
event to which the positive drug test applied, whether the use of the substances was 
inadvertent or not, and it is only the ongoing suspension which varies according to whether 
the specified substances or exceptional circumstances provisions apply.7  Essentially all 
substances are treated the same under the WADA Code, differential treatment being the 
exception rather than the general rule.  
But the various prohibited substances are not treated the same by the public in the 
discussions surrounding the issue of performance enhancing substances in sport.  As 
mentioned in Chapter One, the way in which the media/public reacted to the use of steroids 
by Ben Johnson is a far cry from the treatment of the use of Digesic by Australian 
swimmer Samantha Riley8 or diuretics by Australian cricketer Shane Warne.9  To draw an 
even more revealing comparison, it was recently revealed that Carl Lewis  whose rivalry 
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   WADA Code, Article 10.1 and 10.2.  The 2007 changes to the WADA Code will increase the distinction between 
substances as all but anabolic steroids and a few other substances will be specified substances under the code and 
therefore be open to the application of the new Article 10.4.  Thus, this ambiguity of doping law has been largely 
corrected.  However, as noted in Chapter One, the ambiguity which existed for a number of years is significant in 
demonstrating the role of symbolism.  Furthermore, since the specified substances provision only applies to 
situations where athletes can show that they did not have any intent to enhance performance, all other doping 
cases will be treated under the normal sanctioning provisions in Article 10 (assuming no exceptional 
circumstances apply).  The argument therefore still applies to the revised Code.    
6
   Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code in Robert C.R. Siekmann, Janwillem Soek and Andrea Bellani (eds), 
Doping Rules of International Sports Organisations, 1999 (The Hague: TMC Asser) 599, Article 3.  With the 
reclassification of specified substances in the 2007 version the differential treatment has again been introduced.  
7
   WADA Code, Article 10.3 and 10.5. 
8
   T Magdalinski, 'Drugs Inside Sport: The Rehabilitation of Samantha Riley' (2001) 17(2) Sporting Traditions 17. 
9
  Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Lateline: Warne Tests Positive to Banned Substance (2003) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/stories/s782148.htm> at 13 September 2008;  Neil Wilson, Michael Warner and 
Leela de Krester, 'Not Sinister, Says Botham', Herald Sun (Melbourne), 2003, 7;  BBC Sport, Warne Out After 
Failed Drugs Test (2003)  
 <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/sport3/cwc2003/hi/newsid_2740000/newsid_
2747600/2747627.stm> at 13 September 2008;  Richard Hinds, 'Do the Crime, Do the Time: Warne's Guilt-
Edged Return', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), February 7 and 8 2004, 79 and Alex Brown, Invite Only as 
Warne Takes Junction Oval for a Spin (2004) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/02/04/1075853941933.html?from=storyrhs> at 2 August 2008. 
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with Ben Johnson added so much drama to the 1988 Seoul Olympics doping scandal  
failed a doping test in the 1988 US Olympic trials.  He tested positive for the stimulants 
ephedrine, pseudoephedrine and phenylpropanolamine.10  These revelations have had little 
impact on the positive, ‘clean’ image that Carl Lewis has maintained for the last decade.11  
If the public distinguish between different substances in this way, then why isn’t this 
reflected in the law?  
This can be explained by reference to the operation of a number of different effects of 
symbolism, tending on one hand to treat all substances the same and on the other to 
distinguish between them.  As will be discussed later in relation to the justification for the 
strict liability offence, once the use of performance enhancing substances was identified as 
‘drug use’, then all substances on prohibited lists took on the symbolism of a ‘medical 
drug’ — the powerful life-altering magical potion which represents the power of modern 
science.  On this basis all ‘drugs’ on the list are assumed to have that power, so powerful 
are they that they must be the determinative factor in the competition.  This is one of the 
underlying assumptions behind universal sanctions attached to all prohibited substances:  
once a drug always a drug!   
Symbolism also had other effects here which tend to distinguish between different 
substances.  Firstly anything that looks like an illicit drug is more likely to be demonised 
than a mere ‘medical’ drug:  thus by reason of the second layer of symbolism, (i.e. illicit  
drug symbolism) amphetamines will be more heavily censured than asthma medications.  
Furthermore, the amount and kind of specific, ‘sports drug’ symbolism associated with the 
particular drug will also determine the treatment of athletes who use that substance.  As 
discussed in Chapter Seven, anabolic steroids are particularly ‘steeped in symbolism’.12  It 
is therefore no surprise that users of anabolic steroids — or similar training drugs such as 
human growth hormone (hGH) — are subjected to the most public resentment, while the 
users of prohibited substances with less emotive symbolism attached are not subjected to 
the same level of vehemence.  For instance, the use of caffeine by athletes is not viewed 
with anywhere near the same level of censure as anabolic steroids.  One has only to 
compare the public reaction to the news of the disqualification of the Australian athlete, 
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   Jacquelin Magnay, Carl Lewis's Positive Test Covered Up (2003) 
 <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/04/17/1050172709693.html> at 13 May 2008. 
11
   Director Barry R McCaffrey, Combating the Use of Drugs and Doping in Sport (1999) 
<http://commerce.senate.gov/hearing/1020mcc.pdf> at 13 March 2004, 2. 
12
   Desmond Manderson, 'Symbolism and Racism in Drug History and Policy' (1999) 18 Drug and Alcohol Review 
179, 180. 
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Alex Watson, from the Barcelona Olympics to that of Ben Johnson to see the difference:  
Watson drank coffee while Johnson took steroid pills/injections.  And yet both were 
disqualified by the International Olympic Committee (IOC).  Coincidentally, coffee, being 
something that ‘non-drug-users’ regularly consume, has little negative symbolism 
attached.13    
D Why is Intentional and Unintentional Use of Performance Enhancing Substances 
Treated in a Different Way by the Public But Not by the Law?14 
The fact that the prosecuting side in a strict liability doping case is not required to prove 
intent on the part of the athlete certainly lessens the investigative load on the anti-doping 
body and subsequently lessens the enforcement burden.  The desire to make enforcement 
of anti-doping policy easier for the ‘doping police’ provides an explanation for why 
unintentional doping and intentional doping are treated the same at law.  But it does not 
explain why society is content to allow this equal treatment to occur.  Since the public 
debate surrounding the issue makes it clear that the two types of use are perceived very 
differently, the acceptance of the severe treatment of unintentional drug use needs some 
explanation.  
One significant factor in this explanation lies in the power of symbolism at all levels and 
the complex interaction between them; so strong is that power that even the smallest hint 
of the presence of such a substance in the body of an athlete is enough to stir action.  
Whether it is by reason of the power of drugs in what I have termed medical drug 
symbolism or the repulsion felt against it due to the sport drug symbolism identified above, 
the law cannot tolerate the smallest trace of performance enhancing substances.  This will 
be explored further in the second part of this chapter.  
E Research Questions:  Why So Much Confusion? 
It is fairly clear that one of the answers to the research question of why anti-doping policy 
is characterised by so much confusion is that this is a natural outworking of the way in 
which the policy has developed.  Again, although there are a number of factors 
contributing to this confusion, symbolism plays a highly influential role here.  Rather than 
being a well considered response to the problem of performance enhancing substances in 
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   Leaving aside the fact that caffeine in the form of pills is not seen in the same light.  This will be discussed 
below. 
14
   The 2007 amendments to the Code have increased the opportunity for consideration of the role of the intention of 
the athlete by reason of increasing the number of specified substances.  However, this only applies to the 
ineligibility period and not the initial disqualification.  
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sport, it is clear that emotional factors were often more important than rational ones in anti-
doping decision making.  Furthermore, the discussion in Chapters Five, Six and Seven 
reveals that, although there was some consistency in the symbolism of different eras, each 
era had its own special emphasis and there were a number of levels of symbolism at work 
at any given time.  The outworking of this mix of symbolism was to create a confused 
combination of ideas about doping which are very difficult to unravel.   
IV QUESTIONS RAISED IN CHAPTER TWO:  THE DEFINITION 
OF DOPING 
A Theoretical Definition Versus Operational Definition  
In Chapter Two it was argued that there is a wide gap between the theoretical definition of 
doping as elucidated in the doping discourse and the operational definition as set out in 
anti-doping codes.  The theoretical definition of doping largely involves intentional 
conduct:  when the public think of doping they think of an athlete trying to ‘cheat’ by 
intentionally using prohibited substances.  However, the theoretical definition is extended 
to cover inadvertent use of an effective doping agent — one which would enhance 
performance.  Thus, in some cases, people are willing to think of ‘doping’ as including an 
athlete who accidentally takes a prohibited substance which could have had a 
determinative effect on the competition.  On the other hand, the operational definition as 
defined in the WADA Code excludes the athlete’s intent from the enquiry; only the 
presence of the prohibited substance is relevant.  Where the real difficulty lies is in the 
extended operational definition of ‘doping’:  situations where there is no intent — 
inadvertent doping — and also no effect on the performance of the unfortunate athlete.  
Although this situation is far from what we think of as ‘doping’, it is punished as such in 
anti-doping law. 
There are, of course, some practical reasons why the strict liability approach has been 
taken in anti-doping law:  the reduction of the enforcement burden for the ‘doping police’.  
However, these practicalities would never have been accepted as reasonable justification 
for such a strong approach had it not been for the serious view attached to doping; just as 
only serious illicit drug offences are seen a sufficient warrant for such ‘reverse onus’ or 
strict liability rules in place of the standard criminal law.  Symbolism helps to explain not 
only why doping has been taken so seriously but also why this gap between the theoretical 
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definition and operational definition has been accepted as reasonable.  The reason has 
largely to do with a difference in the layers of symbolism involved.  The most convenient 
way to explain this difference is to consider the symbolism involved in each definition. 
1 Theoretical Definition 
It is clear that the theoretical definition of doping is driven by the idea of ‘cheating’:  the 
athlete intentionally trying to gain an unfair advantage over their fellow competitors.  The 
assumption behind this view is that the use of drugs gives such an advantage.  The point 
has been made a number of times that the presumed advantage is often overstated and that 
the assumption is largely driven by the ‘medical’ symbolism of the power of drugs — 
power to transform the athlete from an average competitor to a superhuman.  But there is 
another layer of symbolism needed to explain why such an attempt would be seen as so 
morally degenerate.  This is largely explained by the next layer of symbolism in the above 
pyramid:  illicit drug symbolism.   
The most explicit references to the moral degeneracy of doping arose in the 1960s.  It was 
argued in Chapter Six that this negative view of doping had largely to do with the illicit 
drug symbolism evident in doping discourse at that time.  Since doping was akin to illicit 
drug taking, the same moral implications applied.  The discourse from which the 
theoretical definition of doping arises is characterised by similar rhetoric as the 1960s 
discourse:  references to drug addiction, roles models and dangers of drugs abound.   
The influence of illicit drug symbolism had another effect:  it led to the further alienation 
of drug use in sport due to the conflict between the image of the Corinthian athlete and the 
illicit drug user.  In Chapter Five it was argued that the clash between the image of the 
perfect amateur athlete and the illicit drug user went a large way to explaining why drug 
taking was assumed to be so totally opposed to the amateur ethos in sport; why taking 
drugs was taking sport too seriously.  This view helps to explain the wide acceptance of the 
‘extended’ definition of doping:  the polluted body of the athlete must be removed from the 
competition whether the athlete was morally innocent or not. 
Furthermore, the theoretical definition which focuses on ‘cheating’ has also been 
influenced by the view of doping in the 1970s when there was a greater focus on fairness 
and the level playing field.  The point was made in Chapter Seven that these ideas were 
particularly strong in light of the tensions of the Cold War:  with such strong rivalries 
between East and West it was no surprise that the drugs which were symbolically linked to 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation? Chapter Eight 
 266 
athletes from the ‘other side’ were viewed as morally degenerate and a form of cheating.  
Thus the language of morality and intent, which began with the ‘illicit drug’ layer of 
symbolism, was overlaid with ‘sports drug’ symbolism specifically related to steroids and 
the morality associated with the rivalries of the Cold War in sport affected the theoretical 
definition of doping. 
Thus the theoretical definition of doping has been most greatly affected by the middle and 
upper layers of the symbolism pyramid:  performance enhancing substances as illicit drugs 
and sports drugs.  
2 Operational Definition 
In direct opposition to the theoretical definition, the operational definition relies totally on 
a factual matter:  the presence of the prohibited substance in the sample of the athlete.  
There are two possible situations in which the operational definition is significant:  firstly 
where there is a prohibited substance in the athlete’s sample which probably did enhance 
their performance; and, secondly, where there was a prohibited substance in the athlete 
which did not enhance performance in any way. 
(a) Inadvertent Doping with Potentially Ergogenic Substances   
The first situation is that of inadvertent doping with effective, or potentially effective, 
doping agents.  It may seem logical to argue that if the substance involved could have had 
an effect on performance, then the athlete should be prohibited.  But this is not the end of 
the story.  Disqualification and subsequent suspension from further competition assumes 
that the doping agent was the only significant differential in the competition:  that drugs, 
and drugs alone, are to blame for the result of the competition.  Such reasoning is best 
demonstrated by the famous defence of the strict liability doping rule by the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in the case of Quigley v International Shooting Union (UIT).15  
This judgement is useful for demonstrating a number of aspects of symbolism at work, so a 
short summary of the case and the relevant judgement will be set out before the discussion 
continues. 
 
 
                                                
15
   Arbitration CAS 94/129, USA Shooting & Q v International Shooting Union (UIT), award May 23, 1995 in 
Matthieu (Ed) Reeb, Recueil des sentences du TAS, Digest of CAS Awards II 1986 – 1998, 1998 (Berne: 
Staempfli Editions SA Berne), 187-204.  
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(i) Quigley v UIT:  the Court’s Reasoning  
The case arose out of an international skeet shooting event in Cairo in April 1994 which 
was held over two days.  After day one, Quigley was placed second but he developed a 
temperature and coughing fits during the night.  The hotel doctor prescribed antibiotics and 
cough medicine and, after Quigley and the team coach showed him a copy of the IOC 
Prohibited List, he (wrongly) assured them that the medications did not contain prohibited 
substances.  After winning the competition, Quigley’s drug test showed ephedrine, a 
prohibited substance which came from the cough medicine he had been prescribed.  
The case before the court turned on whether the relevant anti-doping rules defined the 
offence of doping as a strict liability rule or not.  The significance of the case arises from a 
particular passage in which the court considered the justice of the strict liability rule and 
concluded that it was acceptable for doping policies to be based on the approach: 
It is true that a strict liability test is likely in some sense to be unfair in an individual case, 
such as that of Q, where the athlete may have taken medication as the result of mislabelling 
or faulty advice for which he or she is not responsible — particularly in the circumstances 
of sudden illness in a foreign country.  But it is also in some sense “unfair” for an athlete to 
get food poisoning on the eve of an important competition.  Yet in neither case will the 
rules of the competition be altered to undo the unfairness.  Just as the competition will not 
be postponed to await the athlete’s recovery, so the prohibition on banned substances will 
not be lifted in recognition of its accidental absorption.  The vicissitudes of competition, 
like those of life generally, may create many types of unfairness, whether by accident or 
the negligence of unaccountable persons, which the law cannot repair. 
Furthermore, it appears to be a laudable policy objective not to repair an accidental 
unfairness by creating an intentional unfairness to the whole body of other competitors.  
This is what would happen if banned performance-enhancing substances were tolerated 
when absorbed inadvertently.  Moreover, it is likely that even intentional abuse would in 
many cases escape sanction for lack of proof of guilty intent.  And it is certain that a 
requirement of intent would invite costly litigation that may well cripple federations — 
particularly those run on modest budgets — in their fight against doping.’16   
In accepting the appropriateness of the strict liability rule definition of doping, the court 
drew an analogy between the case of inadvertent doping and the situation where an athlete 
contracts a sudden illness rendering them unfit to participate in competition.  In both cases, 
the court stated, the loss must lie where it falls.  The court reasoned that to do anything to 
resolve the misfortunes of the one athlete would create greater unfairness for the many 
athletes who have not suffered the misfortune.  The core concern regarding inadvertent 
doping was the potential effect on the fairness of the competition.  It was assumed that by 
allowing the inadvertent doper to compete with a doping substance in their system, 
                                                
16
  Ibid, 193.  
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unfairness was created for the rest of the cohort of competitors since they had to compete 
against a ‘supercharged’ athlete. 
This kind of reasoning was also evident in comments made by the CAS panel in C v FINA: 
It would indeed be shocking to include in a ranking an athlete who had not competed using 
the same means as his opponents for whatever reasons.  “The result of the event has indeed 
been objectively vitiated and, consequently, the intention of the author is irrelevant.”17  
Similar attitudes have been expressed by academic commentators:  ‘Further, there can be 
no objection in principle from disqualifying anyone who has won a race with the aid of 
drugs, even though he, she or it was entirely innocent in the matter.  The fact remains that 
the advantage has been gained – and, in objective terms, unfairly.’18 
It was also accepted by the court that to require sporting federations to prove intent on the 
part of ‘doping’ athletes would be too costly and would therefore render them almost 
useless to enforce anti-doping rules.  This has been the heart of the argument for continual 
adherence to the strict liability rule in the face of some harsh criticism.  As has been noted 
above, this is a practical reason to do with enforcement which has only gained 
acceptability through the influence of symbolism in making the issue of doping seem such 
an important one.   
(ii) The Assumptions of the Quigley Reasoning and the Role of Symbolism 
There are a number of interesting and significant assumptions at work in the court’s 
reasoning, but two are particularly significant for this discussion. 
It was assumed that every prohibited substance or method found in every athlete will be so 
effective that it will vitiate the results of the competition.  This is a false assumption.  As 
has been stated a number of times, the efficacy of many substances on the WADA Code 
Prohibited List is lacking, making such an assumption difficult to maintain.  Moreover, 
further difficulty in this assumption is found in the operation of the new criteria for 
inclusion of substances on the Prohibited List.  Since to be considered for inclusion on the 
WADA Prohibited List a substance/method only has to satisfy two out of three criteria 
                                                
17
     LOUIS DALLÈVES, in Sport and Law Conference, Court of Arbitration for Sport, 1993, 26 cited in C v 
Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA) CAS 95/141 in Matthieu (Ed) Reeb, Recueil des 
sentences du TAS, Digest of CAS Awards II 1986 – 1998, 1998 (Berne: Staempfli Editions Berne) at 220. 
18
     Michael Beloff, 'Drugs, Laws and Versapaks' in John O'Leary (ed), Drugs and Doping in Sport: Socio-Legal 
Perspectives, 2001 (London: Cavendish Publishing), 45.   A similar assumption is at work in an article by Dees:  
A Jerome Dees, 'Bring Back the Crowd? How the Governing Bodies for Sports Should Provide Victims of 
Athlete Doping a Better Remedy' (2008) 9 Florida Coastal Law Review 179 who suggests a number of legal 
remedies which could be applied in doping situations to rectify the unfairness: ‘the governing body disgorged the 
wrongdoer of his or her ill gotten gains.’  
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation? Chapter Eight 
 269 
(health, performance enhancement and the spirit of sport), there is a distinct possibility that 
a substance can be prohibited without proof of ergogenic potential.  Thus, even if all 
substances in the past were effective in all situations — which we know is not the case — 
in the future this may not be true.  The aspect of symbolism which assists in maintaining 
such an assumption is the first level of the symbolism pyramid set out above:  ‘medical 
drugs’ — since drugs are such powerful agents, they must be the reason for the doping 
athlete’s success.  This belief, established in the 1920s and 1960s when science and drugs 
were viewed as extremely powerful, was reinforced by the Cold War tendency to look for 
reasons for sporting success other than the predominance of the other side’s political 
system (demonstrating the specific level of symbolism ‘sports drugs’).  Thus, the reasoning 
behind the legal or operational definition of doping, has been strongly affected by this view 
of the prohibited substances:  the famous legal defence of the theoretical definition of 
doping has been affected by the bottom and top layer of the symbolism pyramid.   
Perhaps less obviously, the analogy made comparing the case of inadvertent doping to the 
case of food poisoning on the eve of a competition also provides an example of the 
operation of symbolism.  The analogy has some short-comings.  There are some 
similarities between the case of food poisoning and inadvertent doping — in that the 
athlete is not at fault in either case and both will be ruled out of the competition — but the 
argument fails to recognise that the two situations arise for very different reasons.  Food 
poisoning is the true result of the vicissitudes of life (and not human rules) and renders the 
athlete disabled from competition.  On the other hand, disqualification for inadvertent 
doping is simply the result of the very rule which is sought to be justified by the 
argument.19  Inadvertent doping would not result in any misfortune if there was no doping 
rule or if the doping rules were not strict liability ones.  As such, the misfortune in 
inadvertent doping is merely a creation of the rule itself.  Drawing a comparison between 
these two situations is clearly based on an assumption that doping rules, and the strict 
liability rule, is part of the natural order of things.   
Why would the strict liability approach be viewed as so natural?  The assumption is, to a 
large degree fuelled by the adoption of the illicit drug model in anti-doping policy.  Rather 
than tailoring a regulatory approach to the unique circumstances of sport doping, the 
imagery and association of illicit drugs in doping led the authorities to adopt a total 
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   This is an example of the logical fallacy of arguing in a circle where one assumes the truth of the proposition one 
is wishing to prove.  See discussion in Chapter Three.  
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prohibition and drug testing model which was characteristic of illicit drug laws.  Having 
identified performance enhancing substances with illicit drugs from the earliest times of 
anti-doping policy, it became natural to adopt the regulatory approach used in illicit drug 
control.  This model includes the strict liability approach making intent irrelevant.  So 
strong is the link with illicit drugs that even in an argument which seeks to justify such an 
approach, the rightness of the approach is assumed. 
Thus, the operational definition of doping has also been influenced by what I termed the 
middle layer of symbolism — illicit drug symbolism. 
(b) Inadvertent Doping with Non-Ergogenic Substances 
The role of symbolism is even clearer in the situation where athletes are punished for 
doping when they did not have the intent to dope and the substance had no effect on their 
performance.  Despite the lack of the factors which are usually present in situations 
normally viewed as ‘doping’, the athlete is punished for doping.  So strong is the response 
to the presence of performance enhancing substances that any trace of any drug in the 
system of the athlete is seen as problematic.  It doesn’t matter if it is not unfair or 
unhealthy in that particular situation.  If doping policy was based on the rationales 
examined in Chapter Three, then these things would matter:  if based on health or fairness 
then the effect of the drug would be relevant.  The fact that the mere presence of the drug is 
enough to condemn the user suggests that there is something other than these rationales at 
work.    
It is argued that it is predominantly the middle layer of symbolism that is at work.  The 
close links between performance enhancing substances and illicit drugs made ‘doping’ into 
an absolute evil.  And such a monstrous evil requires harsh treatment in order to effectively 
deal with the issue and symbols involved.  Just as the surgeon may need to cut away some 
healthy flesh in order to remove a cancerous tumour from a patient, so some practices 
which are not ‘doping’ may need to be punished in order to deal with the ‘cancer’ of 
doping.  A radical problem needs a radical treatment.   
Proof of the role of illicit drug symbolism is seen in the similarity with illicit drug laws in 
this regard.  Illicit drug laws do not concern themselves with the effect of the drug on the 
particular user, only whether that substance was present.  It is hardly surprising that a 
system based on illicit drug symbolism, as anti-doping policy is, similarly ignores the 
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effect of the drug.  In both cases what is more important is the emotional response to 
reminders of illicit drugs, the true effect of the ‘drug’ is a side issue.   
In a less obvious way, specific steroid symbolism — particularly their dehumanising 
effects — may have had influence here as well.  The image of a ‘clean’ athlete accidentally 
ingesting a substance which could turn them into a monstrous super-athlete produces a 
similarly radical solution.  So those substances need to be removed from sport even if they 
have no effect on the fairness of competition and are not the subject of immoral ‘cheating’. 
(c) Theoretical Definition Versus Operational Definition  
It can be seen from the discussion above that the layers of symbolism identified in the 
symbolism pyramid have all contributed to the theoretical and operational definitions of 
doping.  The fact that similar symbolism is involved may make it surprising that the two 
definitions would differ so much.  However, the gap between the two arises mostly from 
the interaction between the three layers of symbolism.20  The theoretical definition of 
doping unsurprisingly focuses on the morality of drug use and is driven largely by the 
middle and upper level of symbolism:  illicit drug symbolism and specific sports drug 
symbolism.  The source of the theoretical definition, being mostly anti-doping discourse 
and rhetoric, naturally tends towards the most sensationalist images.  The operational 
definition, springing mostly from case law and doping codes, is less sensational but equally 
affected by symbolism.  On the one hand the operational definition is firstly based on the 
‘medical drug’ symbolism, making all drugs powerful in all situations and therefore 
making drug taking automatically objectionable for destroying the level playing field.  
Secondly, the strict liability approach is largely the result of the adoption of the illicit drug 
model in the 1920s, due to the role of illicit drug symbolism.  The operational definition is 
extended further to cover non-effective doping substances largely through illicit drug 
symbolism where even a trace of a ‘drug’ needs to be dealt with radically. 
B Doping Definition Within Doping Discourse 
In Chapter Two, three doping related incidents were reviewed where athletes had taken 
various substances in an effort to increase their performance.  None of these practices were 
prohibited by the rules of sport, but each of them were subjected to public scrutiny and 
found to violate the public’s sense of what is acceptable performance enhancement and 
what is not.  The public reaction was puzzling in light of the legal status of the practices 
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   This is leaving aside the practical reasons mentioned above. 
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involved.  The point was made that such a strong reaction demonstrates the confusion over 
which substances should be included on the WADA Code Prohibited List and which should 
not.  The confusion over doping definition again demonstrates the influence of symbolism.  
In fact, public discourse, particularly that found in the popular press, is a useful place to 
examine the role of symbolism since rationality and logic provide such little restraint in 
these forums.  What can be seen in this debate, therefore, is the purely emotional realm of 
doping.  The emotions aroused by such ‘doping’ incidents are no doubt due to a number of 
factors, but symbolism is one extremely powerful influence.  
The most powerful symbolism in these events was that of illicit drug use.  Two aspects of 
the discussion are particularly significant:  firstly, the focus on the route of entry of the 
drugs; and, secondly, the similarities between the role model argument in the illicit drug 
and doping debate.   
The use of a hypodermic syringe to inject multivitamins in the Mark French case was a 
powerful reminder of the use of such equipment in the use of illicit recreational drugs such 
as heroin.21  The concern was not so much what was in the injection, but the act of 
injecting itself.  These kinds of images were strong in the French case, the focus was on the 
allegations of a ‘shooting gallery’ at the Australian Institute of Sport facility rather than the 
use of the prohibited substance (equine growth hormone).  Similarly, the use of caffeine 
pills by athletes holds reminders of the use of other pills such as party drugs like 
amphetamines and ‘ecstasy’.  What’s more, the fact that footballers were prominently 
involved in the caffeine pill controversy no doubt fuelled these associations:  reports of the 
use of party drugs such as ecstasy and other stimulants by footballers are common in the 
media.  Similarly, the use of an intravenous drip in the Cannavaro case, although often 
associated with medical treatment in hospitals, involves equipment and anatomical 
structures which are similar enough to hypodermic syringes to elicit the same emotional 
response.  
One other aspect of the public debate over these incidents needs comment, namely that 
taking caffeine pills sends a ‘bad message’ to youth.  The language of this argument is 
extremely reminiscent of the ‘war’ on illicit drugs, a common feature being concern about 
                                                
21
   As evidenced by the Anderson’ report, great exception was taken to the use of such equipment by athletes: The 
Honourable Robert Anderson QC, Second Stage Report to the Australian Sports Commission and to Cycling 
Australia 27 October 2004 (2004) <http://www.dicta.gov.au/?a=16787> at 30 August 2005, 21.  See Chapter 
Two, page 71, footnote 115, for full quotation.  See also Chris Cooper, 'Drugs and Ergogenic Aids to Improve 
Sport Performance' (2008) 44 Essays in Biochemistry 1, 5, who argues that ‘[h]istorically, doping agencies seem 
to have had a bias against injectable compounds, possibly because of the link to illegal street drugs …’. 
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what kind of message illicit drug use sends youth.  The use of the same language as the 
‘war on drugs’ adds power to the rhetoric of the ‘war on doping’ and the similarity in 
language reinforces the fact that the roots of anti-doping policy are to be found in the ‘war’ 
on illicit drugs.   
Of particular note in these three incidents is that all were assumed to involve effective 
performance enhancers, even though none of the substances actually appeared on the 
WADA Code Prohibited List.  There is obviously also a strong element of the first layer of 
symbolism — ‘medical drugs’— so strong is the belief in the power of drugs that the 
public debate is not rooted in doping definition as decided by the authorities.  There was 
also much talk of cheating in the discourse:  ‘This is, I suppose, bordering on cheating.  If 
it’s not on the list it’s not cheating, but it’s bordering and it’s saying well, let’s take every 
step now,’ [World Anti-Doping Agency director-general David Howman].22  This kind of 
language suggests that as soon as the substance involved is identified as a drug — in a 
medical sense — it is immediately assumed that the drug has the power of determine the 
outcome of a competition even if that substance has not been determined to be ‘cheating’.   
The emotional response to these ‘doping’ incidents, based as it is in symbolism, is entirely 
consistent with the way in which the prohibited list has developed over the years — with 
little logic or consistency.   
C Doping Definition Within the Prohibited List 
The point has been made previously that the IOC Prohibited List grew in an unprincipled 
manner, ‘like Topsy’ in Dick Pound’s words.23  He argued that the reason for this less than 
systematic approach was that the IOC Prohibited List was basically a reflection of the 
research interests of the scientists involved.  No doubt this is part of the explanation.  
However, as Dimeo points out, the scientists involved in studying doping were not doing 
so in a vacuum, they also were affected by emotional factors.24  It is clear that not only 
were they affected by their view of sport — and the symbolism of the ‘pure’ amateur — 
but also by the public sentiment generated by symbolism relevant to the substance 
involved.  The influence of symbolism can be seen most pointedly in the substances 
included on the early prohibited lists and the addition of steroids to these lists in the 1970s. 
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   Rob Cross, Caffeine Use 'Bordering on Cheating': WADA (2005) ABC News 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2005/05/18/1371529.htm> at 13 September 2008. 
23
   Dick Pound, Inside the Olympics, 2004 (Mississagua: John Wiley and Sons), 57 - 58. 
24
   Dimeo, above n 2, 102. 
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It has been noted that the first prohibited lists were dominated by drugs which already had 
an identity as illicit recreational drugs.  Obviously, part of the reason that these particular 
substances were chosen was because they were regarded as common doping agents.  But 
the fact that there were many other substances/practices which could have, and had been in 
the past,25 viewed as ‘doping’ agents shows that there was another factor at work:  the 
identification of performance enhancing substances as ‘illicit drugs’.  Moreover, it is 
significant that all the substances which appeared on the first prohibited lists were ‘drugs’ 
(rather than food substances, oxygen or altitude training).26  Doping, then, was largely 
about illicit drugs. 
Symbolism also played a major part in the addition of anabolic steroids to prohibited lists 
in the 1970s.  Clearly that the decision to add steroids to the IOC and other lists was driven 
by something other than pure scientific rationality, since steroids were added to the list 
before adequate tests were available and at a time when scientific opinion was against their 
usefulness as a doping agent.  All levels of the symbolism, particularly the ‘medical drugs’ 
and specific ‘sports drug’ symbolism, worked together to produce public fear and revulsion 
of steroids.  
There was also a significant secondary effect of symbolism on prohibited lists.  This 
secondary effect has operated even on substances which don’t have powerful specific 
symbolic associations.  Two good examples are caffeine and Neoton (discussed above), as 
neither are identified as illicit recreational drugs.  The IOC Prohibited List was not based 
on sound scientific evidence about the ergogenic effects or health dangers of the 
substances.  Rather, it grew as a response to a number of factors, including scientific 
research interests and public opinion created/ reinforced by symbolism.  From the 
beginning of such lists, there was no clear guide as to how a substance was determined to 
be appropriate for inclusion.  Confusion reigned supreme.  In this confusion, public 
opinion was a particularly powerful force:  any performance enhancing substance that 
elicited the appropriate public reaction was open to prohibition.  Thus, as public opinion 
filled the void of scientific rigour, the symbolism which had influenced the beginning of 
the prohibited list continued to act as a major influence on the development of the list.  
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   Ove Boje, 'Doping: A Study of the Means Employed to Raise the Level of Performance in Sport' (1939) 8 
Bulletin of the Health Organisation of the League of Nations 439, 439. 
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   Ibid; The Executive Council of the Federation Internationale des societes d'aviron, 'The Danish Oarsmen Who 
Took Part in the European Championships at Milan in 1950 Were They Drugged?' (1951) 29 Bulletin du Comité 
International Olympique 16; International Olympic Committee, 'Is the Oxygenation of Athletes a Form of 
Doping?' (1954) 45 Bulletin du Comité International Olympique 24. 
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The parallel with illicit drug regulation is noted here.  Many commentators have made the 
point that there seems little logical reason for treating one substance as an illicit drug and 
not another, and that the reason some drugs have been prohibited relates more to what they 
‘represent’ than anything else.  So, here, the symbolic significance of the ergogenic aid 
cannot be overlooked.27 
V QUESTIONS RAISED IN CHAPTER THREE:  ANTI-DOPING 
RATIONALES 
A The Specific:   Symbolism in Each Anti-Doping Rationale 
The commonly presented rationales for anti-doping policy were discussed extensively in 
Chapter Three.  The point was made there that none of these arguments are entirely 
acceptable as a justification for anti-doping policy.  Furthermore, the number of 
justifications which have been presented actually seems to undermine the strength of the 
policy as it suggests that, perhaps, the approach is incapable of justification, a conclusion 
that some commentators have come to.  Without wishing to suggest that symbolism is the 
only reason that these justifications have worked at any level the influence of the 
symbolism examined in the previous chapters has certainly added to the credibility of the 
rationales.  For it is possible to distinguish the effects of symbolism in the arguments 
presented for anti-doping policy.  Each justification will be briefly covered below.  
1 Health 
The role of symbolism in the health argument has been discussed in Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven.  Essentially, despite a lack of reliable scientific evidence to support such claims, 
doping has been cast as an extremely dangerous habit and doping agents as a major threat 
to the health and well-being of the athlete.  The most influential level of symbolism here is 
the illicit drug one.   
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   When the basis for prohibiting a substance or method is unclear and the WADA Code Prohibited List is largely at 
the mercy of changes in public sentiment, it is not surprising that the list would be developed in such an 
unregulated way.  Once the process of increasing the list was started off in this way, it became difficult to take 
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in the WADA Code in the form of the ‘spirit of sport’ clause which is the third criteria for determining when a 
substance will be considered for inclusion on the WADA Code Prohibited List (Article 4.3).  The inclusion of this 
vague notion as a criterion for developing the list allows substances to be included on the list which are not 
performance enhancing.   
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It was argued in Chapter Five that part of the reason for this view in the 1920s was the 
clash between two images:  the ideal of the ‘amateur’ athlete and the image of the ‘illicit’ 
drug user.  This clash of images persisted through to the 1960s where the imagery of illicit 
drug use became even stronger as the language of ‘drug addiction’ crept into anti-doping 
discourse.  On many occasions during the 1960s there was very little distinction made 
between the use of illicit drugs in recreational settings and the use of drugs in a sports 
setting.  Thus, the image of the drug addict and the health dangers commonly associated 
with that image was particularly strong in the 1960s anti-doping rhetoric.  Additionally, the 
specific ‘sports drug’ imagery of steroids as dehumanising agents, common in the 1970s, 
added to the health fears.  By the 1970s, no longer was the major health danger of doping 
an overdose or drug addiction, but the potential side effects of drugs which created 
inhuman monsters. 
2 Level Playing Field 
Similarly, the level playing field argument or fairness of competition has been discussed in 
Chapters Six and Seven.  Despite a lack of reliable evidence to support the notion, anti-
doping discourse justified the prohibition on the basis that the use of such substances 
created an unfair competition since the playing field was not level.  Again, the major type 
of symbolism involved was the illicit drug symbolism.  In Chapter Six it was argued that 
this view owed much to the belief in the power of drugs as effective aids to performance, a 
belief which was particularly strong in the modernist world.  In the 1970s the connection 
between steroids and communist athletes (the third level of the symbolism pyramid) added 
to the argument for the level playing field.  The assumption was that the successes of the 
Cold War enemy must have been attributable to mysterious substances which appeared to 
change athletes from human to superhuman before their very eyes.   
3 Spirit of Sport 
This is the first justification which has not been specifically addressed in Chapters Five to 
Seven.  It was contended in Chapter Three that the rationale of the spirit of sport was a 
vague notion which was a composite of other arguments such as fairness and 
unnaturalness.  However, in identifying the underlying symbolism there is little need to 
break the idea down into its constituent parts since it is clear that the terminology was 
borrowed from the symbolism of amateurism.  The amateur spirit or ethos of sport, as 
discussed previously, encapsulated the ideas of play for play’s sake, gentlemanly 
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behaviour and the downgrading of effort.  The point has been made a number of times that 
the image of doping in sport clashes with the image of amateurism, mostly because of the 
images of illicit drug use associated with doping.  This clash helps to explain why doping 
would be seen as the antithesis of the spirit of (amateur) sport. 
4 Role Models 
This argument was discussed in Chapter Six as it was a prominent basis for anti-doping 
policy in the 1960s.  The role model argument is largely a response to the illicit drug 
symbolism associated with sport in the 1960s:  the perceived danger of athletes, and 
consequently, their adoring young fans, becoming drug addicts. 
5 Medical Ethics 
This argument for the prohibition on doping in sport is a slightly unique one in that such an 
argument is much less driven by the symbolism discussed in this thesis than the others.   
Even so, the argument seems to be based on the idea that it is unethical to prescribe drugs 
to healthy patients rather than unhealthy ones.  This is not devoid of the influences of 
symbolism.  To start with, the image of the healthy athlete — a questionable assumption 
based in the image of the ideal amateur — is often implicitly juxtaposed against the idea 
that by supplying drugs to athletes they are no longer healthy.  This is obviously not 
accurate, particularly when an athlete is the recipient of good medical care.  The argument 
is influenced by the image of the unhealthy illicit drug user.  This is made clear in the idea 
that athletes, having been started on drugs by their doctor, will then go on to become 
addicts when their medical supervision ends.  A similar idea is that it is unethical for 
doctors to treat athletes with drugs which are potentially dangerous to their health.28  The 
danger argument is partly a result of the second and third layer of symbolism:  the image of 
illicit drug use and the transforming and dehumanising aspects of steroid use. 
6 Coercion 
The idea of coercion was discussed in Chapter Seven as it was characteristic of the anti-
doping debate in the 1970s.  A number of symbolic associations are clearly at work in the 
argument that doping should be prohibited because it forces athletes who would rather not 
take performance enhancing substances to take them.  
                                                
28
   Eg International Olympic Commitee, 'The Doping' (1962) 78 Bulletin du Comité International Olympique 51.  
See also Monique Berlioux 'Doping, Drugs and Sport' (1969) 25(October) Olympic Review 561, 562. 
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Firstly, the fact that athletes believe in the power of the drug to aid performance to such an 
extent that they believe that they cannot compete without it, a belief largely attributable to 
‘medical drug’ symbolism, rather than any good evidence.  Secondly, the point was made 
in Chapter Seven that the idea of coercion was strongly associated with the link between 
steroids and the competition between Eastern and Western Bloc countries:  in order to 
compete, Western athletes felt the need to use the same powerful drugs that their 
communist competitors were understood to be using.   
Furthermore, the coercion argument assumes that there is something wrong with an athlete 
being coerced into using drugs — as opposed to being coerced into training full time or 
giving up a social life.29  In these arguments it is generally not made explicit what is wrong 
with the coercion, but one can surmise that it is related to the idea of the health dangers of 
drugs.  Again, the symbolism of illicit drugs and specific steroid symbolism, which focuses 
on the dehumanising power of steroids, are at work.  
7 Unnaturalness 
One of the most prominent arguments for the prohibition on doping is the idea that the use 
of such substances is unnatural.   
Again, it usually not made explicit why unnatural equates with ‘bad’.  The symbolism of 
doping reveals why this may be the case.  The rhetoric about the ‘natural’ athlete is closely 
tied with the amateur ethos:  the amateur ideal was to excel at sport relying on nothing but 
natural talents.  To label something ‘unnatural’ was therefore to label it as going against 
the concept of the pure amateur.  Drugs, whether medical or illicit, were not ‘natural’ 
because they were a product of science.  The drug user was therefore equally tainted as 
unnatural.  Furthermore, the association of dehumanisation of the athlete with steroid use 
added to the clash of symbolism between the natural amateur and the unnatural doping 
agent.  Thus the naturalness argument is influenced by all three levels on the symbolism 
pyramid proposed earlier. 
8 Competition Between Athletes, Not Pharmacists 
A related concept is the idea that athletic competition should be a competition between 
athletes not pharmacists.  The point was made in Chapter Three that one can only assume 
                                                
29
   Jim Parry, Ethics and Doping School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, 
 <www.blues.uab.es/olympicstudeis/doping/parry.htm> at 28 February 2005. 
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that the reason for this is that pharmaceutical assistance would not come within the 
definition of the ‘natural’ athlete.   
Thus, as above, all levels of symbolism are at work here.  
9 Image of Sport 
The argument for the prohibition of doping based on the image of sport argument is similar 
to the concept of the ‘spirit of sport’ but much wider:  it is not limited by any previous 
notion of what sport should be about or like.  The argument therefore simply relies on the 
idea that there is something about the use of performance enhancing substances which 
negatively affects the way the public feels about sport.   
Being such a wide concept, there is plenty of room in the image of sport argument for 
symbolism to play a role as, indeed, all aspects of symbolism presented in the last three 
chapters do.  Firstly, there is the contradiction between the image of the clean sportsperson 
and the drug addict:  images of drug addiction and illicit drug users certainly detract from 
the image that sports authorities attempt to present for their ‘product’.  Secondly, the moral 
degeneracy associated with illicit drug use has been a strong theme in the anti-doping 
debate and the view of athletes as something other than morally ‘healthy’ detracts from the 
healthful image desired by sports promoters.   
Perhaps even more significant is the specific symbolism associated with steroids, the third 
level on the pyramid.  To have elite sport associated with drugs which turn natural athletes 
into artificial robots produces such revulsion in the public mind that the image of sport is 
greatly at risk.  When coupled with the association between steroids and communist 
athletes, it is clear why, at least in the Western world, it was thought that steroids may ruin 
the image of sport. 
It was argued in Chapter Three that the image of sport is the most compelling among the 
rationales for anti-doping policy.  One reason for the power of this argument is its 
recognition that, regardless of the lack of comprehensive ethical or moral justification, 
doping still elicits very powerful emotions and, on that basis, must be dealt with.  This 
argument has the capacity to recognise and accept the power of the symbolism of doping. 
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10 Illegal Activity 
The argument for anti-doping policy which is based on the discouragement of illegal 
activity relates only to the drugs on prohibited lists which are also illegal by the national 
laws of the applicable country.30   
As has been argued, most of the drugs on the WADA Code Prohibited List which are illicit 
drugs are clearly there largely as a result of the symbolism of illicit drugs rather than their 
actual potential to enhance performance.  The role of symbolism here is clear.  Moreover, 
steroids were made illegal as a result of their status within sport.  Thus, the symbolism 
which led to their prohibition in sport also indirectly led to their illegal status.  
B The General:  The Ambiguities of Anti-Doping Rationales 
The discussion above demonstrates that symbolism has had a role to play in each of the 
arguments presented for anti-doping policy.  However, the discussion in Chapter Three 
also posed a number of more general issues and difficulties relating to the anti-doping 
rationales.  Symbolism can also help to explain these.  
1 Why Are There So Many Rationales For Anti-Doping Policy? 
Of course, the primary reason that anti-doping policy has so many rationales or 
justifications is due to the lack of one consistent and acceptable ethical justification for the 
policy.  However, the fact that it is possible to present so many justifications for the one 
policy is somewhat remarkable.  The ability to find so many justifications for one policy is 
obviously due to a number of factors, but can be attributed to some degree to the 
symbolism of doping.   As demonstrated above, each layer of the symbolism pyramid has 
contributed in a different way to the development of these rationales.  Such a mixture of 
symbolism will naturally produce a number of arguments in favour of anti-doping policy.  
2 Why Does No Rationale Completely Satisfy? 
Clearly, arguments which are largely based on symbolism have a strong emotional element 
to them.  Since symbolism has had such a large influence in the development of these 
arguments, it is no surprise that each argument fails to stand up to more rational criticism.   
                                                
30
   These are largely the illicit recreational drugs, with the possible exception of steroids.  Distribution and 
importation of steroids is illegal in many countries.  For instance, ‘[t]he possession, use and supply of steroids, 
other than by prescription from a medical practitioner, dentist or veterinarian is illegal throughout Australia as is 
unauthorised importation’: Australian Institute of Criminology, Illicit Drugs and Alcohol: Drug Types: Steroids 
(2008) 
 <http://www.aic.gov.au/research/drugs/types/steroids.html> at 13 May 2008. 
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3 Why Does Anti-Doping Policy Attract Such Strong Support? 
The deficiencies identified in each of the anti-doping rationales naturally leads to the 
question of why such a policy receives the universal support outlined in Chapter One.   
It is suggested here that the answer is simply that strong emotions are aroused by doping, 
largely because of its associated images.  Of foremost importance is the identification of 
the issue of doping within the framework of the wider issue of drugs in society.  The point 
has been made that doping is not just about sport or fairness; it is about the recreational use 
of illicit drugs in society.  Since drugs in society cause extremely strong emotions, so does 
doping in sport.  Of course, the fact that the rhetoric used in doping discourse is of the 
same emotional tone as the anti-drug discourse assists in producing these strong emotions, 
as does the specific symbolism of the various performance enhancing substances.  The 
image of performance enhancing substances as ‘medical drugs’ helps to legitimise the 
present anti-doping approach as it gives a more rational look to the total prohibition by 
viewing prohibited substances as threatening the fairness of sport.  
With such strong emotions being aroused, it is natural for there to be an equally strong 
response to the issue.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, the way in which doping 
has been dealt with is particularly suited to dealing with the emotional reaction, thus 
explaining why such strong support for anti-doping policy is available today. 
4 Why Do We Prohibit Doping? 
The important question that Chapter Three raised was why, then, do we prohibit doping:  if 
the anti-doping rationales do not adequately explain anti-doping policy, what does?  Being 
the second of the fundamental ambiguities that this thesis seeks to explain, this will be 
discussed in the concluding section of this chapter but, unsurprisingly, the argument will 
be that it is largely due to the symbolism involved. 
VI CONCLUSIONS  
As Dimeo points out, the history of the development of anti-doping policy is an extremely 
complex one.31  And, like most policies, the reason behind its development is 
multifactorial.  This thesis focuses on one particular explanation and argues that the 
symbolism of doping was a powerful force that should not be ignored.  Symbolism can 
                                                
31
   Dimeo, above n 2, 134. 
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assist in explaining some of the very basic ambiguities of anti-doping policy which were 
introduced in the first three chapters of the thesis.  Many have been considered at some 
length before, but below the conclusions are summarised in point form for clarity. 
A Why the Confusion in Anti-doping Policy? 
• Because anti-doping has been strongly influenced by emotions elicited by the 
symbolism of doping. 
• This symbolism taps into fears in society which are not necessarily rational. 
• Different symbols have affected different aspects of anti-doping discourse and 
different time periods in anti-doping history — this contributes to confusion as 
assumptions from the past continue to operate in the next time period. 
B What Is Doping? 
• This is a much more complex question than it appears because it depends primarily 
on the public response to the symbolism of doping. 
• Any drug or practice which produces the appropriate negative gut reaction can be 
‘doping’. 
• ‘Doping’ is anything which produces the appropriate public response because it fits 
with the types of symbolism identified in the last few chapters.  Anything that looks 
like illicit drug taking in sport, any type of performance enhancement which 
clashes with ideals of natural athletes, any sports drug is seen as powerful, or 
dehumanising.  
C Why Do We Prohibit Doping? 
• This is a much less complex question than it appears.  
• We prohibit doping because we don’t like what it symbolises. 
• The interaction between aspects of symbolism is very complex.   
VII THE FINAL QUESTION 
This chapter has provided a detailed explanation of how the symbolism identified in the 
previous chapters has worked to produce some of the characteristics of anti-doping policy 
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today:  the confusions and difficulties, as well as some of the attempts at answering those 
ambiguities.   
There is one final question to be answered and that is:  so what?  In other words, what are 
the ultimate effects of such symbolism and what is the significance of having an anti-
doping policy which is based not on a rational, logical and systematic approach to the issue 
but on emotional influences such as symbolism?  The next chapter will discuss this 
question. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SYMBOLISM AND BEYOND 
‘There is no such thing as public opinion, just published opinion.’ (Winston 
Churchill).1 
‘Laws that do not embody public opinion can never be enforced.’ (Elbert Hubbard).2  
‘There is nothing that makes more cowards and feeble men than public opinion.’ 
(Henry Ward Beecher).3 
I INTRODUCTION 
Public opinion has a bad reputation.  It is seen as irrational, emotional and illogical, all of 
which are assumed to be bad things.  There is also an implicit assumption that policy based 
on public opinion must be bad policy.  The argument of this thesis could be assumed to be 
culminating in such a conclusion.  It has not, however, been my aim to suggest that anti-
doping policy is intrinsically unacceptable because of its strong roots in public opinion.  In 
fact, the task of this chapter is to consider that very question:  does it matter that anti-
doping policy has been strongly influenced by public opinion?  The answer to this question 
is ‘not necessarily’.   
In democratic societies, where government theoretically represents the wishes of the 
people, it stands to reason that public opinion should have a role in the development of 
public policy.4  A policy based on public opinion is therefore not necessarily bad.  
However, the legitimacy of public opinion may rest on the source of that opinion.  It is 
possible for public opinion to be created by well informed, reasonable discussion.  It is also 
possible for it to be based on other things.  Since the argument of this thesis is that anti-
doping policy is based on symbolism, the pertinent question for this chapter is whether this 
is a legitimate basis for the public opinion which has shaped anti-doping policy over the 
last century.  
                                                
1
   BrainyQuote, Winston Churchill Quotes 
 <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/w/winston_churchill.html> at 2 August 2008. 
2
  World of Quotes.com, Elbert Hubbard Quotes <http://www.worldofquotes.com/author/Elbert-
Hubbard/1/index.html> at 2 August 2008. 
3
   ThinkExist.com, Public Opinion Quotes 
 <http://thinkexist.com/quotes/with/keyword/public_opinion/3.html> at 2 August 2008. 
4
   Anti-doping policy is now a universal policy.  Thus, many countries that do not embrace the democratic tradition 
also have the same policy.  However, most of the countries which were heavily involved in the evolution of anti-
doping policy were of this political persuasion. 
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It has been argued in Chapter Eight that the influence of symbolism has created confusion 
and ambiguity in anti-doping policy today; even the most foundational issues of doping 
definition and fundamental rationales for the policy are still very unclear.  Although it may 
not be an entirely satisfactory situation to have a policy marked by such fundamental 
ambiguities, the existence of such ‘untidiness’ does not automatically discredit the whole 
policy.  For in many ways the ambiguities identified in Chapters One to Three are 
theoretical problems which may not necessarily detract from the efficacy of anti-doping 
policy.   
The question of whether the role that symbolism played in the history of anti-doping policy 
weakens that policy is therefore still very much open for debate.  As discussed in Chapter 
One, anti-doping policy now attracts almost universal support and on the surface appears to 
be an extremely well accepted and approved approach to the problem of performance 
enhancing substances in sport.  Thus, on one level it seems that anti-doping policy is a 
‘good’ one despite its entangled and inauspicious historical roots.  
Despite this high level of contemporary public support, anti-doping policy is not immune 
to criticism.  It is possible to identify a number of operational problems with modern anti-
doping policy, as critics have done.  Many of these criticisms can be traced back to the way 
in which anti-doping policy has developed, largely through public opinion based on 
symbolism.  This chapter will consider these operational difficulties and argue that the 
pattern of regulation that developed in the three critical time periods considered in previous 
chapters has led to many of these operational problems.  The aim of the examination is to 
show that symbolism has led to a number of unacceptable problems in anti-doping and thus 
basing this particular policy on symbolism is problematic and inappropriate.    
In the subsequent discussion, the pattern of regulation which developed is described as 
‘reactive regulation’.  The pattern is summarised in the diagram set out below in Figure 6:  
Figure 6: The Reactive Regulation Model 
Symbolism relating to the 
use of performance 
enhancing substances in 
sport
Public opinion regarding the 
use of performance 
enhancing substances in 
sport
Negative image for sport/ 
clash with the intended 
image of sport/ public 
relations issue for sports 
officials
Reactive regulation of the 
use of performance 
enhancing substances in 
sport
 
The chapter is divided into six sections.  The first demonstrates the reactive regulation 
pattern at work by revisiting the history of anti-doping policy in the three time periods 
described in the Chapters Five to Seven.  The next section identifies some major 
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operational issues with modern anti-doping rules and explains how the reactive regulation 
pattern led to these problems.  The fourth section discusses the ultimate effects of 
symbolism.  In the fifth section, a discussion of whether there is a better model of 
regulation for anti-doping policy is provided.  The final section discusses how the reactive 
regulation pattern might affect the future of anti-doping policy. 
II THE REACTIVE REGULATION PATTERN AT WORK 
The reactive regulation pattern has been set out above.  The beginning point is the 
symbolism associated with doping and the model ends with what has been termed 
‘reactive’ regulation.  The term ‘reactive’ is used in contrast to ‘proactive’ regulation 
which would be a more thoroughly considered, evidence-based regulation.5  The reactive 
nature of the regulation is seen in the intermediate steps where public opinion created by 
symbolism creates a negative image and public relations problem for sport and sports 
authorities.  In an attempt to preserve the image of sport, or later ‘the product’, sports 
authorities reacted to the public sentiment surrounding doping by regulating the use of 
performance enhancing substances in sport.  
The reactive pattern emerged to some degree in the 1920s and 1930s but was fully engaged 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  Below each era will be considered in order to demonstrate the 
steps of the pattern at work.  
A The 1920s and 1930s 
It was concluded in Chapter Five that in the 1920s and 1930s there were two points of 
view on the use of performance enhancing substances which were fairly evenly matched.  
On the one hand these substances were viewed in a positive light and there was some 
optimism surrounding their potential to enhance human performance.  On the other was the 
view of performance enhancing substances as a dangerous and potentially addictive form 
of cheating.  It is clear from the work of researchers such as Dimeo and Hoberman that, 
although some of these negatives attitudes to doping had been expressed, doping was not a 
big issue and there was no overwhelming attitude against the use of ergogenic substances 
in sport.  The fact that anti-doping rules began in this era is therefore somewhat surprising 
and leads to the question of why anti-doping policy developed at this time.  It must be 
                                                
5
   For example some of the steps involved in a proactive type of regulation might still involve public opinion but the 
response to such public opinion would involve the commissioning of studies (eg feasibility and impact studies) 
and widespread representative public consultation.   
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admitted here that there is little evidence of what drove sports authorities to make rules in 
the 1920s.  Given the relative marginality of the issue, it seems the momentum did not 
come entirely from within sport; there must have been extrinsic factors which affected 
attitudes of sports authorities.  A number of hints can be gained from the history of anti-
doping regulation which demonstrate the reactive regulation pattern at work. 
1 Symbolism 
The main symbolism involved at this stage was illicit drug symbolism:  performance 
enhancing substances were viewed in the same light as ‘narcotics’ and other illegal 
‘stimulants’.  The evidence for this is largely in the language used to describe ‘doping’ and 
the type of substances involved. 
2 Public Opinion 
Although it appears that doping in sport was not a major issue in society,6 a few hints can 
be found which point to the issue having some attention given it, at least in sports circles.  
When reporting on the IAAF’s (International Amateur Athletics Federation as it then was) 
discussion before passing the 1928 rule on doping, The New York Times described the 
issue as ‘debative’, suggesting that there was some public interest in doping.7  The use of 
the colloquial terms ‘doping’ and ‘stimulants’ to describe the use of performance 
enhancing substances also suggests that there had been some previous discussion of the use 
of these substances, at least enough to generate a familiarity with the subject and a link 
with illicit drugs.  Furthermore, it is clear that illicit drugs were a major issue in society, 
particularly given the influence of the Temperance Movement and the alcohol prohibition.  
It is probable that public interest in the matter was a direct result of the public interest in 
‘dope’ outside sport. 
3 Negative Image for Sport 
As Dimeo points out, there had been a little public comment about doping in sport which 
saw doping as both dangerous and morally degenerate.  For example:  
And the general effect of drug taking, and especially the use of drugs belonging to the 
caffeine and cocaine class, is distinctly bad.  We believe that the medical profession ought 
                                                
6
   Evidence of very limited wider public debate is presented by Paul Dimeo, A History of Drug Use in Sport 1876-
1976: Beyond Good and Evil, 2007 (London: Routledge), Chapter 2. 
7
   The very fact that the IAAF debated and decided to make a rule about the issue may also indicate some public 
interest: Wythe Williams, 'Parade of Athletes Will Mark Opening of Olympics Today: Olympic Athletes Parade 
Today', The New York Times (New York), 28 July 1928, 9. 
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seriously to warn those with whom they come into contact professionally against the use of 
such things.8  
Moreover, the construction of doping as an issue of professionalism is indicative of the 
negative impact on the image of sport.  As discussed in Chapter Five, the symbolism of 
illicit drugs clashed with the image of the ideal amateur sportsperson.  Clearly doping was 
seen as detracting from the image of amateur sport, an ethos which was strenuously 
defended right up until the 1970s.  The negative connotations of drug use in sport can be 
seen in a speech by Pierre de Coubertin in the 1920s when he condemned doping as 
demonstrative of a ‘venal attitude’ toward sport.9   
Since, at this stage, the focus of anti-doping was on amateur sport,10 the public relations 
issue was not to do with protection of monetary investment as it is today.  However, this 
does not mean that sports authorities were not interested in the way in which sport was 
perceived by the wider public.  Although, again, there is little evidence to suggest that 
public relations was identified as a major issue for sports organisers, it is clear that the 
amateur ethos did hold wide public appeal11 and authorities were keen to maintain the 
amateur image.  
4 Reactive Regulation 
As mentioned above, it is clear that the regulations on doping introduced in the 1920s and 
1930s did not arise from an overwhelming tide of undivided opinion against the use of 
performance enhancing substances in sport.  Rather, there were two equally balanced 
opinions of these practices.  Therefore the mere fact that such a rule was introduced at all 
during this period provides support for the argument that these laws were essentially a 
reaction to outside factors.  Furthermore, the type of regulatory model chosen reinforces 
the idea that what was being reacted to was the image of illicit drug use within sport.  
Although it appears that public opinion may not have had a major role to play at this point, 
clearly the desire to protect the amateur ethos was operational.  It was largely the clash of 
image between the symbolism of amateurism and the symbolism of doping which led to 
                                                
8
   Dimeo, above n 6, 26. 
9
  French National Centre for Scientific Research, Pierre de Coubertin, 1923 Speech in Rome, Expert Committee of 
the French National Centre for Scientific Research, Doping and Sports: Collective Expert Assessment (1998) 
<http://www.cnrs.fr/cw/en/pres/compress/dopage/dopage2.html> at 13 September 2008. 
10
   As discussed in Chapter Five, the use of performance enhancing substances was known in professional sport but 
was not a major issue.  
11
  The very fact that a distinction was made between amateur and professional sport reveals the public interest in the 
status of the athlete. 
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this kind of reaction by sports officials.  The reaction was to the issue of drug use outside 
of sport rather than to doping per se. 
It should be noted that the effects of such a reaction were fairly limited, since the 
regulations had little or no operational force.12  However, the pattern of regulation was 
established for the next significant period in anti-doping history.  Additionally, the reactive 
regulation pattern set up the identification of doping as an illicit drug issue.  
B The 1950s and 1960s  
There still appears to have been two strands of thought regarding doping in sport at this 
time:  one which saw performance enhancement through the use of ‘drugs’ as positive; and 
another which viewed it extremely negatively.  Unlike the 1920s and 1930s, however, the 
two strands of thought were more chronological than simultaneous:  in the early 1950s 
anti-doping sentiment was not as strong as in the 1960s.  This change in view can be 
attributed largely to the changing symbolism of doping.  The outcome of such changes was 
the eventual adoption of the first lists of prohibited substances in sport and the introduction 
of drug testing at athletic competitions.  Again, an analysis of the history of this time 
period demonstrates the reactive regulation pattern at work. 
1 Symbolism 
The main symbolism of the 1960s was the power of science, doping agents as illicit drugs, 
and the changing view of amphetamines from innocent ‘pep pills’ to evil drugs of 
addiction.  
2 Public Opinion 
In Chapter Four a number of pieces of evidence were provided to show that public opinion 
had a powerful influence on sports officials, or at least on the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC).  Many of these events took place in the 1950s and 1960s.  For example, 
there were a number of articles in the IOC bulletin in this time period which set out reports 
on doping published in the public press or by other organisations such as the newspaper 
L’Equipe and public figures such as Pope Pius XII.13  In 1963 it was recognised in this 
bulletin that the popular press had contributed to the identification of doping as a problem 
                                                
12
   Since there were little operational effects, the 1920s will not be considered below in terms of the impact of the 
reactive regulation model on anti-doping policy today. 
13
   International Olympic Commitee, 'What Other People Say, Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, 
February, 1956, No. 53, p. 65-66' (1956) 53 Bulletin du Comité International Olympique 52.  See Chapter Four 
for details. 
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in sport.14  Furthermore, in 1968 measures were taken to ensure that the press had details of 
the work of the IOC Medical Commission.15  All this is powerful evidence that public 
opinion was significant to the IOC, particularly regarding the issue of performance 
enhancing substances in sport. 
3 Negative Image for Sport 
It was not until later that concerns regarding the negative impact on the image of sport 
caused by doping were explicitly articulated.  However, it is clear that doping was 
perceived to have a negative impact on the image of sport.  The clash between the amateur 
ideal and the image of illicit drug use was even more poignant in this period than in the 
1920s.  As sport became more politically important with the Cold War, the fight to 
maintain the amateur ethos intensified.  It is clear from the rhetoric of the day that the use 
of performance enhancing substances by athletes was viewed as a very negative thing for 
sport: 
I would prefer to class the athlete as a ‘better race’ on the surface of the earth.  The future 
generations would inherit their characters and therefore a continuity of good human society 
would be maintained.  I would never wish then, that we should be deprived of such fine, 
healthy persons as a result of doping.16 
The image of amateur sport included purity, health and the observance of rules; the 
amateur athlete was the epitome of health — physical, moral and psychological.  The evil 
and danger of doping obviously detracted from these healthy images.  With amphetamines 
being the main doping agent, the association between these substances and the rebel youth 
movement also produced an image of sport seen as incompatible with this amateur ideal. 
The point was made above that in the 1920s the issue of drugs in sport was targeted to 
amateur sport and, as such, the motivation to preserve the image of sport was not one of 
protection of monetary investment.  By the late 1970s and early 1980s this had changed as 
sport became big business.  The 1960s was something of a transition era in that some 
money was beginning to come into sport, mostly in the form of governmental investment 
to promote the national image through sport.  But in many ways the image of sport was 
more a political than financial issue.  Nevertheless, there was still a desire to maintain the 
‘image’ of sport — a concept which involves an impression held by the public —as found 
                                                
14
   International Olympic Commitee, 'Doping, the International Olympic Committee and the Press' (1963) 
84(November) Bulletin du Comité International Olympique 59.  
15
   International Olympic Committee, 'The Work of the Medical Commission' (1968) 10 Olympic Review 263. 
16
   Dr GM Oza, 'Athletes, Doping and Olympism,' (1969) 19(30 May) Olympic Review 209, 211-212.  See also 
Dimeo’s comments regarding this statement, above n 6, 56-57. 
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in the amateur ideal and protect what sport was supposedly all about.17  As discussed 
above, the evil of doping had the potential to infect the public image of sport and this 
needed to be dealt with. 
4 Reactive Regulation   
The reactivity of the regulatory efforts in the 1960s becomes clear when the type of 
regulation is considered:  a total prohibition with a list of prohibited substances and 
accompanying drug testing is typical of illicit drug regulation.18 
Moreover, the drug testing regimes used were not specific to sport and were developed for 
the detection of illicit substances in a wider context.  One of the scientists who introduced 
drug testing into the sporting arena was Arnold Beckett, whose earlier work had been in 
the development of detection methods for application in the identification and treatment of 
drug addiction.  He and his associates had published a number of works on the detection of 
amphetamines and other substances in human bodily fluids.19  Houlihan recognises that the 
adaptation of these tests for sport was a relatively simple exercise:  ‘Whereas tests for 
amphetamines and most other stimulants were easy and cheap to devise as they merely 
required the adaptation of existing analytical procedures…’20   
It is clear from these factors that doping regulation in 1967 was heavily influenced by an 
illicit drug model of regulation.  Sports officials did not come at the issue afresh and re-
invent the wheel.  Instead they adapted a model that they were already familiar with in the 
illicit drug model.  As Houlihan writes, ‘[t]he IOC and most major international 
                                                
17
   For instance, Monique Berlioux 'Doping, Drugs and Sport' (1969) 25(October) Olympic Review 561, 563 in the 
IOC Bulletin in 1969 wrote: ‘Let us quote Bil Gilbert again, with the example he gives us of golf and of the 
“image” one should have of a champion and a sport…  This is also the kind of image that an Olympic competitor 
should create.’ 
18
   The IOC anti-doping regulations were a slightly different format in that the general prohibition was part of a 
declaration by the athlete on the entry form for the Olympic Games.  Even so, the pattern of a general prohibition 
with an associated list of prohibited substances is still clear. 
19
   Arnold Beckett and M Rowland, 'A Specific Method for the Determination of Amphetamine in Urine' (1964) 16 
(Supplement) Journal of Pharmacy and Pharmacology 277; Arnold Beckett and M  Rowland, 'Urinary Excretion 
Kinetics of Amphetamine in Man' (1965) 17 Journal of Pharmacy and Pharmacology 628; Arnold Beckett and M 
Rowland, 'Urinary Excretion Kinetics of Methylamphetamine in Man' (1965) 17 Supplement Journal of 
Pharmacy and Pharmacology 109S; Arnold Beckett and M Rowland, 'Diagnosis of Amphetamine Addiction' 
(1965) 1(5436) British Medical Journal 725; Arnold Beckett and GR Wilkinson, 'Identification and 
Determination of Ephedrine and its Congeners in Urine by Gas Chromatography' (1965) 17 Supplement Journal 
of Pharmacy and Pharmacology 104S and Arnold Beckett, GT Tucker and AC Moffat, 'Routine Detection and 
Identification in Urine of Stimulants and Other Drugs, Some of Which May Be Used to Modify Performance in 
Sport' (1967) 19(4) Journal of Pharmacy and Pharmacology 273.  
20
   Barrie Houlihan, Dying to Win: Doping in Sport and the Development of Anti-Doping Policy, 1999 (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe), 133.  Maxwell J Mehlman, Elizabeth Banger and Matthew M Wright, 'Doping in Sports and 
the Use of State Power' (2005) 50 Saint Louis University Law Journal 15, 24, suggest that the availability of drug 
tests determined the contents of the first IOC Prohibited List in 1967.  Although no doubt this was a significant 
factor, the evidence provided in this thesis reveals that the situation was more complex and that illicit drug 
symbolism also played a role.  
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federations have, not surprisingly, relied on policy instruments which directly parallel 
those developed to combat recreational drug use.’21 
It is clear from the above discussion that illicit drug symbolism not only fuelled the 
regulatory developments of the 1960s but also provided the model for regulation.  The 
question that arises at this point is whether this was an acceptable or appropriate model.   
Since public opinion relating to the use of the ergogenic substances was so inextricably 
tied in with illicit drug symbolism, adoption of a regulatory form which the public was 
familiar with and comfortable applying to illicit drugs would be widely acceptable.  The 
symbolic influence of illicit drugs was equally met by the application of a regulatory model 
with similar symbolism attached. 
This is not to say that this form of regulation was entirely appropriate or suited to the issue.  
Leaving aside the question of whether a total prohibition on performance enhancing 
substances was the best type of approach, the question needs to be considered whether this 
regulatory model was appropriate for the intended job, i.e. could it ensure that such 
substances were not used in sporting competition?  At this point the theory and practical 
realities need to be separated.  The fact is that when drug testing was first introduced to the 
Olympics there were a number of factors inhibiting its effectiveness.  These factors 
included the lack of accuracy of the tests, the limited number of substances tested, the 
confusion over the jurisdiction of the organising bodies, as well as the lack of resources 
available for detection and enforcement.22  Thus, on a practical level, this type of 
regulation was unlikely to work.   
However, the type of regulation adopted could have theoretically dealt with the issue of 
doping as it stood at that stage.  Since the IOC Prohibited List in 1967 included only short 
term, day-of-competition drugs, accurate testing on the day of competition could 
potentially detect — and therefore deter — athlete drug use.  At that time, the aim of drug 
testing in sport was similar to illicit drug testing; the focus of attention was to determine 
what drug was affecting the subject at a particular moment in time, rather than what might 
have been used over the last few months.  Thus for the 1967 IOC Prohibited List, in-
competition testing, although fraught with practical difficulties, at least in theory could 
have effectively deterred the use of prohibited substances.   
                                                
21
   Ibid, 103. 
22
   See Houlihan, above n 20, 132ff for a good discussion. 
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Even in 1967, however, it was clear that a new kind of drug was on the horizon.  
Comments attached to the 1967 Prohibited List regarding anabolic steroids noted that 
detection of such drugs would be difficult ‘[b]ecause the drug is not taken at the time of a 
championship or meeting.’  This prophecy proved correct:  it was not long before the short-
comings of applying in-competition testing to steroid use became apparent. 
In conclusion, the IOC’s prohibition of performance enhancing substances in sport in 1967 
was stimulated to a large degree by public opinion against the use of such substances, 
particularly amphetamines, which flowed out of the associated symbolism.  The type of 
regulation chosen parallelled the type of regulation applied to illicit drugs and was seen as 
appropriate for this very reason.  Although the Prohibited List as it stood at that stage may 
have, in theory, been effectively enforced by the adoption of in-competition testing, it was 
clear, even at that stage, that ergogenic substances in the future would not be.  The 
regulation in 1967 was therefore a reaction to the symbolism of illicit drugs and, although 
not inappropriate at the time, it was short-sighted since it did not deal with the issue of 
training drugs which were already in use in international sport.  It was really a band-aid 
solution to ease public concern generated by a fear of illicit drugs within the sporting 
context.   
In practice it was not even that.   
C The 1970s 
The 1970s was the era in anti-doping policy where the pattern of reactive regulation was 
the most obvious.  The decision to prohibit steroids can be seen as premature and even 
inappropriate:  it was certainly not a well researched response to the phenomenon of 
steroid use in sport.  Steroids therefore provide an extreme example of the way in which 
anti-doping policy developments have been reactive in nature.  Additionally, it is possible 
to perceive the effects of the two previous eras in establishing anti-doping systems based 
on the illicit drug model as a result of this pattern of reactive regulation. 
1 Symbolism 
The major symbolism involved in the 1970s was the influence of illicit drug symbolism, 
the transforming and dehumanising power of steroids and steroids as ‘communist’ drugs. 
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2 Public Opinion 
The point has already been made that there were a number of instances in which the IOC 
showed its concern for public opinion in relation to the issue of the use of performance 
enhancing substances.  One such example was an article from the Sunday Times which was 
reprinted in the IOC bulletin in 1973, criticising the IOC for their lack of steroid testing.23  
Another article printed in the IOC bulletin in 1974 stated: 
On 1st September 1966 at the official reopening session of the Liège Court of Appeal, Mr. 
Jean Constant, Attorney General at the aforesaid court, stated as follows: “The reason I 
have decided to talk to you today about doping is that my official duty requires me — in 
accordance with Napoleon’s edict — ‘to make a speech on a subject suited to the 
occasion.’ Now, while I was writing these lines, the press, radio and television showed 
unceasingly that the ‘subject suited to the occasion’ would at least have the merit of being 
topical.  Day after day, in fact, they took turns in telling the world, in priority over the news 
of the war in Vietnam, that doping was rife among sportsmen.”24  
This demonstrates that in the 1970s the IOC was still well aware of the tide of public 
opinion and that this was understood to be of such significance that it warranted printing 
this article in their journal.  With so many emotional opinions being published on the topic 
it would have been impossible for the IOC not to be aware of public opinion on the topic. 
3 Negative Image for Sport  
No sports official would wish their sport to be associated with such things as illicit drugs, 
superhuman monsters or the plethora of medical problems which had been attributed to 
steroid use.  Furthermore, with the new emphasis on the level playing field and ‘cheating’ 
aspects of doping, there was now an added focus on the impact of steroids on competition.  
For example, the article from the Sunday Times mentioned above included a passage which 
stated that steroids ‘ma[de] a joke of Olympic records in the field events…’. 25 
The 1970s also brought concerns about the impact of the politicalisation of sport which 
negatively impacted on the image of sport.  For the defenders of the amateur code, sport 
was to be played for the joy of it and not for political point scoring.  Although the amateur 
era in Olympic history was fast coming to a close, sports officials still held on to these 
values.  It was pointed out in Chapter Seven that the image of the steroid user clashed with 
the amateur ideal.  Not only was this the case, but the issue of steroids was intrinsically 
linked with the politicalisation of sport through the connection between steroid use and 
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   Michael Bateman, 'The Freaky World of a “Steroid Bomb”' (1973) 68-69(July-August) Olympic Review 262. 
24
  Miss Marie-José Mimiague, 'The Doping Problem in Comparative Penal Law' (1974) 80-81 Bulletin du Comité 
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communism.  The problem that these two factors created for amateur sports is clear in the 
passage below. 
During a recent question-and-answer session on the future of the Olympic movement, 
Monique Berlioux, the secretary of the International Olympic Committee, was asked to 
name the committee’s greatest challenge in the next 20 years.  Challenges, not challenge, 
Mrs Berlioux said: “the growing influence of politics and sport”, she replied, “and the 
manipulation of athletes with drugs and the fabrication of an artificial human being.”26  
It is clear from the above that steroids were perceived by the IOC to create a very negative 
image for sport. 
Although there was an increasing amount of money involved, it was not really until the 
1980s that the Olympic Games became a truly commercial enterprise.27  Thus at this stage, 
the public relations issue was still not related to money so much as a desire to protect the 
image of clean, politically neutral sport.  With the increasing political importance of 
amateur international sport, and the Olympics in particular, it now mattered much more 
which nation the winner represented.  Accordingly, the desire to maintain fair competition 
also increased in importance.  The increasing emphasis on the level playing field argument 
in doping discourse suggests that in the 1970s there was a greater focus on how sporting 
competitions appeared.  Sport needed to be seen as a fair contest between nations and the 
use of steroids potentially prevented that view from flourishing. 
4 Reactive Regulation 
It is evident that public opinion was strongly against steroid use in sport and that the IOC 
was keenly aware of this sentiment.  So strong was the suspicion and concern that the IOC 
and sporting federations were put in a position where politically they needed to ‘do 
something’.  The reaction from the authorities was to include steroids in their drug testing 
protocols and add steroids to their prohibited lists.   
Why is it appropriate to describe such actions as ‘reactive regulation’?  It was nine years 
between the first official recognition of steroids as ‘doping’ by the IOC and their 
operational prohibition.  Moreover, steroids were not added to the IOC Prohibited List 
until sometime after the IOC was criticised for having failed to prohibit them already.  
These facts do not seem to suggest impulsive, reactionary activity on the part of the IOC.  
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   Neil Amdur, 'The Drug Game Threatens International Amateur Sport', The New York Times (New York), 4 
November 1979, S1. 
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   Dick Pound, Inside the Olympics, 2004 (Mississauga: John Wiley and Sons Canada Pty Ltd), Chapter 6, 139ff. 
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However, it must be kept in mind that steroids were first ‘prohibited’ by the IOC in 1967 
and officially added to the list in 1976, long before the official medical opinion concerning 
their efficacy for performance enhancement was changed.  At that stage steroids were 
officially placebos. 
The fact that medical opinion held that steroids were ineffective for enhancing 
performance has been pointed to as evidence of the lack of credibility the medical 
fraternity held in this issue.  Another way of looking at it is that is shows the sheer power 
of public opinion over the IOC and other sports organisations.  Medical opinion was based 
on scientific studies28 while public opinion was created from sensational anecdotal reports.  
And yet the IOC chose to listen to public opinion over medical opinion.29 
The way in which the IOC chose to deal with the issue probably seemed like the natural 
and sensible way to go about it.  They already had regulations, a list of prohibited 
substances, and a drug testing system in place.  It seemed obvious to simply add steroids to 
this system.  But this move did not address the different issues that steroid use involved.  
The system, as it stood, involved in-competition testing.  Steroids were not ‘in-
competition’ drugs; it was possible to discontinue their use before competition but 
maintain the strength gains that had already been achieved through their use.30  By simply 
extending the coverage of in-competition testing to include steroids, there was no way that 
this type of regulation was going to effectively deter steroid use outside competition.  In-
competition testing for steroid use on its own was never going to deter steroid use in sport 
at all.   
This is the point in history at which the issue of doping changed.  No longer were the drugs 
involved short-acting drugs, steroids were the first of the long term, training drugs.  It is 
not surprising that the model adopted for performance enhancing substances in the 1960s, 
when the prohibited substances were primarily ‘illicit’ drugs, was not appropriate for 
steroids.  Illicit drug testing was not concerned with what the subject had taken in the 
weeks and months before the testing took place, except possibly as an indicator of 
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   Whether these studies were reliable and reproducible or not is beside the point here, the fact is that there was at 
least some kind of evidence to support medical opinion while public opinion was based on hear-say and 
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   It could be argued that the IOC was responding merely to health concerns regarding steroids and did not care 
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assumption that the substances might aid athletic performance.  
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addiction to the detected drug.  Steroids were not ‘illicit’, nor were their actions in the 
same category of illicit drugs, since the short term effects of steroids were practically 
irrelevant to the performance issue.  The differences between steroids and the other 
performance enhancing substances should have provided a clear indicator to sports 
officials that the issue of performance enhancing substances in sport was no longer simply 
a part of the illicit drug issue, it was beginning to develop its own particular concerns and 
characteristics which needed to be dealt with from a new perspective. 
There has been much criticism levelled at the IOC for their failure to deal with the ‘new’ 
issues that steroid use brought.  It is clear that the IOC was aware of the difference between 
steroids and other doping substances.  The Dubin commission was particularly scathing in 
their attacks in this regard: 
Despite knowing the fallacy of in-competition testing, as they have for many years, the 
medical commissions of sport organisations such as the IAAF and the IOC have taken no 
steps to make the fallacy more widely known.  By failing to do so they have given the 
impression that their competitions are fair and that their laboratories cannot be fooled.31 
It is easy to be critical of the IOC’s activities in many areas.32  It is possible, however, that 
the decision to adopt in-competition testing for steroids was not a part of a deep conspiracy 
to allow athletes to continue to use steroids in order to maintain the status of their events in 
terms of sporting excellence.  It may have been partly driven by the fact that the IOC’s 
budget for drug testing would not extend to out-of-competition testing at that time.  It may 
also have seemed incongruous to expect athletes to undergo drug testing at any time of the 
year for an ‘amateur’ contest which took place only once every four years.  Additionally, 
there was still confusion over what role the IOC had in anti-doping policy — where the 
IOC’s responsibility ended and the International Federations’ began.  Added to this 
confusion were the loud calls for action by the public.  With all these factors in the mix, it 
is not surprising that the IOC opted to simply extending their existing policy rather than 
initiate a new form of regulation.33  
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Whether the IOC’s activities were motivated by ignorance, practical difficulties or a 
cynical desire to simply look like they were doing something, the fact is that the form of 
regulation chosen was inappropriate for detecting steroid use and thus for deterring the use 
of these substances in athletes.   
In summary, the extension of the system of prohibition and in-competition testing which 
had been established for the IOC’s Prohibited List in 1967 was both premature and 
inappropriate.  The move was premature from a scientific perspective in that there was no 
evidence at the time that steroids did enhance performance and the medical opinion of the 
time held that they were mere placebos.  A more measured response to the issue would 
have been one which was based on good research into the ergogenic potential of the drugs 
and/or the dangers to the health of the athlete.  The symbolism of steroids can explain why 
a form of regulation which was so problematic from either the scientist or lay-person’s 
perspective was adopted and accepted by the public.  The fear generated by the symbolism 
of steroids was so strong that the public demanded action on the part of the IOC.  So 
ingrained was the system of prohibition and drug testing that the natural reaction for the 
IOC was to simply extend this to steroids, despite the fact that this would not deal with the 
issue.  The added advantage of this move was that it would quickly satisfy the public 
craving for action because it would symbolically deal with the issue.  The image of sport 
was at stake and it would not wait for a measured approach.  The quick-fix band-aid 
solution did the job.  At least for a time. 
III THE MAJOR ISSUES IN ANTI-DOPING POLICY AND THE 
REACTIVE REGULATION PATTERN 
Having demonstrated the fact that anti-doping rules were largely reactionary in nature, the 
point has now been reached where it is necessary to consider whether this is problematic or 
not.  In this section a number of the most difficult issues in anti-doping policy today will be 
described and it will be explained how the pattern of reactive regulation has contributed to 
the creation of these difficulties.  
A The Strict Liability Offence 
The strict liability rule in doping has been discussed in Chapters Two and Eight.  It is 
unnecessary to go into detail here except to make the point that the strict liability rule has 
attracted much criticism regarding the justice of the anti-doping rules.  Cases where 
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athletes have been penalised for doping through no real fault of their own give rise to these 
types of criticisms.34  
The role of symbolism in creating this situation has been discussed in Chapter Eight.  The 
only additional point to make here is that the reactive regulation pattern presented above, 
instigated in the 1960s and expanded in the 1970s, meant that the adoption of the strict 
liability offence was a natural part of anti-doping policy since that was the approach taken 
to illicit drug policy as well.   
B Invasion of Privacy 
Another criticism of anti-doping policy relates to the invasion of privacy that drug testing 
represents.  Not only is private information about the athlete revealed through analysis of 
their bodily fluids, but the process of providing a urine sample is both humiliating and 
dehumanising.35  Another incursion into privacy arises from the fact that athletes can be 
called on for drug testing at any time during the night or day.36  The fact that athletes have 
to provide information regarding their whereabouts every day of the year also greatly 
limits their freedom.37   
All of these invasive aspects of anti-doping policy can, again, be traced to the adoption of 
the illicit drug regulatory model.  The problem arises from the fact that the same model has 
been applied to quite different situations.  Whether right or wrong, it seems that there is a 
willingness to subject suspected drug users to humiliating and invasive procedures when 
the information that will be revealed relates to the commission of an offence, i.e. 
possession and use of an illegal substance.  In so far as the substance involved in the 
potential doping case is also an illegal substance, as many on the list are, this is no more 
problematic than in illicit drug policy.  However, there are many other substances on the 
WADA Code Prohibited List which are not subject to the criminal law.  The same level of 
humiliation and violation are not appropriate for the use of drugs such as over-the-counter 
drugs.  And yet no distinction is made between the two types of drugs in anti-doping policy 
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and the same procedures are applied to both situations.  The blame falls squarely on the 
adoption of the illicit drug model of drug testing and its application to circumstances quite 
different to those the model originally targeted. 
C Failure of Drug Testing and Waste of Money 
A number of factors have been blamed for the apparent failure of drug testing, including 
the fact that doping pharmacology is far beyond the science of testing and that, until 
recently, the athletes had enough warning of impending drug testing to hide the traces of 
drug use.  The issue can also be viewed in terms of the adoption of the illicit drug model.  
This model is intrinsically confrontational rather than cooperative:38  authorities try to 
catch athletes using prohibited substances while athletes try to hide their doping practices.  
This sets up an inevitable cat and mouse game which will always lead to a win-lose 
situation.  If another model of regulation had been adopted, akin to the ‘harm-
minimisation’ policy for illicit drugs,39 then drug testing may not exist or, if it did, the 
purpose could be non-punitive.  Non-punitive testing — which could contribute 
constructively to the health of athletes by giving valuable information about their health 
status — would remove the incentive to hide doping and therefore put an end to the eternal 
game of hide and seek. 
A related point is the argument that pouring money into the system of drug testing is a 
waste of money, given the lack of efficacy involved in the process.  A vast majority of 
drug tests are negative.  Whether or not negative drug tests indicate innocence on the part 
of the athlete,40 it can be argued that the money spent on doping tests could be much better 
spent on education, health monitoring and so on.  But because of our commitment to the 
total prohibition model with punitive drug testing, anti-doping without drug testing can 
simply not be imagined.      
D The ‘Fallacy’ of In-Competition Testing and the Problem of Out-of-Competition 
Testing 
As previously discussed, as far as steroids are concerned, in-competition testing is almost 
totally ineffective.  Furthermore, even from the beginning of steroid testing by the IOC it 
                                                
38
    As will be discussed below, there are other possible approaches which are much less confrontational such as the 
suggestion by J Savulescu, B Foddy and M Clayton, 'Why We Should Allow Performance Enhancing Drugs in 
Sport' (2004) 38(6) British Journal of Sports Medicine 666 regarding testing for health. 
39
   For an example of these kinds of arguments see Alex Wodak and Timothy Moore, Modernising Australia's Drug 
Policy, 2002 (Sydney: UNSW Press) generally. 
40
   Charles E Yesalis and Michael S Bahrke, 'Where There is a Will to Gain an Edge, Athletes Find a Way', The New 
York Times (New York), 7 March 2004, SP 10. 
Anti-Doping Policy: Rationale or Rationalisation? Chapter Nine 
 301 
was recognised that in order to effectively test for steroids at the Olympics, a system of 
out-of-competition testing would need to be set up. 41  And yet it was not until the mid 
1980s that this kind of testing was actually instigated by any sports organisation.42  
Criticism has been levelled at the IOC for not introducing these types of tests:  the Dubin 
enquiry characterising it as an intentional misleading of the public.43  Thus, much emphasis 
has been placed on out-of-competition testing as being the only effective way to test for 
steroids.   
However, the concept of out-of-competition testing is not entirely unproblematic.  As 
mentioned above, the requirement for athletes to be constantly available for testing poses a 
large intrusion into the ability of athletes to lead a normal life, since the athlete is 
potentially always ‘on duty’ and ready to go through the humiliating process of drug 
testing.  If the athlete does not comply with the requirements of out-of-competition testing 
they commit an anti-doping offence.44   
Out-of-competition testing is also extremely burdensome in terms of resources for anti-
doping authorities.  Such an expensive programme would need strong evidence to support 
its efficacy.  There is, of course, no such evidence and since there are many other ways 
athletes are able to circumvent testing, out-of-competition testing is unlikely to be the finite 
answer it is presented as.45   
Although potentially more effective than in-competition testing, out-of-competition testing 
may have more negative effects than positive.  The perceived need for out-of-competition 
testing arose from the adoption of the illicit drug model of regulation.  Once an 
inappropriate drug testing model was adopted for steroids — i.e. one designed for 
detecting short-acting drugs — it became clear that this regime would not catch steroid 
use.  The necessity of extending testing beyond the time of competition arose and, along 
with it, the associated problems.  Had anti-doping policy been rethought at the time of 
consideration of the steroid issue, a more appropriate model for dealing with steroids could 
have been introduced.  
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E Unsupervised Use of Drugs with Potentially Dangerous Side Effects 
A number of commentators have pointed out that many of the health dangers associated 
with the use of performance enhancing substances in sport arise from the fact that they are 
used inappropriately and without medical supervision:46  the fear of being sanctioned 
forces athletes to go ‘underground’.  Thus, again, these problems mainly arise from the 
confrontational and punitive approach that came from illicit drug policy.     
F The Politics of Anti-Doping Policy 
There have been a number of commentators who have pointed out the influence of politics 
on the effectiveness of anti-doping policy:47  positive drug tests have been covered up and 
not dealt with according to the rules.48  This is a legitimate argument.  However, if the 
system was not based on the illicit drug model with its punitive and confrontational 
character, there would be much less motivation for such cover-ups to occur.  Furthermore, 
doping is seen in an extremely negative light — largely due to the symbolism of doping.  If 
this was not the case, there would be no perception that public knowledge of the use of 
such substances by sports stars would give sport a negative image, thus removing the need 
to cover up such practices.  Essentially, if doping was not such a powerfully emotional 
issue then the conspiracies and cover-ups would disappear. 
G Destruction of Reputations 
A similar argument can be made for the problem of the destruction of reputations that 
doping allegations cause.  A recent example of this phenomenon is the allegations of drug 
use by Australian swimmer Ian Thorpe.  When these rumours arose, Thorpe publicly 
announced that his reputation had already been tarnished by the leaked information about 
his abnormal testosterone levels.49  This demonstrates the seriousness of doping allegations 
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   Eg John Burge, 'Legalize and Regulate: a Prescription for Reforming Anabolic Steroid Legislation' (1994) 15 
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal 33 and Terry Black and Amelia Pape, 'The Ban on Drugs in 
Sports: The Solution or the Problem?' (1997) 21(1) Journal of Sport and Social Issues 83, 89. 
47
   Eg Voy and Deeter, above n 33; Ferstle, above n 42, 363 and John Hoberman, 'How Drug Testing Fails: The 
Politics of Doping Control' in Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (eds), Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of 
Drugs in the Olympic Movement, 2001 (Champaign: Human Kinetics) 241. 
48
   One example is the initial treatment of the Tunisian swimmer, Oussama Mellouli by his national swimming 
federation.  The Tunisian swimming federation sanctioned him with only a reprimand and a warning after he was 
discovered to have taken a banned stimulant.  This case was appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport and the 
swimmer received an 18 month suspension.  He went on to win the gold medal in the 1500m freestyle event at the 
2008 Beijing Olympic Games:  USA Today, CAS Suspends Tunisian Swimmer Mellouli for 18 Months, Still 
Eligible for Olympics (2007) <http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2007-09-11-3697913355_x.htm> at 8 September 
2008. 
49
   Jacquelin Magnay, 'Thorpe Fights to Save His Name', The Age (Melbourne), 2 April 2007, 1; Jacquelin Magnay, 
'Thorpe: I've Been Tarnished', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 2 April 2007, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/swimming/i-am-not-a-drug-
cheat/2007/04/01/1175366083929.html?s_cid=rss_smh#>, at 13 September 2008.  It was rumoured that Thorpe 
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and the sensationalism attached.  Even when such allegations are baseless, the effect on an 
athlete’s reputation can be long-lasting and extremely negative.  Again, these problems 
largely arise from the regulatory model — the cops and robbers approach to anti-doping 
policy.  Any news of a potential doping case is now seen as a scandal and therefore a great 
news story.  If doping was not seen in the same light as illicit drugs it is doubtful whether 
such sensationalism would attach to these practices.   
IV THE ULTIMATE EFFECTS OF SYMBOLISM 
So far a number of issues in anti-doping policy have been raised, both theoretical (Chapter 
Eight) and operational (this chapter) which can be characterised as a direct result of the 
effects of symbolism.  In Chapter Eight the effects of symbolism were direct; in this 
chapter the focus has been on the indirect effects of doping symbolism through the reactive 
regulation pattern.  
The ultimate effects of symbolism can be summarised as creating a system which: 
• Involves an unclear definition of ‘doping’:  the way in which we talk of doping is 
very different to the way in which we punish it and there are no clear guidelines as 
to which substances and practices should constitute ‘doping’.  
• Lacks a clear rationale for its existence:  it is not clear why we prohibit doping. 
• Uses a system of strict liability which punishes athletes for inadvertent doping even 
when there was no performance enhancement gained. 
• Subjects the athlete to humiliating and invasive procedures and pours resources into 
drug testing procedures which are not effectively deterring the use of performance 
enhancing substances in sport. 
• Requires athletes to be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for drug testing. 
• Produces an environment in which corruption and cover ups flourish and 
conspiracy theories abound. 
• Produces public scandals when athletes are accused of doping. 
                                                                                                                                              
considered legal action in response but this did not eventuate:  'Legal Action Over Drug Claim ', Geelong 
Advertiser (Geelong), 25 June 2007, 1.  John Marshall and Amy Catherine Hale, 'Will The New WADA Code 
Plug All the Gaps?  Will There Be By-Catch?' (2008) 1-2 The International Sports Law Journal 37, 39, claim that 
with the introduction of the concept of the ‘atypical finding’ in the revised WADA Code such information leaks 
are less likely.  Nevertheless, any allegations that are made will continue to be extremely damaging. 
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By far the most significant effect of symbolism is the inappropriate application of a 
regulatory model designed to deal with illicit recreational drug use.  Sports officials did not 
come at the issue of ‘drug use’ in sport afresh and re-invent the wheel.  Instead they 
adapted a model that they were already familiar with in the illicit drug model.  It is not 
surprising that this would be the model taken on, nor that the model appeared acceptable.  
Since public opinion relating to the use of the ergogenic substances was so inextricably 
tied in with illicit drug symbolism, adoption of a regulatory form that the public was 
familiar with and were comfortable applying to illicit drugs, would be widely acceptable.  
The symbolic influence of illicit drugs was met by the application of a regulatory model 
with similar symbolism attached. 
The inappropriateness of the system becomes clear when steroids are considered.  Day-of-
competition testing was never going to detect or deter with steroid use since they were 
used primarily in training in the months before competition started.  The IOC and medical 
experts were aware of this as early as the 1960s and yet no system was developed to deal 
with this problem.  Instead the band-aid solution of the 1960s was stretched to cover the 
new and very different wound.  It is no wonder that steroid testing has very rarely picked 
up steroid use by athletes, since, until recently, authorities were essentially testing at the 
wrong time.  Given that the inadequacies of such testing were clear even before it was 
instituted, the question does arise as to whether drug testing was ever intended to 
adequately deter steroid use at all.  The fact that the adoption of these tests ever ‘fooled’ 
the public into thinking that the IOC and other organisations were dealing with the problem 
can be attributed to the symbolism of steroids:  they were still viewed as illicit drugs, so 
applying illicit drug testing seemed an appropriate step to deal with the issue.  The 
subsequent introduction of out-of-competition testing,50 although a positive step, has 
problems of its own and simply builds on the same model of illicit drug symbolism 
(instead of responding to the issues presented by the modern doping agents).  As long as a 
system designed for an entirely different type of situation is used, the authorities will 
always be a few steps behind the doping athlete.  The final question, therefore, is whether 
there is a system which is more appropriate to deal with the problem of doping. 
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  Out-of-competition testing is now part of the WADA Code, Art 5.1.1. 
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V BEYOND SYMBOLISM: IS THERE A BETTER WAY? 
In considering whether there is better approach, the first point to consider is what exactly 
‘better’ means.  ‘Better’ in this context could mean ‘more rational or logical’, ‘more 
effective’ or ‘fulfilling the purposes more completely.’   
A If ‘Better’ Equals ‘Rational’ 
There is little doubt that it would be possible to have a more rational system of dealing 
with performance enhancing substances in sport.  In fact, a number of alternative systems 
have been suggested which correspond more closely with the stated rationales of anti-
doping policy.  One option is having no regulation at all and allowing unlimited access to 
any and all performance enhancing substances — mostly in combination with harm 
reduction strategies.51  It is claimed that the advantages of this approach is that athletes 
would then have equal access to such substances and that this would level the playing field.  
Since performance enhancing substances are relatively inexpensive forms of performance 
enhancers (or would be if they were not prohibited), the difference between rich and poor 
athletes would be much less significant.52  Additionally, it is thought that free access to 
legal drugs would ensure that athletes used these substances under medical supervision, 
thus making the use of these substances much less dangerous.  If the effect of allowing free 
access to the prohibited substance is as predicted, then it would, indeed, be a more rational 
system.  It would take away the differential access issue and also allow the health of the 
athlete to be monitored and maintained, dealing with both the level playing field and the 
health issue in doping. 
An associated suggestion for alternative regulation is that proposed by Savulescu, Foddy 
and Clayton.53  These authors argue that the level playing field justification for anti-doping 
policy is inconsistent with the very nature of elite sport which rests on the inequalities of 
genetics and training.  They claim that the only legitimate concern is the health of the 
athlete.  They suggest that the best way to ensure the health of the athlete is by checking 
health parameters rather than the presence of specific substances.  If an athlete fails any of 
the medical checks then they would not be allowed to compete.  Something similar has 
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   Robert Dawson, 'How Not to Stop the Cheats' (2003) 4 October(2415) New Scientist 23, Black and Pape, above n 
46, and Anthony Millar, 'Licit Steroid Use - Hope for the Future' (1994) 28(2) British Journal of Sports Medicine 
79 for example. 
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   This, of course, is based on the assumption that prohibited substances do, in fact, work to improve athletic 
performance:  Savulescu, Foddy and Clayton, above n 38; Terry Black, 'Does the Ban on Drugs in Sport Improve 
Societal Welfare?' (1996) 31 International Review for Sociology of Sport 367.   
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been used in the sport of cycling, where competitors are not permitted to participate if their 
PVC level — packed cell volume which reflects the concentration of red blood cells — is 
higher than 0.5.54 
Medical checks are not an entirely new idea.  The marathon rules of the Stockholm 
Olympic Games in 1912 stated that all competitors had to have a medical certificate in 
order to compete in the event.55  The suggested system is also akin to pre-employment 
medical checks which are extremely common in the employment setting.  Given the 
professional status of many athletes now, this seems an appropriate way of dealing with the 
issue.  It is a more rational approach in that it addresses the health issue in a practical way 
by directly checking on the athlete’s health parameters rather than assuming that testing 
will indirectly affect the health of the athlete and that a prohibition on performance 
enhancing substances will ultimately ensure their health. 
This appears to be the extent of suggestions in the literature as to alternative forms of 
regulation which would be a ‘better’ way to deal with the issue of performance enhancing 
substances in sport.  There are other possibilities though, a couple of examples of which 
are explored below. 
To be more appropriate than the present one, a system would need to include responses to 
the various substances and methods based on sound scientific research, rather than the 
associated symbolism.  The process by which decision making is made in policy formation 
is therefore significant.  The most rational approach would be to carry out well-designed 
studies on the effects and side effects of the various substances.  Decision making about 
what is and what is not doping would then be based on accurate information rather than 
anecdotes.56  It is quite possible that the information revealed from such studies could 
determine how each substance should be treated; if no ergogenic or dangerous health 
effects are found, then the use of the substance could be permitted.  If a certain level of 
ergogenic effect is found but no health risk, then the substance could be allowed up to a 
certain concentration.   
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   Savulescu, et al, above n 38, 667. 
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   Lord  Desborough, The Olympic Games of Stockholm 1912 (1912) 
 <http://www.la84foundation.org/6oic/OfficialReports/1912/1912.pdf> at 13 September 2008. 
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As was explored in Chapter Three, one of the main problems with the anti-doping system 
is the lack of consistency in the rationales.  This inconsistency, and the number of different 
rationales which have been promoted, have led to the situation where no single rationale 
covers all the substances on the prohibited lists.  For example, the argument that the anti-
doping rules are based on a desire to protect the level playing field fails to adequately 
cover some substances included on these lists which are not performance enhancing, 
marijuana being an obvious example.  And the argument that anti-doping policy is based 
on a desire to protect the health of the athlete does not adequately account for the 
prohibition of seemingly innocuous substances such as pseudoephedrine and caffeine, 
which pose no more risk to athletes than they do to ordinary people.   
An alternative system, not yet considered in the literature, would aim to overcome this 
rational/ethical problem by creating a layered system where prohibited substances are 
separated on the basis for their inclusion on a prohibited list:  either they are dangerous, 
unfair, both or neither.  The treatment of each category could be tailored accordingly.  
Dangerous substances could be controlled by way of health testing using a variant on the 
suggestion made by Savelescu et al.57  If the athlete does not pass these health tests then 
they are not fit to participate and they would be excluded from competition.  There would 
be need be no further implications, since the aim is not to punish but to protect.  If, by the 
time of the next competition, the athlete is able to pass the health checks then they are free 
to participate since they are fit for competition.   
The class comprising ‘unfair’ substances could be the subject of more punitive sanctions.58  
If there is evidence of the use of a prohibited performance enhancing substance — through 
drug testing or other means — and there was either intent or performance effect, then the 
athlete would be excluded from competition.  If there is no evidence of effect, and it is an 
inadvertent doping situation, then no further sanction need attach to the doping incident.  
Further sanctions could be applied if there is also evidence of intent to ‘cheat’.   
This kind of layered system may be more burdensome for the anti-doping authority to 
prove and would therefore be of questionable workability, but it would overcome some of 
the problems with the present system.  Furthermore, such graded regulatory schemes have 
been employed before in relation to drugs; this is the basis of the various ‘schedules’ in the 
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   It could be more specifically related to the substances on the particular list by the tests correlating with one 
identifiable side effect of each drug on the list 
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   This suggestion assumes that the level playing field argument for a total prohibition on performance enhancing 
substances in sport, considered in Chapter Three, has some legitimacy.  As discussed in Chapter Three, this 
argument has some significant flaws but these will be put to side at this point for the sake of the argument.  
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old Poisons Act model where substances are categorised into different schedules and 
varying regulations apply to these schedules accordingly.59 
These are just two suggestions as to ways in which the system could be made more 
rational.  It is not necessarily being claimed here that all, or even any, of these systems are 
practically or logistically possible, just that these kinds of systems would be more rational. 
B If ‘Better’ Means ‘Effective’ 
‘Better’ could also mean ‘effective’ or ‘fulfilling the purposes more fully’.  It has been 
argued that the present system of drug testing is ineffective, no more than ‘sham’.  In fact 
some argue that rather than decrease the use of performance enhancing substances the 
present system encourages such use — prohibited lists serving as a virtual shopping list for 
athletes by identifying certain substances as ergogenic.60  When considering how anti-
doping policy could be made more effective, what immediately springs to mind is the usual 
arguments about better funding,61 more and better drug testing,62 more education 
programmes63 and changes to the WADA Code Prohibited List64 — to either exclude or 
include substances which are deemed inappropriate.65  It is possible that any and all of 
these suggestions could help to detect more incidents of performance enhancing substances 
and the methods athletes use and even deter the use of such substances in sport.   
Whether these changes would make for a more ‘effective’ policy depends on how the 
purpose or intended result of anti-doping policy is defined.  If the purpose is to catch more 
athletes using prohibited substances, then more and better tests might achieve that.  If the 
purpose is to deter the use of such substances, then more and better tests might indirectly 
achieve that.  Alternatively these tests may result in athletes changing to new, undetectable 
drugs.  If the purpose is to protect the image of sport, then probably the most effective way 
of doing this is not to pour resources into detection.  It would be better to pour resources 
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   See Terry Carney, 'The History of Australian Drug Laws' (1981) 7 Monash University Law Review 165, 182 for 
more details.  In some ways the revised WADA Code has done this to some extent in the Specified Substances 
provision (Art 10.3) since some substances will be subject to these provisions and some will not.  
60
   Michael Bamberger and Don Yaeger, 'Over th Edge: Aware that Drug Testing is a Sham, Athletes to Rely More 
than Ever on Banned Performancers' (1997) 86(15) Sports Illustrated 60. 
61
   Eg Ferstle, above n 42, 375. 
62
   Eg Ibid; Ryan Connolly, 'Balancing the Justices in Anti-Doping Law: the Need to Ensure Fair Athletic 
Competition Through Effective Anti-Doping Programs vs The Protection of Rights of Accused Athletes' (2006) 
5(Spring) Virginia Sports and Entertainment Law Journal 161, 198-199 and Voy and Deeter, above n 33, 89. 
63
   Eg Srikumaran Melethil, 'Making the WADA Prohibited List: Show me the Data' (2005) 50 Saint Louis 
University Law Journal 75, 89 and Robert T Dawson, 'The War on Drugs in Sport' (2000) 1 Bio Med Central 
News and Views 3. 
64
   So that it reflects evidence-based research for example:  David Mottram, 'Does the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) List Need Updating?' (1999) 27(1) Sports Medicine 1, 8 and Melethil, above n 63, 75. 
65
   Ibid. 
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into areas other than drug detection and to ensure that there was no publication of instances 
of prohibited substance use.  The image of sport is created by public knowledge, therefore 
if the single desire is to protect that image, public knowledge of doping should be limited.  
If the purpose is to protect the athlete, then the health checks suggested above would be a 
good starting point. 
And so the same problem arises again.  The ultimate purpose of anti-doping policy is not 
clear.  It may be to stop the use of prohibited substances but for what purpose?  Health?  
Fairness?  Morality?  Preserving natural competition?  Moreover, the reason for the lack of 
clarity regarding the ultimate purpose of anti-doping policy is that it is based on the need to 
respond to public fears spawned from the symbolism associated with various doping 
substances.   
When this is kept in mind, the answer to the question of whether there is a better way 
becomes clearer.  The answer is probably ‘no.’  For the system that we have in place has 
developed to respond to the symbolism of doping and it obviously does so effectively.  The 
public seem to accept that the current system is dealing with the issue of performance 
enhancing substances in sport, or at least is capable of dealing with the problem were 
enough resources and support available.  The public acceptance of the present anti-doping 
system appears to provide an answer to why the drafters of anti-doping policies have 
continued to persist with strategies which experts agree do not effectively deter the use of 
performance enhancing substances in sport.  This is particularly true of in-competition and 
announced drug testing but also relates to the question of drug testing itself.  
This thesis has argued that the issue of drug use in sport is a highly symbolic one.  A 
symbolic problem needs a symbolic solution.  In drug testing such a solution is to be 
found.  Drug testing has a powerful symbolism of its own:  it represents the power of 
‘good’ science — the drug testers — contrasted with the power of ‘bad’ science — the 
dopers.  No other way of dealing with the issue has the same elements so suited to dealing 
with the visual imagery of drug use.  The public believe in drug testing just as they believe 
in the power of performance enhancing substances.   
The system therefore seems to have effectively dealt with the fears of the public about the 
use of these substances in sport.  If the purpose of anti-doping policy is to convince the 
public that the issue is being dealt with, then the present system seems to be highly 
effective.  
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Is there a better system?  There are a number of more rational systems, fairer systems and 
more logical systems but there is probably no more effective system from the symbolic 
viewpoint. 
VI CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE OF ANTI-DOPING 
POLICY 
Public opinion has always been, and continues to be, fundamentally important in anti-
doping policy.  Although often not made explicit, many of the pivotal decisions in anti-
doping policy have come about largely as a response to public outcries over practices in 
sport which offend public sentiment.  The focus of this thesis has been on the main driver 
of public opinion in doping:  symbolism.     
Manderson has argued:  ‘I do not wish to argue for a moment that the symbolic association 
…was the sole reason for the development of drug prohibition; only that symbolic meaning 
and association is an important element in accounting for social change’.66  Similarly, I am 
not claiming that symbolism is the sole reason for the development of anti-doping policy, 
merely that it is an important element in understanding anti-doping history.  And focussing 
on the symbolic meaning of performance enhancing substances is by no means denying 
that throughout the history of anti-doping efforts there have been many well-intentioned 
stakeholders who have been motivated by the health of the athlete or the perceived need 
for moral reform.  Focussing on the symbolism of doping agents equally does not deny the 
serious medical consequences that some doping agents have.  Symbolism, however, 
provides the missing key to why this particular danger in sport has been viewed as so 
unacceptable while other dangers are overlooked or even embraced by the sports-watching 
public as adding to the spectacle of modern sport. 
A The Thesis Argument 
The thesis began by identifying a number of key issues in anti-doping policy which remain 
ambiguous, unacceptable or puzzling.  It was argued that, although on the surface modern 
anti-doping policy appears to be settled and universally acceptable, the surface appearance 
is deceiving.  Anti-doping policy is, and always has been, far from unproblematic; even the 
most basic issues are questionable.  In Chapter Four it was argued that the explanation for 
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both the confusion that exists in anti-doping policy and the development of the policy itself 
was to be found in non-rational factors such as the role of public opinion.  Evidence was 
there provided of the importance of public opinion in the workings of the IOC.  Chapter 
Four posed the question of what drove public opinion and, drawing a parallel with the 
work of Desmond Manderson in the field of illicit drug policy, the task of the thesis was 
set up:  to consider the role of symbolism in the development of anti-doping policy.   
The next Part of the thesis provided a symbolic analysis of the history of anti-doping 
policy in three significant time periods:  the 1920s/1930s, the 1960s and the 1970s.  
Although the analysis proved very complex, three aspects of the symbolism of doping were 
identified:  the power of drugs, links with illicit drugs, and symbolism associated with 
specific substances such as amphetamines and steroids.  
Chapter Eight brought the discussion back to the ambiguities of anti-doping policy and 
demonstrated how the symbolism identified in Chapters Five to Seven had worked to 
produce the confusion in anti-doping policy.  It was argued there that the confusion arises 
mainly because anti-doping policy has been largely driven by public opinion generated by 
symbolism.  The definition of doping is confused because whether a substance is deemed 
to be a doping agent will depend on a number of symbols working together to produce 
public revulsion.  Similarly, it is not clear why doping should be prohibited because this, 
too, has been highly influenced by the symbolism of doping agents rather than rational 
argument.  
The diagram of reactive regulation67 presents a fuller explanation of why performance 
enhancing substances have been prohibited.  As anti-doping policy developed, this pattern 
of reactive regulation was repeated in each era.  In the 1920s and 1960s, that pattern led to 
the adoption of an illicit drug model of regulation.  In the 1970s that model was expanded 
to cover steroids, despite the fact that the system was not able to effectively deal with the 
new generation of performance enhancing substances, the training drugs.  In the 1970s 
anti-doping policy faced a cross road, new issues arose but no new ways of dealing with 
the problem were adopted.  The chance was missed.  As steroid use increased and more 
‘training drugs’ arrived on the scene, it became increasingly clear that the system was not 
effectively deterring use of these substances.  Problems like this provided an opportunity to 
head back to the drawing board and come up with a better system of dealing with these 
issues.  Instead, the system in which so much had been invested, was, again, extended to 
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begin out-of-competition testing where the athlete was required to be prepared for testing 
at any time of the year.  The problems of privacy and limits on freedom which this kind of 
approach imposes on athletes have been largely swept aside.  Why did the IOC and other 
sports organisations ‘get away’ with such an ineffective system?  Because steroids ‘looked’ 
like illicit drugs, an illicit drug model appeared to present an adequate solution.  This has 
never been the case, but drug testing has powerful symbolism of its own and seems to 
assuage the fears of the public. 
The next part of this chapter considered the question:  so what?  Does it matter that the 
regulatory system for anti-doping was largely brought about by a reaction to the 
symbolism of doping?  In this particular situation it has been shown that it does matter, for 
the reactive pattern of regulation has led to a number of significant operational difficulties 
in anti-doping policy.  From the very beginning, the adoption of the illicit drug model of 
regulation was questionable.  In the 1970s its application to steroids clearly demonstrated 
its insufficiencies.  Those inadequacies persist today.   
Amphetamines and steroids have been chosen for this analysis because they epitomise the 
doping debate of their particular era.  It has been argued here that the major reason for the 
prohibition of performance enhancing substances in sport is the public response to the 
symbolism of these substances.  The same explanation can be given for why the 
prohibition on performance enhancing substances has continually attracted so much public 
and government support, despite the lack of consistent, ethically defensible, rationales to 
justify it.  For the passions which gave rise to the initial prohibition have been continually 
reinforced throughout the history of anti-doping efforts.  Moreover, as new performance 
enhancing substances have come into vogue, new layers of symbolism have been added to 
the mix.  The use of EPO (erythropoietin) or hGH (human growth hormone) or THG 
(tetrahydrogestrinone), and even gene doping, all have their own specific symbolism 
attached.68     
Although this thesis does not consider in detail the symbolism surrounding each of these 
substances, it should be pointed out that since the development of steroids most new 
doping agents can be classified as training drugs rather than the short-acting substances 
which the drug testing system was originally established to deal with.  EPO, hGH and the 
designer steroids are just three examples of substances which are utilised for their long-
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term effects rather than their immediate effects at the time of competition.69  Therefore, the 
arguments presented here about the effect of symbolism in applying an inappropriate 
model to the new problem of training drugs also apply to these substances.  
The final section of the thesis asked the question of whether there is a better way to 
regulate doping.  Is it possible to move beyond symbolism to a more rational way of 
regulating the use of performance enhancing substances in sport?  Although a number of 
possible regulatory strategies exist which would provide a more rational response to the 
problem, the point was made that this does not necessarily make these strategies better.  It 
was concluded that if the term ‘better’ means more effective or better at fulfilling the 
purposes of anti-doping policy, then it is doubtful that a ‘better’ system could be 
discovered.  This is because the present system provides the appearance of dealing quite 
adequately with the fears the public hold about the use of performance enhancing 
substances in sport and thus adequately addresses the symbolic significance of doping and 
doping substances/practices.   
1 The Future of Anti-Doping Policy 
Having come to this conclusion it is now possible to make some comments about how 
symbolism and the pattern of reactive regulation might affect the future of anti-doping 
policy.  There are two significant aspects here:  the apparent swing towards the use of other 
kinds of evidence in proving doping and the potential of gene doping.   
In the last decade there appears to have been a subtle change in detection and enforcement 
methods.  Not only is there an increased involvement of national law enforcement bodies 
but there is also a greater emphasis on proving doping through the ‘non-analytical 
positive’.  This evidence, which is basically anything other than a positive drug test, has 
been used in the Bay Area Laboratory Co-operative (BALCO, discussed in Chapter Two) 
investigation and there are indications that anti-doping authorities are now beginning to 
focus more on this kind of evidence than in the past.70  
This, however, does not mean that drug testing is now a thing of the past.  At this point in 
time, the emphasis seems shared between drug testing and other forms of proof.  The 
question therefore arises:  to what extent will non-analytical positives displace the 
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traditional form of detection?  If anti-doping policy is largely driven by symbolism, then 
the symbolism of drug testing must be compared to the symbolism of non-analytical 
evidence.  We have seen that illicit drug style testing is a highly symbolic, and therefore 
aesthetically acceptable, form of detection for a problem which has always been linked to 
illicit drug use.  It is questionable whether other ways of detecting doping are symbolic 
enough, or involve the right kind of symbolism, to be perceived as equally useful in 
dealing with the issue.  The use of law enforcement bodies and the images of drug-bust 
type raids seen in recent years in the Tour de France, and the actions of Australian 
Customs officials in catching Chinese swimmers with growth hormone in 1998, certainly 
all have the right imagery associated with them.  Manderson says this of drug raids in the 
illicit drug context: 
Consider the strange ritual, the display by police or customs officers in drug seizures.  
Nothing could be more futile than the parade of a boatload of cannabis or a few kilograms 
of heroin secreted in condoms.  But what if the point of these displays is not to destroy but 
to heighten our anxiety?  The televised drug haul, though trivial in terms of actual law 
enforcement, offers us physical proof of the existence of this threat, and of its evil power in 
the world. 71 
However, given the reaction to the use of non-analytical evidence in the BALCO 
investigation as outlined in Chapter Two, it appears that there is a long way to go before 
the non-analytical proof has anywhere near the appropriate level of symbolic significance 
to ‘effectively’ replace drug testing. 
The second major issue facing anti-doping policy today is the problem of gene doping or 
genetic manipulation of athletes.  Gene doping is a new technology which has the potential 
to be, although probably has not yet been, applied to athletic performance.72  There are 
many forms of genetic research which could have potential impact on athletic 
performance73 but some of the most obvious involve similar physiological mechanisms to 
the use of EPO or hGH:  
                                                
71
   Desmond Manderson, 'Bewitched by the Fear of Possession', Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 2 April 
2004, 5. 
72
   Although Stephen DR Harridge and Christiana P Velloso, 'Gene Doping' (2008) 44 Essays in Biochemistry 125, 
136 state that it is unknown whether gene doping works at this stage, Wells argues that rumours about athletes 
already using gene technology are far from reality:  DJ Wells, 'Gene Doping: the Hype and the Reality' (2008) 
154 British Journal of Pharmacology 623, 626, 629.   
73
   For a detailed discussion of genetic modification in athletes see Andy Miah, Genetically Modified Athletes: 
Biomedical Ethics, Gene Doping and Sport, 2004 (New York: Routledge); Andy Miah, 'Gene-Doping: Sport, 
Values and Bioethics' in J. Glasa (ed), The Ethics of Human Genetics, 2003 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe) 171, 
172-173, Harridge and Velloso, above n 72, 807.  Laura provides a full account of the history of the development 
of genetic engineering from a sports doping perspective:  Ronald Larura, 'The Doping Problem in Sport: from 
Drugs to Genetic Engineering' in Saxon W White and Ronald S Laura (eds), Drug Controversies in Sport, 1991 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin), 90.  
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Gene doping really is the next step in the potential armoury of the athlete who wishes to 
enhance their performance, from taking drugs or substances such as steroids or things like 
Erythropoietin, or human growth factor, and that’s simply replacing that procedure with one 
where they get the extra growth hormone or the EPO into their system by some sort of genetic 
method, or actually putting it into their body so that genetically their body is programmed to 
reproduce itself.  And of course the advantage of that is that there are no other factors 
involved that can then be detected by some sort of urine or blood test.74  
This is often done by way of a one-off injection of a virus carrier.75 
There has been some interest in the issue by sports officials to date, with a number of 
conferences being held in the last few years to discuss it.  As Miah points out, the IOC and 
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) so far have treated the issue very much akin to 
doping; Miah claims that WADA has been ‘overly focussed upon the ‘doping-like’ 
comparison.’76  Accordingly, under the 2008 WADA Code Prohibited List, gene doping is a 
prohibited activity where its use is non-therapeutic.77  However, at present no testing is 
available for gene doping and it appears unlikely that there will be any effective test in the 
near future.78  This is one of the major issues that anti-doping authorities will face with 
gene doping.  Furthermore, gene doping, despite the fact that in many ways it can mimic 
the action of already known doping agents, is very different to all previous doping 
substances and methods.  One significant difference for the purposes of this argument is 
that gene doping can involve only one treatment but can still have long term effects.  The 
one-off application is obviously not on the day of the competition but some time previous 
to competition.  Thus gene doping may have some common traits with the 1960s doping 
agents in that it involves one-off application while also sharing certain characteristics with 
steroids in that the effect would be a long term (training) one.   
Like steroids in the 1970s, gene doping provides another opportunity for anti-doping 
officials to go back to the drawing board and consider the issue of performance enhancing 
substances and methods in sport afresh.  In order to deal appropriately and adequately with 
the issue of gene doping, there appears to be a need for a completely new approach.  But 
will this happen?  The history of anti-doping policy suggests that it may not:  steroids also 
presented that opportunity but it was not taken advantage of.  However, like all the other 
                                                
74
   Radio National, Sports Factor: Gene Doping (2001) 
 <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/8.30/sportsf/stories/s435073.htm> at 14 July 2008. 
75
  Wells, above n 72, 624. 
76
   Andy Miah, 'Gene-Doping: Sport, Values and Bioethics' in J. Glasa (ed), The Ethics of Human Genetics, 2003 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe) 171, 177. 
77
   WADA Code 2008 Prohibited List, Article M3. 
78
  Harridge and Velloso, above n 72, 136 argue that a test will be very difficult to develop.  For the latest 
developments in this regard see Anna Baoutina, Ian A Alexander, John E J Rasko, Kerry R Emsile, 'Developing 
Strategies for Detection of Gene Doping' (2008) 10 Journal of Genetic Medicine 3. 
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drugs and methods which went before, whether gene doping is appropriately dealt with 
will depend largely on how the issue is constructed in public debate and the symbolism 
which becomes attached to it.  We saw in Chapter Seven that although steroids were not 
illicit drugs, they were seen as (and eventually became) such.  Similarly, gene doping is 
very different to illicit recreational drug use.  Given the past history of symbolism in 
doping, it is probable that it still may be constructed as part of the same issue:  the 
symbolism of doping may adapt to cover this totally new development.  If that happens, 
then there may well be no real change in the present approach, just minor adaptations to 
maintain the appearance of an adequate response.  If, however, gene doping proves to be 
significantly different to other forms of doping, this would make the application of illicit 
drug symbolism unworkable.  In that case, a major change in approach could be coming.79 
2 Concluding Remarks: The Future 
Anti-doping policy is fraught with confusion and ambiguity, even in the most basic and 
fundamental issues.  To look at anti-doping policy today, with its universal code and a 
level of governmental agreement and cooperation not often seen, it is easy to assume that 
no such problems exist.  The degree of consensus is largely a result of unity in public 
opinion regarding the issue of performance enhancing substances in sport.  This unity of 
public opinion is, in turn, largely a result of the power of symbolism in doping discourse.   
Whether this calm surface of consensus will remain in the face of new issues such as gene 
doping will very much depend on the way in which the symbolism of gene doping plays 
out.  One thing is certain:  symbolism will continue to play a key role in the development 
of anti-doping policy and, as long as it does, the regulation of performance enhancing 
substances and methods in sport will continue to be of a reactive nature. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
79
   If Miah, above n 76, is correct, then it appears that WADA and the IOC are already constructing the issue in 
familiar terms by focusing on the comparisons to traditional forms of doping. 
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EPILOGUE 
In the name of all competitors, I promise that we shall take part in these Olympic Games, 
respecting and abiding by the rules that govern them, in the true spirit of sportsmanship, for 
the glory of sport and the honour of our teams, committing ourselves to a sport without 
doping and without drugs.1  
 
As millions of people around the world sit and watch the representative athlete take the 
Olympic oath to uphold the ideal of doping and drug-free sport, the person at home on the 
couch thinks that the issue is clear-cut.  Doping is clearly wrong.  It is cheating.  It is a 
fundamental moral issue.  Anti-doping policy therefore seems a rational policy based on 
the issues surrounding unacceptable performance enhancement in sport.   
This thesis has shown that anti-doping policy is far from rational and that the rationales 
presented for anti-doping policy cannot adequately explain why we prohibit the use of 
performance enhancing substances in sport.  In fact, far from being a cogent policy 
responding to a clear moral issue, anti-doping policy is fraught with inconsistency and 
irrationality.  The reason:  anti-doping policy is based on something much more instinctive 
than rational argument.  Our gut feeling of horror at images of doping in sport is based 
largely on the symbolism associated with doping and doping agents.  Anti-doping policy is 
really a response to these gut instincts.   
Rationale or rationalisation?  Most certainly modern anti-doping policy is a rationalisation.  
 
                                                
1
   International Olympic Committee, Sport and the Olympic Games: Symbols and Emblems 
<http://www.olympic.org/uk/utilities/faq_detail_uk.asp?rdo_cat=10_39_0> at 3 August 2008. 
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